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This thesis takes a global approach to analyzing, discussing and critiquing the 
effectiveness of product liability law in Europe. The thesis approaches the study of 
European product liability law beyond the main product liability instruments 
themselves. It first offers a purely legal analysis, based on the content, effects and 
judicial interpretation of the European product liability directive and on the procedural 
context in which it is framed. Second, it analyzes the directive’s effects on accident 
deterrence, examining the interaction between Europe's ex post liability laws and ex 
ante safety regulations from theoretical as well as practical perspectives. Third, the 
thesis analyzes the effectiveness of ex post liability as a mechanism for compensating 
the victims of product-related accidents in Europe. This last issue of victim 
compensation reaches beyond tort law to include alternative sources of compensation, 
such as public and private insurance. Social insurance systems, in particular, arise as 
the major mechanism of compensation in Europe, and for this reason the 
compensation of product-related accident victims proves to be one of the issues that 
differentiates the role, development and effectiveness of product liability law in 
Europe from the U.S. experience.  
Using the European product liability directive as the starting point and focus of 
analysis, this thesis contributes to the literature by shifting the analysis from the 
product liability directive itself to the more general question of product regulation in 
Europe.  
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is a journey through European product liability law. Starting 
with the European law and the U.S. sources on which it has drawn, it analyzes and 
discusses the historical, legal, and economic contexts that have conditioned the effects 
and performance of product liability in Europe. The dissertation then examines the 
interaction of ex post product liability laws with ex ante product safety laws and with 
alternative mechanisms for compensating victims of product-related accidents, and it uses 
this global perspective to suggest ways in which the effectiveness and performance of 
European product liability law could be improved. 
In 1985 European authorities adopted a product liability directive1 with the goal 
of harmonizing product liability law in Europe. Following the product liability regime in 
force at the time in the United States, the product liability directive introduced for the 
first time in Europe a strict liability regime for products.2 Despite the remarkable formal 
similarities between the product liability directive and U.S. product liability law in force 
at the time,3 the development, effects, and impact of the European and U.S. regimes have 
been significantly different from the perspective of accident deterrence and victim’s 
compensation.4 Compared to the experience of the United States, the strict liability rule 
for products has had much less of an impact in Europe.5
                                                 
1 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 On The Approximation of The Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Of The Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products O. J. L 210, 
07/08/1985 P. 0029 – 0033. 
 While data on European product 
2 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An Analysis 
Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish Harmonization And 
Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1004 (1994) noting that the introduction of strict 
product liability in Europe and in the United States was the result of a similar evolution. See also Jane 
Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1230 (2002) noting that the 
adoption of the product liability directive was the result of social and political considerations. 
3 During the 1990s, U.S. product liability moved from strict liability to negligence-based liability. This 
evolution culminated with the 1998 the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 2. 
4 Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 346 (2000). 
5 See Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva 
Papers 31, 304–313, 305 (2006): Silva, F. & Cavaliere, Alberto, The Economic Impact of Product Liability: 
  2 
litigation is limited,6 over twenty years after the adoption of the product liability 
directive, it appears that Europe has not experienced the type of significant increase in 
product liability cases and judgments that the United States experienced7 and that damage 
awards remain significantly lower in Europe than in the United States.8 Moreover, 
litigation seems to continue to play different roles in U.S. and European society, and fears 
that the product liability directive would import a “litigation culture”9 into Europe do not 
appear to have been borne out.10
                                                                                                                                                 
Lessons from the US and the EU Experience, in G. Galli and J. Pelkmans (Eds.), REGULATORY REFORM 
AND COMPETITIVENESS IN EUROPE, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 299-305 (2000) discussing the often-
called ‘product laibility crisis’ in the U.S. during the 80s. See also Mark A. Geistfeld, Products liability, 
New York University School Of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper NO. 09-19 
(2009). 
 
6 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 305 (2006) including an approximation to the number of product liability cases in the 
different member states. 
7 The level of product liability litigation in the United States has been significantly different and higher than 
in Europe. See also Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. 
Law, An Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1003-1004 (1994) noting the 
role of litigation in European product liability.. 
8 See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, edited by Duncan Fairgrieve, Cambridge, 295 (2005) noting that the level of product liability 
litigation remains significantly low because injured victims in Europe do not generally pursue their product 
claims. See also Robert W. McGee, Who Really Benefits from Liability Litigation?, num. 24, Dumont 
Institute Policy Analysis (1996) noting that liability costs in the United States are 15 times higher than in 
Japan and twenty times higher than in Europe; Paul Burrows, Consumer Safety under Products Liability 
and Duty to Disclose, International Review of Law and Economics 12, 457-478, 462 (1992); Eleonora 
Rajneri, Interaction between the European Directive on Product Liability and the former liability regime in 
Italy, in Product Liability in Comparative Perspective, Duncan Fairgrave (ed.) 67 - 84, Cambridge 
University Press (2005) for an analysis of the impact of the adoption of the product liability directive in 
Italy. From the perspective of an insurance company see Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, 
Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 38 (1996) noting that in many European countries less than 5% of 
product liability claims and insurance coverage disputes actually reach the courts. In the same line, see also 
Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems In Europe And The United States, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 61, 73 
(2003). 
9 Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 433, 441 (1997). See also Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance 
Company, Zurich, 35 (1996).   
10 See Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Product liability entering the twenty-first century, AEI 
Brookings joint center for regulatory studies (2001) noting that during the 1980s the litigiousness of U.S. 
society increased around 33 percent annually – from 2.393 in 1975 to 13.408 in 1989 - while product 
liability lawsuits increased from 2 to 5.7 percent during that same period. See also Geraint G. Howells, The 
relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a necessary element in the 
European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 306 
(2000). 
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This is not to say that the introduction of the European product liability directive 
was entirely without effect. The Lovells Report,11 issued in 2003, represented a first 
attempt to asses the impact of the directive with respect to the level of product-related 
accidents, litigation, and victim compensation. While this report does not include 
sufficient detail on specific product liability cases to permit independent analysis, it 
concludes that there was a slight increase in product liability claims in Europe during the 
1990s.12
 At the member state level there is no systematic data collection of product-related 
accidents or lawsuits. Despite the efforts to seek this information in different authorities 
of the member states, the only information available has been for Spain. The source of 
information on European product litigation in Spain comes from the collection of Spanish 
product liability judgments maintained by the civil law department at Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra.
  
13 I draw on this collection to analyze the amount and evolution of product liability 
litigation in Spain as an example of the effects of the product liability directive in the 
different European member states. The number of judgments is clearly not equivalent to 
the number of accidents or claims, as some victims do not file suits and many of the suits 
that are filed result in settlements.14
                                                 
11 Lovells, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
(2003) available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-
goods/files/goods/docs/liability/studies/lovells-study_en.pdf. Between 2001 and 2003 Lovells did a survey 
between European companies regarding product safety and their view on product liability. The results of 
this survey are the core of the report. 
 Even with these caveats in mind, however, the 
12 See Lovells, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 31,37 (2003) noting that 22% of the companies taking part in the survey noticed an increase 
in the number of product liability claims in the EU during the 10 year previous to issuing the report and 
qualifying the slight increase in product liability litigation as normal.  See also Susan Narita, Product 
Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 8 (1996) also noting that the number of 
claims in most European countries has raised slightly in the past years. 
13 See Guía InDret de jurisprudencia sobre responsabilidad de producto, available at www.InDret.com and 
Fernando Gómez and Pablo Salvador, APÉNDICE 2009 AL TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DEL 
FABRICANTE, Civitas, Madrid (2010) for a complete collection of product liability judgments in Spain. 
14 See Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 38 (1996) 
noting that over 90% of the product liability disputes in Europe do not reach the courts. See also John 
Meltzer Reform of Product Liability in the EU: New Report Finds General Satisfaction, 71 Def. Counsl. J. 
42, 47 (2004). 
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Spanish judgment collection suggests, like the Lovells report, that the introduction of the 
strict liability in the European products directive resulted in only a slight increase in 
product liability claims during the 1990s.15
There are multiple explanations for this small increase in European product 
liability lawsuits. The Lovells report suggests that, in addition to the introduction of the 
product liability directive, three major factors might explain the increase in the litigation: 
consumers' awareness of their rights, their access to information, and their access to legal 
assistance.
  
16 The report also suggests that the combination of the directive with greater 
access to legal assistance and a change in judicial attitudes toward consumer rights17 may 
have made product litigation plaintiffs more successfull, and that this success, in turn, 
may have contributed to the increase.18
In any event, the small increase in litigation that appears to have occurred in 
Europe
 Overall, however, the report attributes a small 
part of the increase in litigation to the directive itself.  
19
                                                 
15 See Lovells, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 31, 37 (2003) and Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance 
Company, Zurich, 8 (1996). 
 is nowhere near the increase in litigation reported in the United States following 
the adoption of strict liability in product suits there. It could be argued that product 
16 The adoption and implementation of the product liability Directive has been an important, but not major 
factor to explain the increase in product liability claims. See Lovells, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 32-34 (2003) suggesting that a main factor 
explaining the slight increase in product liability claims might have been the increase in the awareness of 
consumers’ rights. 
17 Communication From The Commission "Action Plan on consumer access to justice and the settlement of 
consumer disputes in the internal market," Brussels, 14.2.1996, COM(96) 13 final available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF. See also the 
European Commission Green Paper: Access of consumers to justice and the settlement of consumer 
disputes in the Single market, COM/93/576FINAL,, Noivember 16, 1993, 56 (1993) Available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32023_en.htm 
18 See Lovells, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 34-37 (2003). U.S. product liability cases seem to have followed a similar pattern. See 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Court: A Statistical Portrait, 19 Seattle 
U. L. Rev. 433, 437 (1996).  See also John Meltzer Reform Of Product Liability In The EU: New Report 
Finds General Satisfaction, 71 Def. Counsl. J. 42, 47 (2004) noting an increase in the number of settlements 
since the adoption of the Directive. 
19 See Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 compiling product liability judgments in Spain since the product liability 
directive was transposed and incorporated into Spanish law. 
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liability has been used less in Europe than in the United States because products are safer 
in Europe. However, there is no evidence of this.  
The role, effects and development of product liability in Europe have been 
remarkably different than in the United States. The drafters and the industry20 had very 
strong expectations about how the Directive would change the European product liability 
reality, including an expected increase in the level of product liability litigation, the rate 
of insurance premiums, and the contracted insurance coverage.21 It does not appear, 
however, that these expectations have been borne out.22
This thesis aims at approaching the different factors that could explain the nature, 
impact and effects of product liability law in Europe since the adoption of the product 
liability directive with its introduction of a strict product liability regime. Through its 
different chapters, this thesis presents the broad scope of factors that can explain the 
nature and performance of product liability in Europe, its effects on other institutions 
interacting with tort law and further includes regulatory proposals in each of the issues 
discussed. 
 
Given that this thesis focuses on European law, institutions and legal structure, 
Chapter 1 presents a brief historical description of the European Union and a brief 
general overview of the main European institutions, their roles and the most important 
legal instruments in European law. This is of special importance given that the main 
object of this thesis is a piece of European Union legislation, the product liability 
directive.  
                                                 
20 Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 346 (2000). 
21 Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 433, 441 (1997). 
22 See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983 (1994). See also Lucille M. 
Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European Community And 
Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. 
Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 657 (1993). 
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Chapter 2 extensively presents and discusses the main parameters defining 
product liability in Europe since the harmonization of this body of law under the product 
liability directive. It examines the scope of the classes of tortfeasors and victims covered 
by the directive, the content of the strict liability regime it introduced, and the contours of 
its defectiveness test – the consumer expectations test. This chapter also focuses on some 
of the problems encountered by Spanish courts in applying the directive.  
 After presenting the European product liability regime and discussing its main 
challenges, the thesis turns to discuss a variety of issues that may influence its 
effectiveness. The first such issue is procedure, and Chapter 3 focuses on the procedural 
context in which the product liability directive is applied.23 The civil procedure rules in 
force in most European member states are remarkably different from those of the United 
States and present important obstacles for injured plaintiffs. These obstacles may reduce 
the likelihood of product victims prevailing in their claims and this may reduce their 
incentives to bring claims to begin with.24
Rules of procedure, however, are not the most important factor conditioning 
victims’ incentives to bring their product liability claims. Chapter 4 of the thesis argues 
that the directive itself generated uncertainty among injured victims by including optional 
-- and significant -- provisions such as the development risk defense, and by opting for 
the the consumer expectations test as the test for defectiveness, which have been difficult 
for member state courts to apply uniformly. This problem of application has been 
particularly acute because member states tend to rely on negligence-based liability in 
their tort systems. The interaction of the directive's strict liability regime with these 
  
                                                 
23 See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983 (1994) emphasizing the 
importance of procedural and contextual factors that significantly differ from the U.S. context and affect 
the implementation of the product liability directive in Europe. 
24 See Michael G. Faure, Ton Hartlief and Niels J. Philipsen, Funding of personal injury litigation and 
claims culture, Evidence from the Netherlands, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, issue 2 (2006) claiming 
that the litigation culture is different in the U.S. and in Europe because of the different procedural rules and 
of the different evolution of substantive law. 
  7 
negligence-based domestic systems has led to confusion in both legislative transposition 
and court interpretation of the directive's provisions. Compounding this problem is the 
remarkably vague and sometimes abstract language used in the directive, the product of 
long and difficult negotiations among the European member states and of the European 
Commission's desire to reach consensus after making adoption of the directive a 
priority.25
 Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the relationship between European product liability 
law, an ex post tort remedy, and other product-related laws such as the ex ante product 
safety rules manufacturers must comply with in order to be able to market their products. 
As the chapters make clear, the product liability directive is not the only regulation 
product manufacturers must take into account when deciding their level of investment in 
care. European product regulation, when considered beyond the directive itself, includes 
a broad product safety regime that directly conditions product manufacturers’ decisions in 
care combined with a liability regime that aims to create incentives for care by forcing 
manufacturers to internalize the costs of accidents caused by their defective products. 
Both regulations, when jointly analyzed, influence manufacturers’ ex ante decisions on 
care and more generally, on accident deterrence.  
  
Not only are product manufacturers subject to ex ante product safety regulation 
and ex post product liability, but the two regimes also overlap in terms of scope of 
application, tests for defectiveness, and product safety requirements. However, their 
interaction takes place through a very restricted compliance defense and no further 
coordination mechanism is in place. Chapter 6 analyzes the implications of the interaction 
between ex ante safety regulation and ex post liability, discusses the impact of this 
interaction on the effectiveness of each of them, and suggests potential mechanisms and 
                                                 
25 See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability in  Product liability in comparative 
perspective, edited by Duncan Fairgrieve, Cambridge, 295 (2005); Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims 
in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 35 (1996) and Lovells, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003). 
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parameters that could and should be taken into account in order to enhance their joint 
performance.  
Finally, Chapter 7 addresses the compensation of victims of product-related 
accidents. One of the goals of the European consumer protection regime as well as of the 
product liability directive is ensuring and facilitating victim compensation. However, 
compensation under tort interacts with alternative compensation mechanisms such as 
private insurance and, most importantly in Europe, (public) social insurance mechanisms. 
Victims’ incentives to pursue their claims under tort are directly affected by the 
availability and functioning of these alterantive mechanisms. Evidence suggests that the 
introduction of the product liability directive has not had a significant effect on private 
insurance premiums. At the same time, social insurance provides incomplete but 
immediate compensation that dilutes victims’ incentives to pursue product liability claims 
under the directive and, thus, conditions the directive's impact as an effective legal 
instrument.26
Chapter 8 concludes.  
 The product liability practice in Europe suggests that the major costs of 
product-related accidents are born by social insurance systems. The dislocation of the 
costs of product-related accidents from tortfeasors to social insurance systems affects not 
only victims’ compensation (generally leaving victims under-compensed), but also 
torfeasors’ incentives for care and the social insurance systems themselves, which are 
currently going through a period of financial struggle. Chapter 7 examines the different 
compensation mechanisms available to victims of product-related accidents in Europe, 
the coordination mechanisms between them that have been implemented in the different 
member states, and their effects and implications.   
 
                                                 
26 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An Analysis 
Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish Harmonization And 
Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1006-1007 (1994) noting that the existence and 
availability of mandatory health care coverage results in victims being compensated - even if under-
compensated - by the public insurance system and hence unlikely to subsequently file a claim under tort. 
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Methodology of the thesis 
 
 The methodology used in this thesis is a combination of purely legal analysis and 
a law and economics approach to discuss the effects and consequences of the interaction 
of product liability law with other regulatory regimes and institutions. This choice of 
methodology is based on a number of considerations: First, product liability can be 
described as regulation framed in the market context. The market economy in place both 
in Europe and in the United States implies that when products are placed in the market 
and are purchased by consumers, some of them might be defective and some of those 
might cause damage to their consumer or users. Product liability, together with product 
safety regulation aims at minimizing the amount of product-related accidents and the 
magnitude of these accidents while providing instruments to consumers or more 
generally, product users, to claim compensation when they have been injured by 
consumer products. The nature of the law and the issues addressed in this thesis have a 
clear economic component.  
The language used by the European legislature when stating the goals of the 
European product liability directive is framed in law and economics terms. The European 
Commission, in the directive's preamble, clearly states that its goal is to apportion risks 
among parties. Additionally, one of the major goals of European consumer protection 
regulation is to facilitate compensation of victims of product-related accidents.27
                                                 
27 The product liability directive, in its Preamble, paragraph 2 states the apportionment of risks as one of its 
major goals. Facilitating victim’s compensation is one of the major goals of the overall consumer protection 
system in the European Union. See Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a 
United States Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 350 (2000). 
 Further, 
the law and economics approach is often used in the U.S. literature and jurisprudence on 
tort law generally, and product liability in particular. In contrast, the law and economics 
approach is not especially popular in the European legal literature. This thesis focuses on 
European product liability law but with constant references to the regulatory framework, 
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its evolution and the practical experience of product liability litigation in the United 
States. In this context, the economic analysis is also well suited. Finally, the law and 
economics approach allows me to draw on my training and interests in both of these 
disciplins when analyzing legal rules. 
At the same time, there are reasons to be hesitant in relying too heavily on law 
and economics given the inherent limitations of this approach and the sometimes 
questionable results and conclusions to which it leads.28
Despite the inherent limitations of the economic analysis of the law, this 
dissertation relies on it because it still seems the best available approach to product 
liability, its nature, performance and its relationship with other product regimes and with 
alternative compensation mechanisms.  
 Law and economics aims to 
identify the potential effects of legal rules on the behavior and decisions of individuals 
and firms and to discuss their economic consequences and efficiency in order to 
determine policy preferences. Considerations of economic efficiency are undoubtedly 
important but also leave aside other important aspects of law and policy that deserve 
consideration. As a general matter, law and economics imposes strong assumptions on 
how individuals decide and behave based on the understanding that they are rational and 
selfish. Such assumptions are unquestionably useful but at the same time neglect many 
parameters that individuals also take into account when taking decisions. With respect to 
product liability, the accident-minimizing goal seems to be desirable but the instrument to 
achieve it, incentive-creation through litigation, is more questionable. 
                                                 
28 See, for example, A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a potentially defective product: a buyer’s 
guide to Posner’s economic analysis of law, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1655 (1974) arguing that a certain conclusion 
provided by the economic analysis, in the article, a market-type solution offered, did not take into account 
the existence of transaction costs and of income redistribution and hence resulted in creating inequality and 
inefficiencies.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
EUROPEAN PRODUCT REGULATION: AN OVERVIEW  
 
 
1. Historical developments of the European Union  
 
The origins of today's European Union lie in the 1957 Treaties of Rome,29 which 
established the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community. These two entities added to the already existing European Coal and Steel 
Community,30 forming what came to be known first as the European Communities31 and 
later, with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, as the European Union.32
One of the major goals of the European Economic Community was the creation of 
a common market with free movement of goods, services, capital and individuals 
between the member states.
   
33 In order to achieve this goal, certain policies of the member 
states were harmonized,34
                                                 
29 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 
(hereinafter, Treaty of Rome). See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm for the text of the founding 
Treaties. 
 and intra-European barriers to trade were replaced with 
30 The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in 18.04.1951, entered into 
force in 24.07.1952 and expired on 23.07.2002. This Treaty was not published in the Official Journal of the 
European Community. See 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_ecsc_en.htm 
31 With the creation of the European Communities, a Council and a single Commission governing the three 
areas were instituted. See the Treaty Instituting a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Community, Apr. 8, 1965, art. 9, 10 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 152) 2 (1967). 
32 The Maastricht Treaty, called Treaty on European Union O. J. C 191 (1992). Under the Maastricht  
Treaty the European Economic Community Treaty was officially renamed the European Community 
Treaty. For the full text of the Maastricth Treaty see http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html. 
33 Article 9-37 of the Treaty of Rome establishing the free movement of goods and articles 48-73 for the 
movement of persons, services and capital. See also Norbert Reich, CHRISTOPHER GODDARD AND KSENIJA 
VASILJEVA, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW, OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF COMMUNITY LAW, 54, 
89-130 (Interscentia 2003). 
34 The approximation of the laws of the member states to the extent required for the proper functioning of 
the common market is one of the goals laid down in article 3(h) and article 100 of the Treaty of Rome. 
Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome reads as follows: 
“The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the 
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common customs tariffs on imports from third countries. These trade developments 
needed to be coordinated with a series of economic measures that would ensure the 
proper functioning of the common market. For example, market competition had to be 
protected and domestic and monetary policies were harmonized so that the member 
states' macro-economic and micro-economic evolutions would take place in a coordinated 
way and would eventually converge.  
After the first step taken in Rome, the completion of the internal market35 was 
made possible through the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which entered into 
force in 1993.36 Among other things, this treaty established the economic convergence 
requirements for adopting the Euro as the common currency of participating member 
states.37
                                                                                                                                                 
approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.” 
 The Treaty of Amsterdam followed in 1999, and included provisions aimed at 
These provisions provide for three major elements: First, allowing European authorities to approximate the 
laws of the member states but not to unify them. Second, establishing that the legal approximation must be 
done to the extent required, that is, only whenever it would serve the general interest. Third, stating that the 
approximation must be framed within the goal of ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market – 
and the proper exercise of the free circulation of goods, persons, services and capital. The Treaty of 
Maastricht also included the protection of consumers’ interests and the environment as fields subject to 
regulatory approximation. See Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of product liability in the European 
Community, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 21, 23 (1999) analyzing the harmonization of product liability regulation in 
Europe.  
35 The internal market was completed pursuant to the Single European Act (OJ L 169 of 29.6.1987), signed 
on 28 February 1986 and entered into force on 1st July 1987.  
36 For the full text of the Maastricht Treaty see http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html. For 
information regarding the European internal market see http://europa.eu/pol/singl/index_en.htm. See 
Günter Verheugen, Exchange of views of Vice-President Verheugen with the Internal Market and 
Consumer protection Committee (IMCO) European Parliament Internal Market and Consumer Protection 
Committee European Parliament, Brussels, 14 September 2006 for an assessment of the performance of the 
European internal market. This speech can be found at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/500&format=HTML&aged=1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
37 Article 1 of the Treaty on European Union states the convergence criterion: 
“The criterion on price stability referred to in the first indent of Article 109j(1) of this Treaty shall 
mean that a Member State has a price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of 
inflation, observed over a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more 
than 11/2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of 
price stability. Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable 
basis, taking into account differences in national definitions.” 
The creation of the internal market implied the creation of a new, possibly unintended, legal system. See 
Jan M. Smits, The Harmonisation of Private law in Europe: some insights from evolutionary theory, special 
volume in Honor of Alan Watson, Georgia Journal of international and Comparative Law 31, 79-99, 94 
(2002). 
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transferring greater authority from member state governments to European Union 
bodies.38 Further institutional reform was mandated by the Treaty of Nice,39 which came 
into force in 2003 largely for the purpose of regulating and organizing the ongoing 
process of European Union enlargement. The most recent step in the project of European 
integration has been the attempt to create some form of constitution or similar treaty to 
streamline institutional decision-making and unify foreign policy. The member states, 
however, have so far been unable to reach a consensus on such a document (with the so-
called European Constitution40 being rejected by referenda in France and the Netherlands 
in 2007), and instead the Treaty of Lisbon,41 created as an alternative to the constitutional 
treaty, entered into force on December 1, 2009.42
 
 At the time of writing, it remains to be 
seen what will come of these constitutional efforts.  
 
2. Brief overview of European Union institutions 
 
                                                 
38 Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 2, 1997 and entered into force on May 1st, 1999. It amended 
and renumbered the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
and certain related acts, October 2 1997, OJ C 340. The text of this Treaty can be found at 
http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre546.html 
39 The Treaty of Nice changed the weight of the votes of the different member states in the Council of 
Ministers, introduced qualified majority requirements for the adoption of certain decisions and reduced the 
legislative areas that required unanimity. See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm for 
additional information on this Treaty.  
40The Governments of the member states agreed in 2004 that the Treaty establishing a European 
Constitution would enter into force following its ratification by all member states. Even though some 
member states such as Spain ratified it, the text was rejected by France and the Netherlands during 2005. It 
was then agreed that developments in the implementation of the Treaty would be postponed. The partially 
ratified text of the European Constitution can be found at 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm 
41Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, C 306/01, signed at Lisbon on 13 December 2007. The text of the Treaty is available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML 
42 Additional information about the Treaty of Lisbon is available at 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm 
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The principal institutions of the European Union are the Commission, the 
Parliament and the Council.43
The European Commission is the governmental body of the Community and 
represents the interests of the European Union as a whole, independent of national 
governments.
  
44
The European Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of the European Union 
to represent their interests.
 It has four main roles with a hybrid administrative and political nature. 
First, it has the “right of initiative,” meaning that it proposes legislation to the Parliament 
and the Council. Second, it manages and implements European Union policies, ensures 
that they are properly applied in all member states, and elaborates the budget. Third, it 
enforces European law. Fourth, it represents the European Union on the international 
stage and negotiates international agreements on behalf of the European Union.  
45 The Parliament has three main roles: (1) adopting European 
legislation together with the Council, (2) providing democratic supervision over the 
European institutions, and (3) controling and influencing the European Union budget 
together with the Council.46
Finally, the Council of the European Union
  
47
                                                 
43 The three institutions were established in 1950. See, P.S.R.F.  Mathijsen, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 12-55, Sweet & Maxwell  (7th ed. 1999) and John Fairhurst & Chrsitopher Vincenzi, LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 3-71 (Pearson Education Limited) (4thed. 2003). 
 is the main decision-making body of 
the European Union and represents the member states through a minister of the member 
44 John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 81-103, Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. (2006) and UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, Alex Warleigh ed., 
52-58, Routledge (2002).  
45 UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, Alex Warleigh ed., 62-78, Routledge (2002) and John 
Peterson and Michael Shackleton, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 104-124, Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. (2006).  
46 The European Parliament has "advisory and supervisory powers" and further has some power over the 
European budget. P.S.R.F.  MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 12-55 (7th ed. 1999) and JOHN 
FAIRHURST & CHRSITOPHER VINCENZI, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3-71 (Pearson Education 
Limited) (4thed. 2003). 
47 Also called the Council of Ministers. Note that the Council of the European Union is different from the 
European Council, which is formed by the heads of state of the different member states. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/archives/european-council/index_en.htm 
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state's government.48 The Council has six major responsibilities: (1) proposing European 
laws at the request of the Commission, (2) broadly coordinating the economic policies of 
the member states, (3) concluding international agreements between the European Union 
and other countries or international organizations, (4) approving the European Union’s 
budget, (5) developing the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP),49
 
 and (6) facilitating cooperation between member states' national courts and 
police forces in criminal matters.  
 
3. The European Community legislative instruments   
  
European legislative instruments are structured in two major bodies: primary 
legislation and secondary legislation. Primary legislation consists of the treaties discussed 
above and the annexes and protocols attached to them, as well as the additions and 
amendments that some of the texts have undergone.50 Additionally, primary legislation 
includes the accession treaties of the different member states.51
Secondary legislation consists of the instruments promulgated by European Union 
institutions through the powers given to these institutions in the primary legislation. The 
 All of this legislation 
spells out the objectives, organization and functioning of the European Union and its 
predecessors.  
                                                 
48 John Peterson and Michael Shackleton, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 68-80, Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed. (2006) and UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, Alex Warleigh ed., 
26-29, Routledge (2002). 
49 Information on the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) can be found in  
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/index_en.htm 
50 T.C. Hartley, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 99-106, Oxford, Clarendon Law 
Series (1994). 
51 The United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland signed their treaty of Accession in 1973, Greece in 1981, 
Spain and Portugal in 1986 and ten years later Finland, Austria and Sweden in 1995. In 2003 the 
enlargement of the European Union included the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. More recently, the Accession Treaties for 
Bulgaria and Romania were signed on 2005 to take place in 2007. See http://europa.eu/abc/index_en.htm 
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different kinds of secondary legislation are spelled out in article 249 of the Treaty of 
Rome, which states that:  
 
In order to carry out their task and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, the European Parliament acting jointly with the Council, the Council and 
the Commission shall make regulations and issue directives, take decisions, make 
recommendations or deliver opinions. 
 
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and 
directly applicable in all Member States. 
 
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods. 
 
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed. 
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.  
 
As can be seen, article 249 lays out five different kinds of secondary legislation: 
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.52
 Regulations are instruments of general application that are directly binding on all 
member states and take effect regardless their transposition into domestic law. Member 
states are prohibited from modifying or transposing incompletely or incorrectly the text 
of a regulation; to the extent that they do so, citizens can simply bypass the offending 
national legislation and assert directly their rights under the regulation.
  
53 Examples of 
product-related regulations are the Council Regulation on the protection of geographical 
indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuffs54 and the 
Council Regulation on organic production and labeling of organic products.55
                                                 
52 T.C. Hartley, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 107-136, Oxford, Clarendon Law 
Series (1994). 
 
53 T.C. Hartley, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 107, Oxford, Clarendon Law Series, 
(1994). 
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of geographical indications 
and designations of origin for agricultural products and foodstuff. OJ L93 p. 12, 31.3.2006. The regulation 
is available at http://www.tpe.gov.tr/dosyalar/ABcografi/510_2006_Sayili_AB_Tuzugu.pdf 
55 Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and labeling of organic 
products, that repealed the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91. OJ L189, p1, 20.07.2007. The 
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Directives are the instruments used most frequently in European Union law. 
Directives aim to reconcile the need for Union-wide uniformity with the different 
political structures and administrative procedures of the member states.56 Directives are 
binding on member states with respect to their intended results and the deadlines they lay 
down for implementation, but they allow member states to choose the form and method 
of implementation.57
In order to take effect, directives generally must be transposed by the member 
states into their domestic law.
  
58 The transposition process, however, often has been used 
by member states to delay or otherwise obstruct the implementation of directives, either 
by transposing them slowly or incorrectly or by simply failing to transpose them at all. 
This hinders citizens from achieving their rights and otherwise undermines the purposes 
of the directives in question, as well as the goal of Union-wide harmonization. This has 
led the Commission to order certain member state governments to carry out the 
transposition process and to bring member states before the European Court of Justice. 
That court, in turn, has held that even in cases where directives have not been transposed, 
individuals may possess certain rights under them.59 Further it has also held that member 
states may be liable for damages caused by their non-implementation.60
                                                                                                                                                 
Regulation is available at http://eur 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:189:0001:0023:EN:PDF 
  
56 Sacha Prechal, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, Oxford Law Library, 13 and following (2nd Ed. 2005). 
57 Sacha Prechal, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, Oxford Law Library, 73-91 (2nd Ed. 2005). 
58 Sacha Prechal, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, Oxford Law Library, 55-72 (2nd Ed. 2005). 
59 Even though the directive’s direct effect is not mentioned in any of the EC Treaties, it was established by 
the European Court of Justice in the case Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen 
Case 26/62; [1963] ECR 1; [1970] C.M.L.R. 1 where the European Court of Justice held that the rights 
conferred to individuals under European Community legislation should be enforceable by those individuals 
in national courts. In that case, the court stated that  
“3. The European Economic Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only the member states but also their nationals. 
 
Independently of the legislation of member states, community law not only imposes obligations on 
individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal 
heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the treaty but also by 
reason of obligations which the treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well 
as upon the member states and upon the institutions of the community.  
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The European Union generally takes two approaches to maximize the impact and 
effect of directives. The first approach is to adopt sector-specific directives, which 
address specific issues needing certain regulation. The second approach is to adopt what 
are often called “horizontal framework directives.” Directives of this latter type establish 
broad frameworks of principles that apply to a wide range of areas.61
After regulations and directives, decisions form the third type of European 
secondary legislation. These instruments do not have general application but instead 
apply only to specific enumerated parties.
 Examples of both of 
types of directives will be seen in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
62 Decisions do not need to be transposed or 
implemented by member states; they are directly binding as issued. The Treaty of Rome 
limits the areas in which decisions may be employed, and as a result decisions tend to be 
issued less frequently than other types of secondary legislation. Examples of decisions are 
the Council Decision on a common framework for the marketing of products63 or the 
Council Decision regarding the functioning of a system for the exchange of information 
in respect of certain products which may jeopardize consumers’ health or safety.64
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
4. The fact that articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty enable the commission and the member 
states to bring before the court a state which has not fulfilled its obligations does not deprive 
individuals of the right to plead the same obligations, should the occasion arise, before a national 
court.”  
60 European Court of Justice joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and 
others v Italian Republic. Failure to implement a directive - Liability of the Member State (1991) and stated 
that  
“a principle of Community law that the Member States are obliged to make good loss and damage 
caused to individuals by breaches of Community law for which they can be held responsible.” 
[36]. 
61 Horizontal directives, as opposed to vertical directives, include rights that can be invoked and enforced 
by an individual vis-à-vis other individuals. There is a significant amount of literature discussing what is 
the most adequate and effective legislative technique. See Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC law, Oxford 
Law Library, 255 (2nd Ed. 2005). 
62 T.C. Hartley, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, 107, Oxford, Clarendon Law Series, 
(1994). 
63 Council Decision 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on a 
common framework for the marketing of products, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, 82-128, repealing Council 
Decision 93/465/EEC. This Council Decision is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008D0768:EN:NOT 
64 Council Decision 93/580/EEC of 25 October 1993 concerning the institution of a Community system for 
the exchange of information in respect of certain products which may jeopardise consumers' health or 
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The last types of secondary legislation are recommendations and opinions. These 
are non-binding instruments with no direct effect.65 They mostly have persuasive value 
and are used where the Commission believes them is necessary. Examples of such texts 
are the Commission Recommendation on the prevention of smoking and on improving 
tobacco control66 and the Opinion of the Scientific Committee on emerging and newly 
identified health risks on potential health risks of exposure to noise from personal music 
players and mobile phones67 requested by the European Commission.68
 
 
 
4. The development of product regulation within the consumer protection 
goal of the European Union  
 
Product regulation is part of the European consumer protection regime that 
originated together with the creation of the European common market through the Treaty 
of Rome.69
                                                                                                                                                 
safety, O.J. L 278, 11.11.1993, p. 64–69. This Council Decision is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=Decision&an
_doc=1993&nu_doc=580 
 In order to ensure a successful functioning of the internal market and its 
subsequent expansion with the European economic and monetary union, it was necessary 
to ensure an effective consumer protection regime and hence a shared product regulation 
throughout the European market. 
65 Direct effect refers to the possibility for an individual to invoke provisions of community law in order to 
protect his interests. See Sacha Prechal, Directives in EC law, Oxford Law Library, 100 (2nd Ed. 2005). 
66 Council Recommendation 2003/54/EC of 2 December 2002 on the prevention of smoking and on 
initiatives to improve tobacco control (O.J. L 22 of 25.01.2003). The Council Recommendation can be 
found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:022:0031:0034:EN:PDF 
67 Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) on the Potential 
health risks of exposure to noise from personal music players and mobile phones including a music playing 
function. This http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_018.pdf 
68 The European Commission’s request of the opinion can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_q_011.pdf 
69 See article 100 of the Treaty of Rome.  
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Subsequently,70 the Treaty of Maastricht established consumer protection as one 
of its major goals.71 Most of consumer protection legislation is based on article 100 of the 
Treaty of Rome (today Article 95)72, which allows measures to be adopted for the 
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
member states which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market.73 This “high level of protection” has been interpreted not as being 
binding, but as an inspirational principle that should be the basis of European legislation 
dealing with consumers. The principle has often been included in the recitals of the 
different European regulations dealing with safety, health and consumer protection.74
Soon after this principle was laid out, however, concerns arose over the danger 
that the existing domestic rules on product specifications, product testing and product 
liability -- whether based on contract law or torts -- could be used by member states to 
  
                                                 
70 Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome does not mention consumer protection as one of the principles of the 
European Community. It is not until the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht, on February 7th, 1992 – and 
entered into force on November 1st 1993 – when article 3 was amended and its new text included, in its 
article 3(s) consumer protection as one of the principles of the European Community. There is a surprising 
lack of literature discussing, justifying or defending the desirability of the adoption of this “high level of 
protection” in the regulation and discussing its implementation and effectiveness in the subsequent 
European Directives that develop and implement this policy. See Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN 
REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 31, Oxford University Press (2005) for one of the few 
existing analysis of European consumer protection regulation. 
71 This requirement is included in article 95.3 of the Maastricth Treaty (formerly article 100a of the Treaty 
of Rome), which requires that for all measures based on this article regarding health, safety, environmental 
protection, and consumer protection, the Commission “will take as a base level of high level of protection” 
of health and safety, taking account in particular any new development based on scientific facts.  
72 Today article 100 of the Treaty of Rome is Article 95 of the consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome,  
C 325, O.J., 24 December 2002. The consolidated version can be found at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html 
73 Consumer protection was introduced as a goal of the European Community in the Treaty of Maastricht in 
articles 3 and 129a that were maintained in the later Treaty of Amsterdam - that amended and consolidated 
the Treaties of Rome and Maastricht - in its articles 3 and 153. It should be noted that the diversity of 
private law regulation within the European Union is not by itself a reason that would justify harmonization 
because the European Commission does not have a general competence to harmonize the European private 
law. There needs to be a general interest and such harmonization must be necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal common market. See Jacobien W. Rutgers, The Rule of Reason and Private Law 
or the Limits to Harmonization, in RULE OF REASON; RETHINKING ANOTHER CLASSIC OF EC LEGAL 
DOCTRINE, Annette Schrauwen, ed. The Hogendorp Papers (4), Groningen: Europa Law Publishers (2005). 
See also Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. 
Int’l L. J. 21, 23 (1999) discussing the former legal bases of articles 3(h), 100 and 100a of the Treaty of 
Rome.  
74 Jacques Pelkmans, The new approach to technical harmonization and standardization, 25  J. Comm. Mkt. 
Studies 249, 252-253 (1987). 
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create trade barriers and thus jeopardize the success of one of the major goals of the 
common market as well as the goal of achieving a high level of consumer protection. 
These concerns needed to be addressed from a Europe-wide perspective because a state-
by-state approach could not adequately ensure the proper functioning of the common 
market and the removal of protectionist regulations of the member states.75 The Treaty of 
Amsterdam addressed such concerns and in its article 153 reflected the already existing 
Community’s goal of creating a high level of consumer protection without allowing 
member states to adopt barriers to free trade.76
European consumer protection laws, including product regulation, aim to regulate 
all phases of a product's life, from pre-marketing to post-marketing. The European 
Commission through its Directorate General of Health and Consumers emphasizes 
 
                                                 
75 The Community created a consumer protection program covering a wide range of matters. These issues 
were regulated in the amendments of the Maastricht Treaty. See arts 3f ad 129a of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 62, Ashgate Publishing Company 
(2005).  
76 Article 153 (former Art. 129A) of the Treaty of Amsterdam (signed on 1997 and entered into force in 
1999) states: 
1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer 
protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic 
interests of consumers as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to 
organize themselves to safeguard their interests. 
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and implementing 
other Community policies and actions.  
3. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred to in paragraph 1 
by: 
a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in the context of the completion of the 
internal market; 
b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the 
Member States. 
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the measures referred to in 
paragraph 3(b). 
5. Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must be 
compatible with this Treaty. The Commission shall be notified of them.” 
As it can be seen, member states are allowed to adopt measures more protective with consumers than the 
ones established by European authorities. However, such measures should be “compatible with the Treaty” 
and could not amount to a restriction of competition or become a barrier of trade within the European 
common market. 
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product safety as the major focus of consumer protection law.77
To understand and evaluate European product regulation, one must remember that 
product safety provisions are complemented by product liability provisions, that allow 
consumers to seek compensation for the harm caused by defective products.
 European product safety 
law aims to influence the safety decisions made by manufacturers before their products 
are marketed while also imposing obligations on these manufacturers during the post-
marketing phase. This law thus impacts the entire life a product.  
78 This body 
of law is considered by the European Commission to be part of Europe's internal market 
regulation.79
Despite the division between product safety -- considered part of consumer 
protection regulation -- and product liability -- considered part of the internal market 
regulation, there is obviously overlap between these two bodies of law -- overlap that 
affects on one side the economic decisions of product manufacturers and, on the other, 
the rights of the consumers and users of products. Although the overlap is not complete, 
the common scope of application and the importance of both bodies of law to producers 
and consumers warrant a comprehensive analysis of product regulation as a whole. This 
type of analysis, however, has been lacking thus far, and the present study is intended to 
fill the gap. 
  
From a theoretical view and, more particularly, from a law and economics 
perspective, the analysis of product liability within the context of product regulation 
arises as very attractive because of the diversity of approaches of different regulations 
                                                 
77 See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/prod_legis/index_en.htm for an overview of regulation on 
consumer product safety. See also Stephen Weatherill, EC CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY, John A. Usher ed. 
(1997) describing the evolution of the EC consumer policy. 
78 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, O. J. L 210, 
07/08/1985 P. 0029 – 0033. 
79 See the regulation of Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission’s web site.  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/liability/index_en.htm. It should be noted that product 
liability is not considered part of the regulation dealing with consumer affairs. See the product legislation 
on consumer affairs of the Directorate General of Health and Consumers of the European Commission 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/prod_legis/index_en.htm 
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when addressing product risks. Product regulation as a whole aims at creating incentives 
to achieve optimal levels of safety and, thus, to minimize accidents.80 There are two 
different models for achieving such an objective, both of which are used in European 
product regulation laws.81 The first model uses the tort system as an instrument to create 
optimal incentives for safety. The threat of potential tort liability leads agents to adopt 
optimal safety levels in order to avoid subsequent liability.82 Law and economics analysis 
predicts that rational agents, when subject to the threat of tort liability, internalize the 
expected consequences of potential accidents and adopt an efficient level of care.83 This 
is the model used in European product liability laws.84
From the perspective of the consumer who is exposed to a product's risks, these 
models are also different. Under the product liability model, victims may seek 
compensation from the manufacturer for the harm caused by the defective product. It is 
 The second model is to determine 
the desired level of care through legislation. This is essentially the model employed in 
European product safety law: Safety standards, New Approach Directives, and the 
General Product Safety Directive -- all of which are discussed further below -- are the 
essential instruments used to ensure that product manufacturers adopt the level of safety 
determined by the law.  
                                                 
80 From a law and economics perspective, it would not be efficient, assuming it was possible, to reduce 
accidents so to achieve a zero level of accidents, because some risks would be too expensive to eliminate. 
For that reason, law and economics suggests to reduce accidents up to the point where the cost of 
preventing them is lower or equal to the cost resulting from the accidents prevented. This was also 
announced by Judge Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See also 
Thomas J. Miceli, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, 15, Oxford University Press (1997).    
81 Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a 
necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 
Washburn L. J. 305, 308 (2000).  
82 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen Law & Business, 192-197, 615-616, 5th Ed. (1998) 
and Thomas J. Miceli, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, 57-70, Oxford University Press (1997). See in general A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 3rd ed., Gaithersburg, Md.: Aspen 
Publishers (2003). 
83 Thomas J. Miceli, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, 57-70, Oxford University Press (1997). See also Richard 
Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen Law & Business, 192-197, 615-616, 5th ed. (1998).  
84 The market-type solution suggested by law and economics literature has been sometimes challenged 
given that such solution will not achieve equity and efficiency because of the existence of transaction costs 
and the costs of redistributing income. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a potentially 
defective product: a buyer’s guide to Posner’s economic analysis of law, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1655 (1974). 
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through this potential for compensation that manufacturers internalize the costs of the 
harm their products may cause, and thereby end up with incentives to adopt optimal 
levels of care. In contrast, under the product safety model, a consumer may report the 
product's risks to the appropriate authorities, who may in turn impose a penalty on the 
manufacturer or require the manufacturer to withdraw the product. To the extent the 
consumer has been injured, however, he or she has no recourse to compensation from the 
manufacturer under this model.  
Consumer protection, and hence product regulation, is one of the major concerns 
not just of the European Commission but also of European consumers generally. While 
public opinion polls indicate that a majority of European consumers think that the 
adoption of internal market rules at the European level has increased consumer protection 
within the European Union,85 there is wide geographical variance in the perception of 
European consumers as to whether manufacturers and sellers are complying with the 
rules.86 European consumers do not feel equally and uniformly protected. 87
Hence, an analysis of the practical functioning of product legislation seems 
pertinent.  
  
 
                                                 
85 European Commission, Consumer protection in the Internal Market, Special Eurobarometer, 29 (2006) 
where the results indicated that 53 % of European consumers thought that internal market rules increased 
consumer `protection within the European Union. This document is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/topics/eurobarometer_09-2006sum_en.pdf 
86 The general assessment of compliance is quite high, 62%. However, there is also variance in this 
perception: North-West European consumers perceive that their consumer rights are respected -- 65% -- in 
others this perception dropts to 48%. See European Commission, Consumer protection in the Internal 
Market, Special Eurobarometer, 30 (2006). document is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/topics/eurobarometer_09-2006sum_en.pdf 
87 Northern European consumers consider that they are adequately protected but Mediterranean and Eastern 
European consumers are significantly less satisfied. European Commission, Consumer protection in the 
Internal Market, Special Eurobarometer, 29-30 (2006). This document is available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/topics/eurobarometer_09-2006sum_en.pdf 
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TABLE 1.1 – THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S JURISDICTION ON PRODUCT REGULATION: FROM ENSURING A 
PROPER FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNAL MARKET TO ACHIEVING A HIGH LEVEL OF CONSUMER PROTECTION  
 
TREATY OF ROME (1957)88 TREATY OF MAASTRICHT (1992) 89 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM (1997) 90
Article 3 
 
 
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of 
the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty 
and in accordance with the timetable set out therein 
… 
 (h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to 
the extent required for the proper functioning of the 
common market;  
Article 3  
 
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the 
Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the timetable set out therein:  
… 
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the 
extent required for the functioning of the common market; 
… 
(s) a contribution to the strengthening of consumer 
protection; 
Article 3  
 
For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the 
Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the timetable set out therein 
… 
(h) the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent 
required for the proper functioning of the common market;  
… 
(s) a contribution to the strengthening of consumer protection; 
CHAPTER 3 - APPROXIMATION OF LAWS 
Article 100 
 
The Council shall. acting unanimously on a proposal 
from the Commission, issue directives for the 
approximation of such provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the 
common market. The Assembly [European Parliament] 
and the Economic and Social Committee shall be 
consulted in the case of directives whose 
implementation would, in one or more Member States, 
involve the amendment of legislation. 
… 
ARTICLE 100 OF THE TREATY OF ROME CURRENTLY CORRESPONDS TO ARTICLE 95 OF ITS 
CONSOLIDATED VERSION91
Article 95 
 
 
1.   By way of derogation from Article 94 and save where otherwise provided in this Treaty, the following provisions shall apply 
for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 14. The Council shall, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to 
in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market. 
… 
3. The Commission, in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety, environmental protection and consumer 
protection, will take as a base a high level of protection, taking account in particular of any new development based on scientific 
facts. Within their respective powers, the European Parliament and the Council will also seek to achieve this objective. 
… 
                                                 
88 The text of the Treaty of Rome can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf 
89 The text of the Treaty of Maastricht can be found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html 
90 The text of the Treaty of Amsterdam can be found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html 
91 Article 100 is currently article 95 in the consolidated version of Treaty of Rome, C 325, O.J., 24 December 2002. The consolidated version can be found at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html 
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TITLE XI  - CONSUMER PROTECTION  
Article 129a  
 
1. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of a 
high level of consumer protection through:  
(a)  measures adopted pursuant to Article 100a in the 
context of the completion of the internal market;  
(b) specific action which supports and supplements the 
policy pursued by the Member States to protect the health, 
safety and economic interests of consumers and to provide 
adequate information to consumers.  
2. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 189b and after consulting the 
Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the specific 
action referred to in paragraph 1(b).  
3. Action adopted pursuant to paragraph 2 shall not prevent 
any Member State from maintaining or introducing more 
stringent protective measures. Such measures must be 
compatible with this Treaty. The Commission shall be 
notified of them. 
TITLE XIV (ex Title XI) - CONSUMER 
PROTECTION  
Article 153 (ex Article 129a of the Maastricht Treaty)  
 
1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a 
high level of consumer protection, the Community shall contribute 
to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of 
consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, 
education and to organise themselves in order to safeguard their 
interests.  
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account 
in defining and implementing other Community policies and 
activities.  
3. The Community shall contribute to the attainment of the 
objectives referred to in paragraph 1 through:  
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in the context of the 
completion of the internal market;  
(b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy 
pursued by the Member States.  
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred 
to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee, shall adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 3(b).  
5. Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 shall not prevent any 
Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent 
protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with this 
Treaty. The Commission shall be notified of them. 
 
This table includes the evolution of European product regulation. In a first phase, under the Treaty of Rome, product regulation was part of the common internal market 
regulation that intended to ensure that domestic regulation did not become a barrier to the free circulation of goods between the member states. Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome 
provided for the Commission’s authority to adopt regulation for the purpose of ensuring the proper functioning of the common market and article 100 laid down the legislative 
process necessary to adopt regulation with the object of ensuring the proper functioning of the common market. The consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome includes the 
provision of former article 100 in its article 95, in force today. The product regulation derived from the Treaty of Rome is what the table represents in light blue.  
A second phase started with the Treaty of Maastricht under which consumer protection become on of the goals of the European Union – and for that reason was clearly 
stated in article 3 (s) -- and established n its article 129a the measures that should be adopted in order to achieve this “high level of consumer protection”. The area in green 
represents the relevant provisions regarding consumer protection included in the Treaty of Maastricht.  
Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam has maintained the provisions in force of former article 3 and has slightly amended article 129a of the Maastricht Treaty in its article 
153 that today is in force. The orange area represents the relevant provisions on consumer protection included in the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
It should be noted that in addition to the provisions included in article 3 as well as article 153 of the Treaty of Amsterdam currently in force, article 95 of the consolidated 
version of the Treaty of Rome regarding the approximation of laws necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the common market, is still in force today.  
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CHAPTER 2 
EUROPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY:  
A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF DIRECTIVE 85/374  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Drafting of the Directive  
 
The origins of European product liability law go back to the European consumer 
movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. That movement ultimately culminated in the 
adoption of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Liability for Defective Products (hereinafter the products liability directive).92
Before the adoption of this directive, product liability law was undeveloped in 
most European member states.
  
93
                                                 
92 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 On The Approximation of The Laws, Regulations and 
Administrative Provisions Of The Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products O. J. L 210 , 
07/08/1985 P. 0029 - 0033. Hereinafter the “product liability directive.” See also Anita Bernstein, 
L’Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European Community, 31 Va. J Int’l L. 
673, 677-79 (1991). For a description of the consumer movement outside the United States see Warren 
Freedman, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL MANUAL OF PRACTICE, 56 - 103, London; New York: 
Oceana Publications (1987). 
 Product liability was simply not one of the main 
priorities of the European legislative agenda at that time. It was not that injured parties 
were without recourse to seek compensation: most member states had general negligence-
based tort systems that provided a basis for victims’ recovery even before the Europe-
wide product liability system was put in place. However, there was no product liability 
93 See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1230 (2002). See 
also Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 347- 348 (2000).  
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regulation as such. It was not until the 1960's, with an increase in trade and commercial 
relations between the different member states and the mass production of consumer 
goods that it became increasingly apparent that the traditional rules found in European 
legal systems were inadequate to deal with the modern phenomenon of product 
accidents.94
The change came with the Thalidomide crisis in the 1960s.
  
95 Thalidomide was a 
drug developed by a German company in 1956 and used largely by pregnant women to 
alleviate morning sickness and induce sleep. One of this drug's side effects turned out to 
be that it could cause birth defects, the first warnings of which were sounded publicly in 
1961.96 Immediately, German authorities recalled the drug and banned its sale. Germany 
then adopted a pharmaceutical law in 1976, which introduced a strict liability regime for 
defective medicines.97 The episode led consumers all over Europe to put pressure on 
authorities to adopt consumer protection measures -- from both the product safety and 
product liability perspectives -- and to make the issue a priority for the European 
Commission.98
Given this level of public concern, the European Commission took action drafting 
a proposal in 1976 of a European Convention on Product Liability in Regard to Personal 
Injury and Death.
 
99
                                                 
94 See J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. 2403, 2456 (1991); Mark Mitchell, A 
Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 573, 579-580 
(2001). 
 The Strasbourg Convention, as this came to be known, was adopted 
but never implemented because it was signed only by France, Belgium and Luxembourg 
95 In 1962 Thalidomide, a medicine used to prevent miscarriage caused the birth of several thousand 
deformed babies in Europe. See generally PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY ET AL., SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE STORY 
OF THALIDOMIDE, London: Andre Deutsch (1979). 
96 See generally PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY ET AL., SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE STORY OF THALIDOMIDE, London: 
Andre Deutsch (1979). 
97 The German Pharmaceutical law, called the Arzneimittelgesetz, was adopted on August 24, 1976. 
98. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1231 (2002) 
arguing that the product liability directive was a result of the Thalidomide crisis Takahashi Fumitoshi, 
Japan's Product Liability Law: Issues and Implications, 22 Journal of Japanese Studies, 1, 107 (1996). 
99 This was a Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations, and Administrastive Provisions of the M?ember States Concerning Liability for Defective 
Products, 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 241) 9 (1976).   
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(then Member States of the EEC) and Austria (then a non-Member) and because it was 
upstaged by the subsequent product liability directive, a draft of which was presented two 
weeks prior to the presentation of the final draft of the Strasbourg Convention.100
The European Commission believed that the Directive could represent a first step 
in harmonizing product liability laws in Europe.
 The 
reluctance that many states had to signing the Strasbourg Convention may have resulted 
from a decision to focus legislative efforts on the product liability directive instead.  
101 The Commission viewed such 
harmonization as a necessity and a priority in order to avoid a patchwork of different laws 
that would leave consumers with varying degrees of protection depending on the state in 
which they lived,102 while allowing risks to flow through the internal European market 
along with the free movement of goods.103 Considering that the European Community 
was at the time increasing its membership from six to nine countries,104 and that the 
Treaty of Rome, signed twenty years earlier,105
                                                 
100 See Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573, 580-581 (2001) for a description of the drafting process of the product liability directive. 
 was only slowly developing, the 
101 See Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Statutes Of The European Community Member States 
Passed In Response To The Product Liability Directive, 32 I.L.M. 1347 (1993) and Sandra N. Hurd & 
Frances E. Zollers, Desperately Seeking Harmony: The European Community's Search for Uniformity in 
Product Liability Law, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 35, 47-65 (1992) noting that the product liability directive 
represented another step towards the integration of the markets of the different member states. See also 
Commission of the European Communities, Green paper Liability for defective products presented by the 
Commission on July 28, 1999 COM (1999)396, at 11, final. Available at 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf; Product liability directive, at 
preamble. See also Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States 
Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 350 (2000). 
102 See the Preamble of the Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of 
the Laws Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for 
Defective Products, 1976 Directive. 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 241) 9 (1976) which declared that 
"[w]hereas the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the liability of the producer for 
damage caused by the defectiveness of his products is necessary, because the divergences may distort 
competition in common market; . . . " See also Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products 
Liability Attempted In The European Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 677-678 (1991). 
103 The European Commission was keen to promote consumer protection measures to show, after the 
Thalidomide crisis, that the common market was not just for businesses. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in 
Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1231 (2002). 
104 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom became new members of the European Community in 1973 
and joined the founding members Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. See 
http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm. 
105 Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome provides for the European Commission to devote its efforts to the 
“approximation of the laws of the Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the 
common market.”  
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Commission's rush to propose and to adopt this legislative text at the time may seem 
somewhat surprising. Two reasons appear particularly relevant for explaining this: First, 
the undeniable impact of the Thalidomide crisis, which led to public demands throughout 
Europe for better supervision of drugs and, more generally, a higher degree of consumer 
protection. In light of the difficulties in drafting the product liability directive, however, 
this crisis does not appear to fully explain the new shift in the European Commission's 
regulatory policy. Instead, it may be best viewed in combination with a second possible 
reason for the Commission's push, which is economics. As the Commission stated in the 
Directive itself, the existing divergences in member states' consumer protection laws 
risked distorting competition and affecting the movement of goods within the common 
market, imposing different economic burdens on their competing industries106 and 
entailing a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage to health and 
property caused by defective products.107 Harmonized law, such as product liability, was 
considered as a way to promote economic and political integration of the member 
states.108
Ensuring a proper functioning of the European common market thus seems to 
have been a driving force behind this difficult legislative project.
   
109
                                                 
106 See Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications 
for United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 246-247 (1993). 
 The Commission 
107 See the Preamble of the product liabiltiy directive. See also Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of 
product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 21, 22 (1999). See also Patrick Thieffry, 
Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice and 
Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 65, 90 (1989-1990). 
108 Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. Int’l 
L. J. 21, 23 (1999). 
109 This was explained to me by Pr. Dr. Ivo Schwartz, one of the drafters of the Directive, when I had the 
opportunity to meeting him at the Zeup meeting that was held in Barcelona in October 2003 and had the 
chance to have a long and profitable conversation where he shared his experiences in the Directive’s 
drafting process with me. Despite the Commission’s interest in the proper functioning of the internal 
market, there is no empirical evidence showing that divergent rules of products liability law represented a 
significant obstacle to the free movement of goods within the European member states. See Schwartz, Ivo 
E.and Will, Michael R., Wie geht es weiter mit der produkthaftung?, ZEUS 5 (Zeitschrigt fur 
Europearechtliche studien), 14 (2002). See also Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European 
Directive on PL: the promise or progress ?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 403-404 (1988) arguing that in 
light of the lack of evidence for the need of a uniform product liability directive for the proper functioning 
of the internal market, consumer protection might have been the main goal of the Directive. 
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feared that given the free movement of goods, services and people within the European 
Community area, member states would be tempted to protect their own industries through 
product liability laws, and to thus compete with each other in a "race to the bottom" in 
terms of minimizing the risk of liability.110 The result would be a low level of protection 
for European consumers.111
Given the historical context in which the Directive was drafted with the 
Thalidomide crisis as a background, the European Commission's fears regarding the 
potential failure in the European internal market, and the reluctance of the different 
member states to commit to a product liability regulation at the European level, it is not 
surprising that drafting and agreeing on the legal text was a difficult and slow process.   
  
The draft of the Directive proposed by the Commission was repeatedly revised 
because of pressure from the governments of the different member states, which were 
reluctant to transfer regulatory power to the institutions of the European Community and 
feared that the Directive would adversely impact their domestic industries. Industry also 
feared the draft Directive's strict liability regime, particularly given perceptions of the 
history of strict product liability in the United States, which many blamed for causing an 
increase in U.S. litigation and, consequently, an increase in insurance-related costs.112
                                                 
110 If member states would complete in lowering product liability in order to protect their manufacturers, 
states with low levels of consumer protection would provide fewer incentives to make high quality products 
given that they would have lower incentives for avoiding liability. By contrast, in states where liability laws 
were more demanding and hence expected liability was higher, manufacturers would have incentives to 
invest in higher product safety. If that discrepancy existed, differences in liability laws would condition the 
decisions of the manufacturers of the different member states and hence affect free movement of goods 
within the European market. For that reason, the European Commission believed that rules affecting the 
functioning of the internal market should be harmonized. See Geraint G. Howells, The rise of European 
Consumer Law - Whither National Consumer Law?, 28 Sydney Law Review 63-88, 70 (2006). See also 
Robert C. Weber, E.C. Directive Follows U.S. No-Fault Approach, But Litigation Is Rare, NAT'L L.J., 30 
(1991) defending the need of for harmonized product liability regulation in Europe because a unique 
product liability regulation would encourage producers to produce products whose quality correspond to 
the expected liability they are exposed to regardless of the liability laws of the different member states so 
that cross-border trade was not affected. 
 At 
111 See Schwarts, Ivo E.and Will, Michael R., Wie geht es weiter mit der produkthaftung?, ZEUS 5 
(Zeitschrigt fur Europearechtliche studien), 14 (2002). 
112 See Gorege L Priest The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 (1987) 
noting the relationship between product liability regimes and insurance premiums. However, the 
development of the strict product liability regime established by the Directive has not had the same effects 
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the same time, individuals, consumer associations, and other groups that were affected by 
the Directive and allowed to participate in the drafting process, also manifested their 
skepticism about the text.113
Consensus among the parties involved was difficult to reach in two respects. First, 
the European institutions responsible for drafting the Directive -- namely, the 
Commission and the Parliament -- were in disagreement over the strict liability standard. 
While the Commission thought its goal of consumer protection was best achieved 
through strict liability, the Parliament questioned the need of the industry or consumers 
for greater protection
  
114 and stated that the proposal lacked a jurisdictional basis under 
the Treaty of Rome.115 In 1976, the European Economic and Social Committee116 
supported the proposed Directive. But member states feared the economic consequences 
of a strict liability regime on their domestic industries and on the competitiveness of 
European industry as a whole.117
This complicated process, which had a direct impact on the design of the 
Directive and the structure of its regime, continued with a second draft of the Directive 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
as the former U.S. strict product liability. Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A 
Comparison With U.S. Law, An Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So 
As To Accomplish Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1004 (1994). 
113 This process contrasts with the evolution experienced in the U.S. that at the time did not involve a public 
debate as the European.   
114 See Kathleen M. Nilles, Note, Defining the Limits of liability: A legal and political analysis of the 
European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 Va. J. Int’l L., 729, 757-58 (1985).  
115 The European Parliament, through the Legal Affairs Committee and the Committee on the Environment, 
Public Health, and Consumer Protection, commented this issue in this opinion. Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 71) 
1979. 
116 See Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) Report on Proposal for a Council Directive on 
Liability for Defective Products, COM(76)372 final at 41-45. See, later, the Opinion on the Proposal for a 
Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1979, O.J. (C 114) 15 (1979).  
117 During that decade there was a big impulse on increasing the size of the European common market. The 
number of member states doubled so that in addition to the six initial member states (Belgium, West 
Germany, Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands); Britain, Ireland, and Denmark became 
members and then later Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the European Community as well. J.H.H. 
Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. 2403, 2456 (1991). See also Europe at a glance  
http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm 
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presented by the European Commission in 1979118 and the final adoption of the  
Directive in 1985.119 Some consider that the long nine-year process from the first 
initiative in 1976 until its final adoption in 1985 was due to the Europeans’ fixation on 
the U.S. experience as well as to general nervousness over introducing a strict product 
liability regime.120 It is difficult to know the extent to which European authorities were 
learning from the U.S. experience during those long nine years. However, what seems 
likely is that the fears and skepticism involved in this process led to the significantly 
different wording used in the Directive ultimately adopted, as compared to the text 
initially proposed by the Commission.121
The Commission was so committed to its pro-consumer argument that in its first 
draft it even went beyond strict liability and suggested a form of absolute liability under 
which the producer would not be permitted to present any evidence to prove its lack of 
knowledge of a product's risk at the time the product was put into circulation.
  
122
                                                 
118 Amendment of the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the member States Concerning Liability for Defective 
Products, O.J. Eur. Comm. C 271, 3 (1979). 
 This 
included evidence that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when 
the product went into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the risk to the 
119 The product liability directive came nine years after the first draft of the Directive was proposed. See 
Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Statutes Of The European Community Member States Passed In 
Response To The Product Liability Directive, 32 I.L.M. 1347, 1348 (1993). See also Jane Stapleton, Bugs 
in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1231 (2002) stating that the result of such a 
difficult negotiating process is a “directive (…) of the high water marks of Euro fudge and textual 
vagueness.” In the same line see Geraint Howells, Europe’s Solution to the Product liability phenomenon, 
20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 204, 206 (1991) noting that many of the criticisms that can be made to the directive 
arise from the need to compromise between the different member states.  
120 Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573 (2001). 
121 See the Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 1997 in the case of the 
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Case 
C-300/95; 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13458, p. 16-17. 
122 Article 1 of the Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. COM (76) 
372 final, 23 July 1976. Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 11/76 stated that the producer 
of an article would be held liable for damage caused by a defect in the article, whether or not he knew or 
could have known of the defect in the light of the scientific and technological development at the time 
when he put the article into circulation. Such liability system was equivalent to the imposition of absolute 
liability on producers.   
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discovered -- the so-called “development risks” defense. Under this proposal, liability 
would have been imposed regardless of the producer’s knowledge of the risk; producers 
would have been held liable for product risks that appeared even after the product was put 
into circulation and that made the product defective, irrespective of whether those risks 
were known before the product was marketed.123 The European Parliament, though, 
strongly opposed the Commissions’ position on the development risks defense.124
The final draft of the product liability directive balanced both positions by 
introducing strict product liability in Europe while allowing member states to decide 
whether to introduce the development risks defense when transposing the Directive into 
their domestic laws. Strict liability was justified as a harmonized regime because it was 
believed not to threaten the comparative advantage of any domestic industry with respect 
to its neighbors
 
125 while preserving the principle of fair apportionment of risks between 
producers and potential victims126 through the introduction of the development risks 
defense and by facilitating injured victims to pursue their product claims and seek 
compensation.127
However, despite its intentions, all of the problems in reaching consensus during 
the Directive’s drafting process led to a text that goes only half way toward its goal of 
   
                                                 
123 See Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, COM (76) 372 
final, 23 July 1976. 
124 See Josephine Liu, Two roads diverged in a yellow wood: the European Community stays on the path to 
strict liability, 27 Fordham Int’l L J. 1940, 1953-1954 (2004) explaining the European Parliament’s 
position on the proposal.  
125 See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, Desperately Seeking Harmony: The European Community’s 
search for Uniformity in Product Liability Law, 30 Am. Bus. L. J. 35 (1992) and Geraint G. Howells & 
Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: 
Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 993 (1998). 
126 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale L. J. 1055, 1075-76 
(1972) stating that the move towards strict liability responded to a goal of minimizing accident costs and 
hence minimize accidents as well as providing injured victims with an easier and more predictable liability 
instrument compared to liability based on fault.  
127 Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 350 (2000). 
  35 
harmonizing the product liability regime in Europe and introducing strict liability for the 
first time. 
From a harmonization perspective, the Directive was intended to establish a 
common product liability regime for all member states that would ensure that European 
manufacturers where exposed to the same potential liability anywhere in Europe. 
However, this goal did not fully materialize in that the final version ultimately allowed 
some variation between member states in their transposition. As already noted, member 
states could choose whether or not to allow for development risk defenses. In addition, 
they could choose whether or not to place caps on damages.128 In practice, this has led to 
a variation in the product liability laws adopted in each member state.129
In terms of substance, the Directive was intended to introduce strict product 
liability in Europe.
  
130 For the first time, producers would be liable for the harm caused by 
defective products they put into circulation regardless of their level of care when 
producing them. The economic effect of a strict liability regime is such that producers 
become the victims’ insurers for the harm caused by their defective products because they 
bear the risks of this harm regardless of care.131
                                                 
128 See below. The issues left for the member states to decide whether to include them or not in their 
domestic transposition regulation were the inclusion of the “development risk” defense, the existence of a 
cap on damages awarded for death and personal injury resulting from the defective product and the 
possibility of including agricultural products. However, in 1997 the mad cow crisis lead the European 
Commission to propose the modification of the Directive 85/374/EEC and to include agricultural products 
and hold producers accountable. Therefore, the Directive was amended in the year 1999 by the Directive 
99/34/EC, OJ L 141 and primary agricultural products such as meat, cereals; fruit, vegetables and game 
were included within the scope of application of the Directive.  
 This is generally considered an 
129 See infra a table on the adoption of these provisions by the different member status.  
130 The adoption of a strict product liability regime is not unanimously shared in the literature. See, for 
example, William Powers, Jr., A modest proposal to abandon strict products liability, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
639, 640 (1991), claiming that strict liability rests on two premises --  that product cases are significantly 
different from other types of personal injury cases and that product cases are substantially homogeneous 
among themselves -- and arguing that such assumptions are flawed because strict products liability is 
neither a general approach to personal injury law nor a system of strict liability at all. For a defense of strict 
product liability see Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirshoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale 
L. J. 1055 (1972).   
131 This is what in economic terms is called the residual bearer. In this situation, producers would be the 
residual bearers of the injured victim’s losses not worth preventing. See Shavell, Steven, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 47 (1987). See also Sheila L. 
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economically efficient liability system in light of the asymmetric information of 
producers and consumers regarding product risks (producers generally have a 
comparative advantage over the knowledge of product risks) and of the producers' better 
access to insurance against such risks.132
However, the ultimate text of the Directive betrays a fear that a strict liability 
regime would be too burdensome, and while it speaks of strict liability, it also includes a 
number of care considerations,
  
133
Because of the low confidence member states had during the Directive's drafting 
process, the final text included a revision clause under which, every five years, the 
Commission would issue a report about the Directive's implementation and impact, and 
about potential improvements that could be made to it.
 which significantly distort the nature and impact of its 
attempt at strict liability.  
134 The first report was issued in 
1995,135 the second in 2001,136 and the third in 2006.137
                                                                                                                                                 
Birnbaum, Legislative reform or retreat? A response to the product liability crisis, 14 Forum 251, 253 
(1978-1979). 
 Thus far, the reports have 
suggested removing or increasing member states' damage caps, including pain and 
132 Richard Epstein, Product liability as an insurance market, 14 Journal of Legal Studies 645 (1985). 
133 See Preamble and article 7(e) of the product liability directive. 
134 Article 21 of the Directive. These revisions are preceded by consultations open to all interested parties 
and the reports adopt the form of Green Papers. These consultations give public authorities, consumer 
organizations and all interested parties an opportunity to participate actively in the debate on liability for 
defective products. 
135 Report on the application of council directive on the approximation of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the member states concerning liability for defective products, COM (95) 617 
final, 13.12.1995. The document can be found in http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF  
136 Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective Products, 
COM(2000) 893 final, Brussels, 31.1.2001. The document can be found in  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0893:FIN:EN:PDF 
137 Report on the application of Council Directive on the approximation of laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC of 
25 July 1985, amended by Council Directive 1999/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
10 May 1999), COM(2006) 496 final, Brussels, 14.9.2006. This document can be found in  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0496:FIN:EN:PDF 
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suffering in damage calculations, and excluding the so-called “development risks 
defense.” These proposals, however, have led to very few changes in the law.138
 
  
 
1.2 Member states’ domestic product liability laws prior to the Directive  
 
Before the adoption of the product liability directive with its strict liability (or 
quasi-strict liability) rules, injured victims seeking compensation needed to look to 
domestic tort law, and this was not uniform across Europe. No European member state 
had a formal rule comparable to the wording of the Directive or to §402A of the U.S. 
Restatement (Second).139 There were however, laws applicable to harm caused by 
products. The introduction of the Directive did not eliminate these pre-existing laws that 
remained applicable to products or types of harm not covered by the Directive.140 
Additionally, even though the Directive was intended to be a mandatory text, member 
states could still apply domestic laws that were stricter than those required under the 
Directive.141
                                                 
138 See Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 374 (2000) referring to the problems in writing the first report due to the lack of 
available data. 
 Hence, injured victims today often have a choice of suing under the product 
liability directive (as transposed domestically) or suing under pre-Directive legal 
instruments of redress, such as tort, contract or various special liability systems to the 
extent that states have opted to keep these instruments in force.  
139 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).  
140 See articles 8, 10 and 13 of the Directive 85/374 referring to domestic regulation. Article 13 is of special 
importance because it preserves the rights and injured person may have under contractual or non-
contractual liability regulation in force in the member states before the Directive was adopted. See also the 
John Meltzer, Reform of Product Liability in the EU: New Report Finds General Satisfaction, 71 Defense 
Counsel Journal 42, 49 (2004). 
141 This duality has often been considered a serious handicap of the European regulatory structure in terms 
of determining which the applicable law is. See Thomas M.J. Mollers, The Role of Law in European 
Integration, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 679, 683-684 (2000).   
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The structure of the European Union (and its predecessors) allows each member 
state to interpret its domestic law and determine the changes necessary to bring this law 
in line with European legislation.142 This has led most, if not all, member states to switch 
from fault-based or contract-based product liability systems to product liability systems 
based on strict liability.143
Before the European Directive, the product liability laws of the individual 
member states varied greatly. There were, however, some features that the laws shared in 
common:
  
144
(1) Member states had specific product liability statutes in force.
  
145
(2) Liability was available under breach of contract rules. 
  
(3) Liability in tort was available after proving fault. Presumption of fault and 
reversal of the burden of proof were available in some jurisdictions, but there 
was no such thing as a strict product liability regime.146
(4) The rules of each jurisdiction were detailed and full of exceptions.  
  
Although the legal systems of most of the European member states share a similar 
heritage, the product liability regimes of the nine member states that formed the European 
                                                 
142 Even though the Directive’s transposition into domestic legal systems is performed by legislators of the 
member states the Commission is the one able to determine whether this transposition has been conducted 
properly or not and in requesting the necessary changes to be adopted. Failure of a member state in 
complying with the Commission’s requests could result in a judicial proceeding against such member state 
before the European Court of Justice. 
143 For a broad description of the different European member states before the implementation of the 
Directive and other product liability regimes such as the Australian or the U.S. regimes see generally 
Dennis Campbell, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY, general editor, Christian T. Campbell editor; 
London; New York: Lloyd's of London Press (1993). See also William C. Hoffman and Susanne Hill-
Arning, GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE: THE NEW STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS, PRE-
EXISTING REMEDIES, PROCEDURE AND COSTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE 
ASSOCIATION, Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers (1994) and see also Patrick Kelly, 
Rebecca Attree, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY, London: Butterworths (1992).  
144 See Christopher J.S. Hodges, PRODUCT LIABILITY: EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE, 5, Sweet & 
Maxwell (1993) noting the specifics of individual member states. 
145 Christopher Hodges ed., PRODUCT LIABILITY: EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE, 328, Sweet & Maxwell 
(1993). 
146 Christopher Hodges ed., PRODUCT LIABILITY: EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE, 452, Sweet & Maxwell 
(1993) discussing treatment of burden of proof in Italy, at 391 discussing treatment of burden of proof in 
Greece, and at 589 discussing treatment of burden of proof in Spain. 
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Community when the first draft of the product liability Directive was presented in 
1976147 could be divided into three major groups:148 A first group was composed of three 
civil law countries, France, Belgium, and Luxembourg, in which courts had developed an 
extensive product liability law based on contractual liability and on commercial warranty 
law.149 These countries considered warranties to last for the entire life of a product and, 
therefore, imposed de facto strict product liability.150
A second group of countries was formed by Italy and the three countries that 
joined the European Community during or after the Council deliberations on the product 
liability directive: Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. This group was 
characterized by fault-based product liability regimes with the burden of proof on the 
injured victim. Thus, plaintiffs had to produce evidence of the tortfeasors’ fault and 
breach of warranty based on such fault was not presumed.
 
151
The last group was formed by United Kingdom and Ireland, both common law 
countries, along with Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The courts of these states 
had developed an intermediate solution between protecting industry and consumer 
interests by requiring plaintiffs to show evidence of breach of warranty or fault while 
 
                                                 
147 The nine member states in 1977 were France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, The Netherlands, and Denmark. During the negotiation process of the Directive Greece, Spain 
and Portugal joined the European Community. See generally CULTURE AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW, 
Rachael Craufurd Smith (ed.). Oxford University Press (2004). 
148 See Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, Desperately Seeking Harmony: The European Community's 
Search for Uniformity in Product Liability Law, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 35, 47-65 (1992) presenting the different 
negligence and warranty claims in force in the different member states prior to the adoption of the Product 
Liability Directive.  
149 See William C. Hoffman and Susanne Hill-Arning, GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE: THE NEW 
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS, PRE-EXISTING REMEDIES, PROCEDURE AND COSTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 14, Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation 
Publishers (1994). 
150 See Anita Bernstein, L’Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European 
Community, 31 Va. J Int’l L. 673, 697-700 (1991).  
151 William C. Hoffman and Susanne Hill-Arning, GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE: THE NEW 
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS, PRE-EXISTING REMEDIES, PROCEDURE AND COSTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 40, 72 Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers (1994). 
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placing the burden of proof on producers to prove that they were not negligent when they 
manufactured the product.152
It was not until 1985, with the adoption of the European product liability 
directive, that strict products liability, at least in the formal sense, became part of the 
European legal scene.
  
153
 
 
 
1.2.1 Spanish product liability before and after the transposition of Directive 
85/374  
 
Spanish law, both before and after the adoption of the product liability directive, 
has had different sources of regulation under which injured victims can seek 
compensation for the harm suffered: contracts and tort law.154
Contracts are regulated in the Spanish Civil Code of 1889.
  
155 The civil code 
establishes the general principle of the effects of contracts between parties or their 
heirs156
                                                 
152 See William C. Hoffman and Susanne Hill-Arning, GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE: THE NEW 
STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS, PRE-EXISTING REMEDIES, PROCEDURE AND COSTS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 22, 30, 66, Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers (1994). See also Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability 
and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227, 223 (1997). 
 and establishes that a seller is liable to the buyer for breach of contract or for 
153 S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573 (2001). 
154 For an explanation on the distinctive characteristics of Spanish contractual and tort law see Luis Díez-
Picazo, DERECHO DE DAÑOS, 246, Cívitas, Madrid (1999). 
155 Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Royal Decree of July 24 of 1889, published in the Gaceta of Madrid the 
reformed edition of the Civil Code.  
156 Article 1257 CC states that  
“Los contratos sólo producen efecto entre las partes que los otorgan y sus herederos; salvo, en 
cuanto a éstos, el caso en que los derechos y obligaciones que proceden del contrato no sean 
transmisibles, o por su naturaleza, o por pacto, o por disposición de la ley. 
Si el contrato contuviere alguna estipulación en favor de un tercero, éste podrá exigir su 
cumplimiento, siempre que hubiese hecho saber su aceptación al obligado antes de que haya sido 
aquélla revocada.” 
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hidden defects that the object of the contract might have.157 The responsibility of the 
seller is also established by Law 23/2003 of July 10 on Warranties in the Sale of 
Consumer Goods.158
The civil code also regulates liability for intentional and non-intentional torts.
 However, under contract law -- both under the Civil Code and under 
Law 23/2003 on Warranties in the Sale of Consumer Goods -- privity of contract is a 
requirement for liability. Consequently sellers are not liable to third parties who are not in 
privity of contract.  
159 
Injured victims of intentional torts or torts caused by negligence may seek compensation 
under article 1101 CC.160
                                                                                                                                                 
"Contracts will take effects between parties that enter into them and their heirs; except, regarding 
these, in the case in which the rights and obligations deriving from the contract would not be 
transferable or for its nature, or because of an agreement or for the provision of the law.  
  
If the contract contained any right in favor of a third party, such party would be allowed to 
request its performance, as long as such third party would have communicated its acceptance to 
the obligor before the provision in favor of the third party was revoked.” 
157 Article 1484 CC provides that  
“El vendedor estará obligado al saneamiento por los defectos ocultos que tuviere la cosa vendida, 
si la hacen impropia para el uso a que se la destina, o si disminuyen de tal modo este uso que, de 
haberlos conocido el comprador, no la habría adquirido o habría dado menos precio por ella; 
pero no será responsable de los defectos manifiestos o que estuvieren a la vista, ni tampoco de los 
que no lo estén, si el comprador es un perito que, por razón de su oficio o profesión, debía 
fácilmente conocerlos.” 
 
“The seller will have to remedy any hidden defects of the object sold whenever such defects would 
render the object inadequate for the purpose for which it was intended, or they would decrease its 
intended used in a way that had the buyer known of them he would not have acquired it or would 
have paid a lower price for it; but the seller will not be liable for obvious defects or defects in 
plain view, and defects not in plain view in cases where the buyer was an expert that because of its 
profession, should have easily known them.” 
This principle is also established by article 335 of the commercial code of 1885. 
158 Ley 23/2003, de 10 de julio, de Garantías en la Venta de Bienes de Consumo (BOE  núm. 165, de 11-
07-2003, pp. 27160-27164). This law has been repealed by the Royal Decree 1/2007 of November 16, for 
which approved the merged text of the General Law for the Defense of Consumers and users and other 
complementary laws (BOE num. 287, de 30-11-2007, pp. 49181-49215).  
159 In fact, while there was no specific standard regarding liability for damages caused by defective 
products, injured victims find a remedy applying contract law based on the relationship between the 
tortfeasor and the injured victim. If there was no contract between both parties, extra contractual rules 
would apply. See Antonio J. Vela Sanchez, Products liability in Spain, 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 979 (2001). 
160 Article 1101 of the Spanish civil code provides that  
“Quedan sujetos a la indemnización de los daños y perjuicios causados los que en el 
cumplimiento de sus obligaciones incurrieren en dolo, negligencia o morosidad, y los que de 
cualquier modo contravinieren al tenor de aquéllas.” 
  
“Compensation should be provided for harm caused intentionally, negligently or deliquently and 
the ones derived from such conducts” 
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Tort liability is also regulated by the Spanish civil code but consumer protection 
relies on a number of additional laws as well. The general principle in Spain of liability 
for non-intentional harm outside of contract law was long based on negligence. The Civil 
Code provides that anyone whose negligent actions or omissions -- or the actions or 
omissions of others -- cause harm to others must repair this harm.161 But the civil code is 
not the only source of consumer protection law in Spain.162
                                                 
161 Article 1902 CC establishes that  
 In fact, Spain was one of the 
few countries to adopt strict liability laws prior to the promulgation of the product 
“El que por acción u omisión causa daño a otro, interviniendo culpa o negligencia, está obligado 
a reparar el daño causado.” 
 
“Whoever caused damage to another by act or omission, because of fault or negligence, is obliged 
to repair the damage caused.” 
Article 1903 CC provides respondent superior liability and establishes liability for harm caused by others.  
“La obligación que impone el artículo anterior es exigible, no sólo por los actos u omisiones 
propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder. 
Los padres son responsables de los daños causados por los hijos que se encuentren bajo su 
guarda. 
Los tutores lo son de los perjuicios causados por los menores o incapacitados que están bajo su 
autoridad y habitan en su compañía. 
Lo son igualmente los dueños o directores de un establecimiento o empresa respecto de los 
perjuicios causados por sus dependientes en el servicio de los ramos en que los tuvieran 
empleados, o con ocasión de sus funciones. 
Las personas o entidades que sean titulares de un centro docente de enseñanza no superior 
responderán por los daños y perjuicios que causen sus alumnos menores de edad durante los 
períodos de tiempo en que los mismos se hallen bajo el control o vigilancia del profesorado del 
centro, desarrollando actividades escolares o extraescolares y complementarias. 
La responsabilidad de que trata este artículo cesará cuando las personas en él mencionadas 
prueben que emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen padre de familia para prevenir el daño.” 
 
“The obligation imposed in the precedent article is due, not only for the acts or omissions of their 
own, but also for the acts of other individuals for whom one must respond.  
Parents are responsible for the damage caused for the children that are under their care. 
Tutors are responsible for the damages caused by minors or disabled individuals that are under 
their authority and live in their company.  
Similarly the owners or manager of a shop or of a company for the damage caused by its 
employees in the exercise of their duties or of their professional functions. 
The individuals or entities who are holders of an elementary school will be liable for the harm 
caused by the minor-aged students during the periods of time in which they were under the control 
or supervision of teachers in the school, developing activities in the school or extracurricular and 
complementary activities.  
The liability established in this article shall cease when the individuals mentioned herein prove 
that they employed the diligence of a good head of a family in order to prevent harm.” 
162 See Antonio J. Vela Sanchez, Products liability in Spain, 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 979, 985 (2001) 
describing the different sources oif regulation that would result in liability for the harm caused by products 
to users or consumers.  
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liability directive. Strict liability was first introduced in Spain in Law 26/1984 of July 19 
on Defense of Consumers and Users,163 which made manufacturers strictly liable for 
harm caused by their products, albeit in very restricted and specific circumstances.164
In the same way that the Thalidomide crisis led the European Commission to 
consider consumer protection as a priority and to introduce strict product liability in 
Europe, Spain's introduction of strict product liability was also based on a catastrophe: In 
1981, industrial oil that contained toxic elements was sold to consumers and caused more 
than 300 deaths and thousands of injuries.
   
165 In light of this disaster the Spanish 
legislature responded with the imposition of strict liability on producers of certain 
products through Law 26/1984, for the defense of consumers and users (LGDCU).166 In 
the early 1990s, when the case reached the Spanish Supreme Court, the Court held 
criminally liable the perpetrators of the contamination167
                                                 
163 Law 26/1984, of July 19, General for the defense of consumers and users (BOE num. 175 and 176, of 
24-07-1984) (hereinafter LGDCU). 
 and imposed liability on the 
state for the negligent activity of the public servants who authorized the faulty oil 
manipulation without properly ensuring the oil's quality and safety for consumers.  
164 See article 28.1 of law 26/1984 establishing that  
“No obstante lo dispuesto en los artículos anteriores, se responderá de los daños originados en el 
correcto uso y consumo de bienes y servicios, cuando por su propia naturaleza o estar así 
reglamentariamente establecido, incluyan necesariamente la garantía de niveles determinados de 
pureza, eficacia o seguridad, en condiciones objetivas de determinación y supongan controles 
técnicos, profesionales o sistemáticos de calidad, hasta llegar en debidas condiciones al 
consumidor o usuario.”   
 
“Notwithstanding the established in the preceding articles, liability will be imposed for the harm 
caused by the correct use and consumption of goods and services, when for its nature or for the 
regulation applicable to it, include guarantees of certain levels of purity, effectiveness or safety, 
that can be determined in objective conditions and would represent technical controls, 
professional or systematic controls of quality, so that it would reach the consumer or user in the 
adequate conditions.” 
165 This is the case known as the Colza oil case. See Emilio Jimenez Aparicio “La ejecución de la Colza I” 
in Indret 1/2003 and “La ejecución de la Colza II” in Indret 3/2003. These documents can be found in 
www.indret.com 
166 R. Bercovitz: LA RESPONSABILIDAD POR LOS DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS DERIVADOS DEL CONSUMO DE BIENES 
Y SERVICIOS, ed. Tecnos, Madrid, 224 (1987). 
167 Spanish Supreme Court, Section 2, Caso de la Colza, RJ 1992/6783, 23.4.1992 (Decision by Hon.  
Enrique Bacigalupo Zapater). 
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A year later, in 1985, the strict liability rules of the product liability directive were 
adopted by the European Commission and Spain entered the European Community in 
1986. However, Spain did not transpose this Directive until 1994.168
The diversity of legislation bearing on product liability in Spain has led the 
Spanish legislature to systematize and organize its laws in this area in order to avoid 
confusion as well as eliminate contradictory provisions. In 2007, it passed Royal Decree 
1/2007 under which all product liability laws have been consolidated into a single law.
 That transposition 
provided for a uniform liability claim for any harm caused by a defective product 
regardless of the relationship between the manufacturer and the injured victim – either 
user or consumer.   
169 
While it remains to be seen how this law will be applied by Spanish courts (which have 
not yet addressed it),170 Royal Decree 1/2007 does not purport to make any substantial 
modifications to Spanish product liability law but instead largely systematizes the 
different acts into a single law. The only remarkable novelty introduced by this Royal 
Decree is its treatment of defective services -- an area not covered by the European 
product liability directive.171
 
  
 
1.2.2 The product liability directive’s complete harmonization goal and its 
transposition by member states 
 
                                                 
168 Law 22/1994 of July 6, of Liability for harm caused by defective products (BOE núm. 161, of 07-07-
1994).  
169 Royal Decree 1/2007 of November 16, for which approved the merged text of the General Law for the 
Defense of Consumers and users and other complementary laws (BOE núm. 287, de 30-11-2007, pp. 
49181- 49215) (hereinafter RDL 1/2007). 
170 For this reason all the cases cited and references to the Spanish product liability law transposing the 
Directive will cite law 22/1994.  
171 Articles 147-149 of RDL 1/2007 deal with liability for defective services. 
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Consumer protection was a legislative competence transferred to the European 
Commission in 1993 through article 129a of the Maastricht Treaty.172
 The Maastricht Treaty identified two types of legislative measures the European 
Community could adopt regarding consumer protection: (1) measures to complete the 
internal market and facilitate economic integration through the harmonization of member 
states' domestic laws,
 This competence 
was transferred to ensure a high level of consumer protection, through information and 
education, in such areas as health, safety and economic concerns.    
173
The harmonization goal in consumer protection regulation meant establishing 
common rules to ensure the proper functioning of the European internal market, but these 
common rules were to be flexible enough to give members states a choice of the 
instruments and standards to be used in implementing them.
 and (2) measures to support, supplement and monitor the 
policies pursued by the member states.  
174
                                                 
172 Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty), O. J. C 191, 29 July 1992. The Amsterdam Treaty, 
O. J. C 340, 10 November 1997 amended the Maastricht Treaty in 1999 and this article became article 153.   
 Hence, harmonization did 
and still does imply not so much a simple uniformity of regulation but more a common 
approach with the determination of specific content left to member states. It is easy to 
understand, then, that the compromise achieved between member states and the European 
Commission was such that the European authorities would establish harmonized 
regulation regarding the competences given to them by the Maastricht Treaty but member 
states would still have some room to adopt secondary or complementary regulation to 
enhance or increase the consumer protection levels established by the European 
harmonized regulation.  
173 These measures would be adopted pursuant article 95 (ex 100a) of the Traty of the European Union. 
174 European Consumer Law Group, Legal bases for EC consumer policy ECLG/036/05 (2005). This 
document can be found at 
http://212.3.246.142/Common/GetFile.asp?ID=16576&mfd=off&LogonName=GuestEN 
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One of the major goals of the product liability directive was to harmonize product 
liability regulation across the European member states.175 This goal has been repeatedly 
supported by the European Court of Justice in procedings against different member states. 
In such cases, the Court has considered both technical issues176
The Directive seeks maximum harmonization
 and important policy 
questions such as whether strict liability extends to product suppliers in addition to 
product manufacturers.  
177 given that consumer protection is 
still today a high priority regulation area for the European Commission178
Therefore, member states had to properly transpose the Directive and amend their 
existing domestic legislation to avoid contradicting or overlapping with the Directive.
 and hence 
considered necessary to minimize domestic variation in consumer protection rules that 
could create fragmentation of the internal market to the detriment of consumers and 
business. 
179
The European Court of Justice has held that article 13 of the Directive means that 
a member state may not maintain a general system of product liability different from that 
provided by it.
 
180
                                                 
175 See Stephen Weatherill, EU CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-Northampton 
144 (2005). 
 But at the same time the Court has held that the Directive allows the co-
176 See Commission v. France C-52/00 (2002) ECR  I-3827 where France extended the Directive’s product 
liability regime for harm under 500 euros, which was the minimum threshold the Directive required in 
article 9 b in order to be able to file a product liability prima facie case.   
177 Simon Whittaker, LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS: ENGLISH LAW, FRENCH LAW AND EUROPEAN 
HARMONIZATION, Oxford: Oxford University Press 436-444 (2005). See also Geraint G. Howells, The rise 
of European Consumer Law – Whither National Consumer Law?, 28 Sydney Law Review 63-88, 77 
(2006).  
178 See the Commission’s Consumer Policy Programme for 2002-2006 (COM 2002) 208). This document 
can be found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_137/c_13720020608en00020023.pdf 
179 See ECJ C-177/04, Commission v. France (2006) where France extended the Directive’s product 
liability regime for harm under 500 euros, which was the minimum threshold the Directive required in 
article 9 b in order to be able to file a product liability prima facie case. See also ECJ C-52/00, Commission 
v. France (2002); C-154/00, Commission v. Greece (2002); Skov AEG c. Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S (2006); 
regarding the liability of the provider and finally, C-177/04, Comission v. France (2006). 
180 See ECJ C- 183/00 María Victoria González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana where the European Court 
of Justice was asked for a preliminary ruling on the question whether Article 13 of the Directive should be 
interpreted as precluding, limiting or restricting rights granted to consumers under the legislation of the 
Member State. In this case the ECJ understood that the purpose of the Directive was to establish a 
harmonized product liability regime as  
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existence of product liability systems of a different type “based on other grounds such as 
fault, or warranty in respect of latent defects”181
Thus, despite the maximum harmonization
 or based on special liability rules for 
specific types of products. 
182 sought by the product liability 
directive,183 member states are not prevented from passing or keeping in force their 
domestic regulation complementing or covering the legislative gaps left by it or from 
establishing liability regimes based on principles different from defect, which is the basis 
of the Directive.184 Such domestic regulation, though, may not contradict the Directive.185
In sum, when an individual is injured by a defective product and has a prima facie 
case under the product liability directive, the individual may claim compensation under 
the Directive and, in addition, under any relevant domestic regulation so long as it does 
not contradict the Directive. 
 
 
 
Transposition of the Directive 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
“to ensure undistorted competition between traders, to facilitate the free movement of goods and 
to avoid differences in levels of consumer protection’.  
Therefore, harmonization was to be interpreted as complete and therefore article 13 did not allow member 
states to maintain a general system of product liability different from that provided for in the Directive. 
181See Commission v. France, C-52/00 (2002) ECR I-3827, at [15] and [24]. 
182 Maximum harmonization is an essential element of the supremacy doctrine in European law. See Case 
C-52/00, Commission v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I-3827; Case C-183/00, Maria Victoria Gonzalez Sanchez v. 
Medicina Asturiana SA, 2002 E.C.R. I-3901; Case C-154/00, Commission v. Greece, 2002 E.C.R. I-3879. 
183 Harmonization was a priority for the first twenty years of the existence of the Economic Community. 
However, in recent years minimum harmonization has been increasingly emphasized. See Thomas M.J. 
Mollers, The Role of Law in European Integration, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 679, 682 (2000). The need for 
complete harmonization has been more and more questioned. 
184 For example, Spain has a liability regime based on fault established in article 1902 of the Civil Code and 
contractual liability for hidden defects of articles 1484 of he Civil code and article 336 of the commercial 
code. See ECJ, C-183/00, María Victoria González Sánchez c. Medicina Asturiana (2002). 
185 This is one of the crucial elements of the supremacy doctrine that implies that domestic law cannot 
adopt provisions deviating from primary European law (the content of European Treaties) or from 
secondary law (acts adopted in the Community legislative process). See Geraint G. Howells, The 
relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a necessary element in the 
European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 312 
(2000). 
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Once the Directive was adopted, all member states were required to transpose its 
provisions in their domestic legislation by July 30, 1988.186 However, this transposition 
process ended up lasting many years, with most member states failing to comply with the 
1988 deadline.187 Only the United Kingdom, Italy,188 and Greece actually complied with 
it. Today, however, all EU members have finally transposed the Directive. Among the 
last to do so were Spain,189 which finally transposed it in 1994, and France, which did so 
in 1998.190 The Directive has also inspired legislation in non-EU countries such as 
Australia, Japan, Norway and Switzerland.191
In addition to being slow, the implementation process has been problematic in 
other ways, with some states failing to carry out the transposition properly.
 
192
                                                 
186 Article 19 of the product liability directive. See also Christopher J. S. Hodges, Product Liability in 
Europe: Politics, Reform and Reality, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 121, 122 (2000) and Sandra N. Hurd and 
Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for United States Business, 
31 American Business Law Journal 245, 256-247 (1993). 
 The 
European Commission brought the United Kingdom, Ireland,  Italy, France, Greece and 
Denmark before the European Court of Justice on the grounds that their domestic laws 
transposing the Directive were not actually in line with it. At the same time, the 
187 See Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 675-76 (1991) (describing chronically the member states' adoption of the 
Directive). 
188 For the Italian product liability regulation, see Richard H. Dreyfuss, The Italian law on strict products 
liability, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’. & Comp. L. 37 (1997). 
189 For an analysis on the Spanish product liability law see Antonio J. Vela Sanchez, Products Liability in 
Spain, 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 979 (2001). 
190 S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573, 581-582 (2001). 
191 Mathias Reinmann, Product Liability in a Global Context: The Hollow Victory of the European Model, 
European Review of Product Liability, 128, 134 (2003). 
192 Article 189 of the EEC Treaty states that Directives have binding force in relation to the result to be 
achieved but leaves the member states free to choose the form and method to implement them as long as 
the implementing regulation gives effect to the relevant aspects of the Directive an its principles, which are 
set out in the Directives’ recitals. See Andreas P. Reindl, Consumer Protection and the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Consumer Contracts and European Community Law, 75 Wash. U.L.Q. 627, 642-
43(1997) noting that the European Commission has exclusive right to propose Community legislation and 
John G. Culhane, The Limits of Product Liability Reform Within a Consumer Expectation Model: A 
Comparison of Approaches Taken by the United States and the European Union, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 1, 29 (1995) explaining that European directives establish community policy but its leave 
implementation to member states.  
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Commission also started proceedings against France,193 Ireland and the Netherlands for 
failure to comply with the deadline.194
The earliest case, which is the one against the United Kingdom,
  
195
Two cases can be highlighted regarding the transposition of article 9 b) of the 
Directive, which contains the 500 euro damages threshold above which injured victims 
may seek compensation. The European Commission brought actions against France
 involved the 
transposition of article 7 e) of the Directive, which deals with the development risks 
defense. The European Commission argued that the British law transposing this provision 
violated article 7 e) by allowing certain considerations that were not included in that 
article. The European Court of Justice agreed and ordered the UK government to amend 
its law.    
196 
and Greece,197
                                                 
193 Court of Justice of the European Communities; Judgment of the Court of 13 January 1993; Commission 
of the European Communities v French Republic. Case C-293/91. 1993 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7268 where 
the court stated that by failing to communicate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions by which 
it considers itself to have fulfilled its obligations under the Council Directive 85/374/EEC or by failing to 
adopt the measures necessary to comply therewith, the French Republic failed to fulfill its obligations under 
the directive and under the Treaty. The French Government acknowledged in the judicial proceding that by 
the termination of the period laid down in the court opinion, it had not yet implemented the Directive. 
 arguing that the each country's transposition of the Directive failed to 
include this limitation and requested the French legislature to amend its civil code to 
change the provision. The European Court of Justice agreed with the Commission’s 
arguments and requested France and Greece to amend their transposition law to comply 
with the Directive. Both countries amended their laws and complied with the 
requirements of the European Court of Justice.  
194 See table below. See also Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, European Community: Council 
Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member 
States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 32 Int'l Legal Materials 1347, 1350 (1993) discussing 
the timing of member states' passage of laws and also Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict 
Products Liability Attempted in the European Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 674-75 (1991) listing the 
member states’ non-compliance by the established deadline. 
195ECJ C-300/95, Commission v. United Kingdon and Northern Ireland. Opinion written by Melchior 
Wathelet. 
196 ECJ C-52/00 Commission v. Republic of France. Opinion written by Peter Jann.  
197 ECJ C-154/00, Commission v. Greece. Opinion written by Peter Jann.  
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The European Commission's action against Denmark also concluded with an 
amendment of the Danish transposition law, which the European Court of Justice 
considered improperly exposed manufacturers and distributors to the same liability 
standard, violating the Directive's approach of imposing strict liability on manufacturers 
in the first instance, and on distributors only when manufacturers cannot be identified.198 
This same issue was also raised by the European Commission in its case against 
France.199
                                                 
198 See ECJ C-327/05 Commission v Denmark (2005/C 257/12) filed by the European Commission on 
August 30, 2005.  The European Commission’s claim is based on a wrongful transposition of article 3.3 of 
the product liability directive. This case is available at  
 As of today, the various judgments of the European Court of Justice and orders 
of the European Commission for the different countries have resulted in amendments of 
the different domestic laws in order to adapt them to the product liability directive’s text.   
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:257:0007:0007:EN:PDF 
199 ECJ C-52/00 Commission v. Republic of France. Opinion written by Peter Jann. The ECJ understood 
that article 1386.7 of the French civil code subjected to the same liability standard product manufacturers 
and distributors and therefore, did not correctly transpose article 3.3 of the Directive. 
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TABLE 2.1 – TRANSPOSITION LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN MEMBER STATES200
 
 
MEMBER STATE TRANSPOSITION LAW PUBLISHED ENTRY INTO FORCE AMENDED 
AUSTRIA 
Austrian Product Liability Act,  Bundesgesetz über die 
Haftung für ein fehlerhaftes Produkt (Produkthaftungsgesetz, 
ProdHG) of January 21, 1988  
Federal Gazette 99  
Law of February 11, 
1993 and Law No. 
510/1994 
BELGIUM Loi relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits defectueux, of February 25, 1991 (Belgium’s Product Liability Act) 
Belgisch Staatsblad of 
22.23.91, p. 5884   
DENMARK Lov om Produktansvar No. 371 of June 7, 1989 Lovtidende A n [degrees] 371, p.1260   
FINLAND 
(took Directive as a 
model) 
Tuotevastuulaki/Prodcuktansvarslag (Product Liability Act of 
1990) of August 17, 1990   
Act n [degrees] 99/1993 
of 8.1.1993 
Act No 879 of 
22.10.1993 
FRANCE 
Law No. 389-98 of May 19, 1998, JO May 21, 1998 and a 
modification of articles 1386 subs. 1 et seq CC on defective 
products 
   
GERMANY Product Liability Act. Gesetz über die Haftung für fehlerhafte Produckte. Produkthaftung, §1 ProdHaftG of December 15, 1989 
Bundesgesetzblatt 1989 I 
2198   
GREECE Law 2251/1994 (replacing law of 1988)   July 1 1988 
ITALY Decreto del Presidente della Republica No.244 of May 24, 1988  Gazzetta Ufficiale n [degrees] 146 of 23.6.88 June 24, 1988 April, 1., 1991 
IRELAND Liability for Defective Products Act 1991, (no 28 of 1991) and S.I.N [degrees] 316 of 1991  December 16, 1991 June 10. 1989 
LUXEMBOURG Loi du 21 Avril 1989 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux of April 21, 1989 Memorial of 28.4.89 May 2, 1991 September 1, 1991 
THE NETHERLANDS 
Wet Productktenaansprakelijkeid 1990 (Netherlands Product 
Liability Act), contained in Book 6, Title 3, Chapter 3 §§ 185-193 
of the Netherlands Civil Code of 1991 of September 13, 1990 
Staatsblad 1990 no.487 November 1, 1990  
PORTUGAL Decreto-Lei No. 383/89 of November 6, 1989 Diario da Republica n [degrees] 255, p. 4880 21.11.89 May 23, 1998 
                                                 
200 Information from the Commission Green Paper on Liability for Defective Products, COM (1999) 396 of July 28, 1999 at 35 and from the European Centre of 
Tort and Insurance Law, Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability (B.A. Koch and H. Kaziol eds.) Kluwer Law International (2002). 
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SPAIN 
 
Law No. 22/1994 of 6 July 1994 de Responsabilidad Civil por los 
Danos Causados por Productos Defectuosos 
Boletin Oficial del Estado of 
7.7.1994, pg 217575 8.7.1994 
January 1, 1990 and 
Royal Decree 1/2007 of 
November 16, 2007 
SWEDEN Produkansvarlag (1992:18) of January 23, 1992  January 1, 1993 Law 1993: 647 of June 10, 1993 
UNITED KINGDOM Consumer Protection Act 1987, Part 1 and Consumer Protection (Northern Ireland) Order 1987 of May 15, 1987  March 1, 1988  
ICELAND Product Liability Act of March 27, 1991  January 1, 1992 
Took Directive as a 
model for its 
domestic regulation.  
NORWAY  Lov om produktansvar of December 23, 1988  
Amended extensively in 
November 1991 effective 
January 1, 1993.  
FINLAND Law 698 of 17-8-1990 (Tuotevastuulaki)   
Law 8.1.1993/99; 
22.10.1993/879 and 
27.11.1998/880. 
LIECHTENSTEIN Gesetz über die Produktehaftpflicht of November 12, 1992 (Liechtenstein Product Liability Act)    
SWITZERLAND  Bundesgesetz über die Produktehaftpflicht of June 18, 1993  January 1, 1994  
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TABLE 2.2 - OPTIONAL PROVISIONS201
 
  
 
INTRODUCTION OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT RISKS 
DEFENSE 
Art. 7(e) 
FINANCIAL CEILING 
Art. 16(1)(b) 
Austria YES NO 
Belgium YES NO 
Denmark YES NO 
France YES202 NO  
Germany YES YES 
Greece YES NO 
Ireland YES NO 
Italy YES NO 
Luxembourg NO NO 
The Netherlands YES NO 
Portugal YES YES 
Spain YES YES 
Sweden YES NO 
United Kingdom YES NO 
                                                 
201 See Commission Green Paper on Liability for Defective Products, COM (1999) 396 of July 28, 1999 at 35 and William C. Hoffman and Susanne Hill-Arning, 
GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN EUROPE: THE NEW STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS, PRE-EXISTING REMEDIES, PROCEDURE AND COSTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 9, Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers (1994). 
202 The French regulation of the development risk defense is ambiguous. On one hand, Article 12 of the French Act provides for the exclusion of "development 
liability" under tort law but on the other hand, the Sales law provides for an irrebuttable presumption of bad faith of the professional seller which seems to be 
equivalent to a "development risk liability."  
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TABLE 2.3 – OPTIONAL PROVISIONS IN THE EFTA STATES203
 
  
 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT RISKS 
DEFENSE 
Art. 7(e) 
FINANCIAL CEILING 
Art. 16(1)(b) 
Finland NO NO 
Iceland YES YES 
Liechtenstein YES NO 
Norway NO NO 
Sweden YES NO 
Switzerland YES NO 
  
                                                 
203 For the extraterritorial effect –especially among the EFTA states- of the community’s products liability rules see Rudolph Hulsenbek, Dennis Campbell, 
PRODUCT LIABILITY: PREVENTION, PRACTICE, AND PROCESS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 71, 
(1989). 
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2 Following Section 402a of the Restatement (Second)? The Directive’s Strict 
Liability Regime  
 
Product liability systems -- and tort systems more generally -- can be divided into 
three basic categories: (1) negligence-based models, which are currently employed in 
most U.S. jurisdictions204 for product liability cases, and particularly design defect cases; 
(2) strict liability models, which are laid out in section 402A of the U.S. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, and which used to be employed in many U.S. jurisdictions for product 
liability cases; and (3) no-fault systems in which injured parties are compensated by the 
state -- the approach adopted in New Zealand.205 Under negligence liability, the plaintiff 
has to show that the product was negligently made and created a foreseeable risk of injury 
and that the use or contact by the product user or consumer could be foreseen by the 
product manufacturer.206
                                                 
204 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998). See infra for an analysis of the impact and 
consequences of the strict liability regime established by the Directive. See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. 
Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 
Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2008-2009) noting that the Restatement Second of Torts did not differentiate 
between product defects but the Restatement (Third) differentiated between three sub-categories of product 
defect.  
 Under strict product liability, a manufacturer is held liable when 
a product it places into the stream of commerce causes injury to property or persons due 
to a defect that renders the product unreasonably dangerous. Strict liability is thought to 
be better able to allocate the loss that the product causes to the product user or consumer 
since the manufacturer may be able to insure against the risk of harm to person or 
205 Under the New Zealand no-fault system, neither the victim nor the producer, but society at large absorbs 
the cost of damages. The necessary funds to compensate the victim are raised from contributions to the 
social security budget or by taxes. However, such scheme is unlikely to be established elsewhere and is 
even presently being scaled back in New Zealand. Private law rules are therefore the only feasible means of 
ensuing that product victims receive compensation. See, TODD, THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW ZEALAND, 53-57 
(3rd ed. 2001). See also GERAINT HOWELLS, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 5 (1998). 
206 Hartwin Bungert, Compensating harm to the defective product itself -- A comparative analysis of 
American and German products liability law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1179, 1192 (1992). 
  56 
property207 and hence internalize and transfer the costs to the public through higher 
prices.208
The product liability directive introduced, for the first time in Europe, a strict 
liability system for personal injury, death, or damage to personal property resulting from 
products (but not services, which do not fall within the scope of the Directive).
 
209  The 
choice of such a system was made largely based on two reasons. First, such a regime was 
seen as the best way to protect the product user against any threat to life, health and 
property210 because it imposed a lower burden of proof on injured victims and provided a 
relatively easy mechanism to such victims for pursuing their product liability claims and 
seeking compensation.211
                                                 
207 Insurance of victims of product-related accidents is one of the policy goals of strict liability, the idea 
being that firms should act as insurers of product losses by incorporating the cost of insurance in the 
product price and by spreading these costs among all consumers. W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and 
Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) for a general discussion on the issue. See also Hans Claudius Taschner, 
Harmonization of product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 21, 28-29 (1999) 
regarding the goal of the product liability directive as insuring product victims and transferring such cost to 
the final product price.   
 Second, strict liability was thought to be a better way of 
208 Prices are often thought as an efficient mechanism for transferring information regarding product risks 
in the sense that they can reflect the expected liability of the manufacturer and hence provide information to 
consumers regarding the probability of harm and the magnitude of damages. Whenever consumers were 
perfectly informed regarding the probability and magnitude of harm, the Coase Theorem would hold and 
the same equilibrium would be reached regardless of the liability rule in force. For early discussions on this 
issue See J. P. Brown, Toward and Economic Theory of Liability, Journal Legal Stud. 2, 323-349 (1973), 
W. Y. Oi, The Economic Analysis of Product Safety, Bell J. Econ., 4, 3-28 (1974), P. A. Diamond, Single 
Activity Accidents, J. Legal Stud., 3. 107-64 (1974); Koichi Hamada, Liability Rules and Income 
Distribution in Product Liability, The American Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 1, 228-234 (1976) and R. 
H. Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, Journal Law Econ., 3, 1-44.(1960). For the application of this 
reasoning in the product liability discussion in Europe see Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of 
product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 21, 28-29 (1999).   
209 Christopher J S Hodges, Product Liability In Europe: Politics, Reform And Reality, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 121, 122 (2000). 
210 However, empirical studies on the effects of strict product liability on product safety are not concluding. 
See Thomas Lundmark The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product Liability Directive, 5 
D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239 (1996). For a different perspective, see Jorg Finsinger & Jurgen Simon, An 
Economic Assessment of the EC Product Liability Directive and the Product Liability Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND 
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES 185, 202-05 (Michael Faure & Roger van den Bergh eds., 1989). These 
authors develop an "informational product defect" concept that stresses the "sovereignty of the informed 
consumer," and his or her ability to choose risks that have been communicated to him. 
211 Victims’ compensation through law, and more specifically using tort law as an insurance system has 
been widely criticized. See James A. Henderson, Revising Section 402 A: the limits of tort as social 
insurance, 10 Touro L. Rev. 107, 119 (1993-1994). 
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spreading risk, given that strict liability allows, at least in theory, transferring the cost of 
the victim’s harm to the producer.212
The European model borrowed heavily from the then-existing U.S.
  
213 product 
liability system, with the product liability directive clearly taking as a reference the strict 
liability standard of the U.S. Restatement (Second) of Torts,214 which was developed in 
1965 and was adopted by most American states.215 The U.S. model was perceived as 
workable, acceptable and broadly beneficial.216
                                                 
212 Under strict liability the producer, that is the residual risk bearer, is generally considered to be in a better 
position than a consumer to obtain insurance for product-related losses because he can either self-insure or 
enter into one insurance contract covering all consumers. See Thomas Lundmark The Restatement Of Torts 
(Third) And The European Product Liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 265 (1996) and 
Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 
21, 28-29 (1999). However, neither manufacturers nor insurers are able to spread the risk indefinitely 
because the risks they face are not predictable and heterogeneous. See Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort 
law development on insurance: the availability/affordability crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. 
Rev. 285 (1988). 
 However, while the European 
Commission and the Directive's other drafters were looking to the U.S. model, they did 
not seem to take into account the changes that were then occurring in U.S. product 
liability law. The Second Restatement itself was a response to the early phases of product 
213 Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1232 (2002). See also 
Josephine Liu, Two roads diverged in a yellow wood: the European Community stays on the path to strict 
liability, 27 Fordham Int’l L J. 1940, 2005-2006 (2004) considering that this showed that the EC learned its 
lesson from the United States. For an opposite view considering that the European Community followed the 
U.S. model see James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other Countries 
Can Learn From the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, 13-14 (1999). 
See also Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 357, 400 (1992) and Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on 
Product Liability: the promise or progress ?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 403 (1988). 
214Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A Comment i (1977). Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is 
European Products Liability More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 
65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 992 (1998). See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. 
L. Rev. 1225, 1232 (2002) noting that the Directive is like the Restatement Second in certain aspects such 
as the lack of separate treatment of product defects or the definition of defectiveness. See also Aaron D. 
Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph 
of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2008-2009). 
215 However, given that the Restatements are not binding, not all U.S. jurisdictions adopted §402A (or some 
other version of strict product liability). For example, the states of Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Virginia and North Carolina did not adopt it. See Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: 
Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 710-711 (1991). 
Claims under strict liability and under negligence co-existed and both tort theories could be brought parallel 
to actions under contract law. See Hartwin Bungert, Compensating harm to the defective product itself -- A 
comparative analysis of American and German products liability law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1179, 1191 (1992). 
216 See Jane Stapleton, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 68 (1994). See also S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty 
to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 573, 581 (2001). 
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liability law in the United States.217 During the 1970s and early 1980s, courts in the 
United States increasingly questioned the strict product liability system and this system 
experienced a crisis during the mid-1980s when insurance costs led regulators and 
scholars218 to reconsider its merits. At the same time, courts in the United States were 
increasingly reconsidering strict liability for design defects and the duty to warn.219 In 
design defect cases, courts replaced the consumer-expectations test with a risk-utility test 
based on balancing principles -- the essence of a negligence-based model. With respect to 
the duty to warn, courts began to conclude that there should be no such duty when it 
comes to unforeseeable risks and that the duty should relate only to product risks that the 
manufacturer could discover given the state of the scientific and technical knowledge 
available at the moment the product was placed into circulation. Thus, as they 
reconsidered product liability standards, U.S. courts were increasingly questioning strict 
liability and introducing negligence principles in their opinions.220
This evolution culminated with the introduction of a negligence-based system 
proposed by the Third Restatement in the 1990s.
  
221
                                                 
217 This may also explain why defect was thought as a unitary concept so that products were either too 
dangerous (defective) or safe enough (non-defective). David G. Owen, The evolution of products liability 
law, 6 Rev. Litig. 955, 986 (2007). See also Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' 
Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2008-
2009) noting that despite not differentiating between sub-categories of product defects, the drafters of 
section 402A seemed to have relied on different subsets of defect cases for which risk-utility analysis was 
applied.  
 The negligence-based product 
218 Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 Ga. 
L. Rev. 601, 683-99 (1992), and David G. Owen, The Fault Pit, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 703, 705-10 (1992). 
219 See Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the 
XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective Products and 
Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121 (2002) discussing the standards applied in design defect and failure to 
warn cases. 
220 David G. Owen, The evolution of products liability law, 6 Rev. Litig. 955 (2007). 
221 See also Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product 
Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1063, 1080-1087, 1094, 1098, 1104 and 
1106 (2008-2009) presenting the design defect test adopted in the different U.S. states and noting that the 
majority of U.S. stated adopted a risk-utility test with the application of the requirement of the availability 
of a cost-effective reasonable alternative design.  
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liability regime proposed by that Restatement remains the norm in most U.S. states 
today.222
By mirroring the U.S. product liability regime at the moment when it was being 
reconsidered, redesigned and finally modified, the European Directive's drafters opened 
themselves up to criticism.
  
223 On the other hand, the Directive's defenders argued that 
adopting the fading U.S. model as the Directive's reference would not necessarily lead to 
the same problems that the U.S. was then experiencing -- problems that stemmed, it was 
argued, more from other aspects of the U.S. legal system than from the strict liability 
standard itself.224 Moreover, it was argued that the strict liability standard would make 
the European system friendlier to injured victims. Twenty years later, it is not clear that 
the product liability directive has accomplished this goal.225
The product liability directive refers to strict liability in its preamble and in its 
body. The preamble states that 
 
  
                                                 
222 Despite the shift back to negligence that the Restatement Third represented, strict liability for defective 
products and liability for negligence coexist or through case law as they have merged into a single cause of 
action. See Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports To 
The XVIth International Congress Of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective Products and 
Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121 (2002). See also David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding The 
"Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 743, 745 (1996). See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265 (1990); William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 
1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639 and Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 819 
(1992).   
223 See generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other Countries 
Can Learn From the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1 (1999) arguing 
that the adoption of a strict the product liability regime made Europe move further -instead of closer- from 
the U.S. position. 
224 Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 710-711 (1991). 
225 Up to today, it is not clear that the primary choice of injured victims of product-related accidents in 
Europe is litigation. The European Commission, aware that there may be a problem of victims in litigating, 
has taken steps to facilitate and ensure consumer’s access to justice. See the Communication from the 
Commission, “Action plan on consumer access to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the 
internal market," COM (96) 13 final (1996). This document can be found in http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF. See also Howells, Geraint, 
EC ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS, for a brief overview of the initiatives adopted by the European 
Commission regarding consumer’s access to justice. This document is available at 
http://www.iaclaw.org/Research_papers/ecaccesstojustice.pdf. 
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liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of 
adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing 
technicality, of a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern 
technological production.226
 
  
At the same time, the body of the Directive, in its article 1, provides that "the 
producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product" -- which clearly 
defines a strict liability regime. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) established 
that one who sells a product in a defective condition, thus making it unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or his property is liable to the user or consumer for 
injuries or property damage caused by the product regardless of the level of care he or she 
has exercised.227 Under §402A of the Restatement (Second), liability is imposed when 
the seller is in the business of selling the product that causes the injury and the product 
reaches the user in substantially the same condition in which it is sold. Therefore, non-
professional sellers do not fall within the scope of section 402A. The determination that a 
product is "unreasonably dangerous" depends upon whether the product has adequate 
warnings or instructions, and whether it is reasonably designed.228
The general liability statement set forth in article 1 of the product liability 
directive is similar to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) in that both provisions 
suggest that sellers are liable for injuries caused by product defects regardless of "fault" 
or other negligence considerations.
  
229 In this sense, the Directive aimed to maximize 
consumer protection by ensuring that injured victims are awarded damages regardless of 
producers’ fault or the level of care adopted.230
                                                 
226 Pmbl paragraph 2 of the Product liability directive 
 
227 §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  
228 Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws in The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 357, 359 (1992). 
229 Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws in The European Community in 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 357, 360 (1992).  
230 Hence, the conusmers’ and users’ prima facie case involves proving damaage, defect and causation 
between them but not the producer’s fault. See Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict 
Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 
85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 65, 68 (1989-1990). David. W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised 
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One of the main factors that seems to have influenced the drafters’ decision to 
introduce strict product liability in Europe is the important distinction between risk and 
loss.231 The drafters believed that loss resulting from an accident should be imposed on 
product manufacturers through liability given that they are the ones capable of spreading 
the cost of liability among product consumers and of internalizing the cost of the 
expected liability by including it in the price or by buying insurance against it.232
Despite the enthusiasm for strict product liability among the drafters of the 
Directive and other European authorities, the Directive also includes references to a “fair 
apportionment of risks” between product manufacturers and consumers and product 
users
   
233 -- a reference that seems to undercut strict liability because strict liability, by 
definition, does not imply any apportionment of risks. Moreover, this tendency to 
apportion risks among producers and consumers is reflected in other provisions of the 
Directive, which include implicit notions of negligence.234 In this sense, even without 
expressly modifying their stated strict liability principles,235
 
 the Directive's drafters seem, 
at the very least, to have implicitly watered them down. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Definition of “Product” Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 Tort & Ins. L. J. 
845, 888 (2000). 
231 Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 701 (1991). 
232 See Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: 
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law 
Journal 65, 68 (1989-1990) arguing that the availability of liability insurance for manufacturers was one of 
the arguments used in support of the introduction of strict liability.  See also M. Rotchild & J. Stiglitz, 
Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information, 90 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 629-649 (1976). See generally Hal Varian, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS, A MODERN APPROACH, 220 (4 ed. 1996) (1987). 
233 Pmbl. para 2 of the product liability directive. See Geraint Howells, Europe’s Solution to the Product 
liability phenomenon, 20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 204, 206 (1991) suggesting that the Directive has not 
provided a solution to the products liability phenomenon in terms of distribution of product risks. 
234 See infra for a discussion of the negligence elements of the Directive.  
235 Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 751, 776-777 (2003). 
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3 Products Covered by the Directive  
 
The European product liability directive overlaps with the domestic liability laws 
of the different member states. This has a number of practical consequences in terms of 
application, and often leads to confusion. For example, one body of law may appear to be 
applicable to a given suit based on the type of product at issue, while another body of law 
may appear to be equally applicable to that suit based on the type of harm involved. This 
kind of overlap has often made it often difficult to determine the scope of the definitions 
and concepts that must be applied to particular cases.  
This problem has been particularly acute when it comes to the definition of a 
product itself. Domestic legislation generally included such a definition at the time when 
the Directive was being drafted, and there was debate over how the Directive should deal 
with this issue. Many suggested that the scope of the Directive should be the same as that 
of the laws generally regulating the consequences of injuries and torts.236 However, the 
European Commission believed that the Directive should impose only a product-related 
regime. The Commission, therefore, viewed the definition of a product to be necessary in 
order to specify which damage claims could be brought under the Directive and which 
would have to be brought under domestic law. Ultimately, the Directive included a 
definition that limited its scope to movable products, including those incorporated into 
immovables or other movables.237
The strong farming lobby of the 1980s successfully pressured European 
authorities to ensure that primary agricultural products (although not products that had 
undergone initial processing)
  
238
                                                 
236 Some of the controversies and discussions were still in place after the Directive had been adopted. M. 
Goyens, Directive 85/374/EEC on Product Liability: ten years after (Centre de Droit de la Consommation, 
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1996).  
 were excluded from mandatory coverage of the 
237 Article 2 of the product liability directive.  
238 “Primary agricultural products” were defined as "the products of the soil, of stock farming and of 
fisheries.”   
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Directive's strict product liability regime.239 Game was also excluded. The agricultural 
sector argued that imposing strict liability for agricultural products could become a strong 
burden if these products were not industrially manufactured. It was up to the member 
states to decide whether they would subject agricultural products to the liability regime 
established by the Directive.240
In 1986, however, Europe witnessed the first diagnosis of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow disease. This disease, which is 
fatal to cows and is linked to similarly dangerous diseases in other livestock and in 
humans, led to widespread fears over beef consumption -- and food safety in general -- in 
Europe and throughout the world.
 Greece, Luxemburg, Sweden and Finland were the only 
member states to include agricultural products within the scope of the product liability 
directive in their transposition laws. 
241 In 1996, European authorities created a Temporary 
Committee of Inquiry into BSE, which drafted a number of proposals that the European 
Parliament adopted.242
This amendment was made applicable to primary agricultural products and game 
placed into circulation on or after 1 January 1999
 The most remarkable of these proposals was the Committee's 
1997 recommendation that the product liability directive be amended to include damages 
caused by agricultural products. 
243
Today, the Directive defines products in a very broad manner by referring to all 
“movables.”
 and thus ended the discretion 
previously given to member states on the matter.  
244
                                                 
239 Article 2 of the product liability directive  
 This includes finished goods, as well as raw materials and components 
240 Article 15 (1)(a) of the product liability directive.  
241 Some authors considered that the BSE crisis showed how vulnerable interdependent economies were to 
risks inherent to modern societies affecting their neighboring states, which can no longer be managed at the 
domestic level and require transnational responses. See Christian Joerges, Law, science and the 
management of risks to health at the national, European and international level - stories on baby dummies, 
mad cows and hormones in beef, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1, 9 (2001). 
242 Resolution of 19 February 1997 on the results of the Temporary Committee of inquiry into BSE, O.J. C 
85, (17.3.97). 
243 Council Directive 99/34/EC, OJ L 141, 4.06.99. 
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incorporated in a finished product.245 Moreover, the concept of a movable does not 
correspond exactly to the traditional notion of a consumer product and it is often 
necessary to look at the different definitions of movables provided in the domestic laws 
of the member states.246 For example, electricity is specifically mentioned in the 
definition as a movable,247 and the definition would seem to extend to such other utilities 
such as gas and water. At the same time, however, services per se are not covered by the 
Directive,248
                                                                                                                                                 
244 See Christopher Hodges, PRODUCTS LIABILITY EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London (1993) and Christopher Hodges, Reform of the Product Liability Directive 1998-1999, 3, Cameron 
McKenna (1999) arguing that the concept of product included in the product liability directive is 
ambiguous and difficult to specify. See also Gary T. Walker, The Expanding Applicability of Strict 
Liability Principles: How Is a "Product" Defined?, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1, 2 (1986), arguing in favor of a 
predictable interpretation of product.  
 and there is further ambiguity over whether the Directive extends to such 
things as intellectual products.   
245 See Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 357, 362-363 (1992) arguing that if the concept of product under the Directive included finished 
goods, raw materials and components incorporated to a finished product, such concept was broader than the 
concept of product defined under the §402A  which considers a product "any product (sold) in a defective 
condition . . . if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) (the product) is 
expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold." 
246 Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: 
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law 
Journal 65, 70 (1989-1990). 
247 But it should be noted that if electricity was defective at the time of putting into circulation -- article 6 -- 
then there would not be liability for subsequent disruptions in supply. Most courts have understood that 
"electricity is a service, not a product." However, it would appear that the provision will require 
interpretation, for example, as to when current becomes "electricity" for purposes of the Directive. Spanish 
jurisprudence includes some cases where drops in electricity voltage caused damages to the plaintiff or 
where interruptions of the electrical service caused damages. For drops in the electricity voltage see 
Winterthur Seguros, S.A. v. Gesa Endesa (electricity supplier), Court of appeals of the Balearic Islands 
17.7.07 (JUR 2007\317144; Hon: María Rosa Rigo Rosselló) and Ocaso S.A. de Seguros and Reaseguros v. 
Endesa Distribución Eléctrica, S.L. (supplier), Court of Appeals of the Balearic Islands 20.4.07 (JUR 
2007\281413; Hon: Covadonga Sola Ruiz). In both cases, the supply of electricity was interrupted and 
when resumed there was a high-tension that caused damages to certain products owned by the plaintiff. The 
court held the electricity company liable for those damages and awarded compensation to the victim. For 
interruptions of service see Nicasio Celdrán Atienza, S.A. v. Iberdrola Distribución Eléctrica, S.A. 
(supplier), Court of Appeals of Murcia 1.2.06 (JUR 2006\68585; Hon: Fernando López del Amo González) 
and Espasir Viaje, S.L. v Endesa Distribución Eléctrica (supplier), Court of appeals of Barcelona 25.1.2005 
(JUR 2005\146169; Hon: Mª Jesús Jurado Cabrera). In these cases, the interruptions of the electricity 
service caused damages to some products owned by the plaintiffs. The courts awarded damages for the 
damages suffered by the victim due to the defective electricity. 
248 There is currently no Directive or European regulation dealing with liability for defective services. 
Several drafts have been passed (the last one the Commission’s proposal presented on March 5, 2004 
COM(2004)) but the difficulty to agree upon a text suggests how difficult is becoming for member states to 
regulate this issue in a common manner. There have been proposals suggesting to define product in such a 
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In addition to covering movables in general, the Directive also covers movable 
goods that have been incorporated into immovables or other movables.249 Consequently, 
producers of final products are liable for harm caused by defective components they 
include in a final product,250 although not for the damage to the defective product 
itself.251 From the consumer/user’s perspective, the distinction between a defective final 
product and a defective product component does not have much impact. Under the 
Directive the consumer may seek compensation from the manufacturer of either the 
component or the final product, and it is often easier to sue the final product manufacturer 
since claimants generally lack the expertise and information necessary to determine that 
harm was caused by a particular product component or to establish the identity of that 
component's manufacturer.252
 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
ways that could include intangible as well as tangible items. In this sense, the product/service distinction 
would not become relevant any longer and this would be important in Europe given the difficulty to 
regulate and impose liability for defective services. David. W. Lannetti, Toward a Revised Definition of 
“Product” Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 Tort & Ins. L. J. 845, 889 (2000). 
Services are to be covered by the proposed Directive on liability of supplies of services: draft at 
O.J.18.1.91, 91/C 12/11. However, such Directive has never been in effect and is still subject to debate. The 
distinction between products and services has often been questioned. See David W. Lannetti, Toward a 
Revised Definition of "Product" under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 Tort & Ins. 
L.J. 845, 865-870, 887 (2000) arguing in favor of abandoning the difference between product and service 
and arguing in favor of a unified liability regime under the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.   
249 Article 2 of the product liability directive. 
250 Under domestic contribution rules, product manufacturers will be able to seek contribution and recover 
the liability award paid for the damages caused by the defect in the product component.   
251 Article 9(b) of the strict liability directive does not provide compensation for the damages caused to the 
defective product itself but in the case that a claimant could identify the defective component and its 
manufacturer, he/she could bring a claim against the manufacturer of the defective component and recover 
the loss caused for damage to the defective product itself.  However, there are Spanish cases where, even 
acknowledging that the product liability directive does not provide for such compensation, courts awarded 
damages for the harm suffered to certain products such as a truck caused by a defective break system.  
Jesús Manuel v. Autos Lobelle, S.L. and Nissan Motor España, S.A., Court of Appeals of La Coruña 
25.4.06 (JUR 2006\152372; Hon.: José Ramón Sánchez Herrero).  
252 The damage to the product itself is excluded from the scope of the Directive. For an analysis of the 
treatment of the recoverability of physical damage to the product itself in the United States and Germany 
see Hartwin Bungert, Compensating harm to the defective product itself – A comparative analysis of 
American and German products liability law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1179 (1992). 
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4 Producers and other Actors Subject to the Strict Liability Regime  
 
Because the product liability directive is one of the major instruments of the 
European product regulation and because its drafters wanted to facilitate consumers' 
ability to obtain compensation from potential tortfeasors, the scope of the concept of 
producer under the Directive embraces as many participants of the manufacturing process 
as possible.253 This makes it easy for consumers to bring their product claims against the 
maximum number of potential tortfeasors.254 This is often referred to as the channeling of 
liability in the product liability directive.255
The Directive’s definition of producer is quite similar to the definition of "seller" 
in the Restatement (Second) in the sense that it encompasses all persons in the chain of 
production, from the producer of raw materials to the retailer.
  
256 It subjects to primary 
liability the producer of the product but also all parties that present themselves as 
producers -- for example importers into the European Community -- and that give the 
public the impression that they are the producers257 as well as any party putting its name, 
trademark, or distinguishing mark on a product causing the user to believe it is the 
producer.258
                                                 
253 Article 3 of the product liability directive defines producer as the  
 At the same time, the concept of producer does not embrace all entities 
involved in the pre-manufacturing process. Designers, for instance, are not included. 
“the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of any raw material or the manufacturer of 
a component part and any person who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing 
feature on the product presents himself as its producer.” 
254 Christopher J. S. Hodges, Product Liability in Europe: Politics, Reform and Reality, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 121, 122 (2000). 
255 Jane Stapleton, Products Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 45, 
52 (1999). 
256 Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A. See also Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The 
European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 357, 361-362 (1992).   
257 Article 3(1) of the Directive. Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Fifth Chamber) of 10 May 
2001, Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hojesteret – 
Denmark; Case C-203/99. European Court reports 2001 Page I-03569. 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 6690. 
258 This is the so called “own-brand producer.” See Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in The United 
Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 45, 52 (1999). 
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In most product liability cases, consumers do not interact with the product's (or its 
component parts') manufacturers and therefore generally cannot identify them. In order to 
avoid placing injured victims in a defenseless situation, the product liability directive 
expressly provides that the party responsible for placing the product in the European 
market for the first time259 is liable for the potential damages caused by it.260
Sometimes, though, consumers will not be able to identify the producer or the 
importer of the product. In order to protect injured victims in those cases and facilitate 
their pursuit of a product claim, the Directive holds each supplier of the marketing chain, 
including the retailer, subject to liability.
 This 
includes manufacturers of products produced in the European Union and also importers 
of producers produced outside of the European Union boundaries but marketed within the 
European Union market. The importers considered producers under the Directive are the 
ones who introduce the product into the European market for the first time. The 
movement of the product from one member state to the other within the European Union 
market is not considered an import under the meaning of the Directive. 
261 However, the position of producers and 
suppliers is not equivalent: suppliers are liable only in cases when it is not possible to 
identify the producer.262 Only in such cases will the supplier be treated as the producer.263
                                                 
259 Section 2 of article 3 of the Directive places liability also on any person who imports into the 
community a product for sale, hire, leasing, or for its distribution in the course of his business. Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 15 
December 1988. Criminal proceedings against Esther Renee Bouchara, nee Wurmser, and Norlaine SA., 
Case 25/88.  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny - France. 1988 
ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7211. 
 
260 This sometimes makes it difficult for injured victims to sue the importer, especially when this is based in 
another member state because of the different civil procedure laws of the different member states and the 
multi-jurisdictional structure of some of them. Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 31, 
Darmouth publishing Company Limited (1993). 
261 Article 3(3) of the product liability directive.  
262 The Directive requires the supplier or other known members in the distribution chain to provide to the 
injured consumer with the identity of the producer within a reasonable period of time. If the supplir can 
name one of the primarily liable parties he will be discharged from liability. See Jane Stapleton, Products 
Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 45, 52 (1999) and Lucille M. 
Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European Community And 
Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. 
Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 652 (1993). 
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Hence, suppliers are treated as the manufacturers and importers but only in a subsidiary 
way, whenever the manufacturer or importer cannot be identified or whenever the 
supplier has sold the product already knowing that it was defective.264
The Directive provides two major exceptions to its general inclusiveness of 
producers and other agents subject to liability. First, the Directive excludes from liability 
importers that merely transport a product between member states as opposed to those who 
import from outside the European Union. Presumably, this does not present a large 
problem for consumers, because European law allows them to easily enforce judgments 
anywhere in the European Union.
 Through this 
liability structure, a consumer will always have an EU-domiciled defendant against 
whom to bring a claim and, if appropriate, enforce a judgment.  
265
                                                                                                                                                 
263 In the European Court of Justice Preliminary ruling of Interpretation in the case C 402/03 Skov Æg v. 
Bilka, it was held that an intermediary such as a retailer could not be strictly liable instead of a producer 
under the Directive 85/374/EEC. The Court understood that the Directive 85/374/EEC intended complete 
harmonization of liability for defective products in Europe and consequently, member states could not have 
a system of no fault or strict liability for defective products of persons other than those defined by the 
Directive itself. Nor could member States transfer the liability of the producer to other persons such as 
retailers. But the Court did state that member States were free, under the Directive, to have a liability 
system in which a supplier or retailer was liable under negligence or fault. 
 Because of this enforcement capability, it should 
generally be just as easy to pursue compensation from a European manufacturer, or from 
the party that imports a product into the European Union from outside, as from an intra-
Union importer. Because that same capability does not exist in relation to manufacturers 
based in most countries outside of the European Union, the parties that import products 
264 For example, in Jean L.B. v. Goyo e Hijos C.B. (retailer), Court of Appeals of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 
23.9.01 (JUR 2001\18469; Hon: Pilar Aragón Ramírez). In this case, the plaintiffs brought an action against 
the product retailer and the court dismissed the claim because the product manufacturer was perfectly 
identified and therefore the product claim should have been brought against him instead of against the 
product retailer. See also Segurcaixa, S.A. de Seguros y Reaseguros v. SMEG España, S.A. (supplier), 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona, 29.11.04 (AC 2004\2017; Hon: Laura Pérez de Lazarraga Villanueva).  In 
this case, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s product claim brought against the product supplier because both 
the product manufacturer and the importer of the product could be identified.  
265 The Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, September 27 1968 [Official Journal C 189 of 28.07.1990]. The Brussels Convention regulates the 
courts with jurisdiction in civil or commercial legal disputes between individuals residing in different 
member states of the European Union and the European Free Trade Association and includes rules 
regarding the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
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from outside the European common market are the ones exposed to liability under the 
Directive.  
The second exception to the Directive's general inclusiveness is that when a 
product is delivered and the producer is unknown, the supplier is treated as its producer 
unless the supplier can identify the actual producer.266
It is not uncommon for an injured victim to pursue his or her product liability 
claim against two or more potential tortfeasors. As already noted, one of the major goals 
of the product liability Directive is to ensure that injured victims are able to obtain 
compensation for the harm they suffered. For that reason, in cases where there are 
multiple defendants, the Directive makes them jointly and severally liable. This allows 
the victim to recover full damages from any one of the defendants and therefore be 
assured of compensation despite not knowing which defendant caused the damage and to 
what extent.
  
267 The Directive does not deal with issues regarding how these defendants 
are to ultimately apportion liability among themselves or how the paying defendant 
should seek contribution from the other tortfeasors. Instead, the Directive leaves these 
issues to each state's domestic law.268
In Spain, Law 22/94 transposed the Directive and included a joint and several 
liability for damages caused by multiple tortfeasors in its article 7.
 
269
                                                 
266 Article 3(3) of the product liability directive.  
 The law then refers 
to domestic regulation to determine how a tortfeasor who pays on behalf of other 
267 Article 5 of the product liability directive. See also Preamble paragraph 5. The joint and several liability 
is without prejudice of any applicable domestic provisions regarding contribution between them.  See 
Mercedes v. Instaladores C.C.C., S.L. (supplier), Court of Appeals of the Balearic Islands 28.12.04 (JUR 
2005\38399; Hon: Santiago Oliver Barceló) where the court held joint and severally liable the manufacturer 
of a defective water boiler and the supplier/installer of the boiler for having installed it incorrectly. The 
contribution among them was to be determines in application of domestic regulation in a subsequent 
lawsuit. See also Jesús María M. C. v. Conal Hispania, S.A. and Celaya Parreño, S.L., Court of Appeals of 
Burgos 16.12.03 (JUR 2003\43604; Hon: Ildefonso Barcalá Fernández de Palencia) where the court held 
the manufacturer and the subcontractor -- who had the duty to supervise and ensure the product had the 
safety the consumer was entitled to expect -- of a platform in a wine store were joint and severally liable for 
the harm caused by it to the injured victim when it broke.  
268 Article 5 of the strict product liability Directive. 
269 Today, law 22/94 has been overruled by the RDL 1/2007 and provides, in its article 132, that whenever 
damages are caused by multiple tortfeasors this will be jointly and severally liable. 
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tortfeasors may seek contribution from the others.270 Under the Spanish civil code, when 
the obligation among the tortfeasors is joint and several, the injured victim may file a 
claim against any of the tortfeasors or against all of them271 and the payment of one of 
them reduces or extinguishes the obligation of the others.272 The procedural aspects, such 
as whether all tortfeasors should be sued jointly in the same legal process or whether a 
judgment against one of them extinguishes any potential claim against the others are also 
governed by domestic law. In Spain, under the current rules of civil procedure, an injured 
victim would have to sue all the tortfeasors who might be held joint and severally liable 
so that they can take part on the judicial process and defend their position and their 
possible non-liability.273
                                                 
270 Article 143 of RDL 1/2007 provides a three year period for the paying tortfeasor for seeking 
contribution from the other jointly and severally liable tortfeasors. The RDL, though, does not specify how 
this contribution should be done. It should be noted that the product liability directive in its article 12 
expressly declares that contractual limitations between producers will be null and void.   
 Hence, if one of the tortfeasors is not part of the judicial process 
271 Article 1137 Civil Code states that  
“La concurrencia de dos o más acreedores o de dos o más deudores en una sola obligación no 
implica que cada uno de aquellos tenga derecho a pedir, ni cada uno de éstos deba prestar 
íntegramente, las cosas objeto de la misma. Sólo habrá lugar a esto cuando la obligación 
expresamente lo determine, constituyéndose con el carácter de solidaria.” 
 
“The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one obligation does not 
imply that each of them would have the right to request, or have to comply with, the object of the 
obligation in full. The performance of the obligation in full by any of the parties will have to be 
expressly established, becoming the character of the obligation in solidarity.” 
272 Article 1145 CC 
“El pago hecho por uno de los deudores solidarios extingue la obligación. El que hizo el pago 
sólo puede reclamar de sus codeudores la parte que a cada uno corresponda, con los intereses del 
anticipo.  
La falta de cumplimiento de la obligación por insolvencia del deudor solidario será suplida por 
sus codeudores, a prorrata de la deuda de cada uno” 
 
“The payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the obligation. The debtor who 
made the payment could claim against the co-debtors the share that would correspond to each of 
them, with the adequate interests.  
Non-compliance with the obligation because of insolvency of one of the solidary debtors will be 
replaced by his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each of them.”  
273 Article 542.1 of Law 1/2000 of January 7 of Civil Procedure (BOE 7, of January 8, 2000 pp. 575-728. 
amendment of errors BOE num. 90, de 14-04-2000, p. 15278 and BOE num. 180 of July 28, 2001, p. 
27746). This article, regarding the obligation of the joint and severally liable debtor establishes that  
“Las sentencias, laudos y otros títulos ejecutivos judiciales obtenidos solo frente a uno o varios 
deudores solidarios no servirán de título ejecutivo frente a los deudores solidarios que no 
hubiesen sido parte en el proceso.” 
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it will not be possible to seek payment from him.274
Even though this procedure may differ from one member state to another and its 
application presents potential problems -- particularly with regard to the Directive’s 
harmonization goal -- the second report of the Commission justified the continuation of 
the joint and several liability rule among potential tortfeasors. This rule remains in force 
today.
 At the same time, a judgment against 
one of the tortfeasors will be binding on the others who are part of the judicial process 
regarding the existence of the obligation but not its content.  
275
 
 
 
4.1 Who contributes to the physical creation of the product  
 
The concept of producer has what could be called a physical production side and a 
marketing or trade side. With regard to the physical production of the product itself, the 
product liability directive considers producers both manufacturers of final products and 
manufacturers of components or product parts, as already noted.276
                                                                                                                                                 
“The judgments, awards and other judicial rights obtained only against one or some of the joint 
and severally liable debtors will not be an executive title against the other debtors who were not 
part in the judicial process.” 
  
This is a novelty of this law of civil procedure of 2000 given that the former Law of Civil Procedure of 
1881, in its article 421 established that filing a claim against any of the joint and severally liable tortfeasor 
was enough and the judgment against all of them -- even if not part of the procedure -- was binding against 
them. After the Spanish Constitution was passed, in 1978, this article contradicted article 24 of the 
Constitution whereby no-one can be punished without having been able to defend and have been afforded 
fair justice. Therefore, this article was amended and modified in the new law of 2000. Today it is necessary 
to file the damage claim against all the tortfeasors so that they can take part in the process and therefore be 
obliged to pay. The judgment stating the obligation to all tortfeasors will be binding despite their 
participation in the judicial process but this judgment will not be enforceable against those who have not 
taken part in it.  
274 Article 542.1 Law 1/2000 of Civil Procedure. 
275 Green paper Liability for defective products presented by the Commission on July 28, 1999, 
COM(1999)396 final, at 20. This document can be found at 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf 
276 Article 3 of the product liability directive. 
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The Directive does not define what constitutes an act of manufacture. From the 
wording of the Directive and its context it can be understood that the manufacturer is 
equivalent to the producer of a finished product or of component parts277 but not someone 
who solely installs or repairs a product that is already in its finished state -- unless this 
partly modifies the product by replacing parts or installing new parts.278
At the same time, manufacturers of component parts and raw materials are liable 
for the harm caused by the defect in these product components as long as they render the 
finished product defective as well.
  
279 However, the manufacturers of product components 
are exempt from liability whenever the defect "is attributable to the design of the product 
in which the component has been fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer 
of the product.”280 Such definition covers people who extract, process, refine or assemble 
raw materials.281
In light of this definition, it is foreseeable that component manufacturers will be 
interested in receiving detailed contractual specifications and instructions from the final-
product manufacturers regarding the components needed and the use for which the 
  
                                                 
277 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products Should Not Be Required To Rescue Users From 
Risks Presented By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 Sw. U.L. Rev. 595, 611-612 (2008) noting that 
producers of components parts should only be held liable for the harm caused by a defect in the final 
product to the extent that the product component and the final product jointly and synergistically present 
higher risks than each of them separately. Henderson argues that if the product component is not defective 
but the final product is defective; liability should not be imposed on manufacturers of component parts.  
278 Such person would be liable for defective services if the Directive proposal (Commission’s proposal 
presented on March 5, 2004 COM(2004)) would be adopted.   
279 Lockatrucs v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, S.A. (manufacturer), Nirvauto, S.A. y Direcauto, S.L, (importer). 
Court of Appeals of Zaragoza 10.2.04 (JUR 2004\92259; Hon: Antonio Luis Pastor Oliver) where the court 
held the importer of a final product liable for the harm caused by the defect in a component part that 
rendered the final product defective. 
280 Article 7(f) of the product liability Directive.  
281 See Guido Alpa, Manufacturer, Importer and Supplier Liability in Italy Before and After the 
Implementation of the E.E.C. Directive on Damages for Defective Products, 6 & 7 Tul. Civ. L.F. 233, 237-
238 (1991-92). Alpa has raised the question of how to categorize suppliers of computer software, 
considering that liability should be "extended to the manufacturer of a machine which contains defective 
software and is therefore unsafe." 
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product is ultimately intended. Such information may help reduce the risk of liability 
resulting from the production of a defective component.282
 
  
 
4.2 Any person who presents himself as its producer 
 
In many cases, the name of an individual or entity written on the product or on the 
label or other written materials accompanying the product provides the only information 
readily available to a consumer/user regarding who might be liable for injuries that the 
product causes. The product liability directive imposes strict liability on any party that 
presents itself as the producer of the product by putting its name, trademark or other 
distinguishing feature of the product.283
 
 This provision is most relevant in cases where 
the consumer does not know the actual product manufacturer. 
 
4.3 Any person who imports into the community a product for sale, hire, lease or any 
form of distribution in the course of his business  
 
The product liability directive also subjects to strict liability the importer of the 
product into the European Union, regardless of where within the Union this importat 
takes place.284
                                                 
282 A supplier should ideally keep copies of all product information and advertising so as to avoid a 
potential “failure to warn” case.    
 In general, given the difficulty of victims in identifying product 
manufacturers, especially foreign producers, it is useful to be able to bring a claim against 
283 Article 3(1) of the product liability directive. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products 
Should Not Be Required To Rescue Users From Risks Presented By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 
Sw. U.L. Rev. 595, 610 (2008) arguing that trademark licensors who do not participate in the manufacture 
or distribution of the product should not owe any duty to the potential victim and hence should not be 
subject to liability for risks it does not and cannot control.   
284 Article 3(2), 3(3) of the product liability directive. See Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The 
European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 357, 361-362 (1992). 
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the person who initially places the product into the Union.285 This provision is a 
consequence of the structure of the European Union, where trade between member states 
is considered trade within a single market and so it does not matter in which state the 
actual importat from outside the Union took place.286
Allowing victims to sue such importers ensures that there is some potential 
defendant within the European Union boundaries who is primarily liable as a producer. 
This is of great help for victims who are relieved of having to identify and bring a claim 
against the foreign manufacturer and who can therefore avoid foreign law issues, 
problems of enforceability of a judgment and high costs.  
 
This obligation imposed on importers might seem too strict and disproportionate. 
Besides any fairness considerations, however, the obligation is actually quite consistent 
with the position in which European law generally places importers, treating them more 
strictly than intra-Union distributors. For example, the European Economic Community 
allowed the imposition on importers and domestic manufacturers of the obligation of 
retaining (and facilitating the evaluation of) available documents about the characteristics 
of their products.287
                                                 
285 See Lockatrucs v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, S.A. (manufacturer), Nirvauto, S.A. y Direcauto, S.L, 
(importer). Court of Appeals of Zaragoza 10.2.04 (JUR 2004\92259; Hon: Antonio Luis Pastor Oliver) 
where the court held the importer of a final product into the European union market liable for the harm 
caused by the defect in a component part that rendered the final product defective. 
 The failure to fulfill this obligation would result in the application of 
286 The concept of importer into the European Community raised some interpretation issues that led the 
European Commission to take legal actions against France in two different cases. The European Court of 
Justice, in a joined opinion that Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 18 Septembre 2001; 
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. Case C-52/00. 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 
6747; 2002 ECR I-3827, where the European Commission brought an action against the French Republic 
under Article 226 EC for failure to fulfill obligations when transposing the Directive into French national 
law and the case Court of Justice of the European Communities. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van 
Gerven delivered on 15 December 1988. Criminal proceedings against Esther Renee Bouchara, nee 
Wurmser, and Norlaine SA., Case 25/88.  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de grande instance 
de Bobigny - France. 1988 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7211 where the European Court of Justice understood that 
France was treating French producers and importers under different standards than the ones applied to the 
European producers. 
287 Court of Justice of the European Communities. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven delivered 
on 15 December 1988. Criminal proceedings against Esther Renee Bouchara, nee Wurmser, and Norlaine 
SA., Case 25/88.  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny - France. 
1988 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7211. P 25 Citing the judgment of 17 December 1981 in Case 272/80, (1981) 
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stricter rules of criminal liability than those applicable to the distributor of domestic 
products. Thus, extra-Union importers were subject to a higher degree of care than intra-
Union distributors.288 Nevertheless, such measures were considered extraordinary in the 
sense that they needed to be proportionate to the goal they pursued and could be adopted 
as long as they were not inherently discriminatory for the importer or for the imported 
products.289
Importers do not bear an absolute responsibility for the products they import to 
the Union market. For instance, in cases where the manufacturer does not make it 
possible to verify whether the products conform to the domestic rules of the importing 
country -- either because it does not want to provide the information or because it does 
not provide the documents including this information -- the importer may be required to 
provide a product sample to determine such conformity and determine the liability of the 
producer. Similarly, whenever the importer has reason to doubt the accuracy of the 
documents supplied by the manufacturer, member states may require the seller of those 
products to verify a sample of them and determine whether the information given to the 
importer is accurate.  
  
Considering the product liability directive's purpose of facilitating victim’s 
compensation, it would not seem consistent to impose liability on importers to the 
European common market and yet leave exempt distributors within this internal market. 
However, importers and distributors are not subject to the same liability standard. While 
importers are primarily responsible for harm caused by the defective products they import 
                                                                                                                                                 
ECR 3291, paragraph 15, and the Opinion of Mr Advocate General VerLoren van Themaaat in Case 124/81 
Commission v United Kingdom (1983 )ECR 248, and at p. 249.  
288 Court of Justice of the European Communities. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven delivered 
on 15 December 1988. Criminal proceedings against Esther Renee Bouchara, nee Wurmser, and Norlaine 
SA., Case 25/88.  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny - France. 
1988 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7211. P 26.  
289 Court of Justice of the European Communities. Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven delivered 
on 15 December 1988. Criminal proceedings against Esther Renee Bouchara, nee Wurmser, and Norlaine 
SA., Case 25/88.  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny - France. 
1988 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7211 p14.  
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into the European market, distributors or suppliers within the Union have secondary 
liability where the product is imported into the Community and it is not possible to 
identify who imported it.290 Hence, a supplier will not be liable if he informs the victim 
of the identity of the producer.291 But the Directive provides that suppliers will be liable 
“even if the name of the producer is indicated"292
 
 so that they do not avoid being held 
liable by identifying a producer who is outside the Community. This liability structure 
could lead to somehow counter-intuitive results in cases where, for example, the product 
supplier could not identify the importer but could identify the foreign producer and 
therefore avoid secondary liability while leaving the victim in a complicated situation to 
bring a claim.  
 
4.4 Product suppliers whenever the product manufacturer cannot be identified 
 
The drafters of the product liability directive seem to have been well aware that 
globalization and the context of international trade imply that very often consumers do 
not know who the product manufacturer is. For that reason, the product liability directive 
includes mechanisms for cases in which the producer cannot be identified293 and places 
secondary liability on each supplier in the chain of distribution, regardless of their level 
of care.294
                                                 
290 Article 3(3) of he product liability directive. See also Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The 
European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 357, 361-362 (1992). 
  
291 Article 3 of the product liability directive.  
292 Article 3(3) of the product liability directive. 
293 Article 3(3) of the product liability directive. This Article represents a significant administrative and 
financial burden for members of the supply chain because if suppliers or importers cannot pass liability up 
the chain they need to access to information in order to be able to establish that either the product was not 
defective; that it was defective but that the defect did not exist at the time of supply or that they did not 
know about the product risks in order to be able to use the development risks defense. Such information 
will be quite difficult to obtain from the product manufacturer and will represent a significant burden for 
the members of the supply chain. 
294 Article 3(3) of the product liability directive.  
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The term "supplier" embraces intermediate sellers, including wholesalers and 
retailers, and perhaps even other parties with distribution functions.295
There is no specific mention in the product liability directive of how it is to be 
established that the producer could not be identified.
   
296 Therefore, it is not clear whether 
there is a burden on the claimant to prove this or just to declare it. This issue has been 
addressed by the different member states, which have created domestic mechanisms so 
that whenever the injured person cannot identify the product manufacturer, he or she can 
request anyone in the chain to identify others further up the chain, the idea being that this 
request will go on until the victim will be able to identify the producer.297
In Spain, for example, article 138.2 of RDL 1/2007 establishes liability for the 
supplier whenever the producer or importer of the product cannot be identified within 
three months by either the injured victim or the supplier.
  
298
                                                 
295 The paragraph 5 of the Preamble of the Directive seems to suggest a broad interpretation of the concept 
of supplier when it establishes that "in situations where several persons are liable for the same damage, the 
protection of the consumer requires that the injured person should be able to claim full compensation for 
the damage from any one of them."  
 Further, if the supplier has 
sold the product knowing the existence of the defect, it will be liable as the product 
manufacturer or the importer but will have a contribution claim against these entities for 
296 The European Court of Justice has established that domestic regulation could not expose producers and 
suppliers to the same primary liability standard. See paragraph 37 of Case C-402/03, Skov Æg v. Bilka 
Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen and Michael Due Nielsen on a 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Vestre Landsret where the court stated that  
“it follows that the Directive must be interpreted as precluding a national rule under which the 
supplier is answerable without restriction for the liability of the producer under the Directive.”  
297 In fact, some member states such as France or Denmark did not transpose this provision into their 
domestic laws correctly. France placed suppliers under the same strict liability as product manufacturers 
and Denmark subjected suppliers’ liability only to the provisions of domestic law and not under the 
subsidiary liability established by the Directive. See Commission v. France, C-52/00 (2002) ECR I-3827 
and Skov AEG v. Bilka Lauprisvarenhus A/S C-402/03 (2006) 2 CMLR 16, at [17].  
298 This provision was established in article 4.3 of law 22/94 transposing the product liability directive. For 
cases applying this article see Julián v. Autoservicios Miguel, Court of Appeals of Tenerife 9.12.05 (JUR 
2006\69428; Hon: Modesto Blanco Fernández del Viso) and Ramón and Seguros A, S.A. v. C (supplier), 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona 10.5.00 (EDJ 2000\48626; MP: Dolors Montolió Serra). In these cases, the 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona and Tenerife held a product supplier liable for the harm suffered by the 
victim because he did not identify the product manufacturer within the three months provided by the law.  
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the compensation paid to the victim.299 Beyond these specific situations, the supplier or 
product seller will be liable under contract law or under the liability provisions of the 
Spanish civil code.300
Under the product liability directive, whichever member of the supply chain 
identifies the producer, that member alone will be able to avoid liability. Given the great 
incentives this gives suppliers to identify the producer or to provide any other name in the 
supply chain, it would be very suitable if liability would be dependent on the ability to 
correctly identify the producer or a previous supplier, even when in good faith. Otherwise 
such system would lose its purpose. These mechanisms created either by the Directive or 
by the member states aim to provide some kind of equitable solution to the unfairness that 
would result from imposing liability on retailers for defects of which they could not 
possibly have been aware of. This is particularly true for retailers who sell products in 
sealed packages.  
  
From a practical perspective, this means that in order to avoid liability, firms have 
to keep records of their transactions and the product they supply in order to be able to 
point to whoever is responsible for the defect and therefore avoid liability. Nevertheless, 
the burden to show the damage, the defect and the causal relationship between defect and 
damage still remains on the consumer.301
 
 
 
5 Plaintiffs Protected by the Directive      
 
The product liability directive does not specify that the claimant need be a 
consumer, user or purchaser of the product or have any proprietary interest in it. The 
                                                 
299 When selling the product knowing the existence of a defect, the supplier is not liable secondarily but it is 
put in the same position as the producer or the product importer. See RDL 1/2007, addendum to law 22/94.  
(Disposición Adicional Única). 
300 Article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code. 
301 Article 4 of the product liability directive. 
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body of the Directive refers to “injured person” while the preamble refers to 
“consumers,” which are not equivalent concepts.302 It seems reasonable to understand 
that all these potential victims are embraced by the product liability directive and may be 
entitled to bring a claim for the damages they suffered due to a defective product. Under 
the Directive, the categories of plaintiffs entitled to bring claims are diverse and the 
differences between them relate to the damages to which they are entitled. So while 
consumers-purchasers will be able to recover for property damage, an injured innocent 
bystander will be able to claim only the personal damages suffered.303 In any case, the 
final identification of the victim entitled to compensation, though, will be determined by 
the laws of each member state.304
In Spain, the different laws dealing with product liability reflect different 
approaches: while the LGDCU was applicable to consumers and users
  
305 article 129 of 
the RDL 1/2007 is applicable to consumers, users and bystanders.306
                                                 
302 Article 4 of the product liability directive does not define the central term consumer. Marshall S. Shapo, 
Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American Law, 26 Cornell Int'l L.J. 279, 283 
(1993). 
  
303 Article 9(b)(ii) of the product liability directive. Similarly, the Restatement Second section 402A also 
left the definition of the scope of plaintiffs for courts – comment o Restatement (Second) of Torts§402A- 
and courts established that purchasers of the product as well as bystanders fell within the scope of section 
402A of the Restatement (Second), either under negligence or strict liability. See Richard W. Wright, The 
principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1071 (2007). In contrast, the Restatement Third does not 
include a reference to bystandards even though they seem to be included under the liability for harm to 
“persons.” See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 1. See also Mark A. Geistfeld, Principles 
of Product liability 16, 252 (2006). 
304 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
delivered on 14 December 2000; Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary 
ruling: Hojesteret. Case C-203/99. 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7596; 2001 ECR I-3569.  
305 Article 25 of the Law 26/1984, of July 19, of the General Defense of Consumers and Users (LGDCU) 
(BOE nums. 175 and 176, of July 24, 1984). 
 “El consumidor y el usuario tienen derecho a ser indemnizados por los daños y perjuicios 
demostrados que el consumo de bienes o la utilización de productos o servicios les irroguen salvo 
que aquellos daños y perjuicios estén causados por su culpa exclusiva o por la de las personas de 
las que deba responder civilmente.” 
 
“Consumers are users are entitled to compensation for the harm suffered as a consequence of the 
consumption of goods or the use of products or services except in cases where those damages 
were caused exclusively by the fault of the injured victim or by the fault of the individuals for 
whom the victim should be liable for.”  
306 Article 129.1 of RDL 1/2007 focuses on the damages caused by the defective product and the private 
use of the product and does not refer to who might be the individual suffering harm caused by the product 
defect. Specifically, article 129.1 states that 
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The determination of the scope of the plaintiffs protected by the product liability 
directive is an important issue for the effectiveness of the strict liability regime 
established by it. Tortfeasors need to be able to assess the expected liability to which they 
are exposed, especially considering that it is strict, so that they may make informed 
decisions about purchasing insurance.307 Foreseeability is a crucial element in order to be 
able to adjust the insurance premiums and buy insurance according to the expected 
liability to which potential tortfeasors are exposed.308 In addition, the effectiveness of 
strict liability depends on whether the injured victim is a product buyer (a consumer), a 
product user or a bystander given that when deciding whether to buy the product, the 
consumer discounts the risk of harm form the product price and hence strict product 
liability is more attractive for him.309
 
 
 
5.1 The plaintiff’s prima facie case: damage, defect and causation 
 
In order to bring a claim under the product liability directive, victims need to 
show evidence of a prima facie product liability case, which consists of: proving they 
                                                                                                                                                 
“El régimen de responsabilidad previsto en este libro comprende los daños personales, incluida 
la muerte, y los daños materiales, siempre que éstos afecten a bienes o servicios objetivamente 
destinados al uso o consumo privados y en tal concepto hayan sido utilizados principalmente por 
el perjudicado (...).” 
 
“The liability regime established in this book includes liability for personal injury, including 
death, and material damages to property provided that these affect goods and services objectively 
intended for private use or consumption and that are mainly used by the injured victim (…).” 
307 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen eds. 177, 184 (6th ed.) (2003). 
308 James Henderson, Revising Section 402 A: the limits of tort as social insurance, 10 Touro L. Rev. 107, 
117-20 (1993-1994).  
309 A. Mitchell Polinsky, and William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions and 
Market Power, 14 Bell J. Econ.2, 588-589 (1983). 
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suffered damages, that the product was in a defective condition and that there is a causal 
relationship between the product defect and the harm they suffered.310
 
  
 
5.1.1 Damages   
 
The damages covered by the Directive are “death or personal injury” or the 
“damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective product itself, 
with a lower threshold of 500 ECU.”311
For damages other than these ones, the Directive preserves the application of 
"national provisions relating to non-material damage,"
  
312
                                                 
310 Article 4 of the product liability directive. The principle of plaintiff’s burden of proof of causation is 
established in all European countries. Christopher J S Hodges, Product Liability In Europe: Politics, 
Reform And Reality, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 121, 122 (2000). 
 that is, domestic contractual and 
non-contractual law in force in each member state. Therefore, under the Directive, the 
victim’s recovery and the applicable law depend upon the nature of the damage and not 
on the product which caused the damage.  
311 Article 9(a) of the product liability Directive defines damages. The Directive refers to ECUS. The ECU 
was the first attempt to a common European currency but was rejected in 1997, when it was decided that 
the name of the European currency would be Euro, instead of Ecu. Since then, all measurements of 
European legal texts that were done in Ecus were supposed to be understood as expressed in Euros given 
that one Ecu was equivalent to one Euro. In Spain, the conversion to the Directive’s threshold was 65.000 
pesetas included in article 10 of law 29/1994 that became 390,66 euros after having done the currency 
conversion. 
312 Article 9 of the product liability directive. Thus, pure economic loss must be claimed under contract or 
fault liability, if it is available under domestic law. Additionally, under Article 13 of the product liability 
Directive preserves the “rights” derived from ”the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual 
liability or a special liability system existing.” In Spain Article 9 of the Directive was transposed in article 
10 of the law 22/94 – today article 145 RDL 1/2007. This law interacts with contract law and more 
specifically, with article 1101 of the Civil code regarding compensation for damages caused by breach of 
contract; the general warranty clause for product defects of article 1484 of the Spanish Civil Code and with 
law 23/2003 of July 10th regarding warranties of consumer goods.  
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The Directive sets out the compensable damages but domestic legislatures 
determine their specific content and domestic courts must then interpret their legislatures' 
pronouncements in light of the wording and purpose of the Directive313 in each case.314
 Compensation for pain and suffering or non-material damage are not covered 
under the Directive but can be compensated, where available, under domestic law.
  
315 
However, except for the non-pecuniary loss governed solely by domestic law, European 
member states may not reduce the scope of compensable damages under the product 
liability directive.316 This implies that domestic legislators may provide for compensation 
of pain and suffering,317 pure economic loss or loss of profit, and may establish 
coordinating systems with other compensation systems such as private or public 
insurance. Domestic regulation will be applied regarding rules for coordinating the 
compensation received by the victim from different sources.318 Regardless of the 
determination made by domestic courts and legislatures, injured victims must be provided 
full compensation to ensure that the application of domestic law does not impair the 
effectiveness of the Directive.319
                                                 
313 See for example, the judgment in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann 1984 ECR 891, paragraph 26 
regarding the determination of the purpose of the Directive. 
  
314 Article 1 and 9 of the product liability directive. See also European Court of Justice, Judgment of the 
Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 May 2001. Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Case C-203/99. 2001 
ECJ CELEX LEXIS 6690; 2001 ECR I-3569. 
315 Article 9 of the Directive. See the European Court of Justice judgment in the Case C-365/88 Hagen 
1990 ECR I-1845, paragraph 20 See also Court of Justice of the European Communities; Opinion of Mr 
Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 20 September 2001. Simone Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & 
Co. KG. Case C-168/00. 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 6656; 2002 ECR I-2631. 
316 Article 9 of the product liability directive. 
317 Marta v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), Court of 
Appeals of Pontevedra 14.10.05 (JUR 2006\101870; Hon: Jaime Carrera Ibarzábal) where the court 
considered the possibility of providing compensation for pain and suffering to the victim under article 1902 
of the Spanish Civil Code in application of article 15 of Law 22/94, for the damages suffered by the victim 
due to the removal of mammal prosthesis made with soybean oil.   
318 In Spain, for example, this will imply seeking compensation under the Civil code -- contractual in article 
1101 CC and followings or extra-contractual 1902 and following -- and any specific regulation of the 
damage suffered where available. 
319 Article 9 of the product liability directive. See the opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer delivered on 14 December 2000 in the case Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference 
for a preliminary ruling: Hojesteret. Case C-203/99. 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7596; 2001 ECR I-3569. In 
the Case C-203/99 the European Court of Justice established differences between the personal injury and 
the property damage concepts. In that case, the question before the Court was whether the damage caused 
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 The interaction of two regulatory bodies sometimes based on different principles -
- strict liability and negligence -- might result in each one canceling out the potential 
benefits of the other while simultaneously making it more difficult for manufacturers to 
anticipate and internalize the expected liability to which they are exposed.320 Despite the 
Directive’s harmonization goal, the interaction between community and domestic law has 
raised some divergences regarding damages awarded to injured victims321 because 
community law does not provide full compensation to victims, who must then turn to 
domestic law whenever possible. In this sense, even though the Commission considered 
that the amount of damages awarded in individual cases would not differ substantially 
among member states,322 further comparative research suggests that significant variations 
exist.323
 
  
 
a. Compensable damages  
 
The difficult task of determining compensable damages under the Directive was 
addressed by the European Court of Justice in Henning Veedfald v Arhus 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the kidney, which made it unusable for a transplant, has to be construed, in relation to the intended 
recipient of the organ, as personal injury or as damage to an item of property for the purposes of Article 9 
of the product liability directive. Considering the fact that a human organ does not fulfill the requirements 
laid down by Article 9(b)(i) and (ii) in order for there to be damage to an item of property, - that the item 
must be of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption and that it must have been used by the 
injured person mainly for that purpose - the Court ruled that Article 9 of the product liability directive 
should be construed as meaning that damage caused to a human organ at the time when it is removed from 
the body of a donor for immediate transplantation into another persons body is covered by the expression 
damage caused by personal injuries but not by the expression damage to, or destruction of, any item of 
property. Therefore, the damage caused to a human organ which had been removed from the body of the 
donor for immediate transplantation into the body of the recipient was to be considered personal injuries. 
320 But if victims to potential damages under each regime were different such interaction would not be a 
problem. See Juanjo Ganuza and Fernando Gomez, Caution, children crossing: heterogeneity of victim’s 
costs of care and the negligence rule, Volume 1: Issue 3, Article 3, Review of Law and Economics (2005). 
321 Geraint G. Howells, The rise of European Consumer Law -- Whither National Consumer Law?, 28 
Sydney Law Review 63-88, 74 (2006).  
322 European Commission Explanatory Memorandum, E.C. Bull. Supp. L11 para.21 (1991). 
323 Even though oldated today, see Personal Injury Awards in E.C. Countries, McIntosch and Holmes, 
Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. (1990).   
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Amtskommune.324 In this case, the European court laid down the different legislation 
applicable depending on the type of damages suffered by the injured victim. For damages 
covered specifically by the product liability directive, the Directive is to be the exclusive 
source of law, while for other types of damages domestic regulation is applicable.325
The damages that give rise to a claim under the Directive are damages of an 
amount exceeding 500 euros consisting in death or personal injuries and damage to, or 
destruction of, an item of property, other than the defective product itself.
 
326 Damage to 
the defective product itself, thus, potentially could be claimed under the domestic law of 
the member state.327
With respect to property damage, the Directive distinguishes between damage to 
property for professional or for private use
 
328 and only provides a claim for damages that 
arise from a product "of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption" and 
"used by the injured person mainly for his own private use or consumption."329  Thus, 
only individuals not using the product professionally -- and not corporations -- can claim 
damages under the Directive.330
                                                 
324 Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune C203/99 (2001) Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 
10 May 2001. 
 Consequently, damage to personal property will be 
325 Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune C203/99 (2001). See also Whittaker, Simon, LIABILITY FOR 
PRODUCTS: ENGLISH LAW, FRENCH LAW AND EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION, 503, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
326 Article 9 of the product liability directive Court of Justice of the European Communities, Opinion of Mr 
Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 14 December 2000; Henning Veedfald v Arhus 
Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hojesteret. Case C-203/99. 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 
7596; 2001 ECR I-3569. See the U.S. equivalent in East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc. 476 
U.S. 858 (1986) where the United States Supreme Court denied recovery for the damage to the ship 
turbines allegedly caused by the defect in the turbines themselves. 
327 Jesús v. Garlovi S.A. and Citroën Hispania S.A., Court of Appeals of Asturias 23.2.00 (JUR 
2000\124793; Hon: José Manual Barral Díaz) where the court, in application of Spanish law (the LGDCU 
of defense of users and consumers) and article 1902 of the Spanish Civil Code awarded compensation to 
the victim for the damages to the defective vehicle and in application of Law 22/94, awarded compensation 
for the property damage caused by the defective vehicle. 
328 Article 9(b). Damages to property in professional use continue to be covered by the domestic liability 
rules of each Member State. See THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT 
LAW, Franz Werro And Vernon Valentine Palmer, (Eds.) Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 437 
(2004). 
329 Article 9 of the product liability directive. 
330 See Luis Alberto v. Construcciones Arssis, S.L. (supplier), Simex (manufacturer), Court of Appeals of 
Valencia 20.7.06 (JUR 2007\5615; Hon: Manuel José López Orellana), Maxi and Isabel, S.L. and Mutua 
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recoverable under the Directive and damages to commercial property will not.331 Such 
limitations aim to "avoid litigation in an excessive number of cases."332
Additionally, the Directive imposes a compulsory damage threshold of 500 euros 
that must necessarily be included in the domestic regulation.
  
333 This provision has proved 
controversial334 and in some cases member states have been reluctant to transpose it.335
In cases where damages are higher than the threshold, the producer must pay only 
the excess amount; the first 500 euros of damages are thus non-recoverable under the 
product liability directive even by a successful plaintiff.  
 
The European Commission and the European Court of Justice have repeatedly 
stated that this threshold should not be seen as affecting victims' rights of access to the 
courts. Instead, they have said it should be understood merely as a mechanism to avoid an 
excessive number of claims under the product liability directive by filtering out those 
involving only minor material damages. They have also characterized the threshold as a 
way to reduce moral hazard problems by encouraging potential victims to exercise care, 
even when potential damages are low.  
                                                                                                                                                 
General de Seguros v. EDESA, Sociedad Cooperativa (manufacturer), Court of Appeals of Burgos 13.2.03 
(JUR 2003\122404; Hon: Ildefonso Barcalá Fernández de Palencia), Hércules Hispano, S.A. v. Comercial 
Naranjo (seller). Court of Appeals of Las Palmas 22.3.01 (JUR 2001\170616; Hon: Juan José Cobo Palma). 
In all these cases, the Courts of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim by the trial court 
because Law 22/94 was not applicable to a case involving a product for professional use.     
331 Court of Justice of the European Communities, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
delivered on 14 December 2000; Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary 
ruling: Hojesteret. Case C-203/99. 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7596; 2001 ECR I-3569.  
332 Preamble of the product liability directive. 
333 Article 9(b). See also European Court of Justice Cases, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 25 
April 2002. Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic. Case C-154/00. 2002 ECJ 
CELEX LEXIS 2955; 2002 ECR I-3879. In this case, the Hellenic Republic contended that its 
interpretation of the Directive was based on the fact that in its Green Paper of 28 July 1999 on liability for 
defective products the Commission proposed that the threshold of EUR 500 be abolished and considered 
that the existence of this threshold created an unfair inequality as between consumers and, by depriving the 
victim of a right of action, infringed the fundamental right of access to the courts, as guaranteed by Article 
6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 
November 1950. See also, COM(1999) 396 final. The European Court of Justice did not agree. 
334 See, in particular, Case C-236/88 Commission v France 1990 ECR I-3163, paragraph 19. 
335 Commission v. France C-52/00 (2002) ECR I – 3827 at (17-20) and Commission v. Greece, C -154/00 
(2002) ECR I – 3879. 
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This exclusion does not mean that damages under 500 euros are not compensable 
at all. Injured victims might still bring actions for such damages under contract law or 
non-contractual liability to the extent available. 
In sum, the Directive allows victims to claim compensation for damages to or for 
the destruction of any physical property336
 
 worth at least 500 euros provided that the 
product was intended for private use and was used by the injured person mainly for his or 
her own private use and consumption.  
 
b. Cap on Damages 
 
The product liability directive does not cover all kinds of damages nor all aspects 
related to them. It is for domestic courts to apply their domestic legislation on the issue 
and determine the specific amount of damages that a certain victim will be awarded and 
whether there is any limitation on this amount.  
The Directive does not specify how domestic courts should determine the amount 
of damages to award to a victim but in its article 16.1 it allows member states to 
introduce damages caps. According to this article  
 
Any Member State may provide that a producer's total liability for damage 
resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by identical items with the 
same defect shall be limited to an amount which may not be less than 70 million 
ECU. 
From the wording of article 16.1 of the product liability directive it can be seen 
that the caps provision refers to ECUS,337 that should be understood to be set at 70 
million euros.338
                                                 
336 Other than the defective product itself.  
  
337 See Article of 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating 
to the introduction of the euro, Official Journal L 162, 19/06/1997 P. 0001 - 0003, “(…) this means that one 
ECU in its composition as a basket of component currencies will become one euro.” 
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Damages caps are optional provisions that member states may include in their 
domestic laws transposing the Directive if they choose to.339 As of today, such caps have 
been introduced only by Germany and Spain,340 and in both cases without much 
impact.341 In Germany, the introduction of caps was based on the argument that liability 
needed to be limited in some way.342 However, as of today, there has been no case of a 
German court referring to the damages that would have been awarded but for this 
provision. The same has been true for Spain. The Spanish legislature has seemed to 
consider that the introduction of a damage cap protects tortfeasors from potentially 
infinite damage awards. For accidents subject to strict liability the Spanish legislature has 
repeatedly introduced damage caps, damage guidelines or both.343
In fact, when the damage caps provision was included in the draft Directive in 
1985 it was assumed that it would be temporary. The idea was that ten years after the 
approval of the Directive, the Commission would evaluate the effect of this limitation on 
the protection of consumers and the functioning of the internal market and it would make 
 The effect of such caps 
in Spain, like in Germany, has been remarkably limited. 
                                                                                                                                                 
338 In Spain, the conversion of the damage cap of 10.500.000.000 pesetas set by article 11 of the law 
22/1994, which transposed the strict product liability Directive, was determined by article 25 of Law 
46/1998 of December 17 of 1998 regarding the introduction of the Euro. Council Regulation 2866/98/CEE 
of December 31, 1998 established the conversion rated between the currencies of the different member 
states and the euro and set that one euro was equal to 166, 386 pesetas and therefore the damage cap 
resulted in 63.106.270, 96 euros.  
339 Article 16.1 of the product liability directive allowing a possibility of introducing a cap on damages and 
article 15.1 of the Directive, allowing member states to introduce the development risks defense are the 
only two provisions of the Directive that are not compulsory for member states.  
340 See the Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective 
Products, COM (2000), 893 final at 19-20. This Report lists Portugal as well but in 2001, in the Act 
131/2001 of April 24, Portugal repealed such provision and now the damage cap is no longer in force. 
341 John Meltzer Reform Of Product Liability In The EU: New Report Finds General Satisfaction, 71 Def. 
Counsl. J. 42, 49-50 (2004).  
342 Regarding pharmaceutical products, the cap was established in 200 million Deutsche Marks (100 million 
Euros). See Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective 
Products, COM (2000), 893 final at 19-20.  
343 An example of a law with a limitation of damages through damage caps is the law 22/1994 transposing 
the product liability directive today overruled by RDL 1/2007. Regarding damage award guidelines it is 
worth mentioning the Royal Law Decree RDL 1/1994 of June 20, approving the General Law on Social 
insurance (BOE 154, p. 20658 of June 29, 1994). The text of the Royal Decree is available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-14960. The law 48/1960 of July 
21th of aerial navigation combines both techniques of damage caps and damage awards guidelines.  
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recommendations regarding its continued necessity in one of its regular required reports 
to the European Council.344 Even though this limitation on damages could potentially 
compromise the Directive’s founding principle of uniformity among the different 
member states, the three reports that the Commission has presented evaluating the 
performance of the Directive and suggesting possible modifications have not included 
any proposal regarding the damage caps.345
Some have suggested that maintaining the damage caps might be explained by 
their expected effect on insurance premiums.
 Hence, this optional provision is still in place 
today. 
346
The damage caps included in the product liability directive are applicable only to 
the kind of accidents regulated by the Directive and the laws transposing it, which means 
“death and permanent injuries“
 To the extent the caps limit the amount of 
insurance coverage needed, they could reduce companies’ insurance costs. 
347 caused by a certain kind of product and a certain 
product defect.348
                                                 
344 According to Article 100 of the E.E.C. Treaty, the Commission will determine whether to repeal a 
provision or not.  
 Taking into account that pain and suffering are not compensable under 
the product liability directive, any limitation on damages becomes a cap for the injured 
victim when seeking compensation for personal and material damages suffered. As 
mentioned earlier, the product liability directive does not preclude the application of 
domestic regulation regarding damages not covered by the Directive. When a law 
345 The first report regarding the application of the Directive was issued in 1995, COM (1995) 617 final. 
The second report was presented in the year 2000, COM (2000) 893 final, and the third and last report was 
presented in 2006, COM (2006) 496 final.  None of these three reports include any proposal of 
modification or suppression of the damage cap. The only modification proposal was made by the European 
Parliament that proposed to increase the damage cap to 140 million euros. Given the scarce application of 
the cap in force, such proposal has never been adopted. See the European Commission’s Green Paper on 
Liability for defective products, COM (1999) 396 final at 25. The paper is available at 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf. 
346 Christopher Hodges, Reform of the Product Liability Directive 1998-99, 8, Cameron McKenna (1999). 
347 Article 9.1 of the product liability directive.  
348 See Article 16.1 of the product liability directive noting that the cap is applicable for “identical” 
products and for the same defect. 
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different from the Directive is applied, the Directive's damage caps provision is not 
applicable to damages compensable under domestic law.  
Regarding the tortfeasors subject to the damage caps, the limitation is applied to 
each manufacturer or importer and not to all of them as a whole whenever they are 
producing or selling identical products.349
The individualized application of damage caps to a single accident is consistent 
with the joint and several allocation of damages among the product manufacturer and the 
importer.
 In the case of holding corporations, the cap is 
to be applied to each corporation within the group and not to all of them as a whole.  
350
 
 If both respond jointly and severally, a single damage cap is applied and the 
internal distribution of the damages will be determined by the domestic rules of each 
member state. If the damage cap were to be applied to each of them, the total damages for 
the victim could end up larger than the cap set by the Directive.  
 
5.1.2 Defect 
 
The Directive provides that a product is defective when it does not fulfill the 
consumers’ expectations of the product’s safety. Given the importance of this issue, it 
will be discussed separately in section 6 of this chapter.  
 
 
5.1.3 Causation  
 
                                                 
349 For an explanation of how this issue is solved in Spanish law see L. Fernando Reglero Campos (Coord.), 
TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL, 1425-1517, 3ª ed. (Cizur Menor, Thomson-Aranzadi) (2006). 
350 Article 7 of the product liability directive. 
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The final element of the plaintiff’s prima facie product liability case under the 
Directive is providing evidence of the causal relationship between the product defect and 
the harm suffered.351
This element is of special importance in the liability context given that strict 
liability is a system that rests mostly on causation considerations
  
352 and the difficulty of 
establishing this crucial element could become a barrier to recovery in some cases, 
thereby undermining the consumer protection goal of the overall regime.353 Despite this 
reliance on causation it is often considered that strict liability is cheaper and easier to 
administer than negligence-based liability systems given that negligence-based systems 
require proof not just of causation but also of what constitutes reasonable behavior in a 
given context.354
However, even if from this perspective strict liability seems to be a more cost-
effective liability system than its alternatives, determining causation is not without 
difficulties. The proof of causation is generally presented as a two step analysis: first, 
whether but for the product’s defect, the harm would not have occurred (cause-in-fact) 
  
355 
and second, whether the product was the proximate cause of the harm suffered..356
                                                 
351 Article 4 of the Directive. See in general Thomas Lundmark, The Restatement of Torts (Third) and the 
European product liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 253 (1996). 
 Under 
the product liability directive the plaintiff is required to prove both types of causation: 
cause in fact -- but-for causation -- and proximate cause. If the plaintiff succeeds in 
establishing both causation elements, causation will be satisfied. The product liability 
352 Franz Werro, Tort Law at the Beginning of the New Millennium. A Tribute to John G. Fleming's 
Legacy, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 147, 157 (2001). 
353 See generally Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 
5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 369 (2000). See also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European 
Products Liability More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 985, 994 (1998).  
354 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Symposium: Responsibility And Blame: Psychological And Legal Perspectives: 
Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1055, 1076-1077 (2003). 
355 See James A. Henderson Jr., Richard N. Pearson, John A. Siliciano, THE TORTS PROCESS, Aspen, 101 
referring to actual causation or general causation and 467-468 discussing the causation element in product 
liability cases (6th ed.) (2003). 
356 See James A. Henderson Jr., Richard N. Pearson, John A. Siliciano, THE TORTS PROCESS, Aspen, 257-
258 and 467-468 (6th ed.) (2003). 
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directive adequately sets forth causation so that the requirements that define the harm for 
which defendants are liable are identified. Requiring only but-for causation alone would 
allow an infinite and unlimited number of potential claims from victims given that 
commercial activities present risks could be but-for causes of some kind of loss. At the 
same time, requiring proximate cause, would limit the expected claims and expected 
liability to which defendants would be exposed to.357
Although these elements appear easy to separate from a theoretical perspective, 
they are very difficult to distinguish in practice before a court, especially in cases where 
there are potentially concurrent causes of a victim’s injury.  
  
Under the product liability directive, the problem is, then, to determine the 
causation requirements in a way that does not rely on a determination of the defendants' 
negligence, given that this would obviously contradict the strict liability nature of the 
regime.358 This is especially relevant given that in some Spanish cases, causation has 
been the element that has been used by courts to presume defect -- through a Res Ipsa 
Loquitur causation analysis -- and thereby impose liability.359
The product liability directive includes different burdens of proofs and the tests 
necessary to meet them must be clearly be distinguished. First, the defect test requires a 
showing that the product does "not provide the safety which a person is entitled to 
expect."
 
360 Whether there is a "causal relationship between defect and damage"361
                                                 
357 James A. Henderson, Jr., Why negligence dominates tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377, 391-392 (2002). 
 will 
determine causation in the specific case and whether the defendant knew or should have 
known of the product defect in light of the technical and scientific knowledge available is 
358 James A. Henderson, Jr., Why negligence dominates tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377, 391-392 (2002). 
359 See Reamar, S.L. vc. Suministros de Pintura Juan Carlos Jiménez, S.L. (supplier) and Alp Reveton, S.L., 
Court of Appeals of Valencia 25.4.06 (JUR 2006\207061; Hon: Enrique Emilio Vives Reus) and Jesús 
Carlos y Andrés v. Citroën Hispania, S.A, Court of Appeals of Barcelona 21.4.05 (JUR 2005\122401; Hon: 
Josep Llobet Aguado). In these cases, the Courts of Appeal presumed the product defect based on the proof 
of causation and the damages suffered by the victim. 
360 Article 6.1 of the product liability directive. 
361 Article 4 of the product liability directive.  
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the standard to determine the development risks defense in the member states that have 
included it in their transposition laws.362
Hence, under the Directive causation is established whenever the injured victim 
can prove a causal relationship
  
363 between the product defect and the harm suffered by 
the victim and when in addition, the tortfeasor cannot claim any defense under the 
product liability directive and be discharged from liability.364
 
  
 
5.2 Timing of claims 
 
Apart from the victim's prima facie case, the Directive also establishes timing 
requirements that place limits on product liability claims.365 These consist of a period of 
limitation and a period of repose.366
 
  
 
5.2.1 Limitation  
 
The limitation period or statute of limitations of an injured victim is an area in 
which European and domestic regulations interact. The product liability directive 
includes some determinations as to limitation periods and the domestic law of each 
member state also regulates this area through general statutes of limitations. 
                                                 
362 Article 7 (e) of the product liability directive. 
363 Article 4 of the product liability directive. 
364 The product liability directive, in its article 7, provides for several defenses that if alleged and proved, 
exempt defendants from potential liability.   
365 Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 43, Darmouth publishing Company Limited 
(1993).  
366 Article 17 of the product liability directive. These provisions are not applicable retroactively so are 
applicable only to damages that took place after the Directive entered into force – after the transposition 
law was adopted in each member state. In the case where the harm was caused by a defective product 
before the products liability directive entered into effect, this could not be applied and such liability should 
be established under the domestic rules of each country.   
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The Directive sets a three-year period for the injured victim to bring a claim. 
These three years are to be counted from the day on which the plaintiff becomes aware, 
or should reasonably become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of the 
producer.367 Domestic laws relating to the suspension or interruption of the limitation 
period are still applicable and are not to be affected by the Directive.368
This provision is relatively liberal toward plaintiffs because the limitation period 
does not begin to run until both the defect and the identity of the producer are known by 
the plaintiff. This double requirement could eventually result in considerable difficulties 
in determining the precise date upon which the limitation period begins to run.
 The 
specifications of how this limitation period is to be applied are based on domestic laws.   
369
 
 In fact, 
in practice the three-year limitation period might become de facto a much longer period 
for cases involving, for example, chemicals, fibers and drugs, in which plaintiffs do not 
become aware of harm until years after exposure. For example, it is easy to think of 
relatively common situations in which a plaintiff knows of the harm, such as an illness, 
but is not aware that a product is the cause of that harm. In that context, the requirement 
of knowledge of the origin of the harm could be considered equivalent to the knowledge 
of causation. In those cases, courts will consider the moment when it is reasonable for a 
plaintiff to have knowledge of the identity of a particular producer in a chain of suppliers 
and whether the injured victim inquired about the identity of the producer from a given 
supplier or the person who supplied that supplier with a product. Such determinations, 
though, will have to be done on a case by case basis. 
 
5.2.2 Repose 
                                                 
367 Article 10(1) of the product liability directive. 
368 Article 10(2) of the product liability directive.  
369 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 86-87, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
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A statute of repose is distinguishable from a statute of limitations in that a statute 
of repose eliminates all rights to a legal claim after a specified time.  
Under article 11 of the product liability directive a victim has a ten year period 
after which his or her rights are extinguished.370
The preamble identifies a linkage between this provision and other parts of the 
product liability directive that deal with advances in product development and observes 
that products "age in the course of time, higher safety standards are developed and the 
state of science and technology progresses" and for that reason, "it would not be 
reasonable to make the producer liable for an unlimited period for the defectiveness of his 
product."
 This period starts from the date on which 
the producer placed into circulation the actual product that caused the damage.  Note that 
this is different from the date on which a product of that type (but not the actual product) 
was first introduced in the market. 
371
This ten year period represents a significant restriction compared to the repose 
rules in some jurisdictions, and particularly given that in cases of personal injuries caused 
by medical products, the damage may be latent and not manifest itself for many years.
 This repose period seems not to admit any exception. 
372
 
 
Additionally, it may sometimes be difficult to identify and determine the producer or the 
date on which the product was put into circulation. The Directive is silent on whether the 
burden of proof is to lie on the plaintiff or on the defendant in establishing these facts.  
 
                                                 
370 Article 11 of the product liability directive. Hence, during this ten year period, producers will be 
required to maintain sufficiently detailed records that may be crucial when determining whether liability 
should be imposed. See Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  
Are The European Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To 
Defendant Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 652 (1993). 
371 Preamble of the Directive, paragraph 12.  
372 See Gabino and Marcelina v. Cerámica Malpesa, S.A. (manufacturer), Court of Appeals of Jaén 5.11.03 
(JUR 2003\71326; Hon: Jesús María Passolas Morales) where the court understood that the 10 year statute 
of limitations was not applicable because the victim suffered continued damages and the statute of 
limitations was to be applied from the moment where the harm was final.  
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6 The Concept of Defect  
 
One of the pillars of any product liability system is the determination of 
defectiveness. This element is crucial to whether liability may subsequently be imposed 
for the harm caused by the product. In this respect, the Directive again is not creative but 
instead merely follows the U.S. model proposed by section 402A of the Second 
Restatement.373
The product liability directive, in parallel to the Second Restatement, does not 
distinguish among types of product defects. Product liability cases in the United States, 
though, have differentiated between three different kinds of defects: manufacturing 
defects, design defects and defects in the warnings and instructions.
   
374
The determination of whether a product is defective is done by adopting the 
consumer expectations test.
  
375
                                                 
373 § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads as follows: 
 The Directive refers to this test in two different places. 
First, the preamble declares that  
“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold”. 
See also James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn 
From The New American Restatement Of Products Liability, 34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 11 (1999) and Patrick 
Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice 
and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 65, 71 (1989-
1990). 
374 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998) § 1 cmt. a. See also Aaron D. Twerski & James 
A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 
Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2008-2009) noting the differences between the Restatement Second and the 
Restatement Third regarding differentiating between sub-categories of product defects. 
375 James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From 
The New American Restatement Of Products Liability, 34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 13-14 (1999). See also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A and cmts. a & m (1965) regarding the lack of differentiation 
between product defects and cmts g & i regarding the implementation of the consumer expectations test. 
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“ (…) the defectiveness of the product should be determined by reference not to 
its fitness for use but to the lack of the safety which the public at large is entitled 
to expect (…)”376
Second, in its body -- in its article 6 -- the product liability directive states that  
  
“(…) a product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is 
entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account.(…)”377
Hence, the essential element of the defectiveness standard is the expectation of 
consumers, the content of which is controversial and difficult to determine,
  
378 and there is 
no risk-utility balancing of the costs and benefits to product sellers and users. But the 
expectation of consumers is not the only element to consider given that “all relevant 
circumstances” are also mentioned.379 These relevant circumstances include (1) the 
presentation of the product to the consumer, which refers to the producer’s obligation to 
provide proper information with respect to the product risks and use, (2) the product's 
reasonably expected use, and (3) the timing of the product's placement into circulation, 
which will determine the moment at which to evaluate the product’s safety.380
 
  
 
                                                 
376 In light of the different defectiveness tests in products liability in the U.S., it is interesting to see that the 
drafters of the Directive did not consider possible alternatives such as the Reasonable Alternative Design 
test applied today in some U.S. jurisdictions. For a critical analysis of the Consumer Expectations’ test see 
James A. Henderson Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512, 1532-34 (1992) advocating for "reasonableness as the 
governing standard for liability in design defect and failure to warn cases.". 
377 Article 6 of the Directive. See also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability 
More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 994 
(1998). 
378 Michael R. Will, Liability for failure to warn in the European Community, 6 B.U. Int’l L. J. 125, 
131(1988). 
379 Preamble of the product liability directive. See Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 
Darmouth publishing Company Limited, 36 (1993). See also Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon 
Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of 
Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 65, 71 (1989-1990) and William E. Westerbeke, 
Reasonable Alternative Design: A. Design-Based Liability in American Products Liability Law: The 
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 66, 119 (1998). 
380 Article 6 of the product liability directive. 
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6.1 Mirroring the past? The introduction of the consumers’ expectation test   
 
The different defectiveness tests generally aim to achieve an optimal degree of 
product safety and thereby minimize the amount of product-related accidents by 
balancing the social interest in having safe products in the market with the consumer’s 
individual interests in using these safe products.381
The risk-utility test compares the risks presented by a certain product with the 
utility of its use.
 Even though the goals of the different 
available defectiveness tests are similar, the mechanisms they use are quite different.  
382 Whenever the risks of a certain product -- not of that specific product 
but the risks of that product category -- are higher than the utility of its use, the product 
will be considered defective and producers will be liable for any harm resulting from this 
defective product.383 However, this kind of analysis, without providing a defectiveness 
standard, is equivalent to finding whether a product category is “good for society” or not 
and whether the product should be marketed at all.384
In order to move from a product category analysis to a specific product analysis, 
the risk-utility test must be applied together with a defectiveness standard. One such 
standard is the reasonable alternative design.
  
385
                                                 
381 For an economic analysis of liability for defective products see Steven Shavell, AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 58-60, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1987).  
 Under this analysis, a product is deemed 
defective when the plaintiff can prove the “availability of a technologically feasible 
382 The use of the risk-utility test as a test of product defect is not unanimous. See David G. Owen, Toward 
a proper test for design defectiveness: “Micro-balancing” costs and benefits, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1661 (1997) 
criticizing the vagueness of the risk utility test and its application in design defect cases and arguing for the 
application of a macro balance of the risk utility test to evaluate a product category and the application of a 
micro-defectiveness test in the form of an alternative design. See also Richard A. Epstein, The risks of 
risk/utility, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 469, 470 (1987) arguing in favor of the adoption of rules given their reliability 
as well as flexibility as opposed to the application of balancing tests, the application of which is often 
unpredictable.   
383 James A. Henderson Jr., Aaron Twersi, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, 229, Aspen 
Publishers (5th Ed) (2004). 
384 See David G. Owen, Toward a proper test for design defectiveness: ”Micro-balancing” costs and 
benefits, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1661 (1997) arguing for the introduction of aggregate considerations and a macro-
balancing risks and benefits of a product when determining its defectiveness.  
385 The risk-utility test alone was very difficult to implement so that an objective defectiveness test is 
necessary. See Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067 (2007). 
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practical alternative design that would have reduced or prevented the plaintiff’s harm.”386 
Whenever this alternative is available, the product is considered defective.387 This test 
has been often criticized for the high burden of proof it imposes on injured victims who 
sometimes do not have the information available for creating and proving that such 
alterative design exists and is feasible.388
Another defectiveness standard is the consumers’ expectations test. Under this 
analysis, the safety a reasonable consumer is entitled to expect
  
389 hinges on what 
consumers actually expect from a product and what consumers ought to have the right to 
expect.390 In the case that these two expectations were different, the consumer 
expectations test considers the product defective if it does not fulfill the expectations a 
consumer was entitled to have.391
                                                 
386 The plaintiff’s burden of proof under the Restatement (Third) requiring proving the availability of a 
reasonable alternative design that would reduce or avoid foreseeable risks of harm has been controversial 
given that such requirement could preclude otherwise valid claims from jury consideration as well as would 
require plaintiffs to retain an expert witness that could increase significantly their litigation costs. See 
James A. Henderson, Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement In The Courts: an Initial 
Assessment, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 7, 11-12 (2000). See also James A. Henderson Jr., Aaron Twersi, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS, 173, Aspen Publishers (5th Ed) (2004) and Richard W. 
Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1086 (2007). 
 In order to shape these expectations and bring 
consumers' actual expectations in line with what it is deemed that they ought to expect, 
the producer has incentives to provide necessary information in the form of instructions 
for safe use and warnings about the product hazards so that the expectation of consumers 
387 Hence, when courts determine the products design defect based on the risk-utility test might use one of 
these two alternative judgments: either that the product should have been manufactured with a reasonably 
safer design or that it should not have been marketed at all. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Aaron D. 
Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement In The Courts: an Initial Assessment, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 7, n7 (2000). 
388 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations Of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1720 (2003). 
389 James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From 
The New American Restatement Of Products Liability,  34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 18 (1999). 
390 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 997 (1998). 
391 See, for example, the Spanish case Antonio and Antonia v. Manufacturas A., S.A. (manufacturer) and 
Seguros M., SA. (manufacturer’s insurer), Appeals Court Baleares 28.3.00 (EDJ 2000/18237, Hon. Miguel 
Ángel Aguiló Monjo) where a folding chair suddenly and unexpectedly folded and trapped one of the 
fingers of the plaintiff’s three year old daughter, part of which had to be amputated. The court, applying 
article 3.1 of law 22/94 transposing the product liability directive held that the chair did not reach the level 
of safety the consumer was entitled to expect and consequently deemed it defective. The chair manufacturer 
was liable for the payment of 7.111,25 € to the parents and legal representatives of the injured victim.  
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includes all product risks.392 Adequate product labels are also of great importance. One of 
the major criticisms of this test is that the definition of product defectiveness is made by 
reference to an expectation rather than to a scientific test of safety and that it allows 
producers to transfer risk to consumers/users under certain circumstances.393 Further, the 
expectations considered are the ones of the consumer, leaving aside bystanders even 
though they too are protected by the product liability directive and hence entitled to claim 
damages for the harm caused by the defective product.394
 
   
 
6.1.1 The Directive’s inspiration: the U.S. experience with the Restatement 
(Second) 
 
It seems quite clear that the Directive’s drafters looked to the U.S. experience 
with the Second Restatement of Torts during the 1980s and early 1990s.395 As discussed 
above, the Second Restatement predicated strict liability for the harm caused by defective 
products upon a finding that a product was “in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer.”396
                                                 
392 See Paula Giliker, Strict Liability for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business Law 
Review 4, 87-90, 89 (2003) arguing that a court, when determining defectiveness, may consider the level of 
product risks and the defendant’s steps adopted when providing information regarding the product risks. 
See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products Should Not Be Required To Rescue Users From 
Risks Presented By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 Sw. U.L. Rev. 595, 600 (2008) noting that the 
required warnings should be limited to the risks presented by the product and should not be extended to 
risks of other products used or assembled together with the safe product.  
 Under the Second Restatement, defectiveness was 
393 For a defense of the adequacy of the consumer expectation test as a test for defect. See Marshall S. 
Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American Law, 26 Cornell Int'l L. J. 279, 
292 (1993) claiming that this test is entirely adequate in product liability cases in an age of technology and 
development of modern techniques and despite of the increase of complexity of products.  
394 Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1122 (2007). 
395 Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 357, 360, 364 (1992) pointing out that it is important to notice that even though the regimes are 
remarkably similar, there are significant differences such as the concepts on which they are grounded. So 
while the basic key terms in the Restatement (Second) were “seller,” “product,” and “defective condition 
unreasonably dangerous” under the Directive, the relevant terms are “producer,”  “product,” and “defect”  
396 § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts reads as follows: 
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to be determined based on the expectation of consumers; so injured victims were required 
to bring evidence that the product was both defective and unreasonably dangerous.397
The consumer expectations test tends to be strongly linked to strict liability,
  
398 in 
that it focuses on the product as an object in the hands of the consumer and does not 
consider negligence -- or the defendant’s conduct in general -- as design defect cases 
often do. This relationship between strict liability and the consumer expectations test can 
be seen in the comments to the Second Restatement, which state that the product is 
considered defective if “it (was) ... in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.”399 A product is considered 
unreasonably dangerous if it is “dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases the product, with the ordinary 
knowledge to the community as to its characteristics.”400
 
 A manufacturer’s liability, thus, 
hinges on questions about the consumer, not the manufacturer and its potential fault.  
 
6.1.2 The crisis of the consumers’ expectations test in the United States  
                                                                                                                                                 
“(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate 
user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold”. 
397 There was a lot of debate concerning the application of §402A. Some scholars argued that this section of 
the Restatement (Second) was misread. See Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 
Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1702 (2003). Others claimed that this cestion left a broad scope of discretion to 
courts when determining defectiveness based upon such standard. See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability - 
Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cumb. L. Rev. 293, 312-13 (1979). This debate culminated 
in the 80s, when the risk-utility test was considered a better alternative to the consumer expectations test. 
For a more detailed description of the historical products liability evolution see Richard A. Epstein, 
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 9-67, Greenwood Press (1980). 
398 The consideration of the consumer expectations test as a strict form of liability is still controversial. See 
also Jane Stapleton , PRODUCT LIABILITY, 234-236 (London 1994) analyzing the link between strict liability 
and the consumers’ expectation test controversial. See also W. Page Keeton, Products Liability--Design 
Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cumb. L. Rev. 293, 300-02 (1979) arguing that consumer 
expectations reflect the warranty heritage left in strict products liability.  
399 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. g (1965). 
400 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. i (1965). 
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Unlike in Europe, where the Directive and its legislative history provide little 
insight as to what the content of the test apart from the fact that the European 
Commission views it as an objective test,401 there has been extensive debate about the 
exact meaning of the consumer expectation test in the United States.402
Many U.S. courts have found the test unworkable because, while it is easy to 
recite, it is difficult to apply in practice.
  
403 This may explain why, in light of the 
controversial nature of the consumers’ expectation test, many states have opted for a 
more objective measure, such as the so-called risk-utility test,404 the reasonable 
alternative design test or other variations on this theme.405
                                                 
401 The Commission has repeatedly stated the consumer expectations’ test is an objective test for 
defectiveness. See Green Paper at 6. 
 Under the risk-utility test, the 
402  See Daniel Schwartz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 
William and Mary Law Review 1389, 1400 (2007). This article is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=923423 defending the better performance of the risk-utility test compared to the 
consumer expectations test. See also Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a 
United States Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 354-355 (2000) for an analysis of the practical 
problems of application within the context of the European Union. See also Marianne Corr, Problems with 
the EC Approach to Harmonization of Product Liability Law, 22 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 235, 238-39 
(1990). 
403 See Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 Wayne L. 
Rev. 1217, 1236 (1993) and William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 
1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639, 653-54 (1991) arguing that most design cases involve complex features for which 
there are no unique consumer expectations and hence it is difficult to provide a standard to a court. See also 
Jeffrey Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the 
Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 Conn. Ins. L. J. 181, 182 (1998-99) describing the reasonable 
expectation test as a defective test that has revealed attractive to academics but has faced resistance by the 
courts. See also Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 357, 364 (1992). For an opposite view arguing that the concept of defect does not have 
practical difficulties for courts. See Hans Claudius Taschner, Product Liability in Europe: Future Prospects, 
in EEC STRICT LIABILITY IN 1992, 81, Practising Law Institute ed. (1989). 
404 See W. Kip Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 1-13 (1991) advocating for the use of risk-utility 
analysis in products liability cases. See also Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' 
Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061 (2008-2009) 
noting that the marginal application of the risk-utility test involves the reasonable alternative design test 
and that the majority of U.S. states have adopted the risk-utility/reasonable alternative design test and not 
the consumers’ expecations test. See also John F. Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law 
Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects--A Survey of the 
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493 (1996) challenging the view of ALI reporters' 
that the burden on plaintiffs to show the availability of an alternative-design is shared by the different U.S. 
states. 
405 See Thomas Lundmark The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product Liability 
Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 253 (1996) for a discussion of the various tests for defect across 
the different U.S. states. See also Kim D. Larsen, Strict products liability and the risk-utility test for design 
defect: an economic analysis 84 Columbia Law Review 8, 2045-2067 (1984) arguing against the imposition 
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utility of the product is weighed against the risks inherent in its use.406 Among the factors 
considered are the usefulness and desirability of the product, the likelihood and 
seriousness of an injury, the availability of an alternative product, the possibility of the 
manufacturer to eliminate the unsafe characteristics of the product, the user's ability to 
avoid the danger, the user's awareness of the danger, and the manufacturer's ability to 
spread losses through pricing and insurance.407  The risk-utility test is most commonly 
used in design defect cases where the ordinary consumer could not have an expectation of 
a certain relevant safety feature of the product.408
The Third Restatement adopted a kind of risk-utility test,
  
409 which is the 
reasonable alternative design test under which the plaintiff must prove that the danger of 
the product is outweighed by the cost of avoiding the danger, taking several "neutral" 
criteria into consideration, such as the availability of an alternative, feasible design.410
The consumer expectations test provides consumers with a right to expect that 
products will not harm them. In contrast, the risk-utility test relies on a reasonableness 
standard based on a balancing of the advantages and disadvantages of the defendant's 
design compared with an available, safer alternative design offered by the plaintiff.
  
411
                                                                                                                                                 
of liability based on the risk-utility test in design defect cases where there is no evidence of an available 
alternative design.   
 
406 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 99, at 699 (1984) "Under this test, a product can be said to be 
defective in the kind of way that makes it 'unreasonably dangerous' if a reasonable person would conclude 
that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product." 
407 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 99, at 699 (1984).   
408 David A. Urban, Custom's Proper Role in Strict Product Liability Actions Based on Design Defect, 38 
UCLA L.Rev. 439, 456-58 (1990) discussing the functioning of the risk-benefit and consumer expectations 
test for defects in design of products. 
409 David G. Owen, The evolution of products liability law, 6 Rev. Litig. 955, 980 (2007). 
410 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 reporter's note to cmt. d (1998). See also Aaron D. 
Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph 
of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061 (2008-2009) noting that ten years after the adoption of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts, the risk-utility test, that entails the reasonable alternative design test has been 
broadly adopted by the courts of the different of the U.S. states. See also John F. Vargo, The Emperor's 
New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a “New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability 
Design Defects--A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493 (1996) for an 
opposing view than the one of the reporters of the Restatement (Third).  
411 James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From 
The New American Restatement Of Products Liability, 34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 16-17 (1999). 
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The consumer expectations test for defect in product design cases has been 
vigorously debated and broadly discredited in the United States given the significant 
flaws it presents. Among these are its uniform treatment of different defect types, the 
vagueness of its content, and its reliance on intuition in application. 412
The European product liability directive, by adopting the consumer expectations 
test as the test for defect, suffers from all of these flaws.
  
413 Worse, there is an additional 
element that makes the application of this defectiveness test even more problematic under 
the Directive: the Directive does not differentiate between manufacturing defects, defects 
of design, and defects in warnings and instructions,414 and it fails to specify a standard by 
which to measure the safety that could be expected of a given product.415 The Directive 
establishes only that a defective product is one that does not meet “the safety which a 
person is entitled to expect taking into account (particular factors).”416 No guidelines are 
provided to aid in determining what the expectations of the consumers are,417
                                                 
412 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 994 (1998). 
 an 
413 Some authors argue that under the Directive, a product is almost considered defective just with the fact 
of having caused the harm to the consumer. See Michael G. Faure, Product Liability and Product Safety in 
Europe: Harmonization or Differentiation?, Kylos, vol 53, 467-508, 489 (2000). Other authors suggest that 
in light of the uncertainties derived from the application of the consumer expectations test, European judges 
will do a broad balancing costs and benefits which will result in the use of negligence considerations. See 
Jane Stapleton, Products Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 45, 
53-54 (1999).  
414 The regulation of the Directive contrasts with the regulation under the Restatement (Third ), that 
establishes different types of product differents and require different liability rules and standard for defect 
for each of them. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 
1243 (2002) and Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National 
Reports to the XVIth International Congress Of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective 
Products and Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121, 124 (2002). See also Aaron D. Twerski & James A. 
Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 
Brook. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (2008-2009). 
415 When forming expectations, consumer will use the product information they have . So 
the European Commission has introduced regulation in order to prevent misleading 
advertisement. See Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of Product Liability Law in the 
European Community, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 21, 30 (1999). 
416 See Jane Stapleton, Products Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. 
J. 45, 53 (1999). The differentiation between types of product defects has been widely welcome by the 
European doctrine on products liability. See Solé Feliu, Josep, El concepto de defecto del producto en la 
responsabilidad civil del fabricante, 569 et seq., Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch (1997).  
417 The Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984; Relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning misleading advertising (Offical Journal 
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especially important issue in light of the different cultural and educational backgrounds 
of European consumers.418
The consumer expectations test is intended to be applied as objectively as possible 
by detaching the relevant consumer from the actual injured victim and thus avoiding 
case-by-case determinations. The relevant expectations are not the plaintiffs’ but those of 
the public at large, reflecting the expectations of potential victims of the harm caused by 
the defective product.
  
419 This is not to say that the specific injured consumer is irrelevant. 
While the victim’s expectations are not at issue, his circumstances are to be taken into 
account.420
The vagueness and broad judicial discretion that this standard provides to courts 
generate difficulties both from the perspective of the injured victim and from the 
perspective of the potential defendant.
  
421 For victims, it is difficult to anticipate what 
safety expectations will be deemed reasonable given existing variation among consumers 
in terms of the amount of knowledge about product defects and the risks inherent in a 
product being used in a given situation. It is also difficult to formulate the expectation test 
in the case of injured bystanders -- i.e., people who have not purchased a given product 
and thus are completely unfamiliar with its risks but are nonetheless injured by it.422
                                                                                                                                                 
1984, L 250, p 17) prescribes a series of legal measures which the Member States must adopt to protect the 
public against misleading advertising.  
 
418 James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From 
The New American Restatement of Products Liability,  34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 19 (1999). 
419 Article 6 of the product liability directive is thought to target the average consumer, not the specific 
injured victim. Professor Taschner, one of the drafters of the Directive, considers that the question should 
not be the one "of the individual injured party with his subjective expectations," nor even of "the 
expectations of a specific group of consumers," but of "what the community as a whole considers to be 
right." See Hans Claudius Taschner, Product Liability in Europe: Future Prospects, in EEC STRICT 
LIABILITY IN 1992, 83, 89, Practising Law Institute ed. (1989).  
420 Some authors have criticized this difference by claiming that in practice it is difficult to differentiate 
between the abstract expectations of the average consumer. See James A. Henderson Jr., and Aaron D. 
Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 867, 881 (1998). 
421 Given the broad judicial discretion that the consumer expectation test provides to judges, some authors 
have understood that the Directive’s standard was circular. See Jane Stapleton, PRODUCT LIABILITY, 234 
London: Butterworths (1994). 
422 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 995 (1998). 
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Ascertaining reasonable safety expectations for consumers is difficult enough; it may be 
impossible for bystanders whose encounter with the product is essentially accidental.423 
Finally, the application of the consumer expectations test also presents difficulties for 
defendants because of the remarkable degree of uncertainty it involves: depending on 
how the typical or reference consumer is defined, a product will or will not be deemed 
defective.424
In light of the problems of defining the specific content and application of the test, 
courts end up determining defectiveness by combining the idea of an abstract reference 
consumer with a consideration of the actual consumer’s circumstances on a case-by-case 
basis. But they do this with little guidance from the Directive.
 What is more, this reference consumer need not even have to be within the 
manufacturer’s target market. 
425 This has led some 
domestic courts of different member states to require proof that the manufacturer could 
feasibly have designed the product more safely; it has led others to introduce care 
elements in the determination of the liability of the producer.426
This inadequate application of the defectiveness test has caused some to believe 
that the risk-utility test is better suited than the consumer expectations test for design 
defect cases in Europe. This may be particularly true for certain kinds of cases, such as 
complex design cases, where it is difficult to apply the consumer expectation test because 
 
                                                 
423 See Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1122 (2007) criticizing 
the defectiveness standard under the product liability directive and deeming it inadequate given that it does 
not consider all potential product victims such as bystanders.  
424 The application of the consumer expectations test seems so suggest that this uncertainty seems to be 
possible to overcome by providing enough information to the consumer so that product risks are open and 
obvious. For early literature on the issue see Alvin S. Weinstein, Aaron D. Twerski, Henry R. Piehler and 
William A. Donaher, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT: A GUIDE FOR 
MANAGEMENT, DESIGN, AND MARKETING, 45-46, New York: Wiley-Interscience Publication (1978). 
425  James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From 
The New American Restatement Of Products Liability,  34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 14, 18 (1999). 
426 See Jane Stapleton, Products Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. 
J. 45, 53-54 (1999) and Thomas Lundmark, The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product 
Liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 254 (1996). 
  106 
consumers are simply unlikely to have defined expectations about the specific safety of 
the product in question.427
Because of the nature of the consumer expectation test, it is difficult to derive 
general guidelines and specifications for its application. Ultimately, liability comes to be   
based on emotion, culture and the personal circumstances of the injured victim. In this 
sense it is quite vague
  
428 despite the intention for it to be applied on an “objective” basis 
by courts and not on the standard of the individual plaintiff’s subjective experiences.429
The danger of case-by-case determinations of the consumer expectations test is 
especially relevant and complicated in the European context in light of the social and 
cultural diversity and of the different safety expectations of the consumers of the different 
European member states. It does not seem reasonable to assume that each European 
consumer will have the same expectation regarding a given product. Therefore, it does 
not seem possible to consider that a unique, reasonable, Europe-wide standard exists. In 
principle, this should not be a problem for individual victims because domestic courts are 
the ones that assess the expectations that the consumer is entitled to have and these courts 
can simply focus on the expectations of their own state’s consumers without taking into 
account the potentially different expectations of consumers in other European member 
  
                                                 
427 William E. Westerbeke, Reasonable Alternative Design: A. Design-Based Liability in American 
Products Liability Law: The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 66, 66 
(1998). 
428 Judicial discretion is inherent to any legal rule. However, the risk-utility standard for defective design 
cases is said to rely less on intuition in its application than the consumer expectations given that it identifies 
the factual data relevant to determination of design defectiveness. See James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. 
Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From The New American Restatement Of 
Products Liability,  34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 19 (1999). 
429 See Henderson, James A. Jr., Twerski, Aaron D., Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 
Cornell L. Rev. 867, 882 (1998) arguing that risk-utility analysis provides an objective design defect 
standard that does not depend on personal or psychological expectations..Regarding psychological 
perceptions and subjectiveness iun determining standards of defectiveness see in general Paul Slovic, 
SMOKING: RISK, PERCEPTION & POLICY, THOUSAND OAKS, Calif.: Sage Publications (2001); BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS, Cass R. Sunstein ed., (2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) and Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997). 
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states.430
In addition to the diverse consumer profile within Europe, the language of the 
Directive is broad and varied enough to jeopardize any “objective” application of the test. 
While the preamble refers to "the safety which the public at large is entitled to expect," 
article 6(1) refers to "the safety which a person is entitled to expect." If the language of 
the preamble is to be followed, the question would appear to be a relatively objective one 
or at least one dependent on the opinions of substantial majorities as opposed to the 
expectations of a single individual, whether real or prototypical.
 However, this has a direct consequence for potential tortfeasors: a product may 
be deemed defective in one member state and not in another. 
431 Courts are not limited 
to the factors established in Article 6 of the product liability directive and are not told 
what weight to give to each factor. Howeber, when the wording of Article 6 is taken into 
account, the preamble’s desired objectiveness disappears because the special 
circumstances of the injured consumer in court are also relevant.432
Last, a final structural problem presented by the consumer expectation test is that 
even though it captures individuals’ different attitudes towards risk,
   
433 it implicitly relies 
on an exogenous image of the product risks and features and therefore on exogenous 
product expectations that supposedly consumers are able to create.434
                                                 
430 However, if we accept this diversity and therefore, this different standard, the harmonization goal once 
more is put under question. 
 Our rationale as 
431 Despite of this effort to reach an abstraction of the expectations of the average consumer and its 
expectations, there are authors who understand that the risk-utility test will always be a more objective test 
given that it includes scientific considerations. See Henderson, James A. Jr., Twerski, Aaron D., Intuition 
and Technology in Product Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 Geo. L.J. 659, 681 
(2000). 
432 For all of these reasons, some U.S. scholars have concluded that the consumers’ expectastions test does 
not represent a feasible alternative to the risk-utility test. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, 
Arriving at Reasonable Alternative Design: The Reporters' Travelogue, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 563, 572 
(1997).  
432 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations Of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1767 (2003). 
433 Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations Of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1767 (2003). 
434 The consumer expectations test provides its own correction mechanism regarding market manipulation 
because if consumers are manipulated by the manufacturer and therefore their perception of the product 
risk was distorted, they would be entitled to compensation in case they product did not meet their safety 
expectations. The problem with this issue is that if we assume that the product that caused harm is sold in a 
competitive market and therefore has a substantial amount of perfect substitutes, the image and the 
expectations that the consumer would have regarding the safety of the product would be created by the 
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consumers is not independent of the inputs we receive from society as a whole, from 
manufacturers in particular or from our individual characteristics. That is not to say that 
individuals are totally manipulated and unable to have individual thoughts regarding 
consumption, products and safety.435
 
 But all the weight of the consumers’ expectations 
test for defectiveness relies on the external and exogenous expectations of the 
“reasonable consumer,” that will determine the product safety a consumer is entitled to 
expect.  
 
6.1.3 The United States moves on: What about Europe? 
 
The controversy that the consumer expectations test has raised in the United 
States, especially as a test for product design cases,436 has led different U.S. jurisdictions 
to look for a more objective test that would not be subject to the difficult determination of 
the specific content of the consumer expectations test.437 During the 1980s, U.S. courts 
started applying a test that balanced costs and benefits,438
                                                                                                                                                 
industry and not by the specific manufacturer. In this case, imposing liability on the manufacturer of the 
product -- that may not even be responsible for the expectation that the consumer has about the product -- 
might not be the best solution. On the market manipulation problem in product cases see Jon D. Hanson & 
Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. 
L.Rev. 630 (1999) and Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999). 
 believing that such a test was 
435 See generally Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700 (2003). 
436 James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From 
The New American Restatement Of Products Liability,  34 Tex Int’l L J 1, 13-14 (1999). 
437 Jane Stapleton, PRODUCT LIABILITY, London; Boston: Butterworths, 236 (1994). For an overview of the 
developments of the American Law Institute in the subject of product liability and a proposal on how the 
ALI should address this issue at the Restatement (Third) See Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of 
Products Liability: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631 (1995). 
438 The risk-utility analysis is based on a balance of the costs and benefits of a product design cases. The 
most influential development of the risk-utility test in the U.S. is the model suggested by Wade where he 
established the relevant parameters that should be taken into consideration when qualifying a product as 
defective: 
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user and to the public as a 
whole. 
(2) The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable 
seriousness of the injury. 
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more objective than the consumer expectations test. This evolution culminated with the 
proposal made by the reporters of the Third Restatement, who suggested the adoption of a 
risk-utility analysis as the standard of product defectiveness to replace the consumer 
expectations test. The risk-utility test proposed by the Third Restatement consisted in 
showing the existence, availability and feasibility of a reasonable alternative product 
design that was reasonably cost effective and made the product safer.439 If such 
alternative design existed, the product is deemed defective.440 Despite the theoretical 
advantages of the reasonable alternative design suggested by the Third Restatement, its 
application has also been controversial and some U.S. jurisdictions have decided to 
continue applying the consumer expectations test.441
                                                                                                                                                 
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe. 
 
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product without impairing 
its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. 
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. 
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, 
because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of 
suitable warnings or instructions.  
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting the price of the 
product or carrying liability insurance.  
See John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 829 (1973). See 
also John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965) for an earlier version of 
a similar list of factors. See also Montgomery and Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of 
Strict Liability for Defective Products, 17 S.C.L. Rev.803 (1976).    
439 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 reporter's note to cmt. d (1998). See also James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 Cornell L. 
Rev. 867, 910 (1998) considering that the defective product design problem was solved with the adoption 
of a risk-utility test that was thought to be more objective. 
440 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2b (1998) 
“(a product) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could 
have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in a commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the 
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe.” 
Some consider that the reasonable alternative design test imposes and excessive burden on injured victims 
who have to show the availability of such alternative product design. See Thomas Lundmark, The 
Restatement Of Torts (Third) and the European Product Liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 
249 (1996). 
441 See Douglas Kysar, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700, 1728 (2003) presenting a complete overview of the cases 
of the different jurisdictions rejecting the adoption of the reasonable alternative design test and arguing in 
favor of the consumer expectations test. See also Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr, 
Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 
1061, 1180 and following (2008-2009) presenting the defectiveness tests adopted by the different U.S. 
states and arguing that the risk-utility test, that inevitably results in the application of the reasonable 
alternative design test, has been the defectiveness test adopted by the majority of the courts of the different 
U.S. states. 
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The U.S. jurisdictions that apply the reasonable alternative design test do not 
apply it uniformly to all defect types. In contrast to the Second Restatement, the Third 
Restatement differentiates between three major product defects types: manufacturing 
defects, defects of design and defects related to the failure to warn or to instruct.442 These 
categories generally respond to the different natures of the defects and the different 
standards of proof they require. In the Third Restatement, manufacturing defects are 
subject to strict liability, whereas liability for defects in product design hinges on the 
availability of a cost effective reasonable alternative design – meaning a safer design.443 
In other words, product design cases are subject to a negligence-based test.444 Negligence 
is also the liability system applied to defects relating to failure to warn and to instruct 
given that courts analyzing such defects compare the instructions and warnings provided 
by the manufacturer with the ones that should have been given to product users regarding 
product risks.445 Overall, it is possible to qualify the liability regime established by the 
Third Restatement as a negligence-based system.446
The definition and differentiation between kinds of product defect is also one of 
the aspects where the current European product liability system followed the structure of 
the Second Restatement of Torts. However, since 1985 when the product liability 
directive was adopted and subsequently transposed in the domestic law of the different 
member states, it has not evolved and has not incorporated the relevant and significant 
 
                                                 
442 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 (1998). 
443 See Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports To The 
XVIth International Congress Of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective Products and 
Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121, 124 (2002) arguing that the availability of a safer cost effective 
alternative design is not uniformly applied to design defect cases and stating that when the product is by 
itself unreasonably dangerous showing the availability of a safer alternative design should not be necessary. 
444 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 reporter's note to cmt. d (1998). 
445 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products Should Not Be Required To Rescue Users From 
Risks Presented By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 Sw. U.L. Rev. 595 (2008) noting that product 
manufacturers should only be required to warn of product risks presented by the product they 
manufactured. 
446 See in general, James A. Henderson, Jr., Why negligence dominates tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377 
(2002). 
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differences of each kind of product defect.447 The product liability directive does not 
differentiate between product defects, their potentially different standards of proof or 
even the diverse liability systems they would be subject to according to their 
characteristics.448
The Spanish jurisprudence contains numerous examples of judgments where 
courts differentiate between product defects. The manufacturing defect cases are 
generally straightforward and courts tend not to discuss whether the expectations of 
consumers were fulfilled or not. In these cases, courts generally require evidence that the 
specific product that caused the harm was different and less safe than others of the same 
product series. If the product that caused damages to the victim is more dangerous than 
the other products of the same series, the product is deemed defective. Examples of 
manufacturing defect cases in Spain can be found in cases dealing with fireworks
 The product liability Directive refers only to defect and it has been left 
to the scholars and courts of the member states to flesh out the different product defects, 
their defectiveness standards and the different contents of the consumer expectations test 
as applied to each kind of product defect.  
449
                                                 
447 In fact, the differentiation between product defects and their potentially different standard of proof or 
liability regime they should be subject to has not been one of the aspects the European Commission has 
suggested to take into account in the different reports it has issued regarding the application and 
improvement of the product liability directive in the member states. 
 and 
448 Despite the Directive’s uniform treatment of product defects, from an economic perspective, design 
defects, defective warnings and manufacturing defects are different with respect to their accident costs. 
Their basic difference is that while in manufacturing defect cases the total amount of non-negligence 
accident damages is relatively small in comparison to the product’s production costs, in design defects and 
defective warning situations, the amount of non-negligent damages is potentially very high. This analysis 
has led some authors to argue that strict liability could be imposed for manufacturing defect cases but that it 
should not be extended to design defect and defective warning cases. See, for example, John Cirace, A 
Theory of Negligence and Products Liability, 66 St. Johns L. Rev. 1, 71 (1992).  
449 See, for example, Tomás v. Pirofantasía Multimedia S.L. (producer), Centro Asegurador Baeza (the 
manufacturer’s insurer), Casimiro, owner of Comercial Alegre Carnaval (retailer),SAP Alicante 10.1.03 
(JUR 2003\114114; MP: José María Rives Seva). In this case, the court applied article 1902 of the Spanish 
Civil Code and held the manufacturer liable for the harm suffered by the injured plaintiff who lost some 
part of his right-hand fingers as a consequence of the explosion of a defective firecracker, that exploited 
right when it was lighted and not after a few seconds. In the case Rafael v. Comisión Fallera San Vicente-
Marvá, Centro Asegurador, Cía. de Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. y Pirotecnia Zaragozana, S.A, AP Valencia 
13.4.00 (AC 2000\3794; MP: Vicente Ortega Llorca), the court, again applying article 1902 of the Spanish 
Civil Code, held that the firework had a manufacturing defect and awarded damages for the injured victim, 
who suffered several injuries while filming a fireworks display.  
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defective food products.450
 A surprising aspect of the Spanish product liability jurisprudence is the relative 
lack of design defect cases as compared to cases dealing with other kinds of defects. 
Spanish courts tend not to get involved in discussions of whether the product design 
fulfilled the expectations to which consumers are entitled, whether a reasonable 
alternative design is available or whether the product design complies with the risk-utility 
test. Very few cases could be qualified as product design cases in Spain's almost 20-year 
history of jurisprudence applying the law transposing the product liability directive. 
Three design cases may be highlighted: First is a case in which a three year-old child died 
of asphyxiation while eating a candy. The Spanish Supreme Court imposed liability, 
holding that the candy was too big for children of that age and should have been made 
smaller to be safer.
 It is worth noting that in some cases, when the other elements 
of the victim’s prima facie case are present and have been proved, Spanish courts 
presume the existence of a manufacturing defect and award compensation to the injured 
victim. 
451 A second interesting product design case is a case in which a six-
month old baby died when his head was caught between his crib’s bars.452
                                                 
450 For example, in María Luisa L.V. v. Repostería Martínez, SA y Allianz Compañía de Seguros y 
Reaseguros, S.A., SAP La Coruña 21.6.02 (AC 2002\1348; MP: Rafael Jesús Porto García) the injured 
victim broke a tooth while eating a cookie that contained two stones of sugar that were formed during a 
defective manufacturing process. In application of Law 22/94 that transposed the product liability directive, 
the court awarded damages of 8.000 € to the victim.  
 The Spanish 
Supreme Court held the product manufacturer liable for not designing the crib with a 
451 See Luis A.M. and Josefina V.M. v. Interdulces, SA (importer) and Ana María G.J. (retailer), STS 
10.6.02 (RJ 2002\6198; MP: Román García Varela). The Supreme Court awarded 36.060 € to the parents of 
the victim considering the candy defective but also considered the child’s parents negligent given that they 
should have been aware that the candy was too dangerous for his child’s consumption. Using contributory 
negligence considerations the Supreme Court reduced the damage award requested - 62.896 € - by the 
child’s parents. (Note: a literal translation of the concept of concurrencia de culpas is contributory 
negligence. However, its application is equivalent to U.S. comparative negligence analysis). For a comment 
on this case see Antoni Rubí and José Piñeiro, Muerte de un niño asfixiado con un caramelo, comentario a 
la STS, 1ª, 10.6.2002, indret working paper 123 (2003). This paper can be found at 
http://www.indret.com/pdf/123_es.pdf.  
452 See Supreme Court, 1ª Chamber, 25.5.1996, Arsenio R.V.c. Roma 40 Bebés e Hiperbebé and Cunitor 
S.A. (num. 4853) (Hon. Alfonso Barcalá Trillo Figueroa). The court also considered the baby’s parents 
contributory negligent because their conduct constituted “some negligence” (“cierta negligencia por parte 
de los familiares” FD 4º). 
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smaller distance between the bars to prevent such an accident. It also held the product 
retailer jointly liable. The third case is one that can be characterized as a design defect 
case even though the court did not explicitly describe it as such. This is a case dealing 
with the “Superchupinazo,”453 a firework with an ignition mechanism that caused an 
explosion to occur, severely injuring the hands and faces of the people manipulating it.454
It is interesting to note that these design cases share some characteristics in 
common: two of them deal with products that caused harm to children -- in two of these 
cases there are babies or small children involved -- and courts also found that plaintiffs 
had been contributorily negligent and consequently reduced the compensation awarded 
for the damages suffered. At the same time, none of these cases includes a detailed 
analysis of the defectiveness standard applied to the product or of the expectations 
consumers were entitled to have. In all of these cases it appears to have been obvious to 
the courts to suggest that it was relatively easy for the product manufacturer to make the 
product safer. The courts therefore deemed the products defective and the product 
manufacturers liable. In none of these cases, though, is there a discussion of what 
constitutes a design defect and why these products are considered to be defective in 
design. Up to today, Spanish courts have tried hard to avoid these issues and to avoid 
getting into these discussions.  
 
The Court of Appeals of Valencia held the product manufacturer liable. This product has 
finally been withdrawn from the market.  
Spanish courts have also dealt with numerous cases on defects with respect to 
instructions and warnings.455
                                                 
453 This is the name of a very popular firework that is commonly used in Spain when cities and villages are 
celebrating a big festivity, generally organized by the Town hall of these towns.  
 It is possible to divide the Spanish jurisprudence on this 
454 Court of Appeals of Valencia, Section, 12.7.2001, JUR 2001\279709 and Alicante 10.1.2003, JUR 
2003\114114). 
455 In light of the lack of definition of the role of product warnings under the product liability directive, 
product warnings are likely to be a source of disputes. See Paula Giliker, Strict Liability for Defective 
Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business Law Review 4, 87-90, 89 (2003). Failure to warn and instruct 
is also an essential piece of product liability in the U.S. given that it is one of the most common source of 
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type of defect between cases where products lacked any kind of instructions or 
warnings,456 cases where instructions and warnings existed but were incorrect457 or were 
in a language other than Spanish,458 and finally, cases where the warnings and 
instructions were insufficient and therefore the information was not adequate to prevent 
the harm they aimed at preventing.459
This is not the place to present a potentially better alternative defectiveness test in 
Europe but it is interesting to mention the remarkably different perceptions of the 
consumer expectations test in the United States and Europe regarding whether it is more 
consumer friendly than the risk-utility test. While in the United States the consumer 
 In all these cases courts used negligence 
considerations to determine whether product manufacturers complied with their duty to 
warn and instruct product users of the risks presented by the products.  
                                                                                                                                                 
U.S. products litigation. S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of 
Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 573, 573 (2001). 
456 See for example, Paulino v. Sika, S.A. (manufacturer) and Adicons Canarias, S.L.U (supplier), Court of 
Appeals of Santa Cruz de Tenerife 19.1.07 (JUR 2007\158172; MP: Concepción Macarena González 
Delgado) where the court awarded 30.625 € is compensation to the injured victim for the damages suffered 
because the lack of a label on the product and therefore of information about the product risks deemed it 
defective.  
457 See, for example, Semilleros Monteplant S.L. c. Futureco S.L. (manufacturer and supplier), Court of 
Appeals of Barcelona 13.6.05 (JUR 2005\181270; MP: Marta Font Marquina) where, in application of 
article 3 of law 22/94, the court awarded 481.610,17 € to the user of the plant pesticides she bought from 
the defendant-manufacturer-supplier for the property damages he suffered caused by an error on the 
product label regarding the adequate doses of plant pesticides.  
458 See José Ángel T.R. v. José Marcos M.C. (store retailer), Almacenes Sarti, S.L. (supplier) and 
Alicantina de Juguetes, S.L. (manufacturer), Court of Appeals Cáceres 18.4.02 (AC 2002\1330; MP: Juan 
Francisco Bote Saavedra) where the court awarded 72.121,45 € in damages to the victim. The court held 
that the toy, a yo-yo, that caused damages to a woman, was defective because its instructions were not in 
Spanish, in violation of article 3 of law 22/94 transposing the product liability directive and also of 
European rule UNE-EN 50-088 that requires information of the product to be at least in the official 
languages of that member state. 
459 See Miguel G. de A.L. v. Robert Bosch Comercial Española, S.A. (importer), STS 3.12.97 (RJ 
1997\8722; MP: Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta). In this case the injured victim suffered damages in her 
eye due to an imported machine and did not include sufficient information for its proper use. The court 
considered the instructions and warnings were insufficient and held the importer liable for 10.000.000 ptas 
(60.000 euros). See also Javier c. Gregorio y Flamagas, S.A. Lesiones, Court of Appeals of Málaga 7.10.03 
(JUR 2004\12120; MP: Inmaculada Suárez Bárcena Florencio); Rosa S.M. v. Distribuidora Internacional 
de Alimentación, S.A. (DIA), Court of Appeals Barcelona 17.12.01 (JUR 2002\84388; MP: Amelia Mateo 
Marco) and Agreal v. Sanofi Aventis, S.A., Trial Court number 12 of Barcelona 7.9.06 (EDJ 2006\283594; 
Hon: Marta del Valle García). The courts in these cases considered the products that caused harms 
defective in the instructions and warnings stating in all three cases that even though the products included 
instructions and warnings, they did not inform about certain product risks that finally caused the damages 
the victims suffered.   
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expectations test is considered more consumer friendly, Europe seems to believe the 
opposite.460 Europeans consider the most consumer friendly test on product defectiveness 
to be the risk-utility test.461
This different perception might be explained by the mixed nature of the 
defectiveness standard included in the product liability directive. While on first reading 
the defectiveness standard looks like the consumer expectations test, on a closer look it 
becomes clear that it also includes elements of the risk-utility test. On one hand, the 
standard of “the safety which a person is entitled to expect"
 
462 is basically similar to the 
consumer expectations test of section 402A of the Second Restatement, which provides 
that the product “must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 
contemplated by the ordinary consumer."463 But at the same time, the definition of a 
defective condition also includes factors such as the use of the product and the 
presentation of the product,464 which are closer to the risk-utility balancing because they 
require the court to consider the utility of the product and whether the risks were 
communicated to the buyer.465
                                                 
460 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 996-997 (1998) arguing that such 
difference of perspective is due to the difference between what we actually expect -- which is what U.S. 
jurors looked at -- and what the consumer had the right to expect -- which is what European judges will 
look at.  
 These mixed elements might help explain why Spanish 
courts avoid getting involved in discussions of definitions and why the perception is that 
the risk-utility test might be more consumer friendly than the defectiveness test included 
in the product liability directive. 
461 The European reference of the risk-utility test is the one included in the General Product Safety 
Directive, which includes a general safety clause for all consumer products. See Council Directive 
2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 2002). See also 
Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 996-997 (1998). 
462 Preamble of the product liability directive. 
463 See Restatement (Second) §402A cmt. i. 
464 Article 6 of the directive. See below. 
465 See Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 357,  366 (1992) concluding that under the Directive’s definition should be easlier for plaintiffs to 
prove defect than under 402A of the Restatement (Second) because under the Directive it is not necessary 
to prove that the product is both defective and unreasonably dangerous.  
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6.2 Other circumstances to be taken into account  
 
6.2.1 The Presentation of the Product  
 
As mentioned above, the expectation of consumers is not the only variable to 
consider when determining whether a product is defective; “other circumstances” must 
also be taken into consideration.466
The very first item the product liability directive refers to is the presentation of the 
product, which has been interpreted to include the warnings and instructions given to the 
product user,
   
467 even though the Directive does not include a specific reference to 
liability for failure to warn or to instruct of product risks.468
The “presentation of the product” is broad enough to be interpreted to mean 
“product representation,”
  
469 which would include product marketing, product description, 
information and warnings about the product and its use as well as the container or the 
packaging in which the product comes,470
The product presentation is directly related to consumer expectations given that it 
can either increase or decrease the safety expectations a consumer may have regarding 
 in case they were found to be inadequate. This 
phrase seems to include also promotional material from the manufacturer, distributor or 
retailer and any advertisements of the product as well. 
                                                 
466 Article 6.1 of the product liability directive. 
467 As §402A of the Restatement (Second) also includes in the presentation of the product the information 
provided to consumers and hence relevant when evaluating the expectations of consumers.  
468 Article 6(l)(a) of the product liability directive. Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The 
New Product Liability Rules, 371 Practising Law Institute 81, 95-96 (1989). See also Kenneth Ross & 
Gregory G. Scott, Europe 1992: Warning and Instructions under the Strict liability, Machinery, and 
proposed Product Safety Directives, 388 PLI/Lit 49 (PLI), 52-53 (1990). 
469 It remains difficult to ascertain what degree of warning would be required in order to avoid being hold 
liable. See Paula Giliker, Strict Liability for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business Law 
Review 4, 87-90, 89 (2003). 
470 S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573, 582-583 (2001). 
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the product.471 Typically, advertising and marketing practices will serve to raise 
expectations about the product in question by stressing its advantages and generally 
encouraging consumers to have confidence in it.472
Product manufacturers are the main sources of information about products but not 
the only ones. Intermediaries also provide the consumer with such information or 
warning and they are, therefore treated as if they were the producers when they contribute 
to shaping the expectations of consumers regarding the product.
  
473
An essential parameter for determining the extent to which the presentation of a 
product has influenced the consumer expectations is the amount of information provided 
to him or her. Knowing that, producers will try to avoid liability by pointing out as many 
potential risks as possible in the accompanying information. This leads, sometimes, to too 
much information, and it can even become counterproductive in the sense of overloading 
the consumer.
  
474 The warnings, even though adequate, should be consistent with the goal 
of promoting product safety by redesigning dangerous products rather than seeking to 
avoid liability and transferring risk through reliance on the warning having been provided 
to the consumer.475
The product liability directive does not determine the content and scope of the 
concept of product warnings even though they must aim to reduce the total amount of 
  
                                                 
471 In order to determine whether a warning is sufficient in order to provide accurate safety expectations to 
the public, a court may consider the level of risk involved and the steps taken by the defendant when 
providing information to consumers and users regarding product risks. See Paula Giliker,, Strict Liability 
for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business Law Review 4, 87-90 (2003). See also James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products Should Not Be Required To Rescue Users From Risks Presented 
By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 Sw. U.L. Rev. 595 (2008) noting that manufacturers should be 
required to warn about the risks presented by their product but not of other risks beyond these. 
472 Expectations, however, can also be lowered through these practices by suggesting that certain designs 
are standard, which would create the perception that special safety features are only found on deluxe 
models. S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l 
& Comp. L. 573, 582-583 (2001). 
473 For example, doctors are considered intermediaries under the “learned intermediary” theory. 
474 S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573, 579-583 (2001). 
475 A.M. Clark, PRODUCT LIABILITY, 103, Sweet & Maxwell (1989). 
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injury involved in a dangerous activity.476
However, the product liability directive recognizes that it is not possible to require 
product manufacturers to warn of every possible danger of a particular product.
 These are also questions left to the courts of 
the different member states.  
477 It 
therefore addresses the issue of the amount of information that should be provided. 
Consistent with its defectiveness standard, it requires information regarding the risks 
involved only in reasonably expected product uses. Consequently, a warning is required 
whenever a product risk is not obvious and in cases where without the warning the 
product would be unreasonably dangerous when used according its intended or 
foreseeable use so that the user can adequately identify, asses and if so wished, avoid or 
minimize the product risk.478
Member states may lay down their own marketing requirements provided that 
they comply with Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome.
 Adequate product information can render an otherwise 
unsafe product safe.  
479 Those conditions may 
include imposing a language requirement under which information essential for 
identifying the product must be provided in the language, or in one of the languages 480
                                                 
476 Christoph Ann, Innovators In The Crossfire: A Policy Sketch For Unknowable Risks In European And 
United States Product Liability Law, 10 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 173 (1995). 
 of 
the State in which the product is placed in the market and that is easily understood by the 
477 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products Should Not Be Required To Rescue Users From 
Risks Presented By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 Sw. U.L. Rev. 595, 596 (2008) arguing against 
assigning watchdog responsibilities to the sellers of safe non-defective products. 
478 The function of a warning should be to warn users of the risks associated with the product; to instruct 
users on the safe product uses, and on the operation and maintenance of the product, and to inform users of 
the consequences of failure to heed the warnings and instructions. See C. J. Wright, PRODUCT LIABILITY: 
THE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK MANAGEMENT, 123, Blackstone Press. Ltd.(1989).   
479 Articles 30 and 36 of the Treaty of Rome. 
480 See European rule UNE-EN 50-088 requiring product information to be at least in one of the official 
languages of a member state. See also S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day 
Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 573, 589 (2001). These languages are presumed to be 
sufficiently known to the purchasing public of a member state State in question and a trader who draws up 
the mandatory information in one of them must be regarded as having discharged his obligations as against 
that State. Thus, in the case of multilingual States, information relating to products must not necessarily be 
given in all the languages. See also Thomas H. Lee, A Purposeful Approach to Products Liability Warnings 
and Non-English Speaking Consumers, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1107, 1109 (1994).  
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consumers in that area.481 Such language requirements must not constitute a barrier to 
intra-Community trade must be applied “without distinction to all national and imported 
products” and must be “proportionate to the objective of consumer protection which they 
pursue.”482
 
  
 
6.2.2 Foreseeable Product Uses 
 
As mentioned above, the Directive refers to "the use to which it could reasonably 
be expected that the product would be put,”483
This requirement implies that producers must bear in mind the foreseeable 
misuses that the product could have and protect users from the possible injuries resulting 
from such foreseeable misuses. Product defectiveness will be considered only in cases 
where a product causes harm to its users while it is being used in a foreseeable way. 
 an element based on objective 
reasonableness. Thus, potential victims are not protected against harm caused by possible 
product misuses, unintended uses, abuses, or reuses.  
484
                                                 
481 The European Court of Justice has addressed this issue in the case C-33/97, 1999 ECR I-3175, [2000] 2 
C.M.L.R. 135 (1999). Court of Justice of the European Communities. Opinion of Mr Advocate General 
Cosmas delivered on 19 February 1998 in the case Colim NV v Bigg's Continent Noord NV. Reference for 
a preliminary ruling: Rechtbank van Koophandel Hasselt - Belgium. Case C-33/97. 1998 ECJ CELEX 
LEXIS 13375; 1999 ECR I-3175 at 33, 40 and 44. In this case, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities addressed the issue of whether member states could require imported products to carry 
certain label information in the language of the area in which the products are sold or in a language that is 
readily understood by the consumer. The court held that domestic regulation at issue requiring labeling in 
other languages did not constitute a “technical issue” and was therefore valid. Spanish courts held a 
manufacturer liable for failure to warn and instruct of product risks in Spanish in the case José Ángel T.R. 
c. José Marcos M.C. (retailer), Almacenes Sarti, S.L. (supplier) y Alicantina de Juguetes, S.L. 
(manufacturer), Court of Appeals of Cáceres 18.4.02 (AC 2002\1330; Hon Juan Francisco Bote Saavedra). 
  
482 See Case C-33/97, 1999 ECR I-3175, [2000] 2 C.M.L.R. 135 (1999), Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cosmas delivered on 19 February 1998 in the case Colim 
NV v Bigg's Continent Noord NV. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Rechtbank van Koophandel Hasselt 
- Belgium. Case C-33/97. 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13375; 1999 ECR I-3175 p. 40 (135). 
483 Art. 6(1)(b) of the product liability directive. See also PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL 
PRACTITIONER, Colorado Springs, Colo.: Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 260 (1981) stating that foreseeability is a 
basic factor of the misuse defense.  
484 The product liability directive is only concerned with safety. Merchantability considerations or fitness 
for the purpose the product was intended to be used are issues that remain left for domestic law. See 
  120 
The wording of this “circumstance” presents an extensive set of possible 
definitions that are left open and will be determined by domestic courts. For example, in 
the context of products specifically designed for multiple purposes, it is difficult to 
determine which uses are reasonable and potentially expected or where the product 
misuse is attributable to the assembler's design or to the instructions given regarding the 
potential product uses.485
 
  
 
6.2.3 The time the product was put into circulation  
 
The last issue laid out in the product liability directive that relates to the consumer 
expectations test is the question of the moment when the product was put into circulation. 
This moment is crucial given that the producer will be subject to liability under the 
product liability directive only from the moment he or she puts the product into 
circulation, but not before. This is the element that determines the beginning of the period 
in which liability may be imposed on the product manufacturer. It also determines the 
beginning of the period in which liability should be computed and extinguished.486 Any 
harm caused by the product before it has been put into circulation, caused for example by 
bad storage would not be the responsibility of the producer.487
                                                                                                                                                 
Andrew Geddes, PRODUCT AND SERVICE LIABILITY IN THE EEC, THE NEW STRICT LIABILITY REGIME, 21 
Sweet & Maxwell (1992). 
 So any defect must be 
identified when the product is put into circulation and not at the time the damage is 
caused.  
 485 In cases where the product defect may be due to the assembler’s design of the product, the product 
liability directive, in its article 7(f) exonerates the manufacturers of the product components from liability. 
486 Article 11 of the product liability directive. 
487 Under Article 6(1)(c) of the product liability directive; the producer is liable only until the moment 
where he/she puts the product into circulation. 
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The European Commission thought that it was not necessary to define this 
concept.488 To date, however, the European Court of Justice has been requested to 
interpret and define this phrase twice in cases where, because of internal corporate 
organization, it was not clear whether the product had been put into circulation. The first 
case was Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune.489 This case involved a hospital that 
prepared its own solutions, one of which caused damages. The hospital claimed that the 
product had not been put into circulation because it had not left the sphere of control of 
the hospital dispensary and therefore, liability should not attach. The second case is a 
reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, 
in Declan O’Byrne v Sanofy Pasteur MSD Ltd., Sanofy Pasteur S.A.,490
The European Court of Justice stated that “a product is put into circulation when it 
is taken out of the manufacturing process operated by the producer and enters a 
marketing process in the form in which it is offered to the public for sale or 
consumption.”
 where the 
English court requested the European Court of Justice to define what put into circulation 
meant within the scope of article 11 of the product liability directive. This case dealt with 
the issue of whether a product manufactured and distributed within an international group 
of companies was put into circulation for the purpose of article 11 of the product liability 
directive.  
491
The concept of putting a product into circulation does not only refer to the 
circulation of the final product. As mentioned above, manufacturers include the producer 
 In other words, if a manufacturer of a product hands the product to 
another corporate branch of the same corporate group and these two branches are not 
involved in the same manufacturing process, this will constitute putting the product into 
circulation.  
                                                 
488 Declan O’Byrne v Sanofy Pasteur MSD Ltd, C-127/04 [2006] 2 CMLR 24, at [25]. Sanfoy Pasterus was 
formerly Aventis Pasteur MSD and Aventis Pasteur S.A. 
489 Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. C-203/99 [2003] 1CMLR 41. 
490 Declan O’Byrne v Sanofy Pasteur MSD Ltd., C-127/04 [2006] 2 CMLR 24, at [25]. 
491 Declan O’Byrne v Sanofy Pasteur MSD Ltd., C-127/04 [2006] 2 CMLR 24, at [32]. 
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of the final product, component part, raw material and apparent manufacturer as well as 
others in the same position as the manufacturers, such as suppliers or product importers. 
Based on the above judgments, the class should also include different corporations within 
the same corporate holding. 
Such definition is broad enough to leave remarkable discretion to domestic courts, 
which has resulted in different meanings and different judicial interpretation by the 
jurisdictions of the member states. This diversity has made some authors consider it an 
unstable criterion.492
Additionally, once a product has left the hands of the producer being non-
defective, it does not become defective just because the safety expectations of the general 
public have changed
  
493 or because a safer product has subsequently been put into 
circulation.494 So risks that are discovered after the product has been put into circulation 
are borne by the consumer or user.495 The “safety which a person is entitled to expect," 
determined when the product has been put into circulation tells manufacturers that there 
will not be liability for having a better -- safer -- product in the market at a later time496 
but also requires manufacturers to be rigorous the first time they put a product in the 
market.497
This provision, though, does not mean that producers will be free from liability 
after the product has been put into circulation because there is a continuing post-
marketing obligation to take into account new information about the product and about 
new product risks as more products are sold. Further, steps must be taken in warning 
users or preventing product uses that were discovered as dangerous. However, such 
  
                                                 
492 See for example Jane Stapleton, PRODUCT LIABILITY, 336, Butterworths (1994). 
493 Article 6(2) of the product liability directive. 
494 Article 6(2) of the product liability directive. 
495 It would not be possible to hold manufacturers liable for the harm caused by defects that appear after the 
product has been commercialized because this would imply considering the product risks in hindsight, and 
not when the information regarding the risks is available to the producer. See BEHAVIORAL LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, Cass R. Sunstein (Ed.), vol. xiv, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2001). 
496 Article 6(2) of the product liability directive. 
497 Article 6 (1)(c) of the product liability directive. 
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obligations do not derive from the product liability directive but from the product safety 
regime currently in force in Europe.498
 
  
 
7 Defenses  
 
The Directive sets forth a strict product liability regime but in trying to be 
consistent with the “fair apportionment of risks”499 principle, it provides several defenses 
that if alleged and proven by defendants,500 exempt them from liability501 as long as two 
pre-requisites are met: a requirement that the plaintiff is deemed a consumer502 and that 
the defendant is part of the traditional chain of distribution.503
The defenses established in Article 7 can be categorized in different groups. First, 
the ones related to the product timing that restrict liability in cases where the defendant 
did not put the product into circulation, or where the defendant put the product into 
circulation but where it was not defective when it left the defendant’s hands. The second 
group of defenses relates to the defendant’s lack of commercial activity when the product 
left its hands. The defendant will not be liable when the product was not manufactured 
for sale or distribution for economic purpose or when it was not manufactured or 
distributed by the defendant in the course of its business. The last group of defenses are 
those related to situations where the product is defective but the manufacturer is not liable 
  
                                                 
498 See recital 17 and Article 5(1) of the Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General 
Product Safety O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 2002) regarding post-marketing obligations. See Chapter 5 of this 
dissertation.   
499 Preamble of the product liability directive. 
500 See European Court of Justice Cases, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 May 2001; Henning 
Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hojesteret - Denmark. Case C-
203/99. 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 6690; 2001 ECR I-3569.  
501 All of the defenses established in article 7 of the product liability directive are absolute defenses. Hans 
C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules, 371 Practising Law Institute 
81 (1989), noting that article 7 of the Directive has been worded to give courts a duty of careful review. 
502 As explained earlier consumers should be interpreted in the broad sense to include users, bystanders and 
injured persons in general. Article 9(b)(ii) of the product liability directive. 
503 Article 3 of the product liability directive. 
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if the defect is either due to a defective component part or due to the instructions given to 
the manufacturer to assemble the product; the defect is due to compliance with mandatory 
regulations issued by public authorities; or the scientific and technical knowledge at the 
time the product was put into circulation was not such as to enable the manufacturer to 
discover the existence of the defect.504
The product liability directive does not focus only on the manufacturers’ conduct 
but also provides a defense that places its emphasis on victims’ conduct.
  
505 The Directive 
somehow includes contributory negligence considerations in the sense that the judge may 
reduce or extinguish the producer’s liability if the damage is caused both by a defect in 
the product and by the act or omission of a third party, including other sellers for whom 
the injured person is responsible. So if the injured person is partially at fault or solely 
responsible for the damage he or she suffered, the product manufacturer may reduce or 
avoid liability to the extent that it is able to show that the claimant was wholly or partly 
contributory negligent, under each country’s domestic rules.506
 
  
 
7.1  Defenses related to the time element of liability  
 
7.1.1 The defendant did not put the product into circulation 
 
This defense, established in article 7(a) of the product liability directive, is the 
other side of the concept presented above regarding “the time the product was put into 
circulation.” This defense aims to exclude from liability any manufacturer of the final 
                                                 
504 The European Court of Justice has dealt with such defenses in several cases. See, for example, the 
Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 1997 in the case of the Commission of 
the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Case C-300/95. 1997 
ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13458. p3 
505 Article 8(2) of the product liability directive. 
506 Note that, once more, this raises another structural problem since fault is in principle irrelevant under the 
strict liability regime established by the Directive.  
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product, component part, or raw material as well as any product supplier or product 
importer (potentially involving different corporations within the same corporate holding) 
who has not put the product into circulation or into the marketing stream.507 Whenever 
the product has not been put into the distribution chain, no liability will attach.508
The term "put into circulation" has been defined differently by the domestic laws 
of the various member states.
 
509 The definitions range from (1) voluntarily giving the 
product through an act and manifests an intention to transfer it to a third party for this 
party’s use or benefit;510 (2) voluntarily delivering the product to a third party;511 (3) 
delivering the product for the use of the buyer512 or delivering the product to another 
person in the course of business or incorporated into another product.513 An alternative 
view is to consider that the product is put into circulation immediately when it leaves the 
producer’s premises. In any event, whether any contract exists or a payment has been 
made is irrelevant for this determination. However, the diverse interpretations of this 
defense by the different domestic courts of the member states is subject to the common 
conceptual frame determined by the European Court of Justice514
                                                 
507 See O’Byrne v Sanofy Pasteur MSD Ltd, C-127/04 [2006] 2 CMLR 24, at [25] and Henning Veedfald v 
Arhus Amtskommune. C-203/99 [2003] 1CMLR 41. 
 under which liability 
attaches only after the product has been put into the marketing stream.   
508 This has been emphasized by the European Commission in the Green paper Liability for Defective 
products (1999), COM(1999)396 final available at  
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf 
509 See Daniel c. Dual Gres, S.A. (manufacturer), Court of Appeals of Castellón 28.2.06 (JUR 
2006\185376; Hon Esteban Solaz Solaz). In this case, there were defects in some tales installed in the 
plaintiff’s house. Such tales were given by the manufacturer to the retailer by mistake. The court held that 
the manufacturer of the tales was not liable because there was no subjective will to put the product into 
circulation (art. 6.1.a) of law 22/94 transposing the product liability directive. 
510 Belgium, Loi relative à la responsabilé du fair des produits defectueuxm of 25 February 1991, Section 6 
511 Austrian Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz, ProdHG) 1988, Federal Act of 21 January 1988. 
Section 6. Amended 11 February 1993. 
512 Italy, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica no. 244 of 24 May 1988,  section 7 and also the 
Norvegian Lov om Produktansvar (Product Liability Act) no. 104, of 23 December 1988, sections 1, 2(2). 
Amended in November 1991 effective January 1 1993.  
513 United Kingdon, Consumer Protection Act 1987, in force on March 1 1988.  The term used in section 4 
(1)(b) of the United Kingdom Act is “supply,” which is defined by section 46 to include selling, buying, 
lending, exchanging and even giving as a gift. 
514 See O’Byrne v Sanofy Pasteur MSD Ltd, C-127/04 [2006] 2 CMLR 24, at [25] and Henning Veedfald v 
Arhus Amtskommune. C-203/99 [2003] 1CMLR 41. 
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7.1.2 The defect which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the 
product was put into circulation by him or that this defect came into being 
afterwards 
 
A related defense is that product was not defective when it left the producer's 
hands.515 This defense protects a producer where the defect is due to mishandling after 
leaving the producer's control or when a later step in the distribution chain renders the 
product defective because someone removed a safety feature or failed to provide 
instructions for use or warnings. In Spain, courts have interpreted this provision in Juan 
Ramón c. Goodyear Dunlop Tires España, S.A.516
However, it remains to be seen how this defense relates to and interacts with the 
producer's potential post-sale obligations established by the European product safety 
regime.
 where the court held that car tires 
could not be deemed defective because the alleged defect did not exist at the time the 
product was put into circulation. The court based its conclusion on a finding that the 
accident occurred far beyond the product’s life – the time of use and the number of 
kilometers for which the tires had been driven showed they were not defective when put 
into circulation.  
517
 
 
 
                                                 
515 Article 7(b) of the product liability directive. 
516 Juan Ramón c. Goodyear Dunlop Tires España, S.A., Madrid Court of Appeals 20.6.05 (JUR 
2005\173118; MP: Juan Luis Gordillo Álvarez Valdés). The court applied article 6.1 of the law 22/94 
transposing the product liability directive. 
517 See Chapter 5 of this dissertation. This defense directly relates to recital 17 and article 5(1) of the 
Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 
2002). For literature on post-sale duties see Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws in the European 
Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 357, 368 (1992). See also Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, 
Buybacks and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 597 (2009). 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023125 discussing the interaction between the warning 
defense and product liability.   
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7.2 The defendant’s lack of commercial activity 
 
This defense excludes harm caused by products when there is a lack of business 
activity.518
U.S. law offers conceptually interesting arguments relevant to this language under 
what is called the "dual capacity" doctrine.
 The Directive distinguishes between commercial and non-commercial 
suppliers of goods and protects defendants whose products are manufactured neither for 
sale nor for distribution for economic purpose nor in the course of business.   
519
The European Court of Justice has discussed this defense in the context of a case, 
noted earlier, where a defective product -- a solution prepared for patients -- was 
manufactured and used in the course of providing a medical service in a public hospital 
that was financed with public funds, and for which the patient was not required to pay 
any consideration besides general taxes.
 Under this doctrine, courts consider the 
nature of the activity conducted by the tortfeasor. If this activity is not commercial, the 
defense is available. The distinction and consequences resulting from this doctrine have 
neither been regulated nor developed by European courts.  
520
                                                 
518 Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 42, Ashgate Publishing 
Company (2005).  
 Beyond this case there is no case law from the 
519 See William Bell et al. v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266 (1981) where the 
California Supreme Court solved a case regarding injuries attributed to defects in a tank truck containing 
flammable gas, that the plaintiff was delivering to a customer of his employer. The employer, who was the 
defendant in this tort action, had assembled about 200 bulk delivery trucks and used all but four of these in 
its own operations. The plaintiff filed an action against his employer for strict manufacturer's liability 
claiming that various products, other than the tank truck, were involved in his accident, including storage 
tanks, valves, couplings, hoses and other equipment used in the storage and transportation of gas. The trial 
court granted summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that the employee's exclusive remedy 
against the employer was the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). However, the appellate court reversed and 
held that the doctrine of dual capacity permitted the employee to pursue a product liability action against 
his employer where the employee's injury arose from a separate and distinct relationship. The court held 
that the Workers' Compensation Act was not the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer and 
that an employment relationship did not protect the employer from common law liability where the 
concurrent cause of the injury was attributable to the employer's separate and distinct relationship to the 
employee as a manufacturer, which invoked a different set of obligations than the employer's duties to its 
employees. 
520 European Court of Justice Cases, Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 
14 December 2000 on the case Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary 
ruling: Hojesteret - Denmark. Case C-203/99. 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7596; 2001 ECR I-3569. In this 
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European Court of Justice -- and no precedent in Spanish courts -- interpreting the 
provision for ordinarily marketed products.  
 
 
7.3 The product defect was beyond the manufacturer’s control  
 
7.3.1 The defect is attributable to the design of the product in which the 
component has been filtered or to the instructions given by the 
manufacturer of the product 
 
This defense is important for component manufacturers521
Although the theory of this defense is straightforward, a component manufacturer 
may face difficulties in meeting the burden of proof unless it keeps detailed records of the 
design and instructions for safe use which it gives in general, and specifically those given 
to the final product manufacturer. 
 because they are not 
liable if the defect arises out of the misuse of the component part by the end producer in 
two types of situations: first, cases where the defect is due to the design of the product 
into which the component product is fitted; and second, cases where the defect is due to 
the specific instructions of the manufacturer of the final product. So if the defect in either 
the component or the finished product is due to a defect of the final product rather than in 
the component, then the manufacturer of the final product, and not the manufacturer of 
the component part, will be liable.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
case the European Court of Justice held that Article 7(c) did not extend to public hospitals in which a 
defective product had been manufactured and used in the course of a medical service and therefore the 
hospital was liable even if the patient had not paid any consideration for the medical service received.  
521 Article 7(f) of the product liability directive. This defense is omitted form the Norwegian and Swedish 
legislation. Lov om produktansvar of December 23, 1988 and Produkansvarlag (1992:18) of January 23, 
1992. 
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7.3.2 The defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations 
issued by the public authorities 
 
This defense relates to the relevance of safety regulations in the context of product 
liability. The scope of this defense remains uncertain even today but the idea behind it is 
that whenever regulatory standards exist, compliance should provide a defense to avoid 
liability for defective products.522
In order to be able to claim this compliance defense, it is necessary to prove that it 
was not possible to manufacture the product in a non-defective way and at the same time 
comply with the mandatory safety standards in question.
 However, not all safety standards trigger the defense; 
rather, it is triggered only by mandatory standards issued by public authorities.  
523 Hence, if the product could 
have been manufactured in a non-defective manner and still comply with the standards, 
the defense is not available.524
Some courts have held that the violation of voluntary standards might be 
admissible, but not conclusive evidence of product defectiveness
  
525 but that the 
compliance with regulations or mandatory standards or the fact that the product has been 
licensed or tested is no defense to liability.526
                                                 
522 This is a way the European Commission understands encourages compliance with safety standards.  
   
523 Article 7(d) of the product liability directive. However, it will be necessary to provide evidence to show 
that the product manufacturer has used all the information available at the time the product was 
manufactured and therefore that he complied with the state of the art or the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge of that time.  
524 Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules, 371 Practising Law 
Institute 81 (1989) indicating that this provision should be strictly interpreted and very narrowly applied.  
525 This is the interpretations that German and Austrian courts have done of this defense. See Stephan 
Lenze, Product Safety Regulations and Defect, European Product Liability Review 24, 21 (2006). 
526 But it should be noted that whenever the scientific and technical knowledge did not allow discovering 
product risks, compliance with mandatory standards may be evidence that there is no product defect and 
therefore no liability is imposed. See for example Esther v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) y Collagen Biomedical 
Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), Court of Appeals of Vizcaya 20.4.05 (JUR 2005\200889; Hon: María 
Carmen Keller Echevarría) and Blanca v. Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), Court of 
Appeals of Barcelona 4.3.05 (JUR 2005\116914; Hon: Joaquín de Oro-Pulido López).   
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The introduction of this defense has been justified based on the idea that 
producers "cannot be placed between disobedience and liability."527 However, the 
defense has rarely been applied in the member states. In Spain there is only one case528
 
 
where it is possible to interpret that the court justified not imposing liability on the 
manufacturer of a defective mammary prosthesis that caused depression on the patient 
because of compliance with mandatory regulations. In that case, the court held that the 
product was manufactured according to a mandatory regulation in force in the European 
community and under the control of health authorities and that, therefore, imposing 
liability was not justified.  
 
7.3.3 The state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the 
product was put into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of 
the defect to be discovered.  
 
A particular source of tension between European institutions, governments of the 
member states, the industry and consumer organizations529 has been the introduction of a 
defense whereby product manufacturers may avoid liability whenever the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product was put into circulation 
was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered. This defense is 
generally known as the development risks defense.530
                                                 
527 Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules, 371 Practising law 
institute 81 (1989). 
  
528 See Soledad v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer) 
Court of Appeals of Pontevedra 26.1.04 (JUR 2006\18374; Hon: Margarita Fuenteseca Degenefee) where 
the court held that the manufacturer of mammary prosthesis was not liable because the product was 
licensed and approved and complied with the mandatory safety regulations applicable to it.   
529 Consumer representatives objected to the introduction of the “development risks” defense and its 
introduction resulted in delays in the Directive’s adoption. See Christopher J S Hodges, Product Liability In 
Europe: Politics, Reform And Reality, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 121,126 (2000). See also Geraint Howells, 
COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY, 39-40, Dartmouth Publishing Group (1993). 
530 Article 7(e) of the product liability directive.  
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The European Commission argued during the drafting process that the product 
liability regime should be purely strict and that, therefore, the development risk defense 
should be excluded from the final text of the Directive. The Commission believed that the 
introduction of such defense represented an overly lax regime with respect to high-risk 
and high technological industries such as pharmaceuticals and aerospace where the 
potential harm of products is very large and where the defense would significantly 
undermine the effectiveness of strict liability. For that reason, in the first draft of the 
Directive presented in 1976531
Member states, representing the unanimous position of their industries, opposed 
the idea of holding manufacturers liable for product risks that could not be discovered. 
During the process of adopting the Directive, the European Parliament, in 1979, through 
the representatives of the different member states, introduced an exception to this rule.
 the Commission included a provision whereby the 
manufacturer of a defective product would be liable for the harm caused by this product 
regardless of whether the state of scientific and technical knowledge of the risk was 
available at the moment of marketing the product. This proposal implied that product 
manufacturers were liable for all risks existing at the time the product was marketed, 
regardless of whether these risks were known or whether they were discoverable.  
532 
This exception allowed a product manufacturer to avoid liability if it provided evidence 
that showed that the state of the scientific and technical knowledge was such that the 
defect was undiscoverable. But this solution was not adopted unanimously and while 
some states sponsored its introduction, others opposed it.533
                                                 
531 Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1976 
Directive. 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 241) 9 (1976). 
 The argument industries 
532Amendment of the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the member States Concerning Liability for Defective 
Products, O.J. Eur. Comm. C 271, 3 (1979). 
533 Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg opposed the introduction of this limited 
exception and the Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom accepted its introduction. See Solé Feliu, 
Josep, El concepto de defecto del producto en la responsabilidad civil del fabricante, 474, València, Tirant 
lo Blanch (1997). 
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offered was that their limited capacity to acquire knowledge and the constantly changing 
state of technical knowledge required a reasonable standard that could allow them to 
avoid liability when it was not possible for them to know about the product risks at the 
time the product was put into circulation.534
Finally, as is often the case with controversial provisions in European agreements, 
the development risks defense was decided to be neither fully introduced nor fully 
excluded from the final text of the Directive.
  
535 The compromise reached536 was that the 
final text of the Directive would include a defense under which producers would bear 
liability for known and therefore quantifiable risks, but not for development risks, that are 
by their nature, unquantifiable.537 In this sense, the Directive balanced the costs to 
producers of acquiring information about risks involved in their products and the costs to 
consumers of the harm caused by such unknown risks.538
                                                 
534 Christopher J.S. Hodges, UNKNOWN RISKS AND THE COMMUNITY INTEREST: THE DEVELOPMENT RISKS 
DEFENCE IN THE PRODUCT LIABILITY DIRECTIVE, McKenna & Co. (1996). 
  
535 Josephine Liu, Two roads diverged in a yellow wood: the European Community stays on the path to 
strict liability, 27 Fordham Int’l L J. 1940, 1953-1954 (2004). 
536 Article 7(e) of the Directive. This defense would be the equivalent to the American “state of the art,” 
which allows manufacturers to avoid liability for unknown product risks at the time of manufacture. This 
was the provision of the Directive that created the most controversy. Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE 
PRODUCT LIABILITY, 39-40, Dartmouth Publishing Group (1993) remarking that inclusion of development 
risk defense has caused most controversy. See also Anita Bernstein, Looking at Europe for the Difference 
Between Strict and Fault-Based Liability, 14 Journal of Products Liability 207, 209 (1992).   
537 Articles 15 and 7(e) of the product liability directive. The opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tesauro 
delivered on 23 January 1997 in the case of the Commission of the European Communities v United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13458, Case C-300/95. P 22 
described the negotiation process of the Directive according to which the Commission's proposal was 
inspired by the U.S. model for a system of no-fault liability on the part of the producer, which, on the one 
hand, was regarded as the most suitable means of securing adequate protection for the consumer (fourth 
recital) and, on the other, was justified by the fact that the producer was the center through which to impute 
damages, since the producer  may include the liability costs as part of his production costs when calculating 
the price and therefore spread it among all consumers of products which are of the same type but free from 
defects (fifth recital). See also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More 
Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 993 (1998) 
arguing that the introduction of the “development risk” defense intended to avoid the U.S. product liability 
crisis.   
538 See Jane Stapleton, PRODUCT LIABILITY, 236-242, Butterworths (1994). This conclusion has been 
supported by the Study on the economic impact of the development risk clause delivered by Fondazione 
Rosselli, appointed by the Directorate for the Internal Market of the European Commission (Contract No. 
ETD/2002/85) (2004). This study, that strongly supported the introduction and maintenance of the 
development risks defense, concluded that such defense was a fundamental factor to achieve the Directive’s 
goal of balancing the need to preserve incentives to innovation and consumers’ interests. This conclusion 
was based on three arguments: first; that the development risks defense protected incentives to innovate by 
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This compromise solution included two key elements: first, each member state 
would have an option to include the defense in its domestic legislation; second, there was 
a provision stating that the Council of Ministers would review the effect of the defense on 
consumer protection and on the functioning of the common market539 and based on those 
findings, it would then decide whether to include the defense in the final draft of the 
Directive.540 This optional provision has, in some respects, diluted the Directive’s 
harmonization goal.541
Up to today, Finland,
 
542 Luxembourg543 and Norway544 have excluded the 
development risks defense from their transposition laws and France, Germany and Spain 
have excluded its application with respect to specific products: France did not include this 
defense for products derived from the human body,545 Germany for pharmaceutical 
products,546 and Spain for medicines, foods or food products for human consumption.547
                                                                                                                                                 
reducing liability for innovation-related risks. Second; that this defense provided reasonably limited 
liability insurance costs by keeping the litigation at a reasonably low level and finally; that strict liability 
without such defense would not allow high-tech/high-risk industries to buy insurance coverage at an 
affordable cost. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/liability/2004-06-dev-risk-clause-study_en.pdf 
  
539 Article 21 of the product liability directive.  
540 During the final phase of approval of the Directive, the development risks defense was still a source of 
controversy. See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison with U.S. 
Law, an Analysis of its Impact on Trade, and a Recommendation for Reform so as to Accomplish 
Harmonization and Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 983, 990-91 (1994); John G. Culhane, 
The Limits of Product Liability Reform within a Consumer Expectation Model: A Comparison of 
Approaches Taken by the United States and the European Union, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1, 31 
(1995). 
541 Pmbl of the product liability directive. Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products 
Liability More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 
985, 1016 (1998) 
542 Law 698 of 17-8-1990 (Tuotevastuulaki) amended by the Law 8.1.1993/99; 22.10.1993/879 and 
27.11.1998/880. 
543 Loi du 21 Avril 1989 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux of April 21, 1989 
amended by the law 6.12.1989. 
544 Lov om Produktansvar, Act No. 104 of 23 December 1988 (Norsk Lovtidend 1988, Avd. I, p. 1025), as 
amended by Act No. 40 of 24 June 1994. 
545 Article 1386.12 French Civil Code provides the development risks defense and article 1986-11 that 
excludes the application of the defense to products derived for human body.  
546 Drug Act of 1976 (Arzneimittelgesetz.) See also BGH Urt. V. 9, 5, 1995-V12R 158/94 Hamm. Where 
the German Supreme Court held that the development risks defense was not available in manufacturing 
defect cases. See also Christopher J. S. Hodges, Product Liability In Europe: Politics, Reform And Reality, 
27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 121, 124 (2000) for a discussion of the European Directive and especially on the 
implementation of the development risks defense by the different member states. 
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The transposition and specific content of this defense has not been exempt from 
debate.548 The European Court of Justice, in proceedings against France and the U.K., 
established how and on what terms the defense was to be transposed into the domestic 
legislation of those member states that chose to adopt it.549
The inclusion of this defense in the product liability directive is consistent with its 
fundamental principle of fair apportionment of risks between consumers and producers so 
that there is a balance between consumer-safety and commercial -- development 
interests.
   
550 The strict liability regime established by the Directive seemed to have shifted 
the balance of liability in favor of consumer interests given that they were “insured” by 
producers and other members of the commercial chain. It then became necessary to 
include this defense -- even if optional -- so as not to impose an overwhelming burden of 
risk and liability on producers.551
                                                                                                                                                 
547 In reaction to the Colza case that caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of people poisoned, these 
products were left under the scope of the Consumer protection Act of 1984. Article 6.3 of Law 22/1994 
transposing the product liability directive (B.O.E. n1 161, 7.7.1994) -- overruled by the RDL 1/2007 in 
force today -- excludes medical products, food-stuff and food products for human consumption when 
stating that “que el estado de los conocimientos científicos y técnicos existentes en el momento de la puesta 
en circulación no permitía apreciar la existencia del defecto.” See in contrast María Virtudes c. Rhone 
Poulenc Rorer, S.A., Court of Appeals of Barcelona 17.11.03 (JUR 2004\5123; Hon: Laura Pérez de 
Lazarraga Villanueva) where the court does not apply the development risks defense to a pharmaceutical 
lab because they are strictly liable even for unforeseeable risks.   
 
548 See John W. Wade, Symposium: The Passage of Time: The Implications for Product Liability: On the 
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 734, 753-754 
(1993) arguing that the increase in knowledge about a product between the time it is distributed and the 
time of trial either in the form of knowledge of new hazards; new means of improving product safety and 
new product uses should be measured as of the time of distribution and result in liability if the product 
caused harm.   
549 In a judicial process against France, the European Court of Justice considered that France had not 
correctly transposed this exception and its domestic law had to be amended to comply with the judgment of 
the European Court. Commission v. French Republic, Peter Jann, C 52/00, TJCE 25.4.2002. For a comment 
on this judgment see Seuba Torreblanca, Joan Carles “Las Sentencias del Tribunal de Justicia de las 
comunidades de 25 de abril de 2002 sobre la Directiva 85/374, de productos defectuosos: una directiva 
imperativa, no de mínimos”, Indret 3/2002. The European Commission also initiated infringement 
procedures against the U.K. based on Article 169 of the Treaty of Rome understanding that the British 
transposition of this defense was beyond the scope established by the Directive. See Commission, Ninth 
Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission Monitoring of the Application of Community 
Law - 1991, [1992] O.J. (C 250) 17. 
550 Pmbl of the product liability directive, paragraph 7. 
551 The practical impact of the “development risks” defense lies in the fact that the burden of proving that 
the problem was not discoverable, given the state of actual and constructive knowledge, is reversed. Under 
fault liability, the plaintiff has to show that defendant has been negligent, in that his conduct does not 
conform to the requirement of reasonableness under the “state of the art” which constitutes a breach of his 
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The defense establishes that in order to avoid being held liable, a producer is 
required to prove that the objective state of scientific and technical knowledge, including 
the most advanced level of such knowledge, was not such as to enable the discovery of 
the existence of the defect.552 In order for the relevant knowledge to be successfully 
pleaded against the producer, that knowledge must have been accessible at the time when 
the product in question was put into circulation.553
This defense raises the issue of who should bear the costs of unknown risks at the 
time of marketing the product. The inclusion of this defense has economic sense given 
that under strict liability producers are the residual bearers of the costs of the harm caused 
by the defective product. However, in order for this system to be viable, it is necessary to 
limit the scope of the risks that the producer will bear so that it can internalize their cost 
either by investing in safety or by buying insurance against any damage caused by defects 
in the product.
   
554 Thus, the producer will not be held liable for all risks; only for the ones 
it could or should have known of.555
                                                                                                                                                 
duty of care. Under strict liability, the burden is on the defendant to establish the defense.  The reversal of 
the burden of proof has been made on policy grounds so as to make it easier for people who have been 
injured by defective products to succeed in making a legal claim.  See for example, Amanda v. AEI Inc. 
(manufacturer) and Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), Court of Appeals of La Coruña 
31.3.04 (JUR 2006\93996; Hon: Mª del Carmen Vilariño López) where the court considered that the 
defendant did not meet the burden of proving that the state of scientific and technical knowledge was such 
that he could not know the product risks that finally caused harm and therefore the development risks 
defense was not applicable. (Article 3 and 6.1(e) of Law 22/94).  
  
552 This was the definition that the European Court of Justice provided in the Judgment of the Court (Fifth 
Chamber) of 29 May 1997 in the case Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, C-300/95. 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13593; 1997 ECR I-2649. P1. 
Following this definition see Soledad v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic 
Iberica, S.A. (importer) Court of Appeals of Pontevedra 26.1.04 (JUR 2006\18374; Hon: Margarita 
Fuenteseca Degenefee) where the court held that the manufacturer of mammary prosthesis was not liable 
because the product was licensed and approved based on the state of scientific and technical knowledge of 
the time the product was manufacturer that did not enable the producer to know of the product risks. For a 
discussion on the possible times for determining available knowledge see John W. Wade, Symposium: The 
Passage of Time: The Implications for Product Liability: On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge 
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 734, 753-754 (1993). 
553 See Franz Werro, Tort Law at the Beginning of the New Millennium. A Tribute to John G. Fleming's 
Legacy, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 147, 156 (2001). 
554 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 1997. Commission of the European 
Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13458, 
Case C-300/95. P 22. See also Warren Freedman, DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A PRIMER FOR 
  136 
The content of this defense seems quite intuitive from a theoretical standpoint but 
its application raises some questions that are relevant both for producers and for injured 
victims.556
The timing of the relevant scientific and technical knowledge is important because 
of the different moments of putting the defective product into circulation and the moment 
when the scientific knowledge has advanced enough to allow discovering the defect. 
Further, it is not only the producer that is responsible for development risks. In cases 
where risks were unknown or not possible to identify, the importers or finally, the 
distributors, would also be liable for undiscovered risks at the time of a product's 
commercialization.
 On one side, it will be crucial to determine the moment when it needs to be 
decided whether the scientific and technical knowledge was available. On the other, it 
will be necessary to establish which scientific and technical knowledge will be 
considered relevant.  
557
Given the relevance of time and the ever-changing state of knowledge, the 
producer is required to show that, in light of the most advanced scientific and technical 
knowledge objectively and reasonably obtainable, and available to the scientific 
 The exact moments when these members of the commercial chain 
are in a position to discover the defect are different and therefore the moment when the 
scientific and technical knowledge is evaluated is very relevant for these parties. 
                                                                                                                                                 
PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS, Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein, 411-430 (1996) for a very good overview 
regarding the development risks defense in the different U.S. jurisdictions. 
555 See Franz Werro, Tort Law at the Beginning of the New Millennium. A Tribute to John G. Fleming's 
Legacy, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 147, 156 (2001) noting that strict liability should not be imposed unless the 
defendant engaged in conduct that he knew, or should have known, to be risky and unless this conduct was 
the exclusive cause of the injury. 
556 See Pablo Salvador Coderch and Solé Feliu, Josep, BRUJOS Y APRENDICES: LOS RIESGOS DE 
DESARROLLO EN LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE PRODUCTO, Marcial Pons, Madrid/Barcelona (1999). For a 
comparative study on European law on this issue see van Dam, Cees, EUROPEAN TORT LAW, 1410, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford (2006). 
557 Article 4.1 (a) and (d) for the producer, 4.2 the importer or 4.3 for the distributor of the General Product 
Safety Directive. 
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community as a whole, it was impossible to consider that the product was defective558 
when the product was put into circulation.559
But after the product was put into circulation the producer is not relieved from 
liability; instead the producer has a duty of inspecting the product and informing 
consumers of the new, known and discovered risks after the product has left its hands 
under the European product safety regime
  
560 and the domestic rules of each member 
state.561 If the manufacturer knows of new product risks after the product has been put 
into circulation and does nothing to inform its consumers and prevent any injuries 
resulting from these new risks, the manufacturer could be held liable for intentional 
tortuous conduct under domestic civil and penal laws.562
If the producer does everything which could reasonably be expected of it and still 
does not discover the existence of a defect, the “development risk” falls upon the 
consumer or user rather than on the producer.
  
563
Next, it is necessary to establish what knowledge is relevant.
 
564
                                                 
558 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 1997, Commission of the European 
Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13458 
Case C-300/95. P 22. See Christopher Newdick, Risk, Uncertainty and "Knowledge" in the Development 
Risk Defence, 20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 309 (1991) for a discussion of the standards of "knowledge" or 
"knowledgeability." 
 Most European 
countries judge the manufacturer’s conduct by reference not only to its actual scientific 
559 See Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland; Case C-300/95 (May 29, 1997); paragraph 28. 
560 See Article 5.2 of the General Product Safety Directive 2001/95 of December 3 relative to general 
product safety.   
561 In the case of Spain, the Civil Code establishes in its article 1902 a duty of informing about new product 
risks and therefore the manufacturer will have the duty to continue inspecting and developing research to be 
able to discover new product risks. 
562 In Spain, an intentional conduct resulting in torts is called “dolo” and is regulated both by Spanish Civil 
Code (Royal Decree of July 24, 1889) and the Organic Law 10/1995, of November 23rd, approving the 
Spanish Penal Code, BOE num. 281 of 24/11/1995, pages 33987-34058, BOE-A-1995-25444, available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-25444. 
563 Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 29 May 1997. 
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Case 
C-300/95. 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13593; 1997 ECR I-2649. 
564 See Study on the economic impact of the development risk clause as in the Directive 
85/374/EEC on the liability for defective products written by Fondazione Rosselli, appointed by the 
Directorate for the Internal Market of the European Commission (Contract No. ETD/2002/85), at 136 
(2004) where the reporters of the study stated that it is necessary to define the state of the art knowledge.  
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knowledge but also to constructive knowledge -- the knowledge available to it when the 
product was under development, namely the “state of the art,”565 -- which includes the 
facts that are public knowledge within the industry and of which the producer ought to 
have been aware.566
The Directive does not include any guidance on how to determine what 
constitutes the standards necessary to establish scientific knowledge.
  
567 These difficulties 
of interpretation are left to the domestic courts to resolve through case law but they have 
not yet been generally addressed.568
                                                 
565 Under a strict product liability regime, the difference between the two types of knowledge is interesting 
because the apparent objectivity of strict liability seems to exclude reasonableness considerations. In 
practice, though, a defendant subject to strict liability has to prove that he could not have discovered the 
defect by the use of reasonable care. See Christopher Newdick, The Development Risk Defense of the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987, 47 Cambridge Law Journal 3, 475 (1988). 
 The relevance of the determination of the scientific 
566 See Amanda v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), 
Court of Appeals of La Coruña 31.3.04 (JUR 2006\93996; Hon: Mª del Carmen Vilariño López) where the 
court considered that the defendant did not prove that the state of scientific and technical knowledge was 
such that he could not know the product risks that finally caused harm. Therefore, the court understood that 
the defendant ought to know of product risks and therefore should have discovered them. (article 3 and 
6.1(e) of Law 22/94). See Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on PL: the 
promise or progress ?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 422 (1988) arguing that setting the development risk 
defense as a distinct defense from the state of the art sends a confusing signal to parties subject to the 
product liability directive.  
567 One cause of uncertainty under the Directive is the question as to how the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge is to be determined. In contrast see the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals. Inc. 509 U.S. 579 (1993) which redefined the concept of state of scientific knowledge by 
noting that the material relied upon by expert witnesses in their evaluation of scientific controversies should 
have had careful review. In the case European Commission v. United Kingdom, C-300/95 [1997] ECR I-
2649, para 29, in a proceeding started by the Commission against the United Kingdom, the European Court 
of Justice pointed out that the relevant state of knowledge is an objective notion that includes “the most 
advanced level of knowledge” provided that it is accessible when the product is put into circulation. 
However, it is still unclear if the required knowledge pertains to the general existence of the defect or 
whether the defect has to be detectable in particular products. See, Franz Werro and Vernon Valentine 
Palmer (eds.), THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW, 443, Durham, N.C.: 
Carolina Academic Press (2004).  
568 See Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland; Case C-300/95 (May 29, 1997); paragraph 29. In this case, the Commission understood that section 
4(1)(e) of the British  Consumer Protection Act passed in 1987 transposing the Directive broadened the 
defense and significantly restricted the scope of liability because the reference to the "producer of products 
of the same description" introduced  considerations regarding whether the producer in good faith could not 
have discovered the defect. However, the European Court of Justice decided in favor of the United 
Kingdom and concluded that a producer may avoid liability if he can prove that the state of such knowledge 
was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in question might be 
expected to have discovered the defect if it had existed in his products while they were under his control 
was not contrary to the European Regulation. However, allowing taking into account the subjective 
knowledge of a producer taking reasonable care, compared to the standard precautions taken in the 
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standard is important because scientific standards, scientific knowledge and legal 
certainty to impose liability, are concepts that differ.  
The concepts of information and knowledge are not equivalent. Facts and data 
may be known about a product but that may not mean that there is sufficient 
understanding about their implications and consequences at the time the product is put 
into circulation. Even having the information about product risks, the defect may still not 
be possible to discover. It is possible to identify four different situations regarding the 
interaction between knowledge and discoverability of the risks involved in the product:569
a) If the risks are unknown and undiscoverable, the producer could allege this 
defense because the available scientific procedures would not have permitted 
discovering the defect prior to the product being put into circulation.
 
570 In this 
case, the product defect and the subsequent harm are not attributable to the 
producer and therefore the victim bears the accident’s costs without being entitled 
to compensation.571
b) If the risks were known but undiscoverable, the product defect will be deemed as 
discoverable because the risks posed by the product were known. These are cases 
where the producer did not know of the product risks when he put the product into 
circulation
  
572 but the victim’s losses occurred after the risk was detected. These 
damages suffered by the victim are compensable but excluded from the scope of 
this defense because they would result from the failure to warn or instruct of risks 
known after the product was sold.573
                                                                                                                                                 
industrial sector in question, stresses particular terms used in the provision without demonstrating that the 
general legal context of the provision at issue fails to secure effectively the full application of the Directive. 
 Additionally fines would be imposed under 
569 See A.M. Clark, PRODUCT LIABILITY, Chapter 6, Sweet & Maxwell (1989). 
570 Christoph Ann, Innovators In The Crossfire: A Policy Sketch For Unknowable Risks In European And 
United States Product Liability Law, 10 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 173 (1995). 
571 At least compensation from the tortfeasor.  
572 Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY, 29, Dartmouth Publishing Group (1993). 
573 Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; 
Case C-300/95 (May 29, 1997).   
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the European product safety regulation,574 which imposes on manufacturers and 
distributors a duty to inspect and inform of product risks they have knowledge of 
after they put the product into circulation. Thus, such liability would be derived 
from the failure to warn and from safety obligations and not from the innovation 
risk itself.575
c) If the risks were unknown but discoverable, a producer will be at fault if it failed 
to act reasonably in discovering a reasonably foreseeable product risk. Under 
strict liability, the question will be whether the state of the scientific and technical 
knowledge was such that the producer could have discovered the defect.
 
576
d) If the risks were known and discoverable, a producer would always be liable 
under both fault and strict liability, unless the product risks could be 
communicated to the consumer with instructions and warnings.   
 In 
practice this is one of the major issues in product liability litigation.  
The introduction of this defense has been widely controversial577 beyond the 
European Union. For many, this defense has been considered incompatible and 
inconsistent with the strict liability system578 because of the risk spreading and loss 
distribution rationales that lie behind it.579
                                                 
574 See General Product Safety Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 (O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 2002). 
  
575 The product liability directive does not make explicit reference to failure to warn as a cause of action. 
See Michael R. Will, Liability for failure to warn in the European Community, 6 B.U. Int’l L. J. 125, 131 
(1988). See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Cal. 
L. Rev. 919, 922 n.5 (1981). 
576 See Amanda v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), 
Court of Appeals of La Coruña 31.3.04 (JUR 2006\93996; Hon: Mª del Carmen Vilariño López) where the 
court understood that the defendant should have discovered the product risks and did not prove that the 
state of scientific and technical knowledge did not prevent him from such discovery (article 3 and 6.1(e) of 
Law 22/94).  
577 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other Countries Can Learn 
From the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, 13-14 (1999) criticizing the 
introduction of the development risk defense as following the outdated Restatement (Second). 
578 John G. Culhane, The Limits Of Product Liability Reform Within A Consumer Expectation Model: A 
Comparison Of Approaches Taken By The United States And The European Union, 19 Hastings in t’l & 
comp L Rev. 1, 35 (1995). 
579 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 1030 (1998). 
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This defense undermines the nature of the strict liability regime intended by the 
product liability directive. Even though this Directive does not establish absolute liability, 
the strict liability regime is weakened because it provides defendants with a possibility to 
escape from liability based on fault considerations. However, despite the discussion 
regarding its nature and the controversy it has generated because it represents the 
introduction of fault considerations within a strict liability framework, its application 
focuses mostly on manufacturing defects,580 and its narrow interpretation by domestic 
courts has led many practitioners and academics to view the development risk defense as 
having little practical value to producers.581
 
   
 
7.4 Victims’ fault: the introduction of contributory negligence considerations 
 
Article 8 of the product liability directive is not a defense in the strict sense but 
contains two issues regarding liability sharing between the product manufacturer and the 
injured victim. Section 1 of this article imposes liability on the producer when the 
damage is caused both by a defect and by the act or omission of a third party.582
                                                 
580 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other Countries Can Learn 
From the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 1, 13-14 (1999) arguing that 
the language of the development risk defense focuses on manufacturing defects because design defects 
require a value judgment, a risk-utility judgment given that one “discovers” risks but “evaluates” whether a 
product’s design is defective. These authors suggest that in order to make sense in connection with design 
and warning defects, the language of article 7(e) should read as "the state of knowledge was not such as to 
allow the producer to evaluate whether or not the product was defective." However, once more this 
provisions reflects the adoption of an old-dated §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts instead on 
learning from the U.S. developments since 1965 to correct the deficiencies of §402A dealing with design 
defects and failures to warn). 
 Section 2 
of the same article states that such liability "may be reduced or disallowed when, having 
regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused by a defect in the product and by 
581 LOVELLS, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
50 (2003) available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-
goods/files/goods/docs/liability/studies/lovells-study_en.pdf 
582 Article 8(1) of the product liability directive. 
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the fault of the injured person or any person for whom the injured person is 
responsible."583
Fault is not defined in article 8 even though it is possible to construe its meaning 
through the different references the product liability directive includes in its preamble 
when it refers to the victim’s fault. First, when it states that despite strict liability, there 
should be a “fair apportionment of risks between the injured person and the producer,” 
this places the focus both on the producer and on the victim’s conduct.
  
584 At the same 
time, the preamble also explicitly refers to the contributory negligence of the victim that 
should be taken into account when determining the specific amount of recovery either by 
reducing the amount of compensation or by completely eliminating any compensation to 
the victim.585
 The consideration of the victim’s fault or negligence when reducing the amount of 
compensation should not be interpreted as introducing either contributory negligence 
elements or comparative negligence considerations incompatible with the Directive’s 
strict liability system.
 
586 This issue is important given the evolution of analysis on the 
efficiency implications of these rules.587 This “defense” seems to focus on causation and 
blameworthiness through a comparative causation analysis588
                                                 
583 Article 8(2) of the product liability directive. 
 and not on the parties’ fault 
as would contradict strict liability principles.   
584 Directive 85/374 at pmbl., para. 7. See also Marshall S. Shapo, Comparing Products Liability: Concepts 
in European and American Law, 26 Cornell Int'l L.J. 279, 319 (1993). 
585 Preamble, paragraph 8 of the product liability directive.  
586 Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision For Comparative Fault In Products 
Liability, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 281, 341 (1994). 
587 See Mireia Artigot-Golobardes, and Gómez-Pomar, Fernando, Contributory and comparative negligence 
in the law and economics literature, 46-79 in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: TORTS (Michael 
Faure, ed.), Edward Elgar (2009). The initial literature on the matter believed that contributory negligence 
presented greater advantages and led to optimal outcomes. However, this first conclusion was soon 
challenged by the literature that concluded that under perfect information conditions both rules are 
equivalent, and when some basic assumptions are relaxed, comparative negligence seems to favor 
efficiency. 
588 Article 8 of the product liability directive. Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 45 
Darmouth publishing Company Limited (1993).  
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However, the Directive does not specify how the reduction of liability is to be 
applied or calculated and this has led to a diverse interpretation and application of this 
defense by the courts of the member states. It is unclear whether a plaintiff who is fifty-
one percent responsible for his injuries will be allowed to receive forty-nine percent of 
the verdict, or will be totally barred from recovery.589
Even though the consideration of the victim’s fault is established at the European 
level, domestic rules are applicable.
  
590 It is for member states to determine the treatment 
given to the victim’s fault and thereby to establish how the victim’s fault is to be 
determined, evaluated and how responsibility is to be allocated between the producer and 
the injured victim so that liability is reduced.591 Most member states have simply 
transposed the language of Article 8 without going any further.592 For example, Belgium 
has transposed the wording of article 8 in its domestic law without any modification or 
additional consideration.593 The same is true in Denmark,594 the Netherlands595 and 
Portugal.596
Germany has taken a different approach, starting with the fact that its overall 
approach to products liability is primarily tort-based and not contract-based. For that 
reason, the German provisions implementing the Directive incorporate the contributory 
  
                                                 
589 Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 357, 370 (1992). 
590 The national courts have discretion as to the extent to which the producer’s liability is to be reduced or 
extinguished if the injured person is at fault in light of the absence of rules or guidance in the Directive. See 
PAUL SHERMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, Colorado Springs, Colo.: 
Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, 251-255 (1981) for a description of the implications of the introduction of 
contributory negligence and comparative fault considerations. 
591 Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products 
Liability, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 281, 333-334 (1994). 
592 Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, European Community: Council Directive on the Approximation 
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for 
Defective Products, 32 Int'l Legal Materials 1347, 1379 (1993). 
593 Loi relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits defectueux, of February 25, 1991. 
594 Lov om Produktansvar No. 371 of June 7, 1989. 
595 Wet Productktenaansprakelijkeid 1990 (Netherlands Product Liability Act), contained in Book 6, Title 
3, Chapter 3 §§ 185-193 of the Netherlands Civil Code of 1991 of September 13, 1990. 
596 Decreto-Lei No. 383/89 of November 6, 1989. 
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fault provisions of the German Civil Code,597 which reduces the victim's recovery based 
on his or her contribution to the causation of the damage.598 Similar causation-based 
provisions are found in Greece599 and Luxembourg.600 Italy601 is the only country that 
bars recovery for assumption of the risk, when the injured person used the defective 
product despite knowledge of its defect or danger.602
Spain transposed article 8 of the Directive in article 9 of law 22/94 today article 
145 of RDL 1/2007.
   
603 However, neither the transposition law nor Spanish civil 
procedure regulation establishes how the reduction of the victim’s damages should be 
done and what parameters should be taken into account. This lack of definition and 
criterion is also reflected in Spanish jurisprudence. Spanish courts generally do not 
specify and provide reasoning in support of the reduction of the damage award and it is 
not strange to find courts referring to fault604 and to comparative negligence when 
reducing the damage award.605
                                                 
597 For a general description of German products liability laws, see Joachim Zekoll, The German Products 
Liability Act, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 809 (1989). See also Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, European 
Community: Council Directive on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 32 Int'l Legal Materials 
1347, 1372 (1993).  
 This lack of reasoning offered by the courts is especially 
598 Geraint G. Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY, 154, Dartmouth Publishing Company (1993). 
599 Greek Law 2251/1994. 
600 Loi du 21 Avril 1989 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux of April 21, 1989.  
601 Decreto del Presidente della Republica No.244 of May 24, 1988. For an analysis of the Italian 
transposition of the product liability Directive  see Richard H. Dreyfuss, The Italian law on strict products 
liability, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’. & Comp. L. 37 (1997). 
602 Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, European Community: Council Directive on the Approximation 
of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for 
Defective Products, 32 Int'l Legal Materials 1347, 1379 (1993). 
603 Article 145, named “Culpa del perjudicado” (fault of the injured) of RDL 1/2007 states that  
“La responsabilidad prevista en este capítulo podrá reducirse o suprimirse en función de las 
circunstancias del caso, si el daño causado fuera debido conjuntamente a un defecto del producto 
y a culpa del perjudicado o de una persona de la que éste deba responder civilmente..”  
 
“The liability established in this chapter could be reduced or waived depending on the 
circumstances of the case, if the harm was jointly caused by a product defect and fault of the 
injured victim or of any person to whom the injured victim would be civilly responsible of.”  
604 Iñigo v. BMW Ibérica, S.A., Court of Appeals of Madrid 23.1.06 (JUR 2006\120705; MP: Ana María 
Olalla Camarero) where the court did not award full compensation for the damages suffered by the victim 
because the accident was caused by the victim’s fault. The judgment does not include considerations 
regarding the reduction of the award and the arguments in support of it.  
605 See Francisco V.H. v. Suarep and Lladó, S.A. (retailer) and Chemvic, S.L. (supplier), Court of Appeals 
of Barcelona 30.5.02 (AC 2002\1211; Hon: Inmaculada Zapata Camacho) and Paula v. Europ S.L. (seller) 
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delicate in cases where courts consider that the injured victim should not receive 
compensation because the injuries were caused only by the victim’s conduct.606 In fact, it 
is possible to find only a few cases in which courts have specified the percentage of 
compensation reduced and the underlying reasons that justify it.607
Most civil law countries in Europe place less emphasis on the victim’s fault than 
do American jurisdictions. This difference is reflected in the European view that the 
victim’s fault is often not considered as a defense, but rather as a means of adjusting 
plaintiff's recovery, almost as an instrument for assessing damages based on causation 
principles.
   
608 This may be due to the fact that that Europeans are more willing to accept 
responsibility for their conduct when it contributes to the accident. However, as will be 
developed below, the role of European social insurance systems seems to be crucial for 
accepting the reduction or the lack of compensation as a consequence of one’s fault, 
without further litigation.609
                                                                                                                                                 
and Compañía de Seguros MAPFRE, Court of Appeals of  Sevilla 25.2.05 (AC 2005\943; Hon: Rafael 
Márquez Romero). In both these cases, courts understood that the burns the victim suffered in her hands 
were caused by the concurring “faults” of the product manufacturer and the victim, who did not use the 
product according to the instructions and warnings that the producer provided. Courts reduced the damage 
award but did not explicitly state the underlying reasons justifying such reductions.  
  
606 See Mercedes R.R. v. Fortuna Agrícola, S.L., Spanish Supreme Court 30.9.99 (RJ 1999\7848; MP: 
Antonio Gullón Ballesteros) where the court considered that the damages suffered had been caused only by 
the victim’s conduct and therefore no compensation was awarded. 
607 See Jesús Luis v. Peugeot España, S.A., Court of Appeals of Madrid 21.3.05 (JUR 2005\107495; Hon: 
Ramón Ruiz Jiménez). In this case, the court of appeals reduced in 70% the damage award because of the 
conduct of the injured victim that caused the accident that resulted in damages.  
608 Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault In Products 
Liability, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 281, 337-338 (1994). 
609 See Chapter 7 of this dissertation. See also Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - 
Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341 (2000). 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PROCEDURAL RULES AS BARRIERS TO BRING  
PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS IN EUROPE 
 
 
Despite the formal similarities between strict product liability in Europe and in the 
United States under the Second Restatement, its impact, evolution and consequences have 
been significantly different. One set of factors that explain the limited impact of strict 
product liability in Europe are the rules of civil procedure in force in most member 
states.610
In general, when deciding whether to file a claim, plaintiffs consider the 
likelihood of prevailing in court as well as the amount of damages they suffered and for 
which they seek compensation.
  
611
A number of characteristics found in the U.S. tort litigation system encourage 
parties to file lawsuits.
 Needless to say, plaintiffs also take into account other 
parameters such as time, effort, money and emotional distress associated with the legal 
process. But the probability of prevailing as well as the loss suffered are two of the major 
factors that directly impact on victims’ incentives to bring claims. The rules of civil 
procedure directly affect the likelihood of the plaintiff prevailing as well as the courts' 
accuracy in assessing and awarding the damages suffered by the victim.  
612
                                                 
610 See Kip Viscusi, REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, AEI Brookings Joint Centre for Regulatory 
Studies, AEI Press, 1-22 (2002) noting that regulation through private litigation is an American 
phenomenon.  
 In contrast, the rules of civil procedure in force in most 
611 The result of multiplying the probability of success and the amount of the damage award is the expected 
value of litigation. If the expected value of the trial is higher than the litigation costs faced by the plaintiff, 
the plaintiff will have incentives to pursue her claim. If the litigation costs are higher than the expected 
value of the trial, the victim will decide not to pursue her legal claim. When some assumptions are relaxed 
and court errors or judgment proof problems are introduced, these results might be modified. See Steven 
Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 389-
417 (2004).  
612 See the European Commission Green Paper: Access of consumers to justice and the settlement of 
consumer disputes in the Single market, COM/93/576FINAL, November 16, 1993, 56 (1993). Available at 
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European member states contain numerous disincentives for plaintiffs, particularly in 
product liability cases.613
 
 These include plaintiffs’ access to courts, the role of juries in 
determining liability awards, the attorney compensation system, the distribution of 
litigation costs among the parties, the potential damage awards, the availability of 
punitive damages, and the availability of plaintiffs’ class actions.    
 
3.1 Jury v. judge  
 
An important difference between civil procedure laws in Europe and the United 
States is the use of juries in civil cases and hence in deciding liability.  
Tort trials in the United States might be decided by a jury formed between 6 and 12 
citizens randomly selected to hear a particular case.614
                                                                                                                                                 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32023_en.htm considering that the situation of product 
liability in Europe is one of “total underdevelopment”. See also Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence 
Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 31, 304–313, 306 (2006). Similarly, see also 
Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 35 (1996).   
 In cases with a jury, the judge who 
supervises the trial generally decides questions of law while the jury decides questions of 
fact.  
613 Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European 
Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 657 (1993). See also Susan Narita, Product Liability 
Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 6 (1996). For an analysis comparing the 
development of the US and European system see Michael Faure and Ton Hartlief, Toward an expanding 
enterprise liability in Europe? How to analyze the scope of liability of industrial operators and their 
insurers, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 3, num 3, 235-270, 264-265 (1996). 
See also Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on PL: the promise or 
progress?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 410 (1988). 
614 See Field, Richard H., Kaplan, Benjamin and Clemont, Kevin M., CIVIL PROCEDURE, MATERIALS FOR A 
BASIC COURSE, 8th ed., 132-134, Foundation Press Thomson Reuters (2003). See also, on jury size, 
Stephan Landsman, Civil Jury in American, The Law and Contemporary Problems 62: 285, 290-292 
(1999).. 
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European courts do not employ juries for tort suits in either the civil law or the 
common law states.615 Civil suits are conducted before the judge616 and parties exchange 
and discuss documents, procedural rulings are made, evidence is introduced and 
testimony is taken until the case is adjudicated.617 The decision of whether damages 
should be awarded and if so, in what amount are determined by judges or by tribunals 
composed by professional judges, depending on the case.618 Consequently, rules of 
evidence in Europe can be less sophisticated than in the United States given that there is 
no need to protect juries against inadmissible evidence.619
The sympathy of consumer-jurors for injured victims of product-related accidents is 
potentially one of the biggest impacts of the role of jurors in liability cases given that they 
may tend to impose liability influenced by the circumstances of the case by the parties’ 
asymmetry in the specific case.
 
620
                                                 
615 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1006 (1994). 
 Evidence suggests that because of cognitive and 
affective elements of the litigation process, the jurors’ sympathy towards injured 
plaintiffs has been crucial when holding defendants liable as well as when determining 
616 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 35 (1996) 
noting that this contrasts with the role of juries in U.S. civil cases, among them, product liability cases.  
617 This contrasts with the common law process that has been very influenced by the existence of jury trials 
in civil procedures. Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems In Europe And The United States, 13 Duke J. Comp. 
& Int'l L. 61, 72 (2003). 
618 Juries are unknown in civil suits but some European member states have recently introduced juries in 
certain type of criminal offenses. See for example, the Spanish Ley Orgánica 5/1995, de 22 mayo 
regulating juries in criminal cases. See also Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollars, Product Liability in the 
European Community: Implications for United States Business, 31 Am. Bus. L.J. 245, 255(1993). 
619 Under certain circumstances, even hearsay evidence is admissible in some member states. See Patrick 
Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice 
and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 65, 89 (1989-
1990). 
620 William R. Darden, James B. DeConinck, Barry J. Babin and Mitch Griffin, The role of consumer 
sympathy in product liability suits. An experimental investigation of loose coupling, Journal of business 
research 22, 65 – 89 (1991). See also Erik Stenberg, Swiss Reinsurance, PL for US exports 01/99, 22. This 
article can be found in www.swissre.com. 
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the level of jury awards.621 The disproportionate damage awards often awarded by 
juries,622 contribute to the often perceived unpredictability of the liability system.623
Thus, the pro-plaintiff approach often adopted by juries, manifested by their 
inclination to holding tortfeasors liable for the harm suffered by the victims as well as by 
their determination of damage awards, directly impact on the decision of an injured 
victim to pursue her legal claim.
   
624
 
  
 
3.2 Pre-trial discovery  
 
Another significant difference between U.S. and European procedural rules that affect 
the outcome of liability cases is the rules of discovery.625
                                                 
621 See Kaplan, Martin F., and Kemmerick, G., Juror Judgment as Information Integration: Combining 
Evidential and Nonevidential Information, J. Personality Social Psychol. 30(1974): 493-499. For examples 
of the relationship between jurors’ and the level of damage awards see Andrew Carl Spacone, The 
Emergence of Strict Liability: A Historical Perspective and Other Considerations, Including Senate 100. J. 
Products Liability 8 (1985): l-40 and Jim Thomas, Justice as Interaction: Louse Coupling and Mediations in 
the Adversary Process. Symbolic Interaction 6 (2): 243-277 (1983). 
 Pretrial discovery procedures in 
the U.S. require parties to make available to the other party, before the trial, information 
and details they request regarding their legal defense or relevant for the parties’ interests 
622 Some evidence suggests that the more financially sound defendants are, the higher the product liability 
award is and hence the higher product liability exposure defendant has. See Judith C. Glasscock, Emptying 
the Deep Pockets in Mass Markets. St. Mary’s Law J. 18 (1987): 977-1017 and Andrew Carl Spacone, The 
Emergence of Strict Liability: A Historical Perspective and Other Considerations, Including Senate 100. J. 
Products Liability 8 (1985): l-40.  
623 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 307 (2004). 
624 Juries may be more easily influenced, and hence inclined to award damages, by the impact caused by 
having an injured victim before them, especially in cases where the defendant is a corporation. See William 
R. Darden, James B. DeConinck, Barry J. Babin and Mitch Griffin, The role of consumer sympathy in 
product liability suits. An experimental investigation of loose coupling, Journal of business research 22, 65 
- 89 (1991). 
625 See Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 35 (1996) 
noting the effect on product liability claims of allowing mandatory discovery in U.S. product liability cases 
and banning it the different European product liability court rules of the different member states. 
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at trial.626 Hence, U.S. plaintiffs can often obtain from manufacturers or sellers important 
evidence, in the form of documents, depositions and interrogatories.627 The material 
requested must be necessary and admissible evidence,628 and its production is facilitated 
through the threat of court sanctions.629
In contrast to the U.S. system most European civil procedure laws limit significantly 
or do not allow plaintiffs’ discovery.
  
630 As a result, European plaintiffs face great 
difficulty in obtaining the necessary technical data upon which their cases are based.631 It 
is for the party who alleges the facts of a case to prove them and this is generally done by 
the production of evidence in written documents.632 Consequently, the limitation of 
discovery reduces the amount of information plaintiffs may have available regarding the 
circumstances of the product and hence the causes of the product accident, and makes it 
more difficult for the plaintiff to prove the prime facie elements of a product liability case 
-- defect, harm and a causal relationship between them.633
                                                 
626 See Field, Richard H., Kaplan, Benjamin and Clemont, Kevin M., CIVIL PROCEDURE, MATERIALS FOR A 
BASIC COURSE, 8th ed., 70, Foundation Press Thomson Reuters (2003) noting that the main motive of 
pretrial discovery is avoiding the trial from being a “drama of surprises.”   
  
627 Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: 
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law 
Journal 65, 88-89 (1989-1990). See also Erik Stenberg, Swiss Reinsurance, PL for US exports 01/99, 22. 
This article can be found in www.swissre.com 
628 See Field, Richard H., Kaplan, Benjamin and Clemont, Kevin M., CIVIL PROCEDURE, MATERIALS FOR A 
BASIC COURSE, 8th ed., 69-75, Foundation Press Thomson Reuters (2003).   
629 See Field, Richard H., Kaplan, Benjamin and Clemont, Kevin M., CIVIL PROCEDURE, MATERIALS FOR A 
BASIC COURSE, 8th ed., 69-75, Foundation Press Thomson Reuters (2003). 
630 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 310 (2006) and Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European 
Community: Implications for United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993). 
631 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1005 (1994) 
632 Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: 
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law 
Journal 65, 88-89 (1989-1990). 
633 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993). 
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As a result, European plaintiffs have are harder time meeting their burden of proof in 
product liability cases and, hence, they have lower incentives to pursue such claims to 
begin with.634
 
 
 
3.3 The attorney’s compensation scheme: Contingency v. hourly fee attorney 
compensation 
 
Access to justice for consumers in Europe and in the United States is also 
significantly different when it comes to representation.635 One reason for this is that the 
compensation of attorneys in each system is governed by different rules: While in the 
United States, attorneys may be paid on a contingency fee basis; their European 
counterparts in most EU member states636 are compensated by the hour.637 Under 
contingency fees arrangements, lawyers are paid for their services only if the plaintiff is 
successful, and the amount due depends on the size of the award.638
                                                 
634 Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European 
Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 657-658 (1993). 
 In contrast, under 
635 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1005 (1994) noting that 
contingency fees agreements are a great financial incentive for attorneys to pursue promising cases. 
636 Contingency fees have been permissible in Ireland and Scotland. See Christopher Hodges, Competition 
Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: what is the case?, Common Market Law Review 43: 1381-1407, 
1397 (2006).  
637 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 308 (2006) and Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison 
With U.S. Law, An Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To 
Accomplish Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1005 (1994) for an 
analysis of the impact of contingency fees agreements on product liability litigation in Europe. See also 
Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 35 (1996) noting 
that only the U.K allows “conditional fee arrangement” with solicitors. 
638 This kind of arrangement and the possibility for U.S. attorneys to advertise their services make it easier 
for consumers to have access to compensation though it can result in an excessive amount of litigation. N. 
Rickman, Contingent fees and litigation settlement, International Review of Law and Economics 19: 295–
317 (1999). See also Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National 
Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective 
Products and Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121, 147 (2002). 
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per-hour compensation systems attorneys are compensated at an hourly rate regardless of 
the outcome of the lawsuit. Hence, a losing client must compensate the attorney for the 
job done under an hourly fee compensation system but not under a contingency fee 
structure (although the losing client paying contingency fees may still be responsible for 
paying the attorney's expenses).  
The underlying economic justification of contingency fee compensation systems 
is that it provides an efficient means of financing litigation in many cases.639 Its risk 
sharing component ensures that some cases that would not otherwise reach the courts are 
able to be litigated or settled.640
Both systems -- contingency fee or per-hour compensation -- present advantages 
and disadvantages, but the major effect of attorney compensation in Europe is on the 
amount of cases litigated, the number of lawsuits settled prior to trial, and the level of 
damages awarded.
 Without such a tool, victims of product–related accidents 
bear all the risk involved in litigation and this may undermine the financial incentives for 
them to pursue their cases.  
641 Contingency fees may encourage victims to bring suits lacking 
merit, and may also encourage defendants to settle even in cases lacking merit.642
                                                 
639 Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports To The 
XVIth International Congress Of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective Products and 
Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121, 147 (2002). 
 
Additionally, contingency fees give lawyers incentives to encourage victims to pursue 
claims as well as to negotiate favorable settlements given that they will receive a share of 
the settlement award. In contrast, the lack of contingency fees in Europe prevents both 
small firms and individuals with limited financial resources from bringing potentially 
640 Given that the attorney’s compensation is subject in certain degree to the success of the plaintiff’s claim.  
641 Nuno Garoupa and Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Cashing by the hour: why large law firms prefer hourly 
fees over contingent fees (2006). This article is available at: http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/2. See 
also N. Rickman, Contingent fees and litigation settlement, International Review of Law and Economics 
19: 295–317 (1999). 
642 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993) and Joachim Zekoll, American 
Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National Reports To The XVIth International Congress Of 
Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective Products and Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121, 147 
(2002). 
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strong product liability cases because of their impossibility of affording their per-hour 
lawyers’ fees.643
 
 As a result, fewer product liability cases reach courts.  
 
3.4 Availability of legal assistance 
 
An additional aspect that impacts on the incentives and possibility of injured 
victims to bring their product liability claims is the availability of legal assistance.  
Improving consumer access to justice and providing legal assistance enhances the 
performance of the tort system as a deterrent and compensation mechanism given that 
litigation would increase and hence product accidents would be optimally deterred and 
injured victims would be able to access to the compensation they would be entitled to.644
The cost of legal defense is significant such that for each Euro or dollar that a 
defendant pays in compensation, a significant amount is devoted to paying the legal 
services necessary for the process.
  
645
                                                 
643 Jean C. Buzby and Paul D. Frenzen, Food safety and product liability, 24 Food policy, 637-651, 647 
(1999) and Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: 
Implications for United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993).  
 When the cost of legal services, the uncertainty 
about the outcome of the case and the amount of damages -- and hence compensation -- 
claimed are jointly considered, victims may not have incentives to pursue their legal 
644 See the European Commission Green Paper: Access of consumers to justice and the settlement of 
consumer disputes in the Single market, COM/93/576FINAL, November 16, 1993, 56 (1993) available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32023_en.htm, noting the need to facilitate consumers’ 
access to justice in order to enhance deterrence of product-related accidents. See also Alberto Cavaliere, 
Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, European Journal of Law 
and Economics, 18: 299–318, 309 (2004). 
645 There are no studies in Europe regarding the proportion that legal costs represent with respect to the 
damage award. For the U.S., see TILLINGHAST-TOWERS PERRIN, U.S. TORT COSTS: 2003 UPDATE: TRENDS 
AND FINDINGS ON THE COSTS OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM 17 (2003) and TOWERS PERRIN, 2008 UPDATE ON 
U.S. TORT COST TRENDS (2008) finding that plaintiffs receive 46 cents for each dollar the defendant pays as 
victim’s compensation. These studies have not been exempt from debate. See for Economic Policy Institute 
(EPI), responding and questioning the results of the Towers Perrin report on the costs of tort litigation 
during 2005. The document is available at 
http://www.cttriallawyers.org/_docs/public/EPI_FrivolousCaseTortLawChange_summary.pdf. See also 
http://www.epi.org/publications/entry/bp157/ 
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claim. In such cases, the availability of legal aid is crucial to ensure the victim’s access to 
justice646
 
  
 
3.5 The distribution of litigation costs between litigating parties: the American v. 
the British rule  
 
Another aspect that might explain the different volume of product liability cases 
in the United States and Europe is the distribution of litigation costs among the parties 
involved in the litigation.647
Under the American rule, every party bears its litigation costs regardless of the 
outcome of the case. So under the American rule a plaintiff will not be liable for the 
defendant’s legal costs in case of an unsuccessful claim.
  
648 In contrast, in most European 
countries, the litigation costs are allocated under the British rule -- also called the loser 
pays rule -- which provides that a successful plaintiff may recover all or at least part of 
the legal costs from the losing defendant.649 Even though the British rule is in force in 
European member states, the final amount of costs charged to him may vary from country 
to country.650
                                                 
646 The European Commission’s interest in increasing the access justice has led member states to review 
their domestic laws regarding funding of litigation. See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/redress/acc_just/indez_en.htm. See also Geraint Howells, 
COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 2 (Darmouth publishing Company Limited, 1993).  
 
647 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 307 (2006). 
648 See R. Revesz and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Multi-Defendant Settlements: The Impact of Joint and Several 
Liability, New York University C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics Working Paper # 92-37 (1992).  
649 Hence, European plaintiffs face the risk of paying the legal fees of the other party in the lawsuit. See 
Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European 
Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 658 (1993). See also Susan Narita, Product Liability 
Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 38 (1996).  
650 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299-318, 308 (2004). 
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One of the arguments supporting the use of the British rule is the fact that the 
probability of having to bear the legal costs of the other party is an important deterrent 
element against frivolous lawsuits.651 One of the downsides of the British rule is that it 
puts a strong burden on low income victims who may not be able to afford the expected 
litigation costs of both parties in case the claim is unsuccessful.652 There is not much 
empirical literature on the impact of the different rules of distribution of litigation costs 
among parties on the litigation rate653
In product liability cases, the impact of the British rule is very important in terms 
of deterring claims where injured victims do not have an important certainty of prevailing 
because some defendants, especially corporate defendants, might have the ability and 
resources to make litigation significantly expensive, especially when product information 
is relatively complex.
 but some tendencies can be expected.  
654 Further, some defendants in product liability cases are 
defendants in several cases and might have several product liability lawsuits for the same 
or different products while consumers are typically parties in a single lawsuit and 
therefore litigation becomes so risky that they will be interested in being certain they will 
win before filing the claim. Cost shifting rules such as the British rule are said to increase 
consumers' risk aversion concerning litigation.655
Consequently, under the British rule in force in most European member states, 
injured victims will have lower incentives for bringing product lawsuits and in contrast, 
under the American rule there might be a higher level of claims.
 
656
                                                 
651 Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 389-415 (2004). 
 So the distribution of 
652 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 307 (2006). 
653 Stephen B. Presser, How should the Law of Products Liability be Harmonized? What Americans Can 
Learn from Europeans, Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute (2002). 
654 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993). 
655 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 309 (2004). 
656 Steven Shavell, Suit and settlement v. trial: a theoretical analysis under alternative methods for the 
allocation of legal costs, 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 55-81 (1982). 
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the litigation costs might be an additional factor that explains the different trends in 
product liability litigation in Europe and the United States.  
 
 
3.6 Damage awards 
 
An additional factor that contributes to explain the lower level of product liability 
cases in Europe when compared with the United States is the level of damage awards.657 
Damage awards in Europe have been significantly lower than those in the United 
States.658 This difference may be partially due to the generally lower salary levels and 
health care costs in Europe659 as well as to use of judges rather than potentially more 
plaintiff-friendly juries.660
Compensation for damages generally includes three different kinds of harms: 
economic harm, non-economic (personal or material) harm and punitive damages.
  But other factors affect the difference in damage awards as 
well.  
661
                                                 
657 And might also be due to the low level of successful damage claims. But there is little empirical 
evidence available. See Christopher Hodges, Competition Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: what 
is the case?, Common Market Law Review 43: 1381-1407, 1397 (2006). 
 
Economic damages are generally calculated in a similar way in Europe and in the United 
658 Patrick S. Atiyah, Tort law and the alternatives: some Anglo-American comparisons, 6 Duke Law 
Journal 1002–1044 (1987) for a comparison of the U.S. and the English legal systems. Atiyah found that 
U.S. plaintiffs were more likely to litigate, prevail in court and receive generous compensation. Given the 
higher expected value of the lawsuit in the U.S., victims have higher incentives to litigate and hence the 
aggregate level of litigation in tort --  and specifically in product liability cases -- is higher in the U.S. than 
in Europe.  
659 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 255 (1993) presenting the reasons that 
would explain that the adoption of a strict product liability rule in Europe would not change the different 
level of damage awards in Europe compared with the U.S. 
660 Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European 
Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 658 (1993). 
661 See Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva 
Papers 31, 304–313, 310 (2006). Punitive damages, as will be explained below, are not available in Europe. 
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States.662 In Europe, however, they are typically limited to compensation for lost wages 
and medical expenses,663 and the latter is less relevant than it is in the United States, 
given the European social welfare and health care systems.664 Non-economic damages 
are sometimes not allowed in European legal systems665 and when available, they often 
do not include the same damage categories that are included in the United States (for 
example pain and suffering666). Even when European systems include these non-
economic damage categories, they are usually very low amounts667 or are calculated 
according to a previously determined scale that does not necessarily reflect the exact 
amount of non-economic damages suffered by the injured victim.668
The last kind of damages, punitive damages is not available in most European 
legal systems.
  
669
                                                 
662 See 2000 Current Award Trends in Personal Injury, LRP Publications, Jury Verdict Research(R) Series 
52 (2000) presenting results in damage awards in the U.S. and noting that the level of compensatory awards 
remained relatively stable between 1993 and 1997 and since then and until 2000 has more than tripled.   
 
663 Medical costs in the U.S. are mostly borne by private insurance companies. See Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt 
By Association In United States Products Liability Cases: Are The European Community And Japan Likely 
To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. 
L.J. 629 (1993). 
664 Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European 
Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 658 (1993). 
665 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 255 (1993) 
666 In some European countries recovery for pain and suffering is allowed but very limited. Alfred E. 
Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An Analysis Of Its 
Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish Harmonization And 
Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1005-1006 (1994). 
667 See Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 370 (2000) noting that the level of damages awarded in Europe often do not 
reflect the actual harm suffered by the victim and arguing that this factor deters injured victims from 
pursuing litigation. See also Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European 
Community: Implications for United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 255 (1993) 
noting the main differences between the European and the U.S. product liability systems. 
668 See, for example, in Spain, the Real Decreto Legislativo 8/2004, de 29 de octubre, por el que se aprueba 
el texto refundido de la Ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a motor 
(BOE núm. 267, de 5.11.2004)  
available at http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2004/11/05/pdfs/A36662-36695.pdf and see also Munich Re., 
Personal Inuuries and medical malpractice, available at  http://www.munichre.com explaining the different 
compensation mechanisms for personal injuries in Europe. 
669 Up to today, Ireland is the only European member state that allows punitive damages in product cases. 
Some other member states are considering their introduction. See Stephen B. Presser, How should the Law 
of Products Liability be Harmonized? What Americans Can Learn from Europeans, Center for Legal Policy 
at the Manhattan Institute (2002). See also Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability 
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Punitive damages are set not based on injury but on a calculation of the amount 
sufficient to punish the defendant for wrongful conduct and on deterring such conduct in 
the future.670 Given that not all injured victims are compensated, but only those who are 
filing claims and prevailing in their legal process, economic theory often views punitive 
damages as contributing to covering the social cost of accidents.671
The use of punitive damages in product liability cases is not exempt from debate. 
Some view punitive damages as necessary whenever a defendant has been indifferent to 
public safety so that such behavior is punished and deterred.
  
672 Consumer protection is 
often considered an issue important enough to justify the harshness of punitive damages. 
Others, on the contrary, consider that the use of punitive damages is inappropriate in 
product liability cases unless the defendant has committed an intentional tort. Under this 
view, traditional tort instruments are sufficient to provide remedies to victims of 
accidents caused by defective products.673
 This is not the place to discuss the adequacy of the use of punitive damages in 
product liability cases. However, what is important to note is that the unavailability of 
punitive damages and the use of compensatory damages alone has an effect on the 
incentives injured victims have to pursue their product liability claims.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and product safety – understanding a necessary element in the European Product Liability through a 
comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 307-308 (2000). See also J.  Hersch, and W. 
Viscusi, Punitive damages: How judges and juries perform, Journal of Legal Studies 33: 1–36 (2004). 
670 See Meghan A. Crowley, From Punishment to Annihilation: Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. – No 
More Butts – Punitive Damages Have Gone Too Far, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1513, 1514 (2001) noting that 
punitive damages serve the same purpose as fines and penalties as well as have a specific deterrence factor 
of general deterrence.  
671 M. A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harvard Law Review 
4,  869-962 (1998). 
672 David Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257, 1371 (1976) 
defending the use of punitive damages in product liability cases.  
673 John A. Fulton, Punitive Damages in Product liability Cases, 15 Forum 117, 132 (1979), against the use 
of punitive damages in product liability cases. 
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All of these factors result in lower damage awards in Europe than in the United 
States.674 Because of the limitation on litigation and the level of damage awarded, 
producers’ exposure to liability is more predictable675 and significantly more limited in 
Europe than in the United States.676
 
  
 
3.7 Absence of class actions  
 
Another factor that affects the individuals’ incentives to bring a product liability 
lawsuit in Europe is the unavailability of class actions in most European legal systems.677
It is not uncommon that defective products cause relatively small damages to 
many different individuals. When considering the amount of damage suffered and the 
cost of brining a lawsuit, each victim individually often lacks an incentive to bring a 
lawsuit, but if it were possible for all of them to bring the lawsuit collectively, as in a 
class action, then it would become worth it in the aggregate as well as individually. 
Hence, in situations like the one described – small and broadly distributed damages – 
class actions would have an important role in protecting injured victims.
  
678
Class actions, as characterized in the United States, do not exist in the different 
European member states and are still a recent discussion and a rather exceptional 
 
                                                 
674 Hans Claudius Taschner, Harmonization of product liability in the European Community, 34 Tex. Int’l 
L. J. 21 (1999) arguing that the lower level of damage awards as well as its predictability are important for 
their insurability, that does not become a problem in Europe. 
675 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 310 (2006). 
676 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 255 (1993). 
677 Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The European 
Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 658 (1993). 
678 Jose Maria Lopez Jimenez, Las Acciones Colectivas como medio de proteccion de los derechos e 
intereses de los consumidores, La Ley, number 6851, January, 2, 4 (2008). 
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phenomenon.679 In order to improve access to justice for injured victims in this kind of 
case, European authorities have discussed with member states whether class actions 
should be introduced.680 The characterization of these class actions would be remarkably 
different than the class actions brought in the United States by an aggregate of individuals 
injured by a tortfeasor.681 The introduction of class actions at the European level is 
essentially structured around the role of consumer representative bodies to defend 
consumer interests.682
In recent years some European member states such as the Netherlands, Portugal, 
England and Wales, Spain and Sweden have adopted laws on collective actions.
   
683
Spain, for example, does not have a specific trial process when class actions are 
involved. When transposing the European directives on different issues regarding the 
protection of the interests of consumers and users,
  
684
                                                 
679 Patrick Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: 
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law 
Journal 65, 90 (1989-1990) and Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation 
and Deterrence Issues, European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 308 (2004). 
 the Spanish legislature considered 
680 The first approximation of the European Commission to this issue was in 1984, in the Memorandum 
from the Commission: Consumer Redress COM(84) 692, 12.12.1984 where it concluded that in light of the 
diversity of regulation across the member states it was not possible to propose binding harmonization 
regulation of collective actions at the European level. The jurisdiction of European authorities over the 
regulation of collective actions is still today a debated issue. For a strong criticism of the evolution of 
European legal systems towards welcoming actions similar to class actions see Christopher Hodges, Multi-
party actions: A European Approach, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int’ L. 321 (2001). See Christopher Hodges, 
Competition Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: what is the case?, Common Market Law Review 
43: 1381-1407, 1395-96 (2006) warning that the introduction of class actions might result in the American 
litigation crisis and arguing that facilitating private litigation and hence private enforcement might not 
respond to the interest in achieving justice and might result in the involvement of private intermediaries 
with their own commercial interests such as the maximization of the litigation market volume and the size 
of individual cases.   
681 European Union and member states authorities want to avoid what is considered to be serious problems 
of the U.S. class action system in terms of encouraging excessive litigation, blackmail settlements and 
become high costs for business. See Lessons from USA, Australia and the UK, (European Justice Forum, 
2006). Conclusions may be found in www.europeanjusticeforum.org 
682 These collective actions would be limited to injunctive relief rather than monetary claims. See 
Background Report: OECD Workshop on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in the Global 
Marketplace, 31, Washington, DC (2005). 
683 Similar laws are being considered in Finland, Denmark, Norway, Ireland, Italy, and France. See 
Christopher Hodges, Competition Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: what is the case?, Common 
Market Law Review 43: 1381-1407 (2006).  
684 Ley 39/2002, de 28 de octubre, de transposición al ordenamiento jurídico español de diversas directivas 
comunitarias en materia de protección de los intereses de los consumidores y usuarios,  BOE núm. 259, de 
28-10-2002, pp. 37922-37933  (http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/10/29/pdfs/A37922-37933.pdf). See also 
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necessary to facilitate access to justice of small claims that might not be filed because of 
the litigation costs involved and established special norms for certain consumer 
associations and other legal entities that could represent the interests of a class in a 
lawsuit whenever damages are spread.685 The availability of these collective actions, 
though, does not preclude injured victims from bringing their product liability claims 
individually.686 These actions are similar, but not equivalent, to the U.S. class actions:687 
for example, under Spanish law, the damage must be suffered by consumers or users and 
not by other parties; the parties with standing to bring these actions are listed specifically 
in the law688 and injured victims cannot opt out and claim damages individually and are 
further bound by the judgment regardless of whether they file any claim at all.689
These collective actions, in the European states where available, have not been 
extensively used because very often the consumer organizations that could be in the 
position to bring such claims have not had enough financial resources to afford the legal 
costs involved in the process (including, in case of a loss in court, bearing the other 
party’s legal costs).
 
690
                                                                                                                                                 
Jose Maria Lopez Jimenez, Las Acciones Colectivas como medio de proteccion de los derechos e intereses 
de los consumidores, La Ley, number 6851, January, 2, 2008 at 6. 
 
685 See Law 1/2000 of January 7 of civil procedure (LEC), BOE núm. 7, de 8 de enero del 2000, pp. 575-
728 (http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2000/01/08/pdfs/A00575-00728.pdf). 
686 Under article 78.4 of the LEC it is possible to cumulate these individual claims to the collective one.  
687 Miguel Pasquau Liaño, El Nuevo marco para la proteccion judicial de los intereses colectivos y difusos 
de los consumidores y usuarios, 119-120, Consejería de Gobernación de la Junta de Andalucía, Sevilla 
(2003).     
688 Article 11 of Law 1/2000 of January 7 of civil procedure (LEC), BOE núm. 7, de 8 de enero del 2000, 
pp. 575-728 (http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2000/01/08/pdfs/A00575-00728.pdf) establishes three different 
parties with standing to bring these collective actions: first, associations of consumers and users; second, 
injured consumers or users that create a group that represents the majority of the injured individuals and 
finally, legal entities with the goal of protecting consumers and users. In contrast, in the U.S. it is the court 
who appreciates whether the individual bringing the lawsuit has standing or not. P. Gutiérrez de Cabiedes 
and Hidalgo de Cabiedes, Comentario al art. 11 LEC, in AAVV, Comentarios a la Ley de Enjuiciamiento 
Civil, vol 1, 144 Aranzadi, Madrid (2001). 
689 See Articles 11 and 222.3 of the LEC and Jose Maria Lopez Jimenez, Las Acciones Colectivas como 
medio de proteccion de los derechos e intereses de los consumidores, La Ley, number 6851, January, 2, at 
8-9, 15 (2008). 
690 See the Commission’s Green Paper: Access of Consumers to Justice and the Settlement of Consumer 
Disputes in the Single Market COM(93) 576, November 16, 1993, 64 (1993). Available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32023_en.htm 
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The unavailability of an efficient instrument to bring these collective or class 
actions has very likely affected the level of product liability cases litigated in Europe.691
 
 
 
3.8 Cultural differences regarding the incentives to litigate  
 
Procedural rules are crucial for victims’ incentives to pursue product liability 
claims. However, procedural factors alone may not explain the level of product liability 
litigation in Europe and hence the little use and effect of the strict product laibiliy regime 
introduced by the product liability directive.692
Cultural attitudes may have also had a crucial effect on the plaintiffs’ incentives to 
pursue product liability claims under the product liability Directive,
 
693 as the cultural 
approach to litigation in Europe and in the United States appears to be remarkably 
different.694 Of course, explaining cultural differences is difficult generally, and 
explaining different cultural approaches to litigation is especially difficult given the lack 
of empirical evidence on the issue.695
However, when looking at the overall models of addressing legal issues, one 
should not neglect the fact that there is a fundamental difference in the approach to legal 
issues and social changes between Europe and the United States. European countries tend 
  
                                                 
691 However, this tendency could be changing. See infra. Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems In Europe And 
The United States, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 61, 74 (2003). 
692 Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 433, 442 (1997).  
693 John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 507, 519 (1994) noting the different reliance in the 
judicial process between Europeans and north-Americans. See also James Henderson Jr., Aaron D. 
Twerski, What Europe, Japan, And Other Countries Can Learn From The New American Restatement of 
Products Liability,  34 Tex Int.’l L. J. 1, 2 (1999). 
694 Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 372-373 (2000). 
695 See Mary J. Davis, Individual And Institutional Responsibility: A Vision For Comparative Fault In 
Products Liability, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 281, 337-338 (1994). See also See also Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict 
Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341 (2000). 
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to rely on legislation more than on litigation to bring about social change.696 Indeed, 
Europeans appear to have a general attitude against litigation.697 In contrast, the U.S. 
social system heavily relies on individual participation through the court system to seek 
redress and eventually bring about legal and social change.698
Europe has developed in-depth product regulations that reflect a commitment to 
regulation rather than litigation in this field.
 
699 This is not the place to discuss whether 
one of the approaches is optimal or better than the other.700 In fact, both models contain 
elements of the other and are not as structurally differentiated as one would imagine from 
a theoretical perspective. While the extended European product regulatory body interacts 
with some amount of litigation, U.S. tortfeasors do not only take into consideration the 
expected liability they are exposed to but also product safety regulations.701
A factor that is very significant in Europe and that does not seem to have the same 
influence in the United States regarding the individuals’ decision in pursuing their legal 
claims and seeking redress -- especially economic redress -- is the role of social insurance 
or of the welfare state as a whole, under which the state becomes a safety net for citizens 
  
                                                 
696 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993). 
697 See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1007 (1994). 
698 The different approach is manifested both in the pre-marketing and post-marketing phase of the product. 
See in general Thomas Lundmark the Restatement of Torts (Third) and The European Product Liability 
Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239 (1996). 
699 For a comparative analysis of both systems see Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, 
Product Safety In The United States And The European Community: A Comparative Approach, 17 Md. J. 
Int'l L. & Trade 177 (1993). See also Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and 
product safety – understanding a necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison 
with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 344-345 (2000). 
700 Either system, under certain circumstances, could be more efficient than the other. For example, on one 
side regulators do not generally have perfect risk information leading to inefficient regulation. On the other 
side, incentives to adopt care may be diluted when considering that injurers, despite of being exposed to 
litigation, might have bought insurance; might not be sued or might be judgment proof. Steven Shavell, A 
model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of economics 15(2), 271-280 
(1984).   
701 See also James T. O'Reilly and Nancy C. Code, PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESOURCE MANUAL: AN 
ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO ANALYZING ISSUES, DEVELOPING STRATEGIES, AND WINNING CASES, Chicago, Ill.: 
American Bar Association, General Practice Section, 291 (1993) for an analysis on U.S. Consumer Product 
Safety standards. 
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who suffer economic problems.702 As it is developed in Chapter 7, health and social 
security systems of the different member states offset a large amount of the cost of 
injuries,703 which clearly has an impact in shaping the attitude of Europeans towards 
litigation that often is considered unnecessary.704
 
 Litigation in the United States, in some 
way, is like a surrogate for the European welfare state while European injured victims do 
not only have tort law as a source of compensation for product-related injuries but also 
public benefits provided by the state.  
Procedural rules as well as cultural attitudes towards litigation contribute to 
explain the evolution of product liability and the impact of the Directive on the matter in 
Europe. However, these elements are essential parts of the European and the U.S. legal 
systems and largely do not provide explanations for the different levels of litigation 
related to product accidents as well as for the different effects resulting from the 
introduction of strict product liability regime.  
The product liability directive and its liability standard do not seem to have 
contributed to overcome the procedural barriers faced by injured victims when bringing 
product liability claims. The idea that the adoption and implementation of the Directive, 
without any amendment of the rules of procedure would facilitate the enforcement of its 
rights was quite optimistic. In light of the failure of the product liability directive as a 
self-help remedy for victims, some amendments in procedural rules are being considered. 
If victims’ access to justice is facilitated, the Europeans’ cultural perception of the role of 
litigation might change in the near future.  
                                                 
702 See generally Thomas Wilhelmsson and Samuli Hurri, FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE 
EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW, 307, Ashgate Publishing (1999).  
703 S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573, 581 (2001). 
704 Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 372-373 (2000). 
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The product liability directive intended to facilitate victims’ compensation705 but 
this goal does not seem to have been achieved when its low impact in terms of product 
liability cases is considered.706
 
 Additional elements, subject of the following chapters, 
have also contributed to the limited impact of the adoption of the product liability 
directive in Europe and of its introduction of strict product liability. 
                                                 
705 Christopher Hodges, Competition Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: what is the case?, Common 
Market Law Review 43: 1381-1407, 1406 (2006). See also David G. Owen, The moral foundations of 
products liability law: toward first principles, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 427, 434 (1992-1993). 
706Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 689-690 (1991). See also Table 6.1 in Chapter 6 showing the amount 
and evolution of product liability judgements in Spain.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ECHOES OF NEGLIGENCE IN EUROPEAN PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
 
 
An additional significant factor that might further help explain the different 
functioning and role of product liability in the United States and in Europe is the structure 
and content of the product liability directive itself. In particular, it may be that the 
Directive does not create a system of liability as strict as is purporeted or intended. There 
may also be issues of different interpretrations by the member states.707 The adoption of 
the Directive's strict liability regime was justified on three different grounds: protect 
product users against any threat to life, health and property,708 facilitating victims’ 
compensation,709 and ensuring fair apportionment of risks among the parties involved in 
product accidents. The latter justification was made in light of strict liability's effect of 
transferring costs of victims' harm to manufacturers, who are considered to be better able 
to spread these costs.710 Based in these justifications, strict product liability was 
considered more efficient than any other alternative.711
                                                 
707 See Duncan Fairgrieve and Geraint Howells, Rethinking Product Liability: A Missing Element in the 
European Commission’s Third Review of the European Product Liability Directive, The modern law 
review, 70(6) 962-978 (2007) arguing that the European Commission should adopt a more active role in 
defining the scope of the product liability directive and the content of its provisions.  
   
708 However, the empirical studies on product safety are not convincing in concluding either way. See 
Thomas Lundmark The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product Liability Directive, 5 
D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, (1996). For a different perspective, see Jorg Finsinger & Jurgen Simon, An 
Economic Assessment of the EC Product Liability Directive and the Product Liability Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND 
COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES 185, 202-05 (Michael Faure & Roger van den Bergh eds., 1989).  
709 Strict liability constitutes a compensation system whereby potential tortfeasors insure potential victims 
and they spread their expected losses through product prices In order to adequately perform, risks must be 
known and quantifiable so that potential tortfeasors can asses their exposure and buy insurance, if 
necessary. James A. Henderson, Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377, 392 (2002). 
See in contrast, Michael G. Faure, Product Liability and Product Safety in Europe: Harmonization or 
Differentiation?, Kylos, vol 53, 467-508, 488, 491 (2000) arguing that the introduction of strict product 
liability in Europe was due to the result of the industry rent seeking instead of an instrument to increase 
economic welfare. 
710 A producer is generally considered to be in a better position than a consumer to obtain insurance for 
product-related losses because he can either self-insure or purchase insurance coverage. See Thomas 
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Negligence and strict liability are not separated by a sharp distinction but instead 
exist along a continuum with many shades.712 The fact that the product liability directive 
imposes “liability without fault on the producer,”713 however, suggests that the 
Commission intended to adopt a system that falls squarely on the side of strict liability.714
As already noted, the product liability directive is not the only regulation on 
product liability in Europe. Instead, it exists alongside domestic legislation on tort and 
contract law that are often applicable to product-related accidents as well.
  
715 The 
interaction of the Directrive with this domestic legislation as it is interpreted and 
implemented by domestic courts attenuates the Directive's strict liability regime.716 In 
addition, the Directive itself contains elements of negligence that affect its practical 
implementation and impact.717
 
  
 
1. The legal costs of defining a legal regime: Negligence elements in the product 
liability directive  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lundmark, The Restatement of Torts (Third) And The European Product Liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. 
Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 265 (1996). 
711 W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 10 (1984). 
712 Bernanrd A. Koch and Helmut Koziol (eds.) UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY, 101 (The 
Hague; London; New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), and William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal 
to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639 (1991) arguing that the determination on 
whether to impose liability should be made on a case-by-case basis. 
713 See the Preamble of the product liability directive. 
714 However, Anita Bernstein in L’Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the 
European Community, 31 Va. J Int’l L. 673 (1991) analyses the possibility that the Directive was 
promulgated only to show the European Commission’s political power.   
715 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 304 (2004). 
716 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318 (2004). 
717 Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY, 311-22, Darmouth publishing Company Limited, 
(1993)distinguishing between strict product liability and negligence based liability and considerations 
supporting each. 
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The product liability directive clearly aimed at introducing and establishing a 
strict product liability regime in Europe. However, it contains elements that involve 
analyses of care and hence move the regime in the direction of negligence.718
 
  These are 
essentially three elements: (1) the crucial concept of defect, (2) the optional provisions 
regarding damage caps and the development risk defense, and (3) the definition of the 
scope of potential tortfeasors subject to the Directive’s regime.  
 
1.1 The negligence music of the consumer expectations test 
 
Among the cornerstones of a product liability regime are the criteria on which 
liability will be imposed. These involve questions of whether all kinds of products are 
subject to the same liability regime, whether there are different kinds of defects and 
finally, whether the different product defects entail the same or different defectiveness 
standards.   
If the liability regime established by the product liabiltiy directive were truly 
strict, as indended, liability would be imposed based only on a finding of causation of 
harm but this is far from the practice in the U.S. -- when strict product liability was in 
place -- or European product liability cases. Under the product liability directive, liability 
is conditioned to the existence of a defect in the product that caused harm.719
                                                 
718 See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 751, 776-777 (2003) and Paul Burrows, 
Consumer Safety under Products Liability and Duty to Disclose, International Review of Law and 
Economics 12, 457-478, 463 (1992). 
 Hence, the 
719 In not differentiating between product defects the product liability directive resembles the Restatement 
Second. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1243, 1232 
(2002). Additionally, the definition of defect included in the Directive is remarkably broad. In this sense, 
some argue that there is no remarkable difference between a strict liability for the damage caused by a 
product and liability for defect in the product under the Directive. See EUROPEAN CENTRE OF TORT AND 
INSURANCE LAW, UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (B.A. Koch and H. Kaziol eds.) Kluwer 
Law International, 381 (2002). 
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injured victim must prove not only causation but also defect. This starts to sound similar 
to liability under negligence.720
The efficiency and performance of strict liability and negligence often depend on 
the circumstances such as the information available when defining the required level of 
care, whether care is observable or not and the circumstances of enforcement.
 
721 A 
unique and uniform product liability regime for all products and all product accidents 
with a uniform liability rule might generate inefficiencies.722
In addition to these contextual parameters, the extent to which product liability 
will function as a strict liability regime or a negligence system hinges on the definition of 
defect. When taking a close look to the concept of defect, which is one of the pivotal 
concepts of the Directive, it seems less clear how strict the Directive’s regime is.
  
723 As 
explained earlier, the Directive defines defective product as one which does not provide 
the safety a reasonable consumer is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into 
account.724 Even though this test is applied in the context of strict product liability, 
spelling out the reasoning of the test implies considerations725 that bring the standard 
closer to negligence than to strict liability.726
                                                 
720 See William Powers, Jr., A modest proposal to abandon strict products liability, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639, 
653 (1991) arguing that the structure of product liability cases is negligence-based. 
  
721 For example, evidentiary difficulties inherent to negligence -- in terms of determining the standard of 
care and observing whether the tortfeasor has adopted the required level of care --might justify introducing 
strict liability as a way of enforcing reasonable care. See Mark A. Geistfeld, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY, 24, Foundation Press, New York (2006). See also Franceso Silva and Alberto Cavaliere, The 
Economic Impact of Product Liability: lessons from the US and the EU Experience, in: Giampaolo Galli 
and Jacques Pelkmans (eds.), Regulatory Reform and Competitiveness in Europe, I, Horizontal Issues. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 292–323 (2000). 
722 Depending on the context, strict liability or negligence might perform more efficiently and hence will be 
more adequate. See Michael G. Faure, Product Liability and Product Safety in Europe: Harmonization or 
Differentiation?, Kylos, vol 53, 467-508, 489 (2000). 
723 See THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Franz Werro and Vernon 
Valentine Palmer, (Eds.), 437, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press (2004).  
724 Despite the defect issue being within strict product liability, some argue that in adopting this definition 
the European Commission signaled that it was endorsing negligence standards for design and warning 
cases. 
725 Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS § 358,  987 (2000).  
726 William Powers, Jr., A modest proposal to abandon strict products liability, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639, 
653 (1991). Some consider that a true strict liability regime for product defects would exist if the concept of 
defectiveness was based on for example, the consumer assessment -- or misperception -- of product risks 
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The consumer expectations test included in the product liability directive does not 
provide an independent objective standard against which to judge a product.727 Concepts 
such as average consumer,728 that is, the reference and relevant consumer the 
expectations of whom will determine the expectations the consumer in the case is entitled 
to have, or the concept of reasonable expectations of safety, which is often vague and 
difficult to specify, can result in courts729 applying negligence considerations when 
defining the level of safety a consumer is entitled to expect730
                                                                                                                                                 
regardless of the actual product’s level of safety. See THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN 
TORT LAW, Franz Werro and Vernon Valentine Palmer, (ed.), 56-57, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic 
Press, (2004). See also Paul Burrows, Consumer Safety under Products Liability and Duty to Disclose, 
International Review of Law and Economics 12, 457-478, 463 (1992). 
 or  implying defect 
727 In fact, the broad definition of defect in article 6 of the product laibility directive could result in deeming 
the product defective just by the fact of having caused harm. European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law, 
Unification of Tort Law: Strict Liability, 381 (B.A. Koch and H. Kaziol eds.) Kluwer Law International 
(2002). 
728 In light of the consumers’ perspective adopted by the consumers’ expectation test, many consider that it 
represents a pro-defendant solution given that there are limitations inherent to its successful application. 
Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability? 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 1025 (1998). 
729 In light of the negligence elements of the defectiveness tests some anticipated problems for courts to 
define standards of product design, for example. See Mary J. Davis, Individual And Institutional 
Responsibility: A Vision For Comparative Fault In Products Liability, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 281, 352 n.2 (1994). 
Regarding the difficulty of applying a strict liability standard in warning defect cases see generally James 
A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of 
Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265 (1990) advocating for the use of a negligence standard in failure-
to-warn cases to mitigate confusion stemming from a strict liability standard. 
730 See Arsenio R.V. v. Cunitor, S.A. e Hiperbebé, Roma 40-Bebés, Spanish Supreme Court 25.6.96 (RJ 
1996\4853; MP: Alfonso Barcalá y Trillo-Figueroa) where the court understood that both the plaintiff and 
the defendant should have noticed the manufacturing defect of the crib before using it and causing an 
accident on the plaintiff’s baby resulting in death; also Transportes Miguel Aranda, S.L. v. Automoción 
Ramos, S.A. y Firestone, Court of Appeals of Badajoz 13.7.2002 (AC 2003\303; MP: Francisco Rubio 
Sánchez) where the court held that the plaintiffs had proved the negligence of the manufacturer for not 
having adopted the “ required level of care.” Another example is the judgment in the case Pescados 
Montabán, S.L. v. Autodistribución Iliberis, S.A., SAFE de Neumáticos Michelín e Iveco-Pegaso, S.A., of 
the Court of Appeals of Granada, of 211.2000 (AC 2000\266; MP: Antonio Gallo Erena) where the court 
held that the plaintiff had met the burden of proof of the prima facie case and further proved the 
manufacturer’s negligence based on the evidence showing a breach of the level of due care.  
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whenever causation is difficult to prove731 through the application of res ipsa loquitur 
arguments that clearly hinge on negligence.732
Further, the flexible content of consumer expectations often allows manufacturers 
to defend themselves by putting the blame on the consumers’ conduct and alleging that 
victims were contributorily negligent by ignoring warnings or that the product was used 
in a way that was not a foreseeable.
  
733
Together with the expectations of consumers, the product defect is to be 
established on the basis of the presentation of the product and its foreseeable uses.
 Again, this analysis rings negligence bells more 
than sounding like strict liability.  
734 
These elements seem to imply that judges perform a global evaluation of the product 
risks and benefits, as it would be done under a negligence system, which may also 
include the product price as a parameter indicating the level of safety of the product.735
Finally, the use of a unique test for defect does not seem to take into account the 
different potential risks presented by products and the different investments in care that 
parties have incentives to adopt depending on the liability rule in force.
  
736
                                                 
731 See Isabel v. Lidl Supermercados, S.A., Sevilla Court of Appeals,  13.11.06 (AC 2007\978; MP: 
Conrado Gallardo Correa) and Francisco Javier F.S. v. Dokasde, S.A., Compañía Vinícola del Norte de 
España, S.A., N.D de Comunicaciones, S.L. y Orbis Fabri, S.A.), Court of Appeals of Barcelona, 30.6.00 
(JUR 2000\305476; MP: Pablo Díez Noval) where both court of appeals presumed the existence of defect 
in cases were the victim was not found contributorily negligent and further presumed negligence based on 
the inability of the defendant of proving diligence.  
 When 
analyzing the different kinds of product defects in practice, court are hard pressed to 
avoid using negligence considerations when they reach questions about the definition and 
determination of design defects or about warnings and instructions. This is particularly so 
732 See Comunidad de Propietarios v. Tecal Miguel Prieto, S.L. y Cahispa, S.A. de Seguros Generales, 
Court of Appeals of Salamanca, 12.2.2004 (AC 2004\426; MP: Ildefonso García del Pozo) where the court 
understood the plaintiff proved the causal relation between the defendant’s negligence and the harm 
suffered by the victim.  
733 Eleonora Rajneri, Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and the Former 
Liability Regime in Italy, Global Jurist Topics: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1, Article 3 (2004). 
734 Article 6.2 of the product liability directive.  
735 See THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Franz Werro and Vernon 
Valentine Palmer, (Eds.) Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 443 (2004). 
736 Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1243 (2002). 
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when referring to reasonable alternative design, foreseeable risks or the reasonable 
amount and kind of information required in the instructions or warnings.737
The discussion of whether the different product defects considered in practice 
should be treated under different product liability rules has not arisen in Europe because 
product defects are uniformly treated in the product liability directive. However, in light 
of the jurisprudential practice differentiating between product defects -- at least in 
Spanish courts -- the discussion regarding whether different product defects should be 
subject to different liability regimes or different tests for defect seems important.  
  
Additionally, when focusing on the consumer expectations test and particularly on 
the level of safety a consumer is entitled to expect, some argue that the test should be 
applied for all kinds of product defects -- manufacturing, design, and warnings and 
instructions -- given that consumers can reasonably expect that product manufacturers 
will take reasonable care when designing and manufacturing products as well as warning 
about product risks.738 When reasonable care considerations are introduced in the 
application of the consumer expectations test negligence is present in the defectiveness 
standard.739
The different liability regimes available under tort to regulate product accidents – 
strict liability and negligence – represent different ways of balancing the interests of 
consumers and product manufacturers.
 
740
                                                 
737 Owen, David A., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, 411, Thomson/West (2005). 
 For example, the transition from the Second to 
the Third Restatement with the resulting change of liability from strict product liability to 
negligence triggerd a discussion of whether the Second Restatement represented a pro-
victim approach, with victims insured by product manufactures, while the Third 
738 Mark A. Geistfeld, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCT LIABILITY, 23-26 (2006). See also Richard W. Wright, The 
principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1122 (2007). 
739 David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681, 706-07 
(1980). 
740 See Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY, 311-2,2 Darmouth publishing Company 
Limited, (1993)distinguishing between strict product liability and negligence based liability and 
considerations supporting each. 
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Restatement represented the opposite, a pro-manufacturer approach, by imposing 
negligence as the liability system for design and warning defect cases (leaving aside 
manufacturing defect cases, which were still subject to a strict liability rule).741
 
 This 
discussion regarding the implications of product liability rules in the approach adopted by 
the product liability system has not been addressed in Europe. In light of the sometimes 
negligence-like application of the Directive's liability regime, it would be advisable to 
deal with these questions.  
 
1.2 Optional provisions  
 
Another parameter that impacts on the strict liability nature of the product liability 
directive and hence its practical application is the possibility for member states to 
introduce optional provisions in their domestic transposition laws.742 The first defense is 
the threshold limit of 500 euros under which injured victims may not seek compensation 
under the Directive. The second is a development risks defense743
The limit of 500 euros excludes compensation for injured victims who suffer 
minor damages caused by defective products. The Directive’s strict liability is limited, 
then, to the minimum threshold damage. For these minor damages injured victims are the 
residual bearers of the harm they suffer.
 and finally, the third is 
the possibility of limiting damages to 70 million euros and hence of introducing a damage 
cap.   
744
                                                 
741 See Abed Awad, The concept of defect in American and English products liability discourse: despite 
strict liability linguistics, negligence is back with a vengeance!, 10 Pace Int’l L. Rev. 275, 357 (1998) 
arguing that the Restatement Third introduces a pro-manufacturer ultra-negligence liability regime.  
 If liability were purely strict, all damages 
742 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 301 (2004). 
743 Article 7 of the product liability directive. 
744 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 47 (1987). 
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caused by defective products would be internalized by tortfeasors regardless of their 
amount.745
The second optional provision available to member states is the development-risk 
defense layed out in article 7 of the Directive. The development risk defense is a 
negligence-based defense
 The limitation of damages above a certain amount introduces a limitation on 
the internalization of harm and hence on how strict the product liability regime is. 
746 under which defendants can escape liability in cases where 
they can show that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when they 
put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be 
discovered.747 The inclusion of this defense protects firms' incentives to introduce new 
products in the market because if they cannot discover product defects in light of the state 
of scientific and technological knowledge, they will not be liable for the harm caused by 
their defective products that in these cases may be unpredictable.748
But the introduction of the development risk defense can also be seen as 
weakening the goal of strict liability.
  
749 By allowing the defense, the Directive tries to 
“square a circle,” as Stapleton puts it,750 because while using strict liability language, it 
provides protection to business for unforeseeable risks.751
                                                 
745 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 47 , Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(MA) (1987) and William Landes and Richard Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, 273-
280, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) (1987). 
 If the strict liability principles 
of risk spreading and of loss distribution are accepted, the inclusion of a development 
746 Geraint Howells, COMPARATIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 35, Darmouth publishing Company Limited, 
(1993). 
747 See European Commission v. United Kingdom, C-300/95 (1997) ECR I-2649, para 29. However, it is 
still not clear if the knowledge refers to the general existence of the defect or to the finding of the defect in 
particular products. See also THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Franz 
Werro and Vernon Valentine Palmer, (Eds.) Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press, 43 (2004). 
748 Thomas Lundmark, The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product Liability Directive, 5 
D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 255 (1996). See also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European 
Products Liability More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 985, 986 (1998). 
749 By allowing product manufacturers to claims such defense the product liability directive went beyond 
the U.S. Restatements that do not include such defense. See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American 
products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1243, 1232 (2002). 
750 Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1231 (2002).  
751 This was a compromise demanded by the English Government of Margaret Thatcher. See Jane 
Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225, 1231 (2002).  
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risks defense is difficult to defend752 given that it allows European courts to use a 
negligence-based risk utility test for design defects.753 If this defense were applicable not 
only in design defect cases but also in manufacturing defects, the strict product liability 
alluded to in the Directive's preamble would be reduced largely to mere rhetoric.754
The importance of the negligence component of this defense depends on how it is 
interpreted.
 
755 If the defense is interpreted shield producers in cases where the defect was 
not reasonably foreseeable, it would result in a negligence-based regime. If, instead, the 
product manufacturer is liable for damages caused by defective products unless the defect 
was absolutely undiscoverable, the liability regime would be someplace in between a 
purely strict and a negligence based regime. In light of the Directive's failure to include 
guidance as to how the content of this defense is to be established, it is left for domestic 
courts to determine the state of scientific and technical knowledge available at the time 
the product was put into circulation.756
The interpretation, scope, and content of this defense is important to the question 
of how the Directive impacts on consumers' rights. It could either strengthen them 
through a strict liability regime or leave them largely as they were prior to the adoption of 
the Directive by introducing only elements of strict liability while leaving in place 
  
                                                 
752 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 1030 (1998). 
753 See Thomas Lundmark The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product Liability 
Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239, 255 (1996). See also Paul Burrows, Consumer Safety under 
Products Liability and Duty to Disclose, International Review of Law and Economics 12, 457-478, 464 
(1992). 
754 Or could even be rendered meaningless. See Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European 
Directive on PL: the promise or progress?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 423 (1988). 
755 Jane Stapleton, Products Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 45, 
56 (1999).  
756 In contract see the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc. 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) which refined the concept of state of scientific knowledge in particular by insisting that the material 
relied upon by expert witnesses in their evaluation of scientific controversies should be subject to careful 
review. See Jane Stapleton, Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths of Reform, 34 Tex. Int'l 
L.J. 45, 56 (1999). 
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negligence as the regime in force in most member states (as was the case before the 
product liability Directive entered into force).757
 The third optional provision that affects the strict liability nature of the Directive 
is the damage cap of 70 million euro on liability resulting from death or personal injury 
caused by a defective product.
  
758
 
 As with the damage threshold discussed earlier, this 
provision limits the tortfeasor’s internalization of expected damages and hence impacts 
its incentives to invest in care. Consequently, this provision diminishes the effectiveness 
of the strict product liability regime.  
 
1.3 Potential tortfeasors subject to the product liability directive  
 
All members of the chain of distribution, including product manufacturers, have a 
duty to warn of product risks when they know, or should know, that a product without 
warnings is likely to be dangerous when used for its intended purpose.759 The scope of 
this duty, however, is not uniform for all members of the chain. Manufacturers are held to 
a higher standard than product retailers, for example, because they are presumed to have 
higher knowledge of the product and the risks it imposes on others.760
 
 The duty element 
is clearly a negligence concept.  
 
                                                 
757 Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on PL: the promise or progress?, 18 
Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 422 (1988) arguing that the introduction of the development risk defense as a 
different defense to the concept of state of the art sends a confusing signal that undermines the 
effectiveness of the strict product liability regime aimed by the Directive.  
758 Article 16.1 of the product liability directive. 
759 Article 3 of the product liability directive. See also Paula Giliker, Strict Liability for Defective Products: 
The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business Law Review 4, 87-90, 89 (2003).  
760 S. Mark Mitchell, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 Ga. J. Int'l & 
Comp. L. 573, 575 (2001). See also Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of 
the Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 751, 776-777  
(2003). 
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2 Strict product liability or a negligence regime with a reversal of the burden of 
proof?  
 
Despite the negligence elements present in the product liability directive and 
explained above, it should not be concluded that the strict product liability regime 
becomes a fault liability system just because of the fact that it contains certain elements 
based on fault.761
The initial enthusiasm for the strict liability laid down by the Directive is quite 
diluted by these fault-based considerations.
  
762 But the negligence-based aspects of the 
product liability directive do not turn the liability regime into a fully negligence-based 
one. The Directive does not simply maintain the negligence regime in force in most 
member states before its adoption763 because it does not include duty elements and hence 
lacks the core element of any negligence regime.764
                                                 
761 Bernanrd A. Koch and Helmut Koziol (eds.) UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT LIABILITY (the Hague; 
London; New York: Kluwer Law International, 101 (2002). 
 The introduction of negligence-based 
elements does not change its strict liability nature, even though they may have an impact 
regarding the burden of proof among the parties. The burden of proof is generally defined 
on two different levels: first, which of the parties must provide the evidence required -- 
called the burden of proof -- and second, what is the level of confidence required by the 
762 See Jane Stapleton, Products Liability In The United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 Tex. Int’l L. 
J. 45, 67 (1999) arguing that despite the product liability directive’s intent to impose liability without fault 
on the producer, in practice only some areas such liability regime was introduced while the core of the 
liability in some other areas was negligence-based. 
763 See Michael R. Will, Liability for failure to warn in the European Community, 6 B.U. Int’l L. J. 125, 
133 (1988) arguing that the product liability directive is not a negligence-based liability system and did not 
just replace the negligence product liability systems in force before the product liability directive was 
adopted but put a new clothing on them.  
764 See Alan Calnan, Perpetuating Negligence Principles in Strict Products Liability: The Use of State of the 
Art Concepts in Design Cases, 36 Syracuse L. Rev. 797 (1985) and Kathleen D. Wilkinson, Admissibility 
of State of the Art Defense - Manufacturer's Expertise May No Longer Be Allowed in the Courtroom, 
Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, 205 (1988). 
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adjudicator in order to understand that the evidence supports the legal claim – called 
standard of proof.765
Under a pure strict liability regime, the injured victim bears the burden of proving 
the harm, the defect and the causal relation between them.
 
766 However, with the 
introduction of optional provisions and the adoption of the consumer expectations test, 
strict liability may function as a rebuttable presumption of liability that can be overcome 
by the defendant alleging and proving any of the available defenses.767
There is a remarkable divergence between common-law and civil law standards of 
proof in civil cases. In England and the U.S., the standard of proof is probabilistic, and 
civil claims must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
  
768 In contrast, in civil-
law countries the standard is that a civil claimant must in effect convince the trier of fact 
that the claimant's assertions are true.769
The difference between the common law and civil law systems shows basic 
differences in attitudes toward the process of trial. For example, there is very little 
interest shown in civil law countries regarding standards of proof or the study of the 
differences between civil law and common law standards of proof.  
 If we assume that the standards of proof have a 
practical impact, this difference between common-law and civil law rules are of great 
practical importance.  
                                                 
765 Fernando Gómez, Burden of Proof and strict liability: an economic analysis of a misconception, Indret 
01/2001. 
766 See James A. Henderson Jr., Richard N. Pearson, John A. Siliciano, THE TORTS PROCESS, Aspen 413-
435 (6th ed.) (2003). The two different liability regimes have a direct impact on the manufacturer’s decision 
regarding product design, manufacturing and pricing. See Andrew F. Daughety, Jennifer F. Reinganum, 
Product Safety: liability, R&D and signaling, the American Economic Review, vol. 85 no. 5, 1187-1206. 
1188 (1995). 
767 For an explanation on the effect of exceptions on the content of rules see Robert C. Casad, Kevin M. 
Clermont, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE, Durham, NC: Carolina 
Academic Press, 39-44 (2001). 
768 Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 
243, 243 (2002). 
769 Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 
243, 243 (2002). 
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In civil-law systems, the legal proof's requirement of "full proof" avoided the 
necessity of formulating or even contemplating expressly different standards of proof for 
criminal and civil cases. So, continental scholars have not paid much attention to 
standards of proof because of the lack of probabilistic determinations.  
Another parameter that may explain the little concern about burden of proof and 
standards of proof shown by civil law systems may be the absence of the jury institution. 
Under an adversarial system of litigation such as the one in the United States, the court 
does not conduct an independent investigation of its own but instead distributes between 
the litigants the burdens of provinig facts.770 Whether one or the other of the parties has 
met the burden of proof is for the judge to decide and there is no occasion for the jury to 
hear anything about it. But it is for the jury to decide, when a case is submitted to it, 
whether the party with the burden of proof on a particular issue of fact has sustained it. In 
such case, the judge must explain to the jury the charge and the degree of persuasion to 
which the jurors must be convinced.771
The modern institution of the civil jury appears to have been especially effective 
in introducing the common law's progress toward probabilistic standards of proof. At 
least, the correlation between the existence of the civil jury and the development of the 
preponderance standard seems to be working in the sense of introducing probabilistic 
considerations in the decision-making process.
  
772
Some scholars argue that from a theoretical perspective, the allocation of the 
burden of proof between the parties should not be relevant for the outcome of the case 
because given the information about the case, parties would start from opposite sides but 
 
                                                 
770 For an analysis of the burden of proof in U.S. products liability see James T. O'Reilly and Nancy C. 
Code, PRODUCTS LIABILITY RESOURCE MANUAL: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE TO ANALYZING ISSUES, DEVELOPING 
STRATEGIES, AND WINNING CASES, Chicago, Ill.: American Bar Association, General Practice Section, 135 
(1993). 
771 Richard H. Field, Benjamin Kaplan, Kevin M. Clermont, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL 
PROCEDURE, New York, N.Y.: Foundation Press; [St. Paul, MN]: Thomson/West, 1245 (2003). 
772 Barbara J. Shapiro, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
253-55 (1991).  
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ultimately converge in persuading the jury and the judge.773 In contrast, other scholars 
understand that rules are a way of allocating power among individuals774 and therefore 
defend that the  allocation of the burden of proof has an impact on the outcome of the 
case given the differences in the costs of the information for the parties when obtaining 
the necessary evidence.775
Coming back to the product liability discussion, some of the negligence elements 
included in the Directive result in the application of a negligence rule with a reversal of 
the burden of proof, requiring defendants to prove diligence in order to avoid being held 
liable. But whenever strict liability is in force, fault considerations should be irrelevant. 
The choice between a strict liability regime or a regime of negligence with a reversal of 
the burden of proof has a significant practical impact on the outcome of product liability 
cases in light of the different access to information that directly affects the parties’ 
positions in the process and their probability of prevailing. Consumers may have 
difficulties in proving claims due to a lack of legal or other resources needed to 
investigate, or due to an inability to obtain essential information from the other party. 
Such problems are particularly severe in relation to technical products, or where the 
alleged injuries are of complicated nature. Producers and insurers, on the other hand, 
have a real concern that any relaxation of the rules relating to the burden of proof would 
encourage "frivolous claims."
 In this sense, shifting the burden of proof upon the defendant 
in tort cases may be justified on efficiency grounds in light of the defendant’s lower costs 
of presenting evidence of diligence or lack of fault.  
776
                                                 
773 See Kevin M. Clermont & Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 243, 243, 2002 and Robert C. Casad, Kevin M. Clermont, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 39-44 (2001). 
  
774 Frederick Schauer, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE, Oxford University Press (Clarendon Press), 1991) (paperback 
edition 1992) P 158- 162 See also Frederick Schauer, Neutrality and Judicial Review, Law and Philosophy, 
23, 217-240 (2003) arguing that rules have an underlying objective of achieving moral goals. Therefore, 
Professor Schauer in this article defends that neither rules nor their interpretation is neutral.  
775 See Fernando Gómez, Burden of Proof and strict liability: an economic analysis of a misconception, 
Indret 01/2001, www.indret.com. 
776 See generally Manfred Wandt, German Approaches to Product Liability, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 71 (1999). 
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If information was perfect, the liability rule in force -- or the absence of liability -- 
and the allocation of the burden of proof between the parties would be irrelevant given 
that consumers and producers would have the same information regarding product risks 
and hence on the expected liability and such information would be reflected in the prices 
of products.777  Consequently, both parties, consumers and producers, would have access 
to the relevant information for meeting the burden of proof of the liability rule in force. 
But in cases with imperfect information the efficiency of liability rules and of the 
allocation of the burden of proof between parties significantly depends on who has access 
to the relevant information.778
Thus, the allocation of the burden of proof often hides the real question of who 
should bear the consequences of damages resulting from unavoidable defects -- 
manufacturers, the victim, society at large, or the relatively small group of product users, 
one of whom has used a defective product. Consequently, the introduction of these 
negligence-based elements and burden of proof issues is important. 
  
 
  
3 Are the negligence-based elements of the product liability directive distortive 
enough of the liability regime?  
 
The presence of negligence elements in the product liability directive is not 
necessarily a problem for the product liability regime,779
                                                 
777 This result is consistent with the Coase theorem. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 
Journal Law Econ. 1 (1960). See also Dennis Epple and Artur Raviv, Product Safety: Liability Rules, 
Market Structure, and Imperfect Information, 68 American Economic Review, 80 (1978) and Michael 
Spence, Consumer Misperception, Product Failure, and Producer Liability, 44 Review of Economic 
Studies, 561 (1977). 
 but may raise concerns at two 
778 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 52-53, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (MA) (1987); William Landes and Richard Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, 
275-280, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) (1987). 
779 Some suggest abandoning strict product liability and defend negligence in product liability cases -- with 
a special rule for manufacturing defects – based on the idea that product cases are not a distinct group of 
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different levels: (1) the internalization of damages caused by defective products and (2) 
the protection and compensation of injured victims, both goals of the Directive. 
Regarding the internalization of damages, strict product liability aims at creating 
incentives for care on the part of tortfeasors, who will try to minimize the expected costs 
of the liability to which they are exposed.780
Regarding the consumer protection goal of the product liability directive, the aim 
was to allow victims to bring their product liability claims without having to prove fault. 
But the Directive's purported advantages to consumers are questionable in light of the 
limitations of their claims, both in terms of amount – excluding claims below 500 euros 
or above 70 million – and in terms of fault.
 But the negligence elements included in the 
product liability directive, such as the damage threshold or the damage caps, reduce the 
expected costs of liability and, therefore, impact the incentives’ torfeasors have to adopt 
care.  
781
The combination of a strict product liability regime with negligence elements 
should not necessarily be problematic from a theoretical or practical perspective.
 The presence of the development risk 
defense introduces fault considerations based on sophisticated knowledge – scientific 
knowledge – that is often difficult to challenge or obtain for injured victims. 
Consequently, from this perspective the product liability directive does not seem to have 
enhanced consumer protection as it intended. 
782
                                                                                                                                                 
tort cases that could perform better under strict liability than under negligence. See William Powers, Jr., A 
modest proposal to abandon strict products liability, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 639, 640, 642 (1991). 
 Even 
though the strict nature of the product liability regime introduced by the Directive should 
be affirmed, the lack of definition of the negligence elements it contains and of their 
780 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 52-53, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (MA) (1987); William Landes and Richard Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, 
275-280, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA) (1987). 
781 Eleonora Rajneri, Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and the Former 
Liability Regime in Italy, Global Jurist Topics: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1, Article 3 (2004). 
782 From a practical perspective, strict liability may present lower evidence requirements for injured victims 
to receive compensation. See Mark A. Geistfeld, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Foundation Press, 
New York, 23-26 (2006). .  
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practical implementation would require some guidance in order to preserve the 
Directive’s strict liability spirit.  
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CHAPTER 5 
EX ANTE PRODUCT REGULATION: EUROPEAN PRODUCT SAFETY LAW 
 
 
1. Structure of product safety law in Europe 
 
Understanding product safety law in Europe is not an easy task. It can be difficult 
even to sort out the general structure of this body of law -- what instruments are in force, 
their hierarchy, and the major differences between them -- let alone the law's actual 
impact on products. This chapter aims to clarify the picture and to place it in the broader 
context of product regulation, which covers not just issues of liability but also those of 
safety.783
  
 Whereas product liability law is a form of ex post regulation, product safety law 
operates ex ante. Chapter 6 will discuss the interaction of ex post liability rules with ex 
ante safety rules when they operate together in the same legal system. 
 
                                                 
783 Up to today, most of the literature on European product safety often evaluates the performance of certain 
Directives, their potential improvements and interactions with safety standards but do not generally provide 
a global analysis of the European product safety regulation, its nature and performance. Further, there is 
little literature including the recent developments and regulation adopted on this issue. Examples of 
literature once the first General Product Safety Directive (1992) was adopted are Geraint Howells, 
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, Dartmouth (1998); Peter Cartwright, Product Safety and Consumer 
Protection, 58 The Modern Law Review 2, 222-231 (1995); Christopher J.S. Hodges, A new EC Directive 
on the Safety of Consumer Products, Eur. Buss. Law Review, vol. 12, num. 11-12, 274-280 (2001), 
Giandomenico Majone, REGULATING EUROPE, Routledge (1996) and J. Pelkmans, the New Approach to 
Technical Harmonization and Standardization, 25 J. Comm. Mkt. Stud. 249, 252-3 (1987). Examples of 
more recent literature that include analysis of the new General Product Safety Directive (2004) and New 
Approach Directives are in Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 
Part II : Procedural Mechanisms for safety (Chapters 7-15), Oxford University Press (2005). 
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Table 5.1 - General Structure of European Product Safety Regulation 
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European product safety law is based on a system of product safety standards, 
notifications and enforcement mechanisms. The legislation through which the system is 
layed out can be categorized according to a number of different criteria, which are 
summarized in Table 5.1. Instruments may be categorized based on the extent to which 
they contain their own express safety standards or merely incorporate external standards -
- called essential safety requirements. They may also be categorized according to whether 
they regulate specific products or apply generally. Finally, they may be categorized 
according to their use of "CE" markings and the obligations they impose during the pre- 
and post-marketing phases.  
At one extreme are a set of directives known as New Approach Directives, which 
include their own specific standards -- essential safety requirements -- and apply to 
specific products. At the other extreme is the General Product Safety Directive 
(GPSD),784
New Approach Directives
 which applies generally and does not include safety standards but give effects 
to compliance with safety standards. (In this sense, the GPSD is often referred to as a 
standard-receptive directive.) In between are two categories of instruments that apply to 
specific products but rely on a combination of standards they they expressly lay out and 
ones that they incorporate by reference. These last two categories are known as New 
Approach/Global Approach Directives, which follow New Approach principles except 
for providing for CE marking, and directives based on New Approach/Global Approach 
principles, which refer to harmonized standards instead of including essential safety 
requirements.  
785
                                                 
784 Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 
2002), hereinafter, the GPSD. 
 generally include essential safety requirements that 
are applied together with general safety standards products must comply with. These 
785 See http://www.newapproach.org 
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directives also include notification and risk monitoring procedures for the products they 
apply to.   
At the same time, the European Commission established a general principle of 
safety under which there is an obligation to place only safe products in the market. This 
obligation is included in the GPSD,786
The following sections follow the structure of Table 5.1 in presenting and 
discussing the role of standards and the standardization process in Europe, and then 
looking at these questions in the context of New Approach Directives and GPSD.  
 which is applicable whenever there is no specific 
legislation applicable to a certain consumer product. The obligation includes notification 
and enforcement mechanisms for member states as well as for European authorities. 
Notification measures entail the obligation of member state authorities to notify European 
authorities of the existence of unsafe products. Enforcement mechanisms refer to the 
measures European or member states authorities must adopt after an unsafe product has 
been detected in a certain market.  
 
 
2. The standardization process  
 
One of the pillars of the European product safety regime consists of product safety 
standards.787
                                                 
786 Council Directive 92/59/EEC of June 29, 1992 on General Product Safety, O.J. L228 24 (Aug. 11, 1992) 
amended by the Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) 
(January 15, 2002). 
 Since the mid-1980s, the European Community has made increasing use of 
standards in support of its policies. Today, there are around five thousand standards 
787 Product safety standards have been increasingly used and harmonized around the world given that it is 
often not possible to design one product where standards from different countries are technically different. 
See Mark R. Barron, Creating consumer confidence or confusion? The role of product certification marks 
in the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 413, 437 (2007). 
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implemented in Europe, many of which are consumer product safety standards.788 Some 
standards are included in product-specific regulations like the New Approach 
Directives,789
There are two major types of standards in Europe.
 while others are applied without any product-specific legislation. 
790 On one side, there are 
“harmonized standards,” which are designed by independent standard bodies acting at the 
domestic, European and international levels.791 At the European level, these bodies are 
the European Committee for Standardization (Comité Européen de Normalization, 
CEN),792 the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (Comité 
Européen de Normalization Electrotechnique, CENELEC),793 which deals with 
electrotechnical matters, and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI),794
On the other side, there are standards of the type included in New Approach 
Directives.
 which covers the telecommunications field and other areas of broadcasting and 
office information technology. These institutions adopt standards whenever the European 
Commission mandates it, after consultation with the member states.  
795
                                                 
788 It should be noted that there are also non-consumer product safety standards. This information can be 
found at : http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standards_policy/index_en.htm and 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standards_policy/european/flyer/index.htm  
 New Approach Directives are characterized as including a comprehensive 
regulation of the products to which they apply, from the safety standards applicable to 
these products, called essential safety requirements, to the conformity assessment and 
notification procedures manufacturers must follow in the pre- and post-marketing phases. 
The New Approach technique has not been used often because the standards elaborated 
789 See http://www.newapproach.org 
790 These two types of standards have three dimensions concerning their nature, scope and level of 
applicability. See W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 24 (1984). 
791 In the U.S., there are over 400 public organizations that write standards that are adopted by the 
manufacturers within an industry. These standards are generally voluntary. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, 
Legislative reform or retreat? A response to the product liability crisis, 14 Forum 251, 278 (1978-1979). 
792 For further information See www.cenorm.be 
793 For additional information see www.cenelec.be 
794 For more information see www.etsi.org 
795 See infra. 
  189 
on this basis have raised substantial debate about their completeness and 
appropriateness.796
Hence, the major body of European product safety standards consists of the 
harmonized standards adopted by the three European standardization organizations: CEN, 
CENELEC and ETSI.  
 In addition to the essential safety requirements included in New 
Approach Directives, harmonized product standards are also applied to the products 
regulated by these Directives.  
 
 
2.1 Standardization organizations  
 
This section will present the functioning of the European standardization process, 
focusing in the first type of standards: "harmonized standards." The standardization 
process begins with the initiative of the European Commission, which consults with the 
member states regarding the need for adopting a product safety standard and the approach 
that should be used to design the standard. Once there is an agreement, the Commission 
issues a mandate to the European standardization bodies to draft the product safety 
standard. The process followed by CEN, CENELEC and ETSI is based on the principles 
of consensus, voluntary compliance and transparency.797 The importance of participation 
and consensus is essential in order to minimize the pressure from private interests -- 
whether economic operators or pressure groups -- or public or political forces seeking to 
influence or to capture the regulator when drafting the safety standard.798
                                                 
796 So far, the field in which the New Approach technique has been used the most is for environmental 
design of products, regulated by the Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and 
Packaging Waste, as amended by Directive 2004/12/EC (consolidated text). 
 For that reason, 
before the standard is adopted all parties affected by it are given an opportunity to raise 
797 Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on the role of standardisation in Europe, Official Journal C 141 
of 19.05.2000. 
798 Anthony Ogus, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY, 171, Oxford University Press 
(1994). 
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objections and present their views to the standardization body at the member state 
level,799 and all comments submitted are considered. By emphasizing consensus, 
European authorities believed that parties would be less inclined to lobby for standards 
most beneficial to their interests.800 Once standards are designed, they are published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities and after that they must be transposed 
into domestic regulation, so that they become then domestic standards.801
 
  
FIGURE 5.1 - THE STANDARDIZATION PROCESS - roughly summarizes this 
process: 
European Commission proposal of a standard 
 
Member states discussion with the European Commission 
 
European Commission mandate + Contract with CEN 
 
Standing Committee 
 
Technical Committee 
 
CEN, CENELEC, ETSI 
(consensus and participation of affected parties) 
                                                 
799 The European standardization bodies have delegations in the different member states. These are 
domestic bodies that are responsible to collect the comments, objections and inputs provided by all parties 
participating to the drafting of the product safety standard at the domestic level. Once all this information is 
collected, these domestic standardization bodies transfer it to the European standardization bodies.    
800 The clash between domestic and European standards also takes place in the U.S. between Congress and 
state governments. Some authors claim that the Congress should establish national product safety standards 
that would preempt state safety regulation. See Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort 
Law: the regulatory compliance defense, American Law and Economics Review 2(1) (2000). 
801 See Vademecum on European standardization 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standards_policy/vademecum/ 
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A voluntary standard is issued  
 
When drafting the safety standard, the European standardization bodies have the 
task of including the technical specifications that reflect the “state of the art” in the 
matter.802 The technical information included in the standards also has an additional 
function: establishing the meaning of “safe” for Directives that include general references 
to safety.803
Compliance with harmonized standards adopted by these institutions is voluntary, 
which means that manufacturers are free to choose the technical solution they believe is 
best to comply with the requirements established by the Directives applicable to the 
products they manufacture.
  
804 However, compliance is quite attractive because it 
provides significant benefits for the manufacturer such as the presumption of conformity 
included in some directives, especially in the New Approach Directives, and the 
possibility of attaching the CE marking to their products, which represents a passport for 
their products to the whole European market.805 Because of these incentives, industry de 
facto complies with the standards.806
                                                 
802 See Commission Communication on the Development of European Standardization, 1991 O.J. C20/1 
which states that standards must be effective and therefore must be kept up to date and reviewed in order to 
include new technological developments.  
 But whenever the Commission considers either on 
803 Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a 
necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 
Washburn L. J. 305, 315 (2000). 
804 The use of voluntary standards is not exclusive from the European Union. In the United States, the 
Consumer Product Safety Commission also establishes, together with the industry being regulated, 
voluntary standards of product safety. Once the voluntary standards are designed, the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission does not impose a mandatory regulation for the same product risk. Such 
standardization scheme was not except from debate. See W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER 
PRODUCT SAFETY, 64, American Enterprise Institute (1984). 
805 See section 3.5 of this chapter on CE marking. 
806 Given that complicate with voluntary harmonized standards raises a presumption of conformity to the 
essential safety requirements included in New Approach Directives product manufacturers have great 
incentives to comply with such standards. See Mark R. Barron, Creating consumer confidence or 
confusion? The role of product certification marks in the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 413, 
430 (2007). 
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its own initiative or upon request of member states that a standard presents shortcomings, 
the Commission can decide to withdraw the publication of the reference of the standard 
in the Official Journal. Only in those cases, compliance with harmonized standards will 
not provide a presumption of conformity.  
 
 
2.2 The process of design and adoption of standards  
 
European standards are adopted on the basis of a mandate from the European 
Commission to the European standardization bodies, which is like a contract between the 
Commission and CEN for drafting standards.807 Once the Commission proposes a 
Directive and negotiations between member states begin, the Commission and CEN also 
start to negotiate the content of the standards to be drafted.808
As mentioned above, the process within the standardization bodies is intended to 
be open to all interested economic agents. The interested parties and European bodies 
collaborate in drafting a proposal for a safety standard,
  
809 and upon completing it they 
send it to the European Standing Committee for approval.810
                                                 
807 The contract is signed with CEN given that it is the standardization body that deals with more kinds of 
products generally. See Vademecum on European standardization 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standards_policy/vademecum/ 
 Once this Committee 
approves the proposed standard, the Commission asks CEN for its opinion on it and CEN 
808 See Vademecum on European standardization 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/standards_policy/vademecum/index.htm 
809 Consumers are also encouraged to participate in this process. However, in order to ensure that their 
participation is effective, they are generally represented by technical experts given that in general consumer 
movement is not quite organized and lacks the expertise to decide in this process and to have some impact 
and influence on producers. For this reason, the consumer representation in the European standardization 
process is done since 1985 through the ANEC (European Association for the Co-ordination of Consumer 
Representation in Standardization”, also referred as “The European consumer voice in standardization”). 
See www.anec.org for further information on ANEC. See also Geraint G. Howells, The relationship 
between product liability and product safety – understanding a necessary element in the European Product 
Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 326-28 (2000). 
810 The Standing Committee is set up under the Technical Standard Directive. Directive 98/34/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998. Official Journal L 204, 21/07/1998 P. 0037-0048. 
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responds with a detailed specification of the number of standards that will be necessary 
depending on the scope of regulation of the safety Directive, how long it will take to the 
different technical committees to have them prepared and what the cost of designing such 
standards will be. After financial negotiations the Commission and CEN sign a contract. 
At this stage of the process, the responsibility lies with a Technical Board,811 
which has different procedures depending on the issue being regulated and on whether 
there is already an existing safety standard.812 A first procedure is used whenever the 
standard to be issued is a new standard. Under this procedure the proposed standard is 
sent to a Technical Committee. Once a standard is drafted, it is open to public 
participation for six months. After that, there are discussions regarding the comments of 
the public and an ultimate version of the standard is done. A second procedure is used in 
cases where there is already a reference document such as a domestic standard, a 
European trade specification or a standard of an international organization. In these cases 
there is no need for a Technical Committee to allow public participation and the standard 
can be directly adopted. Nevertheless, there are still six months for replies in case anyone 
has something to say about the standard. A third procedure is the one established by the 
"Vienna Agreement,"813 under which CEN is allowed to transfer the work for the design 
of European Standards to the International Standards Organization (ISO).814
After allowing public participation through one of these three mechanisms,
  
815
                                                 
811 The technical board of standardization is an organization that controls the process of drafting a product 
safety standard as well as promotes its fast execution. See also 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_for_goods/technical_harmonisation/
index_en.htm on Technical harmonization.  
 
member states take a vote on the final draft. Given that compliance with standards is 
812 Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a 
necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 
Washburn L. J. 305, 319 (2000). 
813 The agreement on technical cooperation between ISO and CEN is called the Vienna Agreement. 
814 See www.iso.org. See generally Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety 
Directive: another call for US exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 
155 (1996). 
815 Note that, differently to the process used by the Consumer Product Safety Commission in the United 
States, the industry only participates in the final draft of the standard and its participation does not limit the 
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voluntary, maximum consensus is key for the success of a standard since the higher the 
level of acceptance by all parties the more they will be willing to comply.816
This process imposes obligations at both the European and the domestic levels. At 
the European level, the Technical Standards Directive
  
817 requires that standardization 
bodies send draft standards upon request of the European Commission818 and keep the 
Commission informed of any action taken regarding the drafts. At the domestic level, 
member states must ensure that their own different standardization bodies communicate 
necessary information for the design of a standard and publish their domestic standards so 
that parties in other member states can comment on them.819
This process is essentially the same for standards developed under the New 
Approach, although in this latter case compliance is required, because compliance with 
the essential requirements included in New Approach Directives is mandatory.
  
820
 
 
 
2.3 Are standards harmonized?  
 
The European Community's goal with respect to product safety standards is to 
achieve Europe-wide harmonization wherever possible.821
                                                                                                                                                 
scope of decision of the European standardization bodies. See Anthony Scascia, Safe or sorry: how the 
precautionary principle is changing Europe’s consumer safety regulation regime and how the United States’ 
Consumer Product Safety Commission must take notice, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 694-694 (2006) 
describing the role of the industry in the design of product safety standards, that could delay the 
implementation of such safety measures.  
 However, it is difficult to 
816 CEN, STANDARDS FOR ACCESS TO THE EUROPEAN MARKET, 13 (2d ed. 1995). See Also Jacques 
Pelkmans & Dr. Michelle Egan, Fixing European Standards: Moving Beyond The Green Paper, 14-15, 
CEPS Working Document No. 65, Brussels (1992). 
817 Technical Standard Directive, 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998. 
Official Journal L 204, 21/07/1998 P. 0037-0048. See http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s06011.htm for 
technical harmonization. 
818 Article 3 Technical Standard Directive, 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
June 1998. Official Journal L 204, 21/07/1998 P. 0037-0048. 
819 Article 4 Technical Standards Directive, 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
June 1998. Official Journal L 204, 21/07/1998 P. 0037-0048. 
820 Council Resolution on a New Approach to technical harmonization and standardization, Council 
Resolution of 7 May 1985 OJ C 136, 4.06.1985. 
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assess the degree of harmonization in the implementation of the standards because these 
harmonized standards are implemented at the domestic level either by transposing 
European standards into domestic law, or by withdrawing domestic laws that conflict 
with the European standards. At the same time, the existence of harmonized standards 
does not preclude member states from maintaining or adopting domestic standards 
dealing with subjects that are within the scope of a harmonized standard,822  as long as 
the domestic provisions refer to technical requirements and do not conflict with European 
provisions. 823
 The European Commission is especially interested in ensuring that European 
standards are transposed and applied uniformly by the member states to avoid having 
certain products meet the standards in one state and not in another, which would 
jeopardize the free circulation of goods and the proper functioning of the internal 
market.
  
824
 
 In order to achieve this goal, the Commission has introduced procedures to 
monitor the member states’ activities and thereby minimize, as much as possible, the 
differences between the domestic rules of the member states. 
 
3 New Approach Directives825
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
821 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 68, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
822 These harmonization documents refer to the harmonized standards issued by the standardization bodies.  
823 www.british-europeanstandards.org/en-standards.htm and see also Geraint Howells and Stephen 
Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 99, Ashgate Publishing Company (2005).   
824 The European Commission’s goal is similar to the discussion taking place in the U.S. regarding whether 
the Federal government could adopt minimum national standards or, because of the possibility of Congress 
being captured by the interests of the industry, it is better that states are responsible for product safety 
regulation. See §4 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998). See also Ashley W. 
Warren, Compliance with governmental regulatory standards: is it enough to immunize a defendant from 
liability?, 49 Baylor Law Review 763 (1997) defending the desirability of non biased agencies not subject 
to lobbyists’ activities.  
825 For additional information on New Approach regulation in Europe see www.newapproach.org  
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3.1 Origin of the New Approach  
 
A crucial element of the single internal market was ensuring that the technical 
harmonization governing products addressed the diversity of domestic technical standards 
and regulations within the European Community.826
The Community New Approach originated in a European Council Resolution of 
May 1985
 
827 with the goal of improving the performance of the internal market828 and 
simplifying and speeding the creation of harmonized regulations. The hope was that the 
regulations would evolve from the detailed product-specific technical requirements 
included in safety standards to regulations that would only include the essential 
requirements for certain types of products.829
                                                 
826 See Commission Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the Global 
Approach, 7-8 (2000) describing the goal of creating a single internal market by Dec. 31, 1992. This 
document is available at  
 The New Approach Directives lay down 
essential safety requirements but also rely on European standards to develop details of 
http:// europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_ en.pdf  
827 On 7 May 1985, the Council adopted a Resolution on A New Approach to technical harmonization and 
standards, Council Resolution of 7 May 1985, 1985 O.J. (C 136). The New Approach responded to the 
European Court of Justice's Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence. Case Rewe-Zentral AG v 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, C-120/78 (known as Cassis de Dijon), (1979) E.C.R. 649, 662, 
(1979) C.M.L.R. 494 (1979). See also Communication from the Commission Concerning the 
Consequences of the Judgment Given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (Cassis 
de Dijon), Official Journal of the European Communities C 256/2 (March 10, 1980). In this 
communication, the Commission interpreted Cassis de Dijon to require that barriers to trade resulting from 
regulatory differences (i) necessary, that is appropriate and not excessive, (ii) satisfy mandatory 
requirements including public health, protection of consumers or the environment, (iii) and must be the 
means which are the most appropriate and least hinder trade. See also Jacques Pelkmans, The New 
Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization, 25 J. Comm. Mkt. Stud. 249 (1987). 
828 The Agreement on the European Economic Area extends the Internal Market to Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway despite their non-membership to the European Union. Consequently, all New Approach 
Directives apply in these countries as they do in EU member states.   
829New Approach Directives are based on article 95 of the Treaty of the European Community and are 
adopted according to the co-decision procedure provided for in article 251 of the same treaty. See European 
Commission, Guide to the implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the Global 
Approach (Brussels, 2005), http://europa,eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/newapproach.htm. The New 
Approach has been considered of fundamental importance for the internal market. See Günter Verheugen, 
Exchange of views of Vice-President Verheugen with the Internal Market and Consumer protection 
Committee (IMCO) European Parliament, Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee European 
Parliament (2006). This speech is available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/500&format=HTML&aged=0&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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certain product safety issues. The essential element of product safety in Europe, though, 
is still the standardization process.830
The essential safety requirements are different from product safety standards. 
Essential technical requirements included in New Approach Directives are based on the 
principle of protecting health and safety of product users
  
831 either by requiring safety 
measures regarding specific product hazards or by requiring certain product 
characteristics in terms of manufacture or design.832 They are, thus, mandatory. In 
contrast, harmonized standards consist of detailed technical specifications for ensuring 
the safety of specific products.833
New Approach Directives have a two-fold purpose: on one side, assuring 
compliance with harmonization technical requirements of certain product sectors, and on 
the other side, guaranteeing a “high level of protection” of the public interest by 
preventing member states from adopting technical barriers to trade without notifying the 
other member states.  
 And further, they are voluntary.  
Given that compliance with essential safety requirements is mandatory, the 
European Commission introduced transparent and harmonized conformity assessment 
procedures. Products that conform to the requirements are allowed to bear a "CE" mark 
that shows such compliance and are given access to the European market. Conformity 
assessment procedures were introduced by the New Approach Directives and then further 
                                                 
830 Despite the obligation to comply with mandatory essential safety requirements, standards are an 
essential element of product safety given that compliance with them raises a presumption of conformity 
with the essential safety requirements. See the Commission Green Paper on the Development of European 
Standardization: Action for Faster Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 8 October 
1990. This paper is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF  
831 European Commission, Guide to the implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the 
Global Approach, 7 (Brussels, 2005), http://europa,eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/newapproach.htm. 
832 European Commission, Guide to the implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the 
Global Approach, 27 (Brussels, 2005), 
http://europa,eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/newapproach.htm. 
833 European Commission, Guide to the implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the 
Global Approach, 28 (Brussels, 2005), 
http://europa,eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/newapproach.htm. 
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developed by what is known as the Global Approach.834 The Global Approach 
subdivided conformity assessment procedures into a number of different operations -- 
called modules -- which have different content depending on the stage of the 
development of the product and the type of assessment involved.835
The New Approach and the Global Approach
 Conformity 
assessment procedures sought to harmonize conformity assessment so that member states 
could have confidence that all products claimed to conform to European standards 
actually complied with them.  
836 are aimed at (1) achieving 
technical harmonization limited to compliance with the essential requirements,837 (2) 
assuring that only products fulfilling the essential requirements are placed in the market 
and put into service; (3) leaving compliance with harmonized standards or other technical 
specifications voluntary so that manufacturers may choose the technical solution that is 
best for complying with the essential safety requirements; (4) creating a presumption that 
harmonized standards conform to the corresponding essential requirements; and (5) 
allowing manufacturers to choose among the different conformity assessment procedures 
provided for in the applicable directives.838
                                                 
834 See the Council Resolution of 21 December 1989 on a global approach to conformity assessment, O.J. C 
010. This Resolution is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=163035:cs&lang=en&list=163035:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl=1&pgs=10&hwo
rds=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte. 
 
835 See Council Resolution on a Global Approach to Conformity Assessment 90/683/EEC, 1990 O.J. C 10, 
which led to the Council Decision 93/465/EEC, Concerning the Modules for the Various Phases of the 
Conformity Assessment Procedures and the Rules for the Affixing and Use of the CE Conformity Marking, 
Which are Intended to be Used in the Technical Harmonization Directives, 1993 O.J. (L 220). These 
decisions laid down general guidelines and detailed procedures for conformity assessment to be used in 
New Approach directives. 
836 European Commission, Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global 
Approach, Introduction 7 (2005). This document can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/index.htm 
837 Council Resolution of 07.05.1985 on the “New Approach to technical harmonization and standards” 
838 See the Council Resolution of 21 December 1989 on a global approach to conformity assessment, O.J. C 
010 and Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of 
the conformity assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity mark. 
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Not all the directives included in what is called the New Approach are uniform.839 
Some New Approach Directives include essential safety requirements and provide for CE 
marking. Others are based on the ideas of the New Approach and the Global Approach 
but do not provide for CE marking. Still others are just based merely on New Approach 
and Global Approach principles. New Approach Directives cover a large number of 
product sectors840 even though the rules contained in these Directives may vary.841 Since 
the adoption of the New Approach technique, twenty-one New Approach Directives have 
been adopted and came into force,842 four Directives that do not provide for CE marking 
have been adopted,843 and four additional Directives based on the principles of the New 
and Global approach have been adopted.844
 
  
 
3.2 Elements of the New Approach 
 
This legislative technique of the New Approach presented some innovation such 
as the inclusion of mandatory essential requirements, setting up conformity assessment 
                                                 
839 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, COM(2003) 240 final. For example, the Toys 
Directive includes a notification procedure, not included in the Low Voltage Directive 73/23/EEC that 
includes a safeguard clause.  
840 It is estimated that the trade of products covered only by the major sectors regulated by the New 
Approach directives largely exceeds the volume of € 1500 billion per year. Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enhancing the Implementation of the New 
Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, COM(2003) 240 final. Page 4 annex II, table 1b. Examples of products 
regulated by New Approach Directives range from the Directive on Toy safety: 88/378/EEC, OJ 1988 L 
187/1; Machinery: 89/392/EEC, OJ 1989 L 198/16 amended by the Directive 91/3689/EEC, OJ 1991 L 
198/16; pressure vessels: 87/404/EEC, OJ 1987 L 220/48; Construction products: 89/106/EEC, OJ 1988 L 
40/12; Personal protective equipment: 89/686/EEC, OJ 1989 L 399/18; Implantable medical devices: 
90/385/EEC, OJ 1990 L 189/17; Gas burning appliances: 90/396/EEC, OJ 1990 L 196/15; Medical devices: 
93/42/EEC, OJ 1993 L 169/1. 
841 For example, while the Toys directive is very clear and precise, other directives include vague objectives 
and refer to the need to minimize risks or reduce them as far as possible.    
842 For a directive’s list see http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/directives/table1.htm 
843 For a list of the Directive’s, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/directives/table2.htm 
844 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/directives/table3.htm 
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procedures and introducing the CE mark.845
The essential requirements aim to ensure a high level of protection to the 
public.
 The product control system designed by New 
Approach directives covers both the pre-market product phase through the required 
conformity assessment procedures, and the post-market phase, by imposing market 
surveillance obligations. 
846
Even though New Approach Directives set down essential safety requirements, 
they leave the method of compliance in the hands of the manufacturer, who can decide 
either to comply with standards
 For that reason, they are mandatory. The essential requirements are defined in a 
way that makes it possible for member states to enforce them uniformly.   
847 or to comply with essential safety requirements and 
obtain some kind of conformity for the product design. Hence, despite being subject to a 
New Approach Directive, manufacturers also take into consideration the content of safety 
standards when adopting their safety decisions. This regulation places on manufacturers 
and, more generally, on economic operators the responsibility of ensuring regulatory 
compliance through the means they choose,848 without having authorities involved in the 
pre-marketing phase of the product.849
 This approach is also made possible by the vertical nature of New Approach 
Directives that contrasts with horizontal Directives -- like the GPSD -- that cover 
consumer products but place emphasis on post-marketing mechanisms.
  
850
                                                 
845 Council Resolution on a New Approach to technical harmonization and standardization, Council 
Resolution of 7 May 1985 OJ C 136, 4.06.1985. New Approach Directives are based on three pillars, which 
are the Council Resolution of 07.05.1985, the Council Resolution of 21.12.1989 on a Global Approach to 
certification and testing and the Council Decision 93/465/EEC. 
 Even though 
846 See Anthony I. Ogus, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY, 150 (Oxford 1994).   
847 If a manufacturer complies with harmonized standards published by the Official Journal of the European 
Communities, they are presumed to comply with the corresponding essential requirements.  
848 Communication from the Commission to the Council of the European Parliament Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, COM (2003) 240, 7.5.2003. 
849 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 61, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
850 The main difference between vertical and horizontal directives is against whom the rights included in 
them can be asserted. Under vertical directives it is necessary to invoke such rights before a public 
authority or the state while horizontal directives include rights that may be invoked and enforced by private 
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these two approaches share some features in common, they are significantly different 
given that horizontal directives do not involve pre-marketing assessment of a product and 
merely require manufacturers to produce a declaration stating that a product conforms to 
the legal standards. Sometimes such a declaration is approved by an independent 
technical organization though this is not strictly necessary. Once a declaration is issued, 
the other member states are required to recognize it and allow the product to be 
marketed.851
In contrast, New Approach Directives include conformity assessment procedures 
that product manufacturers must choose from in order to assure that their products 
conform to the essential technical requirements. Conformity assessment procedures 
allowed under New Approach Directives are quite flexible and may be adjusted to the 
specific type of product risk involved. In some cases, these procedures require the 
intervention of third parties, namely notified bodies that will certify compliance after 
evaluating whether a product conforms to essential requirements. 
  
Finally, New Approach Directives include a CE marking, which is a mark 
attached to the product that declares that a manufacturer has verified that a product 
conforms to all the harmonization provisions that apply to it and that the product has been 
subjected to the applicable conformity assessment procedures. 
This New Approach technique is intended to prevent the creation of domestic 
product safety mechanisms that could represent barriers to trade. Under certain strict 
circumstances, however, member states can nonetheless restrict the free moment or the 
marketing of specific products lawfully manufactured or marketed in another member 
state as long as the Commission is notified in advance.852
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals against other privates. See Sacha Prechal, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, Oxford Law Library, 255 
(2nd Ed. 2005). 
  
851 Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 662, [1979] C.M.L.R. 494 (1979). 
852 See Decision 3052/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1995 
establishing a procedure for the exchange of information on national measures derogating from the 
principle of the free movement of goods within the Community, OJ L 321 (1995). A report on the first 
years of application of the Decision was published by the Commission on 7 April 2000 - COM(2000) 194 
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3.3 Conformity assessment  
 
  The process of showing that a product complies with applicable requirements is 
known as conformity assessment.853 The Global Approach introduced conformity 
assessment procedures to be used in New Approach Directives.854 Through these 
conformity assessment procedures,855 public authorities can ensure that products placed 
in the market conform to the requirements included in the directives applicable to them 
while at the same time manufacturers can prove that their products comply with the 
safety requirements included in New Approach Directives and obtain the declaration of 
conformity.856
There are different ways in which the determination of conformity can be done. 
All the conformity assessment procedures are based on modules
  
857 that vary depending 
on whether they are applied to the manufacturing phase of the product, the design phase, 
or both.858
                                                                                                                                                 
final. All this information is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995D3052:EN:NOT 
 These modules describe the elements that a manufacturer must use in order to 
853 The formal definition of conformity assessment procedures by the ANSI is the “demonstration that 
specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person or body are fulfilled.” See  
ANSI: Understanding the Benefits of Accreditation, http:// 
www.ansi.org/conformity_assessment/accreditation_programs/benefits.aspx? menuid=4. 
854 See Council Decision on a Global Approach to Conformity Assessment 90/683/EEC, 1990 O.J. (C 10), 
which was amended by the Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the 
various phases of the conformity assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE 
conformity marking, which are intended to be used in the technical harmonization Directives. 
855 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 31, 87, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
856  Modules for conformity assessment are defined in the Council Decision of 22 July 1993 (93/465/EEC). 
See also Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 62, appendix 5, 
Oxford University Press (2005). For a discussion of the relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
regulations in European consumer protection see Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship between product 
liability and product safety –understanding a necessary element in European Product Liability through a 
Comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305 (2000). 
857 The modules applicable to a certain produce vary depending on the product and the risks involved in it. 
Generally, the higher risks the product presents, the more complex the conformity assessment process is. 
See Council Decision 93/465 (1993) concerning the modules for the various phases of the conformity 
assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity marking, which are 
intended to be used in the technical harmonization directives. 
858 If a manufacturer would subcontract the product design or production, he would still remain responsible 
for the execution of conformity assessment for both phases. See Mark R. Barron, Creating consumer 
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show that the product complies with the safety requirements included in the applicable 
directive.859
The conformity assessment procedures are based on the intervention of either the 
manufacturer or a third independent party, called a notified body, which must ensure in 
its assessment, approval and surveillance that the product complies with the applicable 
product regulation.
  
860 Through the first conformity assessment method, product 
manufacturers issue a self-declaration of compliance with the safety requirements 
included in the directives applicable to the product. Given that no third party is involved 
in this quality assessment process, the manufacturer must provide all the documentation 
required by the conformity assessment procedure regarding the design, manufacture and 
operation of the product and include a declaration of conformity.861
The other method for a manufacturer to obtain a declaration of conformity 
involves the manufacturer filing an application with the third party notified body. The 
application must be supported by all the technical documentation and include a product 
sample in order to obtain the body's conformity assessment.
 It is also generally 
required that the manufacturer keeps all the technical documentation for a period of ten 
years after the product has been manufactured so that domestic authorities can check 
whether the self-declaration is adequate. 
862
                                                                                                                                                 
confidence or confusion? The role of product certification marks in the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. 
L. Rev. 413, 427 (2007). 
 The notified body 
examines the quality of the manufacturer’s product in order to ensure its conformity with 
859 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/files/blue-guide/guidepublic_en.pdf at 
31-33. For a comprehensive list and explanation of the different modules see Christopher Hodges, 
EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 292-296, Oxford University Press (2005).  
860 See the Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach, 
Chapter 5 on Conformity assessment procedure available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-
market-goods/files/blue-guide/guidepublic_en.pdf 
861 Some authors consider that the fact that CE marking can often be obtained by the manufacturers’ self-
declaration should be a  matter of concern. Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability 
and product safety – understanding a necessary element in the European Product Liability through a 
comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305,  345 (2000). 
862 H-W. Micklitz, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN PRINCIPLES 
OF JUSTICE AND THE LAW AT THE EUROPEAN UNION, 8, E. Paasivirta and K. Rissanen (eds.), Institute of 
International Economic Law, University of Helsinki (1995).  
  204 
the applicable directives; if the product complies, the body attaches its identification 
number on the approved product and issues a certificate of conformity.863
Regardless of the method followed, the responsibility lies with the manufacturer 
to apply the appropriate conformity assessment procedure, and either issue a self-
declaration of conformity or seek a declaration of conformity from the third party notified 
body.
   
864
The amount and type of documentation that the manufacturer must keep under the 
self-declaration procedure or under the third party conformity assessment procedure 
depends on the nature of the product and the regulation applicable to it. In either case, the 
retained documentation must be such as to enable authorities to determine whether the 
product complies either with the essential safety requirements included in the applicable 
New Approach Directive or with the applicable harmonized standards set by the 
standardization bodies.
 
865
These conformity assessment procedures are strongly based on the role of 
member state authorities in encouraging manufacturers to test their products and seek 
certification from the notification bodies or to issue self-declarations.
 
866
                                                 
863 However, the two most important approaches to conformity assessment are based either on an approved 
total quality management system named ISO 9000 series standard or on individual product assessment. See 
Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call for US exporters 
to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 162 (1996). 
 These procedures 
are not free from implementation problems at the procedural and structural levels. 
Procedural problems arise because of the lack of a common conformity assessment 
procedure in all directives. This variance causes problems for manufacturers, whose 
864 Even though the three procedures are available to manufacturers, most of the New Approach directives 
require the intervention of a third party conformity assessment body called notified body. Geraint G. 
Howells, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 110-14 (Dartmouth) (1998). 
865 See the Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach, 
Chapter 5 on Conformity assessment procedure available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/files/blue-guide/guidepublic_en.pdf at 34-35. 
866 The Commission has had an active role in making such symmetric enforcement possible and has passed 
some resolutions in this respect. See the Conformity Assessment and CE Marking Decision 1993 O.J. L 
200/23 and the European organization for Testing and Certification (EOTC), established on April 25, 1990 
on the basis of the memoranda of understanding between the Commission, EFTA and CEN. 
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products may be covered by more than one directive and thus may be subject to different 
conformity assessment procedures. At the same time, it is not uncommon for member 
states to have more than one notification body, which can result in confusion (for both 
manufacturers and public authorities) over which of these bodies is the proper one to turn 
to for a given declaration of conformity.  
Structural difficulties arise from the fact that these procedures are designed at the 
European level but implemented at the domestic level.867 Member states may have the 
temptation to be benevolent to their own manufacturers and facilitate declarations of 
compliance for them. The European Commission, being aware of this potential problem, 
has included as part of the New Approach, an automatic recognition and acceptance 
clause under which member states must recognize and accept each others’ testing and 
certification procedures.868 On the basis of this harmonization, conformity assessment 
procedures result in the CE marking, which is a common product mark that signals the 
approval of that product to access the entire Union’s internal market.869
 
   
 
3.4 Notified bodies  
 
                                                 
867 The European commission developed the Global Approach to Certification and Testing (OJ 1989 C 
267/3) which lead to the Council Resolution on a Global Approach to Conformity Assessment of December 
21 1989 (OJ 1990 C 10/1). The outcomes of this global approach included the Conformity Assessment and 
CE Marking Decision (OJ 1993 L 220/23) and the establishment of the European Organization for Testing 
and Certification (EOTC). 
868 This mutual recognition is automatic in the case of products coming from a European member state. 
However, there is also mutual recognition for products coming from third countries of the European 
Economic Area and EFTA states whenever there is a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) signed 
between the European Union and that country. See Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on 
New Approach and Global Approach, Chapter 9 on External Aspects, 63. This document can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/chap09.pdf 
869 See the proposal for a Council Decision regarding the modules for the various phases of the conformity 
assessment procedures which are intended to be used in the technical harmonization directives, O.J. 
C231/3, COM (89) 209 (1989). For a critical perspective on this issue see H. Micklitz, Inquiry on EC and 
current national certification schemes for particular consumer goods, SECO, 1990. 
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New Approach Directives include a mandate for the creation of notified bodies, 
privately or publicly owned, the function of which is to provide independent verification 
that certain aspects of the product design, manufacture or quality system have been 
satisfactorily carried out by the manufacturer.870 Once the product passes this evaluation, 
the notified body issues the conformity assessment declaration according to the 
requirements established by the applicable directives. 871
Member States have the responsibility to ensure that these notified bodies meet 
certain requirements that are included in the annexes of the applicable directives.
  
872 Each 
directive provides the legal basis for notification and for the legally binding criteria that 
member states must apply to the bodies in question.873
Up to today, notified bodies have developed different procedures and criteria that 
may result in diverse notification systems in the different bodies of the member states 
under the same directive. For that reason, the Commission has recently proposed 
consolidating the requirements that notified bodies will have to fulfill.
  
874
Once a notified body has been created, member states are responsible to inform 
the Commission and the other member states that this body will conduct conformity 
assessment procedures under the applicable directive. States are also responsible for 
 
                                                 
870 The exact function of each body is determined in each Directive but is generally different from the pre-
marketing conformity assessment functions, which are under the manufacturers’ responsibility. 
871 Approximately 1000 bodies had been notified to the Commission by the end of 2002. See 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, COM(2003) 240 final, Tables 1a and 1b in 
annex II. This document may be found at  
http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_doc=COMfinal&a
n_doc=2003&nu_doc=240 
872 For a list of the notified bodies by country, product or directive. See NANDO-IS, that is a web site that 
links directly to the database of Notified Bodies (NANDO).  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/nando-is/home/index.cfm. 
873 Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various phases of the 
conformity assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of the CE conformity marking. 
874 Communication from the Commission to the Council of the European Parliament; Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, COM (2003) 240, 7.5.2003. See additionally Christopher 
Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 66, Oxford University Press (2005) 
discussing the role of the European Commission. 
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informing the Commission and other member states if they wish to remove a notified 
body.875
These procedures are not always fully observed and sometimes governments fail 
to send the notification to all other member states,
  
876 which causes problems for the 
recognition of notified bodies or for the certificates of conformity they issue. This can 
ultimately result in restrictions on the free movement of goods.877 Since New Approach 
Directives were implemented, there has not been a systematic exchange of information 
between member states regarding the criteria and procedures applied by notified 
bodies.878
 Whenever a member state informs the European Commission and other member 
states of the creation of a notified body, that body is to enjoy mutual recognition by the 
notified bodies of the other member states.
 This lack of uniformity and supervision at the European level may be 
significantly undermining states' confidence in the mutual recognition principle and 
creating problems both in the level of product safety and in the functioning of the internal 
market. Transparency regarding the implementation of the requirements concerning 
notified bodies is one of the key elements for the success of the system created by New 
Approach Directives. 
879
                                                 
875 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 186, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
 Consequently, once such a notified body 
876 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, COM(2003) 240 final, page 7. The text of this 
Communication is available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0240:FIN:EN:PDF 
877 See Mark R. Barron, Creating consumer confidence or confusion? The role of product certification 
marks in the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 413, 439 (2007) noting that the recognition of 
notified bodies as well as of the certifications they issue has taken place within the European Union but also 
between different states, through entering into mutual recognition agreements of their conformity 
assessment bodies in order to facilitate and promote trade. 
878 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Enhancing the 
Implementation of the New Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, COM(2003) 240 final. Page 7. The text of this 
Communication is available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0240:FIN:EN:PDF 
879 See Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach, Chapter 
9 on External Aspects, 63. This document can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/chap09.pdf 
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issues a conformity certificate, the product must be allowed to be marketed in all of the 
European Union member states.880 For that reason, some New Approach Directives 
require notified bodies to have an active exchange of information so that notice on 
denials and withdrawal of certificates are widely and quickly known. This is especially 
important to prevent non-complying products from being marketed in a member state 
different from its state of origin and to prevent products from being submitted for 
certification several times. The information transmitted by notified bodies to other 
notified bodies needs only to refer to the type of product and to the reasons for denial or 
withdrawal; thus, confidential information about a product provided by the manufacturer 
is protected.881
 
 
 
3.5 CE marking  
 
The Global Approach also established and called for the use of the CE 
marking.882 The CE marking is the result of the conformity assessment procedures 
regarding compliance with the applicable directives. Once it is determined that a product 
complies with the established requirements and a conformity declaration is issued, a CE 
marking sign or a sticker is attached to the product.883
                                                 
880 However, authorities do not always have the tools to assess and control the activities of the notified 
bodies they have designated, but which operate in countries outside their jurisdiction. This may impede 
authorities from taking appropriate measures if the bodies’ activities do not conform to the applicable legal 
requirements set out in the directives. 
 This shows that the product 
conforms to all the obligations and all requirements included in the directives applicable 
to it -- compliance with essential requirements included in the applicable New Approach 
881 Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach, Chapter 6 on 
Notified Bodies, 39. This document can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/chap07.pdf 
882 Council Decision 90/683, Global Approach Resolution, Council Decision 93/465, 1993 O.J. (L 220) 23. 
883 The CE mark is covered by Council Decision 93/465/EC that harmonizes the rules for affixing and using 
the CE marking. Annex B(d) gives these guidelines for the CE marking regarding its size, the place where 
it should be affixed on the product and the requirements regarding its visibility.   
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directives and with conformity assessment procedures as governed by the modules 
established by Global Approach -- and can therefore freely circulate within the European 
Union market.884 Failure to comply with the directives applicable to the product can 
affect the manufacturer’s rights regarding the product or its brand.885
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CE marking is not a commercial quality mark but it is equivalent to a 
declaration by the manufacturer (or his authorized representative) -- whether established 
inside or outside the Community -- stating that the product conforms to all applicable 
provisions.886 The flexibility introduced by the New Approach in offering free circulation 
of products throughout the European Union market entailed an increased responsibility 
on the manufacturer for the conformity of the product with the safety provisions of the 
directives applicable to it and for the affixing of the CE marking.887
The CE marking, required by the Global Approach on most products in order to 
allow free circulation in the European Union market, coexists with different domestic 
  
                                                 
884 See Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach, Chapter 
5 on CE Marking. This document can be found at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/chap07.pdf  
See also Mark R. Barron, Creating consumer confidence or confusion? The role of product certification 
marks in the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 413, 428 (2007).  
885 Mark R. Barron, Creating consumer confidence or confusion? The role of product certification marks in 
the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 413, 424 (2007). 
886 See http://www.cemarking.net/ce-mark. See also Geraint G. Howells, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 45-
46 (Dartmouth) (1998) and Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
SAFETY, 57, Oxford University Press (2005). 
887 See Commission Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the Global 
Approach, 7-8 (2000). This document is available at http:// 
europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_ en.pdf 
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certification marks of different member states.888 During the last 20 years, certification 
marks -- as well as conformity assessment procedures -- have increased in number and 
kind in different countries. The impact of this increase in certification marks -- local or 
national -- on the performance of the CE marking remains unclear so it is still not 
possible to conclude whether multiple certification marks on a product may result in 
consumer or market confusion. Nevertheless, in light of the importance of certification 
marks for the functioning of the internal market and the high level of consumer protection 
pursued by the European Commission, the increase in the amount and variety of 
certification marks should closely be observed so that CE marking does not lose the 
purpose it aimed at achieving.889
 
 
 
3.6 Product withdrawal 
 
While member states must recognize the product safety certifications issued by 
their own domestic notified bodies and the notified bodies of the other member states 
they can also take steps to block or withdraw a product from the market when it is found 
that the product may endanger the safety of individuals, domestic animals or property.  
Monitoring the products about to be introduced or already introduced in the 
domestic market is the responsibility of domestic market surveillance authorities, whose 
role is crucial to ensure a successful implementation of New Approach Directives and to 
achieve the desired high degree of consumer protection at which these directives are 
                                                 
888 Local marks that coexist with CE marking are for example VDE in Germany or BSI in the United 
Kingdom. 
889 See Commission Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and the Global 
Approach, 7-8 (2000). The document is available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_ en.pdf 
Noting that conformity assessment procedures in the European Union have significantly changed in the last 
20 years and have impacted the use of certification marks. 
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aimed.890 If a product is deemed unsafe, the competent market surveillance authority of a 
member state has the power to withdraw it from the market under what is often called the 
“safeguard clause” included in New Approach Directives.891 Such actions may be taken 
at any of the different stages of the product's life: before it is marketed or once it is 
already in the market.892
Given the economic consequences that a product withdrawal may have for 
product manufacturers, this procedure involves not just domestic authorities but also the 
European Commission, and it includes numerous guarantees in order to ensure that there 
are enough grounds in support of the product withdrawal.
 
893
Before adopting any withdrawal action, the authorities of the member states must 
inform the European Commission that they are considering adopting such a measure so 
that all member states can coordinate their subsequent actions. Once the Commission is 
notified, it decides whether the measure is justified.
  
894 If it deems the measure justified, 
the Commission will then inform the other states that they should also prevent the 
product from being marketed.895
                                                 
890 However, there is no evidence that these enforcement mechanisms are uniform throughout the different 
European member states.  
  
891 Member States are obliged to take restrictive measures against products that are found to be unsafe. The 
safeguard clause procedure provided for in New Approach Directives allows the European Commission to 
check the grounds for national measures that aim to restrict the free movement of goods bearing the CE 
marking. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Enhancing the Implementation of the New Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, 15 COM(2003) 240 final.  
892 Allowing the European Commission to take actions against a certain product places the consumer 
safety’s interests before those of the manufacturer. See Anthony Scascia, Safe or sorry: how the 
precautionary principle is changing Europe’s consumer safety regulation regime and how the United States’ 
Consumer Product Safety Commission must take notice, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 706 (2006). 
893 Any non-compliance does not justify the adoption of restrictive measures. The product must present 
significant risks and must be considered unsafe. See European Commission “Guide to the Implementation 
of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach”, Chapter 8 on Market Surveillance, at 57. 
This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/chap08.pdf 
894 See Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on New Approach and Global Approach, Chapter 
8 on Market Surveillance, at 60. This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/chap08.pdf 
895 If the product manufacturer would consider that such measure was not justified, it could subsequently 
challenge it in court. See Anthony Scascia, Safe or sorry: how the precautionary principle is changing 
Europe’s consumer safety regulation regime and how the United States’ Consumer Product Safety 
Commission must take notice, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 706 (2006). 
  212 
In addition to withdrawal from Europe-wide circulation, domestic authorities may 
also consider that a product should be withdrawn simply from its own market because of 
non-compliance with domestic standards. This could occur when the product complies 
with European-level safety requirements but not the stricter requirements that a member 
state may impose.896 In these cases, the European Commission, which has priority in 
harmonizing safety standards in the union’s internal market, adopts even more 
precautions before withdrawing the product from the market and refers the case to the 
Standing Committee for a determination as to whether the domestic standard in question 
conflicts with European safety standards.897
 
 After studying the action, the Commission 
will notify the member state whether the domestic standard needs to be withdrawn and, if 
so, the consequences of this withdrawal on the product's continued circulation.  
 
4 Standard-Receptive Directives (General Product Safety Directive) 
 
The other major body of European product safety regulation, together with New 
Approach Directives, is structured around the General Product Safety Directive,898
The General Product Safety Directive (GPSD)
 which 
will be the focus of this section. 
899, in effect since January 15, 
2004,900
                                                 
896 The European Commission has tried to overcome this problem by promoting the participation of the 
national delegations of the different member states in order to harmonize as much as possible the 
standardization process and avoid a diverse application of product standards. See Article 2(b) of the GPSD. 
See also Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and Product Safety -- 
Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through a Comparison with the U.S. 
Position,  39 Washburn L.J. 305, 328 (2000). 
 aims to protect consumer health and safety by imposing an obligation on 
897 See the Commission Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization: Action for Faster 
Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 8 October 1990. This paper is available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF  
898 Council Directive 92/59/EEC of June 29, 1992 on General Product Safety, O.J. L228 24 (Aug. 11, 1992) 
amended by the Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) 
(January 15, 2002). 
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member states to ensure that only safe consumer products are placed in the European 
market901 while ensuring that the functioning of the internal market is protected and 
enhanced.902 Unlike New Approach Directives with their essential safety requirements, 
the GPSD is a standard-receptive directive.903
The GPSD was originally adopted in 1992
 This means that the GPSD provides for a 
general obligation of placing safe products in the market but does not include the safety 
standards products must comply with. So products must comply with safety standards not 
included in the GPSD itself.  
904 and was revised in 2001.905
                                                                                                                                                 
899 GPSD, Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) 
(January 15, 2002).  
 Its 2001 
revision entered into force in 2004. The 1992 version of the GPSD introduced into the 
European Union the concept of a “general product safety obligation” in order to ensure a 
900 The GPSD 2001/95/EC came into force when it was published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities (OJEC L 11) on 1-15-2001 and overruled the former product safety directive 92/59/EEC. 
However, the new GPSD did not have any effect until January 15th 2004 that was the deadline of member 
states to transpose the directive into domestic law. See also Norbert Reich, Christopher Goddard And 
Ksenija Vasiljeva, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW, OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF COMMUNITY 
LAW, 213-215 (Interscentia 2003). 
901 Art 1(1) of the GPSD. However, even though European product safety is harmonized, differences 
between consumers regarding attitudes towards risk may significantly vary. Geraint G. Howells, The 
Relationship Between Product Liability and Product Safety -- Understanding a Necessary Element in 
European Product Liability Through a Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39 Washburn L.J. 305, 328 
(2000). 
902 See Council Directive 2001/95, 2001 O.J. (L11) 4 (EC) including a goal of ensuring the importance of 
protecting consumer health and safety while ensuring a proper functioning of the European internal market 
based on the precautionary principle. See also Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product 
Safety in the United States and the European Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & 
Trade 177, 179 (1993). 
903 Examples of this type of Directives are the Council Directive 86/594/EEC on Airborne noise emitted by 
household appliances; the Council Directive 97/67/EC Community postal services, Amended by 
2002/39/EC; the Council Directive  76/769/EEC  on Restrictions on marketing and use of certain dangerous 
substances and preparations and the Council Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste electrical and electronic 
equipment (WEEE) amended by the Council Directive 2003/108/EC. 
904 Council Directive 92/59/EEC of June 29, 1992 on General Product Safety, O.J. L228 24 (Aug. 11, 
1992). This directive was the first general directive on consumer safety and introduced the concept of a 
general safety directive.  
905 Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 
2002). 
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high and uniform level of safety of consumer products throughout the European Union. 
However, it did not have much impact.906
The 2001 revision of the GPSD maintained the requirements of the original 1992 
GPSD but added and reinforced provisions regarding the directive’s scope of application, 
required producers to provide information to consumers about product risks and product 
recall, emphasized the application of standards in order to ensure that only safe products 
could be marketed, reinforced the powers of authorities for market surveillance, 
established a framework for sharing information regarding product risks and for 
facilitating the collaboration between authorities of the different member states, and 
finally, aimed to ensure that unsafe products were withdrawn from the market through 
rapid intervention measures.
 
907
The GPSD is based on the precautionary principle,
  
908 which aims at establishing a 
coherent level of consumer protection for all consumer products in the internal market 
without interfering or overlapping with sector-specific legislation.909
                                                 
906 Some practitioners argued that the GPSD ’92 did not have much impact because it did not go far enough 
in terms of enforcement measures and was too vague regarding some important provisions. See The 
International Comparative Legal Guide to: Product Liability 2007, Chapter 3. Product Safety: 
 For that reason, the 
GPSD declares a right of consumers throughout the European Union to a minimum level 
The New EU Regime. This document is available at 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/1486.pdf 
907 See generally Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 
11) (January 15, 2002).  
908 The precautionary principle is based on the premise that the government should regulate potential risks 
before they become certain. The European Commission has stated repeatedly that the precautionary 
principle should be taken into account when analyzing and quantifying risks. The Commission has 
structured risk analysis in three different elements: risk assessment, risk management and risk 
communication and has noted that the precautionary principle is particularly associated with risk 
management. See Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle COM (2000) 1 
final, 1-2 (2000) emphasizing the importance of the precautionary principle for the European Commission.  
909 Guidance Document on the Relationship Between the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) and 
Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on Product Safety, Directorate General Health and Consumer 
Protection, (DG SANCO) November 2003 at 39. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/guidance_gpsd_en.pdf 
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of product safety and establishes that non-compliance will result in sanctions by 
governmental authorities responsible for the enforcement and punishment.910
The GPSD complements specific product safety legislation as well as operates on 
its own when no such legislation exists. In general, specific directives have priority over 
general provisions of the GPSD, but the GPSD nonetheless applies to products covered 
by specific legislation, governing those areas that the specific legislation does not 
address.
  
911 In cases when there is no applicable specific legislation,912
The GPSD can be divided into three different parts. First, articles 3 and 4 
establish a general safety obligation that is applicable whenever sector directives do not 
cover the category of risk involved. Second, articles 5-18 apply as long as the issue 
considered is not regulated by a specific provision in a sector directive.
 the GPSD applies 
fully.  
913 Finally, the 
GPSD includes notification requirements914 applicable to all sector directives for 
products with CE markings.915
                                                 
910 Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in the United States and the European 
Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 177, 178 1993. See also Geraint G. 
Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a necessary element 
in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 335 
- 336 (2000). 
 The GPSD requires member states to notify the European 
Commission whenever a consumer product presents serious risks. Such notification is 
done through a notification procedure called the European Rapid Alert System for non-
911 Guide to the implementation of Directives based on the New Approach and the Global Approach. See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/legislation.htm. See also Geraint G. 
Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a necessary element 
in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 
335-336 (2000). 
912 Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call for US 
exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 162 (1996). 
913 Guidance Document on the Relationship Between the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) and 
Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on Product Safety, Directorate General Health and Consumer 
Protection, (DG SANCO), 39 November 2003. 
914 Article 12 GPSD. Guidance Document on the Relationship Between the General Product Safety 
Directive (GPSD) and Certain Sector Directives with Provisions on Product Safety, Directorate General 
Health and Consumer Protection, (DG SANCO), 40 November 2003. 
915 These sector Directives would be New Approach Directives that regulate specific kinds of products and 
provide for CE marking. See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/directives/table1.htm. 
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food consumer products (RAPEX). With respect to products covered under sector 
directives, in addition to the RAPEX notification, there are other notification processes 
established and designed by the specific sector directive. In cases where notification is 
not required under safeguard clauses of New Approach Directives or under the RAPEX 
system of the GPSD,916 the GPSD requires member states to give notification to 
European authorities of any domestic measure adopted.917
 
  
 
4.1 The relationship between the GPSD and New Approach Directives 
 
The GPSD, as adopted in 1992,918 was not a New Approach Directive because it 
did not include essential safety requirements and did not provide for CE marking. The 
new GPSD919
As mentioned above, New Approach Directives regulate all aspects of safety and 
risk regarding the products to which they apply. In this context, the GPSD is a horizontal 
directive that complements the specific vertical New Approach Directives (and related 
directives) and applies to consumer products not covered by specific EU regulation.
 of 2001 is still not a New Approach Directive even though it shares some 
of the New Approach characteristics and has important implications for consumer 
products covered by New Approach legislation. 
920
                                                 
916 Article 12, of the GPSD refers to the RAPEX procedure. 
 
When a product is regulated by a New Approach Directive and complies with the 
917 Article 11 of the GPSD. 
918 Council Directive 92/59/EEC of June 29, 1992 on General Product Safety, O.J. L228 24 (Aug. 11, 
1992).  
919 Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) (January 15, 
2002). 
920 See Sacha Prechal, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, Oxford Law Library, 255 (2nd Ed. 2005) for the difference 
between vertical and horizontal directives. 
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essential safety requirements, the product is deemed to comply with the GPSD as well.921
Hence, the safety requirement included in the GPSD applies to consumer products 
only when the specific regulation applicable to them does not contain provisions on 
safety and risks. New Approach Directives include these essential safety requirements but 
that does not imply that the GPSD does not affect products covered by them: New 
Approach Directives do not include provisions regarding enforcement mechanisms and it 
is the GPSD that provides them.
 
In this sense, the GPSD functions as a safety net.  
922
 
  
 
4.2 The safety net: the general safety obligation in the GPSD 
 
In 1989, the European Council adopted a resolution on future directions for the 
European Community consumer protection policy923
The European Council recognized the difficulty of relying on horizontal 
regulations alone to set Community-wide standards that would ensure the high level of 
consumer safety and health protection sought. For that reason, it created in the GPSD a 
 in which it stated the importance of 
promoting a high level of safety and established the need for better information about 
products and services in order to improve the confidence of consumers in the functioning 
of the European internal market. 
                                                 
921 Compliance with harmonized standards raises a presumption of conformity with the essential 
requirements included in New Approach directives. See the Commission Green Paper on the Development 
of European Standardization: Action for Faster Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 8 
October 1990. This paper is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF  
922 See infra for an explanation of these enforcement mechanisms but among these enforcement 
mechanisms, the GPSD includes the requirement for member states to define the organization and tasks of 
surveillance authorities, the RAPEX procedure and the imposition of the obligation to manufacturers to 
order the recall of dangerous products.  
923 Council Resolution 89/ C 294 of November 9th 1989 on future priorities for relaunching consumer 
protection policy, 1989 OJ (C 294) 1  
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general duty of safety,924 which interacts with the product-specific safety rules that are 
tailored to the particular characteristics of the products they regulate. The general duty 
included in the GPSD takes the form of a safeguard clause that imposes a general safety 
obligation on all product manufacturers for all products they place in the market.925
The GPSD requires all consumer products to conform to applicable safety 
standards or, in the absence of a standard, to conform to “the degree of safety that 
consumers and users in general can reasonably expect.”
   
926 Through this general safety 
duty, the GPSD becomes the basis of authority for proceeding against any and all 
consumer products that pose a danger927 and for imposing liability on producers for 
marketing unsafe products even without causing any injury to an end-user.928 This 
general duty of product safety represents a consumer-oriented bias when determining 
whether a product may be deemed unsafe.929
The general safety obligation can be considered part of the pre-marketing product 
control mechanisms because even though it does not impose any specific control on the 
product manufacturer, it is intended to influence the manufacturer's decisions regarding 
 
                                                 
924 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. See also A. Ogus, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY, 150, 
170 (Oxford 1994) who considers that such general obligation provides regulators with a discretion that 
impedes public scrutiny and leaves economic operators uncertain as to what is required to them. 
925 Article 1(2) of the GPSD. Such duty does not apply to products covered by “specific rules of 
Community law of the total harmonization type.” See Recital 7 of the GPSD. See also Suzanne Laplante, 
The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call for US exporters to comply with the 
ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 162 (1996). 
926 Recital 16 of the GPSD. In practice, the Directive is only relevant for non-food products given that food 
safety is regulated by specific food safety regulation. See Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of 
food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters of food 
safety, O.J. L 031 (2002), applicable to food products.  
927 Article 2(b) of the GPSD. See also Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in 
the United States and the European Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 177, 
190 (1993).  
928 Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call for US 
exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 165-166 (1996). 
929 See Anthony Scascia, Safe or sorry: how the precautionary principle is changing Europe’s consumer 
safety regulation regime and how the United States’ Consumer Product Safety Commission must take 
notice, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 691 (2006) considering the general obligation of safety preferable to a cost 
benefit approach when determining whether a product may be qualified as unsafe because it allows 
focusing only on the safety of all consumers instead on cost-benefit considerations.  
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the level of safety to adopt.930 These safety incentives are created through the imposition 
of penalties for marketing an unsafe product regardless of whether the product has injured 
a consumer or product user.931
This general duty provides two important benefits. On one side, it creates an 
incentive for manufacturers to factor in product safety as a priority when designing, 
manufacturing and distributing products. On the other, it provides guidance as to the 
consumer expectation standard that is used in subsequent liability procedures.
  
932 Such 
safety requirement represents a balancing approach to regulation because it requires 
removing only those risks that are justified by the benefits or use derived from the 
product.933
The duty is made concrete by requiring member states to adopt adequate measures 
to ensure that only safe products are marketed and to take action when an unsafe product 
is placed on the market. In this way, the general safety obligation directly affects member 
states in that it requires them to adopt laws, regulations or administrative provisions and 
to create enforcement authorities to enforce such duty.
  
934
The GPSD does not specify the content of the general duty and the safety clause 
functions as an abstract obligation subject to the interpretation of the surveillance 
authorities of each member state.
  
935
                                                 
930 Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 10, Ashgate Publishing 
Company (2005).   
 Despite the uncertainty created by this abstractness, a 
931 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: 
another call for US exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 165-
166 (1996). 
932 See article 6 of the product liability directive that established the consumers’ expectations test as the 
defectiveness test. Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in the United States 
and the European Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 177, 191, 1993 
933 See Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 110, Ashgate Publishing 
Company (2005).  
934 Article 5 of the GPSD. 
935 France, for example, does not provide a sanction for breach of such general safety obligation. French 
Consumer Code, articles 221-225.  Some have suggested attempting to define the safety expectations 
consumers are entitled to have. See H-W. Micklitz, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW WITHIN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION” IN PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND THE LAW AT THE EUROPEAN UNION, 284-286, E. 
Paasivirta and K. Rissanen (eds.), Institute of International Economic Law, University of Helsinki (1995). 
  220 
significant proportion of consumer products are governed by specific legislation -- 
particularly when it comes to the imposition of standards. This specific legislation often 
makes it possible to easily assess whether a product complies with the general duty of 
safety of the GPSD because compliance with the specific standards will mean compliance 
with the general duty.936
Although the general duty of safety is most frequently viewed in the context of a 
product’s pre-marketing phase, it also affects the marketing and post-marketing phases as 
well. When an unsafe product reaches the market in spite of the GPSD’s general safety 
clause and any applicable specific safety legislation, the general duty of safety may still 
be invoked in the post-market control phase to impose a fine on the manufacturer.
  
937 This 
would be done at the member state level, however, as the GPSD does not itself lay out 
enforcement or remedial measures, but instead leaves it to member state authorities to 
ensure that marketed products comply with general safety duty.938
The existence of a European Union standard and regulatory framework does not 
imply that manufacturers are subject to a harmonized concept of safety or safety 
standards: On the contrary, consistent with the European Union’s goal of high consumer 
protection, member states may adopt stricter safety standards, extend the scope of 
individuals with product safety responsibilities, and even make distributors (as well as 
producers) liable for unsafe products.
  
939
                                                 
936 Article 3(2) and article 3(3) of the GPSD includes a list of factors to consider such as voluntary national 
standards giving effect to European standards, the community technical specifications; standards drawn up 
in the member states in which the product is in circulation; codes of good practice in respect of health and 
safety in the sector concerned and the state of the art. 
 The limit on such measures is simply that they 
937 Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 128-129, Ashgate Publishing 
Company (2005).  
938 Article 3(1) of the GPSD. Even though the general duty of safety is created at the Community level, 
member states are the responsible for its enforcement. In this sense, local particularities are preserved and 
taken into account. Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in the United States 
and the European Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 177,  189 (1993). 
939 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
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cannot be imposed if they would create trade barriers.940 Assuming a member state’s 
stricter safety measures pass this test, these measures may be enforced and will be 
complementary to Europe-level measures.941
 
  
 
4.3 Safe product under the GPSD  
 
The GPSD applies only to consumer products, which are defined as “any product 
intended for consumers or likely (…) to be used by consumers”942 supplied in the course 
of a commercial activity whether new, used or reconditioned.943 In order to ensure a high 
level of consumer protection, these consumer products are required to be safe.944 Under 
the GPSD this means that they (i) do not present any risk or (ii) present the minimum 
risks compatible with the product’s use.945
                                                 
940 Articles 30-36 of the Treaty of Rome established the free circulation of goods, labor and services within 
the European internal market. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf 
 However, other aspects should also be taken 
into account. These include: the categories of consumers at risk when using the product, 
especially children and the elderly; the characteristics of the product, including 
composition, packaging, instruction for assembly or for installation and maintenance; the 
product’s effect on other products; the presentation of the product, including labeling, 
warnings, instructions for use and disposal, and any other indications or information 
941 See Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call for US 
exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 159 (1996). 
942 Article 2(a) of the GPSD. The GPSD is only applicable for non-food products as food safety is regulated 
by Regulation 178/2002/EC of 28 January 2002 – 2002 O.J. L 31. However, there is no equivalent directive 
for non consumer products. 
943 Article 2(a) of the GPSD defines products. Second-hand products identified by the supplied as antiques 
or reconditioned products are not included in the definition as long as the supplier informs the person to 
whom he supplies the product.. 
944 Article 2(b). In fact, European regulation regarding consumer protection is structured around the concept 
of safe product, which is crucial, for example, in the Product Safety and Product Liability Directives.   
945 Article 2(b) of the GPSD ’01. 
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regarding the product.946
The Directive uses the risk-utility test to define a safe product.
 These other aspects are important to assessing safety under the 
GPSD.  
947 This test does 
not require a zero risk level for consumer products but requires removing risks when a 
safe alternative exists and removing those risks that are not outweighed by the benefits 
derived from the product use.948
The determination of the level of safety required for a given product is done 
according to specific product standards considering the product’s "fitness for use" and 
providing the required "safety for the user."
 Thus, a safe product will have to pass the risk-utility test, 
which means that it must reach the highest level of safety compatible with its use.  
949 The GPSD does not explicitly state the 
safety requirements for each kind of consumer product but provides a list of factors, 
related to the product's nature and use, that should be taken into account when evaluating 
the risks presented by a product:950 the categories of consumers at risk when using the 
product; the characteristics of the product; the product's composition; the instructions for 
assembly and maintenance of the product; the product's effect on other products; and the 
product's presentation and disposal.951 The GPSD specifically states that the feasibility of 
obtaining higher levels of safety or the availability of other products presenting a lesser 
degree of risk do not necessarily constitute grounds for considering a product "unsafe" or 
"dangerous."952
                                                 
946 Article 2(b) of the GPSD ’01. 
  
947 Article 2(b) of the GPSD clearly states a risk-utility analysis by stating that a product is safe when it 
does present “only the minimum risks compatible with the product’s use.” Note that the defectiveness test 
used by the Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 
O.J. (L 210) 29 is the consumer’s expectations test. See Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
948 Reducing accidents risks to achieve a zero risk level would not be efficient. Accidents should be reduced 
until the cost of investing in a marginal unit of care is lower or equal to the marginal cost of the accident 
prevented. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-213, Aspen eds., 6th ed. (2003).  See 
also Thomas J. Miceli, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, 15, Oxford University Press (1997).    
949 Article 2(b) of the GPSD. 
950 Article 2(b) of the GPSD. 
951 Article 2(b) GPSD. 
952 Article 2(b) last paragraph GPSD. See also Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product 
Safety Directive: another call for US exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. 
& Com. 155, 158-159 (1996). 
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The GPSD not only defines safe products with respect to the product 
characteristics, but it also refers to a product’s compliance with safety rules at both the 
European and the domestic levels.953 In this sense, a product is deemed safe if it conforms 
with the specific European safety legislation applicable to it.954 In the absence of specific 
European safety legislation, a product is deemed safe if it complies with the specific 
domestic safety rules in the member state in which the product is marketed.955
Whenever there is neither a specific European nor a specific domestic safety 
provision applicable to the product, compliance with the GPSD’s general safety duty is 
determined based on the state of the art and technological knowledge, analogous 
domestic standards of the member states where the product is marketed, and reasonable 
consumer expectations concerning safety.
  
956
 
  
 
4.4 The actors of this directive: producers and distributors  
 
Article 3 of the GPSD introduces responsibilities for producers and distributors. It 
requires these actors to comply with product-specific directives and more generally, with 
the general safety obligation included in the GPSD. Producers and distributors are not the 
only actors upon which obligations are imposed. Member states are also required to 
create a framework where such compliance will be possible and where enforcement 
mechanisms will ensure that producers and distributors adopt safety standards and 
comply with the general safety obligation.957
                                                 
953 See Article 3(2) and article 3(3) of the GPSD. 
  
954 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. It should be noted that member states still have an active role in the definition 
of product safety and therefore can pass regulation establishing higher safety requirements. See also 
Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call for US exporters 
to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 155, 159 (1996). 
955 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
956 Article 3(3) of the GPSD.  
957 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 87-112, 155-190, 
Oxford University Press (2005). 
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4.4.1 Primary actors: Producers  
 
Consistent with the goal of minimizing the amount of dangerous products that 
reach the market, the GPSD embraces in its applicable scope a broad range of agents 
involved in the manufacturing process so that all of these agents have incentives to seek 
information regarding the risks of the products they supply and adopt appropriate 
measures to prevent these risks and to stop dangerous/unsafe products from reaching 
consumers. 
Under the GPSD, producers, as defined in article 2 (e) of the GPSD,  include the 
manufacturer of the product itself, as well as the manufacturer’s representatives or 
importers (in cases where there is no representative in the European Union) and any 
entity that presents itself as the product manufacturer by affixing its name, trademark or 
other mark on the product.958 Additionally, the GPSD also applies to other entities in the 
supply chain that may affect the safety properties of a product placed on the market.959
The GPSD imposes two major duties on producers
  
960 that are adjusted to the 
“limits of their respective activities.”961 A first duty, which is mandatory, is to comply 
with the general safety obligation under which manufacturers must ensure that the 
products they market are safe.962 This duty mostly affects the pre-marketing product 
phase. The second duty, which is voluntary,963
                                                 
958 Article 2 (e) GPSD. See also Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
SAFETY, 93, Oxford University Press (2005). 
 is to inform consumers of product risks 
959 Article 2(e) of the GPSD. 
960 Article 3(1) and Article 5 (1) of the GPSD. 
961 Article 5(1) of the GPSD. However, there is no guidance to determine how this adjustment is going to be 
made. Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 93, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
962 Article 3(1) of the GPSD. See also Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and 
product safety – understanding a necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison 
with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305, 339 (2000). 
963 Article 5(1) of the GPSD establishes that among “other obligations” of producers and distributors,  
“Producers shall provide consumers with the relevant information to enable them to assess the 
risks inherent in a product throughout the normal or reasonably foreseeable period of its use, 
where such risks are not immediately obvious without adequate warnings, and to take precautions 
against those risks.”    
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and monitor the products they place in the market.964
The main goal of the informational duty is to provide consumers with information 
during the foreseeable period of product use about product risks that are not obvious 
without the product manufacturer’s warning.
 This includes creating systems to 
continuously provide consumers with information about product risks and establishing 
mechanisms to react to them, including, if necessary, withdrawing products from the 
market. These informational obligations, that mostly take place at the post marketing 
product phase, are not uniform across producers given that they adjust to the diverse size, 
nature and capacities of the different product manufacturers. 
965 This may be done by marking products 
for identification purposes, sample testing products, investigating complaints, and 
keeping distributors informed of the results of monitoring activities.966 The information 
provided must be such that the risk is identified in a way that will enable the potential 
user or consumer to make his or her own risk assessment.967 Warnings should not be false 
or misleading and must take into account the perception and knowledge that can 
reasonably be expected from the potential user or consumer.968 In light of the existing 
linguistic differences between the European member states, there is a general agreement 
between European and domestic legislators969
                                                 
964 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
 that any safety information offered to 
965 Article 5(1) of the GPSD. 
966 Article 5(1) fourth section, GPSD. 
967 Article 5(1)  of the GPSD. See also Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety 
Directive: another call for US exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 
155, 1996 at 159-160. 
968 The Commission has also approved regulation prohibiting misleading advertising. Article 2.2 Directive 
98/8/EEC. 
969 See Council Resolution of 17 December 1998 on Operating Instructions for Technical Consumer Goods, 
98C/411/01, OJ C411/1, 31.12.98. 
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consumers must be provided in the local language or languages of each member state970 
so that consumers are informed of the product risks in an effective manner.971
Of course, regardless of the informational duty, a manufacturer that learns of 
product risks that qualify the product as unsafe or dangerous must take action and, if 
necessary, withdraw the product from the market.
  
972
 
 
 
4.4.2 Secondary actors: product distributors  
 
Distributors also have duties under the GPSD, although such duties are framed 
under due care and negligence parameters.973 Distributors are required to act with due 
care to help ensure compliance with specific safety requirements and with the general 
safety obligation of the GPSD.974
At the same time, distributors should not supply products that they know, or 
should know, pose risks not compatible with the general safety requirement.
 In particular, they must collect information on product 
risks, keep and provide documentation necessary for tracing the origin of products, and 
cooperate in actions taken by manufacturers and government agencies to avoid risks. 
975
                                                 
970 Using the words of the European Commission, “information should be presented in a way adapted to 
local needs and concerns, and be available in all official languages if the Union is not to exclude a vast 
proportion of its population (…) a challenge which will become more acuter in the context of 
enlargement.” European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428, 25.7.2001. 
 As with 
971 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 124, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
972 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
973 Distributors are defined in article 2(f) of the GPSD as “any professionals in the supply chain whose 
activity does not affect the safety properties of a product.” 
974 Article 5(2) and 5(3)of the GPSD. 
975 Article 5(3) of the GPSD. The Directive includes a system for rapid exchange of information between 
Member States and the Commission on products causing serious risks that allows saving resources while 
maximizing consumer protection. This information system is called the RAPEX-system by the General 
product Safety Directive. See section 4.7 of this Chapter. 
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producers, distributors’ duties hinge on the limits and capacities of their respective 
activities.976
The burdens placed on producers and distributors are different, however, in that 
producers
  
977 are subject to a higher safety standard than the one placed on distributors.978 
While producers are compelled to place only safe products in the market,979 distributors 
are required to help comply with safety obligations and such help is evaluated under 
negligence parameters.980
 
 In this sense, distributors are given a subsidiary role to that of 
producers.  
 
4.4.3 Member States  
 
As mentioned above, producers and distributors are not the only agents that have 
responsibilities under the GPSD.  They are joined by member states, which are required 
to adopt laws, regulations, and administrative provisions to compel producers and 
distributors to comply with the obligation of placing only safe products in the European 
Union market.981
Member states must be active parties in two different areas that are crucial for 
successful implementation of the GPSD: market monitoring and enforcement. Member 
  
                                                 
976 Article 5(2) of the GPSD. This difference may be due to the intention of the GPSD of being sensitive to 
the diverse resources distributors have and the variety of activities they perform. Christopher Hodges, 
EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 138-140, Oxford University Press (2005). 
977 Producers are defined in art. 2(d) and its obligations are established in article 3. 3(1) includes the 
obligation to place only safe products on the market while art 3(2) outlines two supporting information 
obligations: informing consumers of products risks and keeping informed of the risks of the product in 
order to react to them.  Producers are strictly liable for the harm caused as a result of the failure to comply 
with these obligations.  
978 Article 2(f) of the GPSD. Distributors are subject to a negligence liability regime under which they must 
exercise due care in order to help ensure compliance with the general safety standard.  
979 Article 3(1) of the GPSD. 
980 Article 5(2) of the GPSD. 
981 Article 6 of the GPSD. See also Suzanne Laplante, The European Union’s General Product Safety 
Directive: another call for US exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. int’l L. & Com. 
155, 160-161 (1996).  
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states must establish and appoint authorities to monitor the compliance of all the 
producers' duties under the GPSD, allow these domestic authorities to require all 
necessary information from the parties involved, and make arrangements to ensure that 
persons who may be exposed to a risk are informed of that risk in a timely and suitable 
manner.982 The RAPEX system requires member states to inform the European 
Commission of serious risks so that it can alert the other member states. At the same 
time, these domestic authorities may also impose penalties if a producer or distributor 
fails to comply with the obligations under the GPSD and they may temporarily prohibit 
marketing of certain products while carrying out inspections, or permanently prohibit 
marketing if the products have already proved to be dangerous.983
 
 
 
4.5 Reporting to authorities: a special obligation under the GPSD 
 
The GSPD is the only directive that explicitly requires producers and distributors 
to notify authorities when a consumer product is dangerous.984 Such notification must be 
provided when the producer or distributor knows or should know that the product is 
unsafe, based on the information in its possession.985
This obligation is two-fold: on one side, it is intended to encourage producers to 
comply with their post-marketing obligation to monitor product risks, while enabling 
authorities to control and monitor such compliance. On the other side, it is intended to 
make sure that the final determination of whether a product is dangerous is done by a 
public authority so that there are no other commercial interests involved.  
 
                                                 
982 Article 6(2) of the GPSD. Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY, 155-190, Oxford University Press (2005). 
983 Article 7 of the GPSD. 
984 Article 5.3 of the GPSD. See also Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCT 
SAFETY, 143, 145, Oxford University Press (2005). 
985 Article 5.3 of the GPSD. 
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The practical implementation of this reporting process is quite complicated and 
does not appear to be very effective because there are no coordination mechanisms986 
between the public authorities who receive the manufacturers’ or distributors’ 
notifications regarding product risks and who must decide what action should be 
adopted.987
 
  This lack of Europe-wide coordination may undermine the functioning of the 
internal market and jeopardize the success of the safety obligations under the GPSD.  
 
4.6 Notification procedures under the GPSD 
 
Once producers and distributors have reported to public authorities, member states 
must notify the European Commission of the actions they decide to adopt. The GPSD 
includes two kinds of notification procedures: non-emergency and emergency 
procedures.988
These notification procedures are aimed at producing a coordinated response to 
cross-border problems that could arise with the application of different standards and 
different obligations for product manufacturers and distributors. The structure and 
language of the GPSD is designed to prevent member states from creating trade barriers 
by taking different measures with respect to the same product. Member states need to 
define the rule and penalties applicable in case there is a breach of obligations by any of 
the agents affected by the GPSD and to notify to the Commission.
 The former are used most frequently, while the latter are rarely used.  
989
                                                 
986 The GPSD is silent regarding whether there is a reporting obligation to report to an authority of one state 
when the event has occurred in another member state. See Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 146, Oxford University Press (2005). 
 Such procedures are 
987 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 144, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
988 Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO), Guidance Document on the 
Relationship Between the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) and Certain Sector Directives with 
Provisions on Product Safety, 12 (2003). This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/guidance_gpsd_en.pdf 
989 Article 7 of the GPSD. 
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meant to: (i) supervise the adequacy of the actions of the member states, (ii) inform other 
member states, and (iii) take community action, where adequate. However, the actual 
implementation of these procedures takes place at the domestic level and evidence 
suggests that domestic authorities do not give their European obligations a high 
priority.990
Under the non-emergency procedures, whenever authorities of the member states 
are notified of product risks, they must adopt measures
 
991 proportional to the seriousness 
of the risk and based on the precautionary principle.992 Once any of these measures have 
been adopted, the European Commission must be notified.993 If the European 
Commission determines that the measure is justified, it informs all other member states. 
If it concludes that the measures were not justified, the Commission informs the member 
state that initiated the action.994
The GPSD also includes emergency procedures that are applied whenever there is 
a serious or immediate product risk to the health and safety of consumers in one or some 
member states.
  
995
                                                 
990 Geraint Howells and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, 144, Ashgate Publishing 
Company (2005).   
 Every time a member state initiates an emergency procedure, it must 
inform the Commission of any emergency measures taken to prevent or restrict product 
marketing or use in order to prevent an expansion of the risk of harm beyond the member 
state's boundaries. It should be noted that whenever there is an immediate risk of harm to 
consumers in more than one member state, the European Commission is involved in the 
decision regarding the measures that should be adopted so that there is a Community-
991 Article 8(1) of the GPSD. These measures include restricting the marketing of a product or requiring its 
withdrawal.  
992 Article 8(2) of the GPSD.  
993 Article 11 of the GPSD. 
994 Article 11(2) of the GPSD. 
995 Article 13 of the GPSD. 
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wide solution not subject to the sometimes long and difficult discussion among the 
authorities of the different member states involved.996
 
 
 
4.7 RAPEX  
 
RAPEX is a system that allows market surveillance authorities in the different 
European member states and the European Commission to efficiently share information 
about dangerous products found in the European market and to further inform consumers 
about potential risks to their health and safety.997
The RAPEX system aims to ensure that information about dangerous products can 
be quickly circulated among domestic authorities and passed to the European 
Commission. It also aims to ensure evaluation of the effectiveness of product safety 
regulation on the basis of product notifications made by European member states to 
European authorities and the measures adopted. 
 
Information should generally flow between member states regarding product 
safety but RAPEX is especially relevant in cases where a member state restricts the 
marketing of a product or requires that a product be withdrawn from the market.998
The RAPEX procedure requires notification of measures taken against a product 
or a class of products that presents a serious and immediate risk to the health and safety 
of consumers.
  
999
                                                 
996 When determining the actions that should be adopted the European Commission is assisted by Scientific 
Committee formed by representatives of the member states. Articles 13 of the GPSD. 
 This notification procedure is established by the GPSD, but it is also one 
of the areas in which the GPSD and New Approach Directives interact. RAPEX is 
997 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on the operation of 
the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf  
998 In fact RAPEX is two parallel systems, one for food products and the other for non-food products. 
Council Decision 84/133/EEC, OJ 1984 L 70/16. it was subsequently replaced by the Decision 89/45/EEC: 
OJ L 17/51 as amended by the Decision 90/352/EE, OJ L 173/49. 
999 Article 12 of the GPSD. 
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applicable to consumer products covered only by the GPSD as well as to products 
covered by New Approach Directives,1000 whenever these product-specific directives do 
not include their own notification procedure.1001
When a consumer product falls within the scope of RAPEX
  
1002 and a serious and 
immediate risk is detected,1003 measures, based on information about the product and the 
nature of the risk provided by the producer or the distributor, may be adopted. Each of the 
30 countries participating in this system1004 appoints a RAPEX contact point.1005
                                                 
1000 Some New Approach Directives include notification procedures known as “Safeguard Clause,” that 
aims to check the grounds for domestic measures which seek to restrict the free movement of products. 
However, this mechanism is different from the goals aimed by the RAPEX system, which intends to create 
the framework for a rapid exchange of information on dangerous products in order to protect the 
consumers’ health and safety. See the European Commission Guidelines for the management of the 
Community Rapid Information System (RAPEX) and for notifications presented in accordance with Article 
11 of Directive 2001/95/EC, 24. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/rapex_guid_en.pdf 
 The 
contact point submits to the Commission detailed information about the risks presented 
by dangerous products found in that country’s market and the measures domestic 
authorities are considering adopting in order to prevent those risks from causing 
accidents. The information received and validated by the Commission is rapidly 
1001 Examples of sectoral New Approach Directives that do not include a notification procedure and where 
therefore the RAPEX system is applicable are: Toys Directive 88/378/EEC, Low Voltage Directive 
2006/95/EC (amending Council Directive 73/23/EEC of 19 February 1973 on the harmonization of the 
laws of Member States relating to electrical equipment designed for use within certain voltage limits, OJ L 
77, 26.3.1973, p. 29–33), Machinery Directive 98/37/EC, Cosmetics Directive 76/768/EEC, Motor 
Vehicles Directive 70/156/EEC, Personal Protective Equipment Directive 89/686/EEC.  
1002 As mentioned above, RAPEX is applicable to dangerous consumer products which can be used by 
professionals and consumers (such as toys or lamps) with the exception of pharmaceutical and medical 
devices and food products that have specific mechanisms – for example, food product have the RASFF 
alert system. See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on the 
operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf  
1003 The European Commission requires objective evidence of the danger, suspicion is not enough. Article 
3(4) of the GPSD. 
1004 The participation countries are all European Union member states plus three EEA countries: Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway. See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2007 Annual 
report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, 9. This 
document is available at   
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf  
1005 A list of Contract Points of the different member states can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/contact_points.pdf 
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circulated to the national contact points in all countries participating in the system.1006
When there is a need for immediate action by a member state, it must first inform 
the European Commission.
 
These contact points then ensure that their respective domestic authorities check whether 
the product in question is present in their market and take appropriate action. The results 
of these market surveillance activities, including additional information relevant for other 
national authorities, are then reported back to the Commission through the RAPEX 
system. 
1007 The duty to inform under the RAPEX system arises when 
the decision to adopt measures has been taken (even if they have not been adopted yet). 
Member states must provide the Commission with detailed information of any restrictive 
measures they decide to adopt in response to identified risks as well as any preventive 
measures that producers and distributors might have adopted voluntarily.1008
It is important to note that a safety notification is not equivalent to deeming the 
product unsafe or dangerous and thus the number of RAPEX notifications is not 
equivalent to the number of safety measures adopted either by domestic or European 
authorities. In order to take a safety measure under European safety law, notification is 
required but not all notifications result in a subsequent measure. So the number of 
measures adopted in response to RAPEX notifications is significantly smaller than the 
number of notifications reported to European authorities, either because they are not 
necessary or because the notification has not been performed as required. Hence, while 
 
                                                 
1006 The European Commission publishes on the internet every week an overview of dangerous products 
and the measures adopted to eliminate the risks. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/rapex_archives_en.cfm 
1007 Article 12(1) and Annex II, paragraph 4 of the GPSD establishing the steps a state must follow 
whenever there is a danger of a serious and immediate risk and a member state seeks to prevent, restrict or 
impose specific conditions on the possible marketing or use of the product within its own territory. 
1008 Of the 1355 notifications for products presenting serious risks, 643 were measures concerned by 
domestic authorities (47%), 669 were adopted voluntarily by manufacturers and distributors (50%) and in  
43 cases, measures adopted by domestic authorities were complemented by actions adopted by private 
market operators (3%). See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2007 Annual 
report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, 22. This 
document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf  
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RAPEX statistics can suggest inferences about the number of measures taken or, more 
broadly, the number of unsafe markets on the European market, these are only inferences 
subject to possible error, not direct measurements.1009
Further, even assuming that all safety notifications were to result in a measure 
adopted, the enforcement activities of the Member States are mostly based on post-
marketing monitoring that may result in product recalls or withdrawals but such activities 
do not catch all the dangerous products on the market. The RAPEX system, thus, includes 
all safety notifications validated by the European Commission during the period between 
January 1st to December 31st of years 2001 to 2009,
  
1010
Hence, the RAPEX system does not allow to determine which products have been 
notified, by whom, and whether a subsequent measure – compulsory or voluntary – was 
adopted for that specific product. The latter type of information would be ideal for 
assessing which are the riskier products in the market and the effectiveness of the 
European product safety mechanisms regarding the adoption of pre-market and post-
market controls in order to ensure that safe products reach the market. Unfortunately, 
however, this type of information is not available, and inferences must instead be drawn 
from the RAPEX notifications. 
 regardless from the date such 
notifications were transmitted by the National Contact Points, the date of publication by 
the Commission and whether they subsequently resulted in a safety measure adopted. 
Despite these important limitations, the safety notifications collected by the 
RAPEX system through the information provided by the domestic authorities allow for 
an assessment and an evaluation of changes in time of the amount of potentially unsafe 
products, the risk involved in them, the activity of domestic authorities regarding 
notifying potentially unsafe products and which product categories are the most 
                                                 
1009 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2005 Annual report on the operation 
of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, 3-4. This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/reports/report_rapex_05_en.pdf 
1010 However, annual RAPEX reports are only available for the period ranging from 2004 to 2009. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/rapex_archives_en.cfm 
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frequently notified as potentially unsafe, as well as whether notifications have resulted in 
an increase in care adopted by producers and therefore in a subsequent reduction of safety 
notifications of that product category. 
It should be noted that in order to be able to accurately assess the effectiveness of 
the European product safety regulation, it would be necessary to know the exposure of 
products to the safety regulation. That is, the total number of products marketed in a 
given European member state – regardless of their origin of manufacture – and evaluate 
whether the amount of notifications evolves in parallel to the products marketed and 
subject to the European product safety regime.  
Under RAPEX, safety notifications are classified by product category. Table 5.2 
comprises all the safety notifications collected by the RAPEX mechanism as classified by 
European authorities between 2004 and 2009. As it can be seen, safety notifications have 
increased their variety as the RAPEX system was developing. At the same time, some 
product categories have been aggregated together in light of the difficulty differentiating 
between often similar concepts.1011
 
   
Table 5.2 - Categories of product notified under RAPEX 
 
PRODUCT CATEGORY 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Chemical products 1 1 9 19 21 44 
Childcare machines/articles 4 0  30 89 67 
Children's equipment 30 2 41 59 
Clothing 9 13 33 54 140 395 
Communication equipment     1 8 10 
Computer hardware 4 0 4    
Construction 0 2 0 1   
Cosmetics and hygiene 23 22 48 81 56 86 
Decorative articles 0 24 23 20 21 14 
Electronic appliances 105 238 174 156 169 138 
                                                 
1011 An example of this grouping is childcare machines, articles and children’s equipment that since 2008 
are grouped into a single category that collects their safety notifications. Before 2008, these categories were 
differentiated.  
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Fashion items    1   
Firearms    1   
Food-imitating products    23 55 40 
Furniture  8 7 20 8 12 17 
Gadgets 6 1  3 4 6 
Garden machines/furniture 4 10  1   
Gas and heating appliances   6 7 12 15 
Hand tools    2  2 
Hobby/sports equipment 9 7 30 24 27 49 
Household appliances 12 38 24 25   
Jewelry   5 3 13 7 
Kitchen/cooking access. 8 1  10 10 14 
Laser pointers 3 15  20 5 8 
Lighters 16 21 22 18 37 30 
Lighting chains    17 44 39 
Lighting equipment   98 84 81 52 
Machinery and tools   19 29 25 7 
Motor vehicles 25 63 126 197 160  
Motor vehicles parts    1  146 
Others 18 16 11 2 8 19 
Percussion caps 2 0     
Personal protective 
equipment   6 12 22 12 
Pet accessories    1   
Pyrotechnical products    1   
Recreational crafts    6 8 5 
Stationary 0 6 4 3 20 5 
Toys 101 171 221 417 498 472 
Vehicles    8   
 
As it can be seen from the table 5.2, the categories of products which are most 
often notified under RAPEX are articles intended for children (toys and children’s 
equipment) and electrical products (domestic appliances and lighting equipment). These 
categories account for over 50% of all RAPEX notifications.  
The origins of the products that generate safety notifications under RAPEX is 
very diverse. During 2009, 60% of all notification sent through RAPEX referred to 
products with China – including Hong Kong – as their country of origin. Additionally, 
337 notifications – 20% of the notifications sent through RAPEX during 2009 – 
concerned products originated from the 27 European Union member states and 3 
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EFTA/EEA countries.1012 These figures are similar for previous years as well, with 
notifications of EU and EFTA/EEA products accounting for 20% of all notifications in 
2008, 22% in 2007 and 21% in 2006.1013
Given the significantly high proportion of RAPEX notifications relating to 
products of Chinese origin and the remarkable proportion of these products subsequently 
deemed dangerous, the European Commission has sought cooperation from China and its 
authorities. In 2006, the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Safety of the 
European Commission (DG SANCO)
 
1014 and the Chinese General Administration for 
Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on general product safety. This memorandum provided for the 
support of Chinese authorities in the effort to ensure product safety, especially for 
consumer goods subsequently exported to the European Union market. The system laid 
out in the memorandum is known as the “RAPEX-CHINA”1015 and it is an on-line 
information exchange system between European and Chinese authorities, who may 
follow up directly on notifications regarding unsafe products coming from their 
country.1016 The European Commission committed to report on the effectiveness of this 
system every three months.1017
Another important RAPEX classification is the nature of the danger under the 
GPSD. The GPSD differentiates between article 12 and article 11 measures; depending 
on how serious the danger is (with higher levels of danger falling under article 12). 
  
                                                 
1012 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on the operation 
of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf 
1013 See in general http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/rapex_archives_en.cfm 
1014 For more information on the DG SANCO see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm 
1015 See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/int_coop/docs/rapex_china_summary_analysis.pdf 
1016 Some European countries also have online systems of exchange of information of product risks. For 
example, the Spanish website where producers and distributors may report information on product risks is: 
http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/formularioNotificacion.jsp 
1017 See http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/index_en.htm for a brief analysis of the quarterly 
reports.  
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As table 5.3 shows, the categories of dangers have also increased as the RAPEX 
system has developed while some dangers, such as fire risks or suffocation, for example, 
have remained present and quite stable. 
 
Table 5.3 – Nature of the danger under article 12 of the GPSD 
 
DANGER 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Allergy   2 3   
Bacteriological    8   
Burns    71 103 90 
Cancer 20 0 7 14   
Chemical 5 69 95 212 341 493 
Choking/suffocation1018 80  96 157 317 285 261 
Cuts 1 0 5 24 26 18 
Damage to hearing   2 20 39 32 
Damage to sight   8 38 11 19 
Drowning   4 5 5 12 
Electrical shock 110 249 270 246 282 214 
Explosion 2 0 8 8   
Fire risk/burns1019 64  114 194 216 185 124 
Health 5 27 44 11 14 2 
Microbiological risk   11 6 12 11 
Other 22 1 2    
Poisoning   10 50   
Risk of injury 1151020 227  274 376 366 405 
Skin lesion/irritation 4 0 2 4   
Release of metals    6   
Suffocation     166 35 
                                                 
1018 Since 2007 choking and suffocation are separated as different kinds of dangers. See European 
Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2007 Annual report on the operation of the Rapid Alert 
System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf 
1019 Since 2007 burns are a different danger category than fire risks. See European Commission, Keeping 
European Consumers Safe, 2007, Annual report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food 
consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf 
1020 It should be noted that risk of injury appears in the 2005 report referring to 2004 data but such 
information is not included in the 2004 report. See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers 
Safe, 2005 Annual report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, 
RAPEX. This document is available at  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/reports/report_rapex_05_en.pdf 
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Strangulation     36 182 
 
 
As the table above shows, the most common risks observed have been the risk of 
injury, choking and electrical shock as well as burns, fire, suffocation and chemical risks.  
The RAPEX alert system has evolved in such a way that domestic authorities, 
through their contact points, have increasingly notified authorities of the presence of 
dangerous products in the market.1021
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Number of RAPEX notifications circulated 
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As figure 5.2 shows, the number of RAPEX notifications circulated by the 
different member states has increased significantly every year the RAPEX system was in 
force.1022
                                                 
1021 This information can be found at European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2008, 
Annual report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, 15-16. 
This document is available at  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2009_en.pdf. Table 5.4 - Total Number 
of RAPEX Notifications Circulated 2001-2009 summarizes the results.  
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These results might be attributed to an increased effectiveness of product safety 
enforcement by national authorities, increased awareness by businesses of their 
responsibilities, the European Union enlargement in 2004 and 2007,1023 as well as to 
several network-building actions coordinated by the Commission.1024 The European 
Commission is clearly optimistic about the implementation and effectiveness of this 
system and has interpreted that the increasing awareness of obligations by producers and 
distributors and of member state authorities and the enhanced cooperation with third 
countries has been the key to the increased effectiveness of the RAPEX system.1025
The different member states participating in the RAPEX system are not equally 
active. During 2009, the member states that were most active in the RAPEX system and 
that accounted for 47% of the total number of notifications were Spain (220 notifications, 
13% of the total), Germany (187 notifications, 11% of the total), Greece (154 
notifications, 9% of the total), Bulgaria (122 notifications, 7% of the total), and Hungary 
(119 notifications, 7% of the total).
 
1026
                                                                                                                                                 
1022 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2004-2009 Reports.  RAPEX reports 
are available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/stats_reports_en.htm 
 Other countries are increasingly participating in 
RAPEX as well: during 2009, half of the countries increased their activities in the 
RAPEX system and notified authorities of more dangerous products than during 2008 
given that the total share of the five most notifying countries decreased from 50% in 2008 
to 47% in 2009. Similarly, the 44% of notifications accounted for by the top 5 
1023 In 2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia joined the European Union. On 1 January 2007 Romania and Bulgaria also joined, becoming the 
current 27 Union member states. For further information on the different phases of European enlargements 
see http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm.  
1024 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2006, Annual report on the operation 
of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/stats_reports_en.htm 
1025 Keeping European consumers safe 2007 Annual Report on the Operation of the Rapid Alert System for 
non-food consumer products. (OJ L 11, 15.1.2002) at 16. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf 
1026 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on the operation 
of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, 21-23, RAPEX. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf   
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participators in 2007 was actually a decrease from the percentage they represented in 
2006, when they accounted for 61% of the total.1027
Spain is one of the most active countries in product notifications under RAPEX. 
The Spanish case is an interesting example because there is a big difference between the 
amount of notifications generated by Spanish authorities overall and the amount of 
notifications generated by products with a Spanish origin. While Spain is very active in 
notifying European authorities of potentially unsafe products in the Spanish market, the 
amount of Spanish products exposed to RAPEX notifications is relatively small, 
considering the little impact of notifications of products with Spanish origin relative to 
the total amount of notifications.
  
1028
 
  
Figure 5.3 – RAPEX notifications and notifications by Spain 
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1027 Keeping European consumers safe 2007 Annual Report on the Operation of the Rapid Alert System for 
non-food consumer products. (OJ L 11, 15.1.2002) at 16. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf 
1028 See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2004-2009 Reports.  RAPEX reports 
are available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/stats_reports_en.htm. See Table 5.5 - Total 
RAPEX Notifications and Notifications By Spain 2001-2009 summarizing the results.  
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Not all notifications entail a measure adopted. Once the Commission receives a 
notification, it first checks that such notification conforms to the requirements of article 8 
of the GPSD, which are very restrictive,1029 and it determines whether the risk involved is 
such that it can only be effectively eliminated through the adoption of measures at the 
Community level.1030
The types of measures most commonly adopted by member states and the 
European Commission, as well as by producers and distributors themselves in response to 
the different safety notifications are: stopping a product’s sales, withdrawing the product 
from the market, providing information to consumers about the risks related to the use of 
the product, and recalling a dangerous product from consumers.
  
1031
As can be seen from Figure 5.3, the number of notifications has increased. In 
parallel the number of measures, shown in Figure 5.4, has also increased.  
 Some measures are 
compulsory, others are voluntary and others are compulsory but complemented by 
voluntary corrective action. 
The blue area shows notifications that have resulted in no measure either because 
they did not qualify for treatment under article 12 of the GPSD,1032 or because they were 
treated as notifications under Article 11 of the GPSD.1033
                                                 
1029 Specifically Article 8(1)(b) to (f) of the GPSD. See also Article 13 of the GPSD. 
 Those notifications not fitting 
under article 11 or article 12 GPSD were disseminated to the National Contact Points for 
information only so that other countries are aware of the safety problems, often linked to 
specific product categories. Consumers are warned in generic terms of typical risks with 
1030 In this sense, the European intervention only takes place at the inter-state conflict level. Article 13(1)(c) 
of the GPSD. 
1031 50% of the total RAPEX measures taken during 2007 were adopted voluntarily by manufacturers and 
distributors. See the press release Memo/08/252 issued by the Directorate General on health and consumers 
on April 17, 2008. The Memo is available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/252&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN 
1032 Article 12 of the GPSD provides for the adoption of measures taken by the competent authorities or 
voluntarily by producers and distributors for products presenting a serious risk. 
1033 Article 11 of the GPSD provides for the adoption of measures taken by the competent authorities on 
products posing a lesser risk. 
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these product categories. These mainly concern notifications with insufficient 
information about the product or missing information on the producer or importer.1034
The amount of voluntary measures adopted is represented by the green area. 
Voluntary measures represent an important percentage of notifications, as can be seen in 
Figure 5.4. The same may be said of compulsory measures, which are represented by the 
yellow and also represent an important percentage of the total amount of notifications. 
Finally, the amount of compulsory measures complemented by voluntary action does not 
seem relevant for the analysis.  
 As 
can be seen, the amount of notifications without measures has slightly increased and 
remains a significant percentage of RAPEX notifications.  
It is interesting to observe that the proportion of voluntary and compulsory 
measures adopted is quite similar. Given that compulsory measures are taken at the 
initiative of the European Commission and voluntary measures are adopted at the 
initiative of the producer, it seems possible to suggest that the role of reputation of 
RAPEX notifications and their publicity might be important enough so that 
manufacturers have incentives to adopt measures at their own initiative.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1034 During 2009, 124 notifications (7 % of all notifications sent through RAPEX) did not include 
information about the country of origin of the notified product. Even though still an important percentage, 
the number of cases with an unidentified country of origin decreased from 23% in 2004 to 7% in 2009. The 
remarkable evolution in terms of determining the products’ country of origin has been interpreted by the 
European Commission as an indicator that market surveillance authorities have been increasingly aware of 
the importance of a products’ traceability. See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 
2009 Annual report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, 21-23 
RAPEX. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf   
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Figure 5.4 – Measures adopted by number of notifications 
2006-20091035
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4.8 Post-marketing obligations  
 
The objective of the GPSD, keeping unsafe products out of the market, is 
supported by a broad system of pre-marketing controls and post-marketing 
obligations.1036
                                                 
1035 See Table 5.6 - Type of Measure by Number of Notifications 2006-2009 summarizing the results 
shown in figure 5.4.  
 The GPSD’s design takes into account the fact that consumer products are 
not subject to any pre-marketing verification by public authorities and therefore places 
1036 Recital 17 of the GPSD. It is not clear whether the GPSD considers that pre-market obligations are the 
same level as post-marketing obligations. This is an important consideration given that the product risk may 
be the same before the product is marketed but its knowledge may not be the same because of hindsight 
problems. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS, Cass Sunstein (Ed.), 100-112, Cambridge University Press (2000). 
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strong emphasis on market surveillance and enforcement. Hence, under the GPSD it is 
not enough for a producer to ensure the safety of a product at the time it is placed in the 
market; the producer must also be informed and up to date about product risks, must 
monitor these risks, and, in cases where the product has already been marketed, must 
warn, recall or withdraw products from the market once it becomes apparent that these 
products do not comply with the general safety obligation.1037
The main goal of such post-marketing obligations is to identify (1) products that 
should have been identified before and therefore not marketed at all because of their lack 
of safety, as well as (2) products that were not unsafe before they were marketed but 
became unsafe afterwards.
  
1038
Compared to the 1992 GPSD, the 2001 GPSD includes extensive obligations 
regarding market surveillance.
  
1039 It establishes the powers authorities should have in 
order to be able to adopt certain measures and it provides principles that must be followed 
when exercising such powers, including the necessary proportionality between the 
seriousness of the risk involved and the measures adopted.1040
                                                 
1037 Articles 3(4) and 5(1) of the GPSD. 
 In 2008, additional 
1038 Article 9 of the GPSD. 
1039 GPSD recital 24. It should be noted that the GPSD specifically includes post-marketing obligations but 
these obligations overlap with the post-marketing incentives created by the product liability directive for 
manufacturers for warning consumers and users of new product risks. These incentives are a result of the 
warning duties included in the product liability directive by which whenever a product manufacturer warns 
consumers and users of product risks that appeared after the product was marketed, liability for harm will 
not be imposed. Hence, manufacturers have clear incentives to warn of new risks that may present the 
product once it has been marketed. For a discussion of the interaction between the warning defense and 
product liability see Kathryn E. Spier, Product Safety, Buybacks and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn, Harvard 
Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 597 (2009). Available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023125 
arguing that strict liability with a warning duty or defense results in too many product recalls and excessive 
incentives for manufacturers to warn consumers and noting that social welfare is maximized when 
manufacturers are only required to issue cost -- justified warnings -- hence introducing a negligent-based 
duty to warn, despite of its difficulties to be implemented. For additional literature discussing the 
incentives to recall products and warn of new product risks arising after the product has been introduced in 
the market see L. Welling, A Theory of Voluntary Recalls and Product Liability, Southern Economic 
Journal, 57: 1092-1111 (1991); A. M. Marino, A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information, 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 12:245-265 (1997) and more recently Omri Ben-Shahar, How Liability 
Distorts Incentives of Manufacturers to Recall Products, available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=655804. (2005). 
1040 Article 8.2 of the GPSD. 
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European regulation reinforcing the market surveillance mechanisms for products 
covered by Community harmonization legislation and traceability of products was 
adopted.1041
The GPSD does not specify the mechanisms and infrastructure that member states 
should have,
  
1042 who should bear the costs of adopting measures against unsafe products, 
and what the consequences should be if the producer decides not to take action or takes 
inadequate action.1043
Spain has more than 50 public bodies dealing with product safety and, more 
generally, with consumer protection. These bodies are dependent on either the central 
government or on the governments of the different autonomous communities into which 
Spain is divided.
 All these decisions are left to be determined and adopted by 
member states. 
1044
The most important authority is the National Consumer Institute (INC),
   
1045 which 
is the authority responsible for protecting and promoting consumers’ and users’ rights. 
There is also: an Evaluation Committee,1046 which monitors the RAPEX system's 
implementation in Spain; a Technical Commission for product safety,1047
                                                 
1041 See Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 30  and Decision 768/2008/EC, OJ L 218, 
13.8.2008, p. 82 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating to the 
marketing of products. Regulation 765/2008 laid down the obligation for competent authorities of the 
member status to carry out appropriate checks on the characteristics of products on an adequate scale on the 
European market and before those products are released for free circulation.   
 which provides 
information, at the request of the Spanish and European public authorities about the risks 
1042 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 164, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
1043 The lack of specification of the consequences for not complying with the obligations established by the 
GPSD is also present in New Approach Directives. Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF 
CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 149-164, Oxford University Press (2005). 
1044 This diversity can be explained by the decentralized political structure of Spain, that is structured in 17 
Autonomous Communities, each of which counts with its consumer bodies.  See http://www.consumo-
inc.es/en/Seguridad/direcciones2.htm for a list of the different notification bodies of the Autonomous 
Communities.  
1045 The National Consumer institute is an authority created by the Spanish Government, in development of 
article 51 of the Constitution and consumer protection regulation. See http://www.consumo-inc.es/ 
1046 See http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/organos.htm 
1047 See http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/organos.htm 
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presented by certain products; and a Contact Committee on product safety,1048
Whenever a producer or distributor wants to report information about a certain 
product risk it must file an on-line form on the web-site of the INC,
 which 
interacts with producers and distributors on product safety issues.  
1049
During 2007, Spain's product safety authorities dealt with 2225 product-safety 
procedures for non-food products,
 and the INC will 
initiate an assessment of whether safety measures should be adopted and will circulate the 
notification to other product safety authorities of Spain's autonomous communities as 
well as the authorities of other European Union member states.  
1050 609 of which were initiated by the Spanish 
autonomous communities and 1616 by the authorities of other European Union member 
states. There were also 316 notifications provided voluntarily by producers and 
distributors.1051
 
 The 2007 notifications and the notifications of prior years resulted in the 
withdrawal of 488,294 product units from the Spanish market. No information is 
available about safety measures or penalties, other than product withdrawals.  
 
4.9 Looking for effectiveness: deciding between surveillance and enforcement 
mechanisms under the GPSD  
 
One of the most interesting features of the GPSD is that it places responsibility for 
pre-market and post-market obligations on different agents. During the pre-marketing 
phase producers and distributors lead the process and are the ones responsible for 
                                                 
1048 See http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/organos.htm 
1049 See http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/formularioNotificacion.jsp 
1050 Last information available is for the year 2007. These notifications represented an increase of 39% with 
respect to the notifications received during 2006. See Red de Alerta, Notificaciones de productos de 
consumo no alimenticios que pueden suponer un riesgo para la seguridad de los consumidores, at 12. The 
document is available at http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/informacion/pdf/resumen2007.pdf 
1051 See Red de Alerta, Notificaciones de productos de consumo no alimenticios que pueden suponer un 
riesgo para la seguridad de los consumidores, at 12. The document is available at http://www.consumo-
inc.es/Seguridad/informacion/pdf/resumen2007.pdf 
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ensuring that the products they market are safe and comply with applicable rules. 
However, in the post-marketing phase, it is the member states that are primarily 
responsible for monitoring products that reach the market and for ensuring that product 
safety rules are enforced.1052 While producers and distributors still have obligations in 
this phase, their roles are secondary to those of the states.1053
Some parameters might affect the efficacy of the post-marketing controls. The 
structure of domestic product safety authorities is not homogeneous among the different 
member states, which themselves range from centralized to decentralized or federal 
systems. At the same time, coordination problems may arise when several governmental 
departments are potentially responsible for monitoring consumer products.
  
1054 The failure 
of some member states to have a system of sanctions for non-compliance with the general 
safety obligation1055 is remarkable and there is a surprising lack of information and 
transparency about the producers who have been sanctioned.1056
                                                 
1052 See Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 206, Oxford 
University Press (2005) for a complete overview of the actors involved in product safety in all kind of 
products.  
 Further, the 
1053 Article 5(1) of the GPSD. 
1054 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 182, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
1055 For example, the French Consumer Code in articles 221-225 does not include a sanction for breach of 
the general safety obligation.   
1056 In fact a few years ago there was a case in Spain regarding sunflower oil. In that case, the Spanish 
government authorities issued a warning recommending consumers not to use sunflower oil because of the 
possibility of it being toxic and asking supermarkets and distributors to remove the bottles from the shelves 
so that consumers would not have access to this product. However, when asked about what specific brands 
and kind of sunflower oil that were supposedly toxic authorities did not disclose such information and did 
not inform about the measures adopted or penalties imposed on the manufacturers or importers of this kinds 
of oil. A few days later such warning was lifted and sunflower oil is now available in stores. For more 
information see International Herald Tribune, april 26, 2008, Spain issues health warning about tainted 
sunflower oil, The Associated Press, http://iht.nytimes.com/articles/ap/2008/04/26/europe/EU-GEN-Spain-
Tainted-Sunflower-Oil.php?scp=1&sq=sunflower%20oil%20spain&st=cse; El Pais 01/05/2008, Arcadio 
Silvosa, Sanidade paraliza 3.000 kilos de aceite de Ucrania, 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/Sanidade/paraliza/3000/kilos/aceite/Ucrania/elpepiautgal/20080501
elpgal_6/Tes; El Pais, 22/05/2008, Ricardo M de Rituerto, Bruselas prohíbe las importaciones de aceite de 
girasol de Ucrania. Kiev es incapaz de garantizar una exportación libre de contaminantes, Brussels 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Bruselas/prohibe/importaciones/aceite/girasol/Ucrania/elpepisoc/2
0080522elpepisoc_6/Tes.  
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identification of the producer on the product or its packaging1057 is an important element 
for ensuring traceability but is not a mandatory obligation in all member states.1058 In 
light of an increasingly global market, there is a need for further coordination of market 
surveillance regulation between member states including the cooperation with custom 
authorities.1059
The problem may ultimately stem from a lack of political will to contribute to the 
success of this system. This was recognized by the European Council as early as 
1994,
  
1060 when it stated that there was a lack of mutual confidence and transparency 
between the different administrations, and that this created problems and endangered the 
efficient and uniform enforcement of Community legislation affecting the functioning of 
the internal market across the member states. The Commission also has pointed out 
significant weaknesses in market surveillance under the 1992 GPSD.1061
 
 For that reason, 
in light of the failure of the member states to create appropriate domestic surveillance 
mechanisms, the amended GPSD included enhanced enforcement mechanisms. However, 
so far this does not seem to have completely solved the enforcement problem of the 
GPSD.  
                                                 
1057 Article 5(1)(a) of the GPSD. A New Legislative framework decisions makes it obligatory for the name, 
registered trade name or registered trademark of the producer or imported as well as their address to be 
indicated in the product. See Decision 768/2008/EC, Annex I, Articles R2(6) and R4(3). 
1058 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of 
the Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general 
product safety, 13, COM (2008) 905 final. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/prod_legis/docs/report_impl_gpsd_en.pdf 
1059 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of 
the Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general 
product safety, 13, COM (2008) 905 final. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/prod_legis/docs/report_impl_gpsd_en.pdf 
1060 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Development 
of Administrative Co-operation in the implementation and Enforcement of Community Legislation in the 
Internal Market, COM (94) 29 final, 16.2.1994; adopted by the Council Resolution of 16 of June 1994 on 
the Development of Administrative Co-operation in the Implementation and Enforcement of Community 
Legislation in the Internal Market, OJ C179/1,1.7.1994. 
1061 Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Experience Acquired in the 
Application of the Directive 92/59/EEC on General Product Safety, COM (2000) 140 final. 
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5 Challenges Presented by the GPSD 
 
Assessing the impact and effectiveness of the safety regime the GPSD establishes 
is a difficult task.1062 The European Commission provides information regarding 
notification procedures and dangerous products, including these products' countries of 
origin and the kinds of danger they present. What is not available, however, is any data 
regarding product risks, effectiveness of monitoring and market surveillance, costs that 
the safety system imposes on European and domestic authorities, or the quantity and size 
of the penalties imposed. Without such data, it is difficult to make an evaluation and to 
suggest potential reforms that could be implemented so that the effectiveness of the 
system could be enhanced.1063
In 2005 Europe celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the New Approach and 
held a conference
 Additionally, product safety is one of the main bases of 
European consumer protection, the other being product liability. In light of the interaction 
between these two regulatory bodies, being able to assess the functioning and analyze the 
performance of the product safety regime is crucial to improving the effectiveness of the 
overall European consumer protection system.    
1064 at which the European Commission's vice president for enterprise 
and industry, Günter Verheugen, stated that the New Approach had been successful and 
defended the extension of this regulatory model to industrial products.1065
                                                 
1062 Some suggest that the GPSD has shown a positive impact on product safety. See Alberto Cavaliere, 
Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, European Journal of Law 
and Economics, 18: 299–318, 313 (2004). 
 This was in 
1063 Other authors have also argued that more information and more data is necessary for evaluating the 
performance of the regime and that a European Product Safety Agency should be created. However, such 
agency has not been created. See Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
SAFETY, 258-259, 261 Oxford University Press (2005). 
1064 The program of the conference is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newapproach/new_approach_conference_en.htm.  
1065 Günter Verheugen is the Vice-President of the European Commission Responsible for Enterprise and 
Industry. The closing Speech at the European Conference on the 20th Anniversary of the New Approach 6 
(Nov. 30, 2005) is available at  
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line with the opinion of the European Commission, in a recent evaluation of the 
implementation of the GPSD, which concluded that the Directive has proven to be a 
powerful tool for ensuring a high level of consumer protection.1066
Mr. Verheugen also pointed out flaws in the system, including a lack of 
confidence by consumers in the CE marking in certain product sectors and the unequal 
implementation of the system by member states.
 
1067
 
 The lack of uniform implementation 
by the member states centers on two major issues: the definition of a safe product, which 
mostly impacts the pre-marketing phase, and the informational obligation imposed on 
producers and distributors, which mostly impacts the post-marketing product phase. 
These obligations, based on concepts that are essential to both the product safety regime 
and the product liability regime, should be further clarified and specified under this 
regulation so that producers know what they are exposed to and consumers are able to 
better assess the level of product risks and hence are able to have accurate expectations 
regarding product risks and product safety.   
 
5.1 How does the producer know a product is safe? 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/pdf/verheugen_%20speech_%20anniversary_%20naga.
pdf See also Günter Verheugen, Exchange of views of Vice-President Verheugen with the Internal Market 
and Consumer protection Committee (IMCO) European Parliament Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection Committee European Parliament,  Brussels, 14. September 2006. This speech can be found at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/500&format=HTML&aged=1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
1066 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of 
the Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 on general 
product safety, 12, COM (2008) 905 final. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/prod_legis/docs/report_impl_gpsd_en.pdf 
1067 Despite its challenges, voices defend that the consumer safety regulation in the United States should 
look at the European product safety regulation in light of its successful balance between consumer 
protection and free market protection. See in general Anthony Scascia, Safe or sorry: how the precautionary 
principle is changing Europe’s consumer safety regulation regime and how the United States’ Consumer 
Product Safety Commission must take notice, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 689 (2006). 
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The concept of safe product is a key element of the product safety regime. If a 
product is safe, the product may be marketed with no problem and the producer and 
distributor will have only the obligation to gather information and report product risks 
that become known after the product has been marketed. It should be noted that a safe 
product may still result in the manufacturer’s liability in cases where the product is 
deemed defective and such defect causes harm to a product user.1068
It is sometimes said that the concept of a safe product in the GPSD is more 
objective than the concept of a defective product under the product liability directive
  
1069 
because while the latter concept hinges on consumer expectations, the former is not based 
on them.1070
However, the definition of safe product is quite vague and it is difficult to 
establish the risks that should be taken into account when qualifying a product as unsafe. 
In the pre-marketing phase, it is only for product manufacturers to decide that a product is 
has passed the risk-utility test
  
1071 and is therefore safe under the GPSD.1072
The GPSD does not include any guideline for conducting the product’s risk 
assessment and how the different knowledge about risks during the product’s life will be 
considered. In other words, products are evaluated under the risk-utility test before they 
are marketed but once the product is in use and it has come to the attention of 
 Public 
authorities only intervene once the product is already in the market.  
                                                 
1068 See Chapter 6 of this dissertation. For an analysis of the interaction between the concepts of safe and 
defective product.  
1069 Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. 
(L210) 29. 
1070 Geraint Howells, Consumer safety in Europe: in search of the proper standards, in LEGAL VISIONS OF 
THE NEW EUROPE, B. Jackson and D. McGoldrick (eds), Graham & Trotman (1993). Other scholars have 
suggested the introduction of the concept of consumer expectations in the content of the general product 
safety obligation. See H-W. Micklitz, Principles of Justice in Private Law Within the European Union” in 
Principles of Justice and the Law at the European Union, 284-286, E. Paasivirta and K. Rissanen (eds.), 
Institute of International Economic Law, University of Helsinki, (1995).  
1071 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 98, Oxford 
University Press (2005).  
1072 The GPSD does not include any mechanisms or guidelines to ensure that producers place only safe 
products in the market. See Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
SAFETY, 98, Oxford University Press (2005).  
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authorities,1073 risks are assessed again. But the GPSD does not refer to how the potential 
hindsight problems will be handled.1074
The European Commission has recognized this problem and has qualified it as the 
risk assessment problem, and in 2006
 The lack of definition of risk assessment 
procedures by the European Commission may sometimes lead to subjective results as 
well as in discrepancies among the risk assessors -- the producers and member states -- as 
to a product's safety.  
1075 it initiated a revision of the risk assessment 
guidelines that are part of the RAPEX system. In doing so, it created a Working Group 
named IRAG (Improvement of Risk Assessment Guidelines)1076 that identified the risk 
assessment problems and made some proposals that included guidance on risk 
assessment. However, the revision of the risk assessment processes has not yet been 
finalized.1077
 
 
 
5.2 The information obligations under the GPSD and the Product Liability 
Directive: What information is needed to comply with both directives?  
 
Another important aspect of the GPSD is the obligation of producers to provide 
information to consumers about product risks throughout the product's foreseeable period 
                                                 
1073 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 98, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
1074 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL 
LAW & ECONOMICS, 100-112, Cass Sunstein (Ed.), Cambrigde University Press (2000). 
1075 European Commission (SANCO) issued the report Establishing a Comparative Inventory of 
Approaches and Methods Used by Enforcement Authorities for the Assessment of the Safety of Consumer 
Products Covered by Directive 2001/95/EC on General Product Safety and Identification of Best Practices, 
Final Report (2006). This document can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/serv_safe/reports/risk_assessement_methods_en.pdf 
1076 Information about this working group and the European Commission workshop on risk assessment 
celebrated on December 2007 where the results of the working group where presented see, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/committees/index_en.htm 
1077 After incorporating the first comments, the Guidelines were  put to a public internet consultation in 
2008.  
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of use.1078 This is an especially important area because if the producer complies with this 
obligation and warns of a product risk, this action may relieve it from potential liability 
for the harm the product might cause. If information about product risks is provided, then 
the product will not be deemed defective for inadequate warnings and instructions1079
However, the obligation regarding information and warnings of product risks 
presents a classic problem that law and economics literature has tried to answer: How to 
determine when a risk is significant enough that information should be given about it, and 
in what level of detail should such information be given. That is, what is the amount of 
information that should be provided so that the informational obligation is fulfilled.
 and 
the manufacturer will therefore not be liable for the potential harm caused by not 
providing the information -- the instructions and warnings -- regarding these product 
risks.  
1080 
Providing too little information would not induce consumers to adopt an optimal level of 
care but giving too detailed and excessive information regarding risks would not lead to 
an optimal outcome either.1081
The silence of the GPSD seems to leave this question open and subject to the cost-
benefit analysis that product manufacturers will conduct when they gather the 
information about their products and distribute it among consumers.
  
1082
                                                 
1078 Article 5(1) of the GPSD. 
 The GPSD seems 
to rely on the optimal result that will theoretically be reached when product 
manufacturers weigh the marginal costs of obtaining information about product risks with 
1079 Article 7(f) of the product liability directive. 
1080 Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, 79-121, 
Harvard University Press (1994). 
1081 W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 6, Washington, DC: American Enterprise 
Institute (1984). Viscusi understands that most product risks are easily perceived so providing information 
should pose little problem except for health risks. 
1082 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 121, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
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the expected utility they will gain when complying with this obligation.1083 Consequently, 
manufacturers will invest in finding information about their product risks up to the point 
where the marginal cost to acquire the information equals what they save in terms of 
expected liability.1084
However, even assuming that the amount of information provided was optimal, 
there is still some inconsistency regarding the information that must be provided in both 
the pre-marketing and the post-marketing phases that may influence the effectiveness and 
overall performance of the European product regulation regime.
 
1085
All of the informational mechanisms included in the GPSD seem to imply that 
producers, when they apply the risk-utility test to their products, have information of all 
the risks presented by their products, even of those that do not arise from foreseeable 
product uses.
   
1086 However, this is an unrealistic assumption; even if feasible, it would not 
be economically affordable because it would represent incredibly high costs that would 
not be invested if they were higher than the expected liability the producer would 
save.1087 Therefore, in light of the importance of such duty both from the product safety 
and the product liability perspective, it would be necessary for European authorities to lay 
down the content and scope of this obligation so that its application is uniform across 
states and manufacturers know the informational standard to which they are subject and 
can conduct a proper cost-benefit analysis and internalize the economic consequences of 
compliance with their duties under the European product regulation regime.1088
                                                 
1083 Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 184, Aspen eds., 6th ed. (2003). Marginal costs are 
unitary costs. See also Hal R. Varian, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, A MODERN APPROACH, 218-221, 
360, W.W. Norton (1999).  
  
1084 Expected liability is determined by the probability of the damage and its magnitude. (Expected liability 
= P*L). See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 167, Aspen eds., 6th ed. (2003). See also 
Hal R. Varian, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS, A MODERN APPROACH, 218-221, 360, W.W. Norton 
(1999). 
1085 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 140, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
1086 Article 2(b) and article 5.1 of the GPSD.  
1087 Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 169-170, Aspen eds. (6th ed. 2003). 
1088 Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 141, Oxford 
University Press (2005). 
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The product safety regime is closely related to the product liability regime 
currently in force and it is not possible to analyze and evaluate the structure and 
performance of European product liability law without presenting and discussing the two 
regimes together. Only after this analysis it will be possible to evaluate European product 
regulation law as a whole, to assess whether its goals are being achieved, and to suggest 
how it might be improved.  
I will turn now to present the interaction between the ex ante product safety 
regulation described and discussed in this chapter and the ex post liability law discussed 
earlier in this thesis. 
 
CHAPTER 5 APPENDIX  
 
Table 5.4 
Total Number of RAPEX Notifications Circulated 2001-2009 
 
 
 2001 2002 2003 20041089 2005  2006 2007 2008 2009 
TOTAL 76 84 139 468 847 1051 1605 1866 1993 
Article 12 0 0 67 388 701 924 1355 1545 1699 
 
 
 
Table 5.5 
Total RAPEX Notifications and Notifications by Spain 2001-2009 
 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
RAPEX 
NOTIFICATIONS 
TOTAL 
76 84 139 468 847 1051 1605 1866 1993 
Notifications Spain     38 42 79 108 163 220 
 
                                                 
1089 It should be noted that according to the report 2004, total number of notifications in 2004 is 388 even 
though in the subsequent RAPEX reports elaborated by the Directorate General of Health and Consumers 
such number -- 388 -- refers to the notifications under article 12 and the total number of notifications in 
2004 being 468. See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2004 Annual report on 
the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/reports/report_rapex_04_en.pdf 
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Table 5.6 
Type of Measure by Number of Notifications 2006-2009 
 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
Compulsory measures 531 643 775 901 
Voluntary measures 378 669 736 752 
Compulsory measures complemented by 
voluntary corrective action 15 43 34 46 
TOTAL NUMBER OF MEASURES 924 1355 1545 1699 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
INTERACTION BETWEEN SAFETY AND LIABILITY RULES: THE JOINT 
USE OF EX ANTE AND EX POST PRODUCT REGULATION 
 
 
European product regulation operates at three major phases of a product's 
lifecycle: before the product has been marketed, while it is being marketed, and after it 
has caused harm to a consumer or other user. Regulation of the first two phases is 
dominated by product safety law -- safety standards themselves in the pre-marketing 
phase, and notification obligations and enforcement mechanisms in the marketing phase. 
Regulation of the third phase is dominated by product liability law. Of course, there is 
also overlap in the phases to which each body of law applies, and there are also 
interactions between the two bodies, with their ex ante and ex post orientations.1090
European consumer protection legislation, as a whole, and each body of law 
individually, aims at minimizing product risks by ensuring that only safe products reach 
the market and that injured victims receive compensation if a product causes harm. The 
literature generally distinguishes between four different mechanisms for minimizing 
product risks: the market, self regulation, government regulation, and tort law.
 This 
chapter examines these interactions. 
1091
The literature on market-based mechanisms predicts that when markets function 
relatively well and information is available, consumers and users presented with 
otherwise substitutable products of the same price will choose the ones with the lowest 
  
                                                 
1090 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) arguing for a smaller role of the 
tort system when reducing risks. 
1091 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
277-90 (1987) distinguishing between ex post and ex ante mechanisms as well as between privately or state 
initiated mechanisms. See also Michael Baram, Liability and its influence on designing for product and 
process safety, Safety Science 45, 11–30 (2007). 
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risks and the aggregate demand created by these choices will provide feedback to 
producers regarding consumer preferences for design and safety.1092 The critique of this 
approach is that, as an empirical matter, markets have not produced optimal levels of 
product risks. While one may dispute what how optimality should be measured, there is 
strong evidence that consumers often lack perfect information and many markets do not 
function according to the classical model.1093
As an alternative to market regulation, the literature on self-regulation looks to 
safety standards voluntarily adopted by producers.
  
1094 Self-regulation has often been used 
in industries where corporate and professional associations prefer to establish their own 
safety standards to avoid government-imposed regulation.1095
                                                 
1092 See generally Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1437 (2010) defending the market as the best mechanism to create incentives to manufacture safe 
products. See also John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The easy case for products liability law: 
a response to professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1919 (2010) challenging the effectiveness 
of market mechanisms in creating incentives for safety.  
 Self-regulation is similar to 
government safety regulation in that it operates largely in the pre-marketing phase, before 
the harm occurs, and self-regulation is arguably more effective than government 
regulation because the industry often possess better information about products than does 
1093 The performance of market forces in creating incentives for safety have been broadly discussed in the 
literature and today there still seems to be remarkably different perspectives on this issue. For one of the 
most recent discussions see Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 
123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010) defending the market as a mechanism -- even if not perfect -- to create 
incentives to manufacture safe products; John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The easy case for 
products liability law: a response to professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1919 (2010)  
challenging Shavell and Polinsky’s approach and Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, A Skeptical 
attitude about product liability is justified: a reply to professor Goldberg and Zipursky, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1949 (2010). 
1094 This would be an ex ante privately initiated mechanism. See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 277-90 (1987). 
1095 For the use of self-regulation in Europe see Paul van der Zeijden and Rob van der Horst, Self-
Regulation Practices in SANCO Policy Areas (2008) available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/self_regulation/docs/self-reg-SANCO-final.pdf and The Current 
State of Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation in the Single Market,  EESC pamphlet series (2005). See also 
Andrzej Baniak and Peter Grajzl, Industry Self Regulation, Subversion of Justice, and Social Control of 
Torts, 23-24 (2007). This article is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031324 arguing that when public 
legal institutions are vulnerable to subversion, delegating regulatory authority to the industry appears 
superior to governmental standard setting and courts imposed liability and arguing in favor of self-
regulation as a desirable institutional arrangement in developing and transition economies. See Edward 
Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, Journal of Economic Literature, 41:2, 401-
425, 420 (2003) arguing that in such cases, no government intervention and hence the functioning of the 
market alone would be the best way to minimize risks.  
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the government. On the other hand, there are obvious reasons to be skeptical that 
industries will voluntarily achieve socially optimal levels of risk, given the bottom line 
pressures and incentives for profit.   
A third mechanism for minimizing product risks, of course, is government safety 
regulation, including ex ante standards and sanctions for non-compliance.1096 The theory 
here is that governments are in the best position to set and enforce socially optimal risk 
levels.1097 Whether this, in fact, occurs, depends on the functioning of the democratic 
process.1098 One clear weakness is the vulnerability of government decision-makers to 
pressure from industry.1099 Attempts to guard against this problem include the creation of 
independent standardization bodies or agencies.1100
The final mechanism for risk minimization is ex post tort law,
   
1101 based on the 
incentives for care created by exposure to liability for the harm caused by defective 
products.1102
                                                 
1096 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
277-90 (1987). See also Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010) arguing that safety regulation is an effective mechanism to minimize product 
risks. For a skeptical view of this argument see John C. P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The easy 
case for products liability law: a response to professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1919 
(2010). 
 However, the effectiveness of the deterrent effect of tort liability strongly 
depends on the victim’s pursuing their liability claims, the information available to courts 
1097 This outcome will be achieved in cases where both the level of care and the accident occurrence are 
observable. But whenever one of these two parameters is not observable, the first best will not be achieved. 
Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet, On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post 
liability, Economics Letters 84, 232 (2004). 
1098 For example, whenever courts are easy to influence and manipulate, the creation of safety incentives by 
the market is considered to be a socially optimal policy over other available alternatives. See Edward 
Glaeser and Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, Journal of Economic Literature, 41:2, 401-
425 (2003). 
1099 When governments are weak, industry self-regulation may be superior than government standard 
settings or courts imposed liability. See Andrzej Baniak and Peter Grajzl, Industry Self-Regulation, 
Subversion of Justice, and Social Control of Torts (2007). This article is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031324 
1100 An example of these independent bodies could be the three European standardization bodies such as the 
European Committee of Standardization (CEN), the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). 
1101 This would be an ex post, privately initiated mechanism. See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 277-90 (1987). 
1102 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984). 
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so that court errors are minimized and the probability of tortfeasors being judgment proof 
and hence unable to compensate the victim for the harm suffered.1103
As explained in chapters 2 and 5, the mechanisms used in Europe to minimize 
product risks are ex ante government regulation (based on safety standards framed within 
a general obligation of introducing safe products to the market)
 
1104 and ex post product 
tort liability.1105 These mechanisms, driven by the aspiration for a single market, share 
the goal of creating incentives to minimize product risks and hence product-related 
accidents.1106 At the same time, the two mechanisms are fundamentally different:1107 
While product safety is a regulatory body based on ex ante safety standards and fines 
applicable once a product is deemed dangerous, product liability is an ex post liability-
based regime that aims at creating incentives for investing in care1108 as well as 
compensating victims for the harm caused by defective products.1109
In Europe, these two bodies, being applicable to different phases of a product's 
life, interact and share common goals: bringing safe product to the market while 
 
                                                 
1103 See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional 
Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) suggesting that 
the limitations of liability under tort are not present in other mechanisms such as ex ante regulation. See 
also Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 402, Aspen eds., 5th ed. (1998).  
1104 It should be noted that the GPSD also imposes post-marketing obligations given that there is a 
monitoring and an obligation to provide information regarding product risks known after the product has 
been marketed. See Recital 17 and Article 5(1) of the GPSD. 
1105 The European consumer protection model uses tort law to compensate injured victims of product 
accidents. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government 
regulation, and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 68 (1989) discussing the 
compensation role of tort law and arguing in favor of using alternative compensation mechanisms. 
1106 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984). 
1107 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, 
num. 2, 54 (1991) arguing that the fundamental difference between tort law and regulation stems on 
procedures -- regarding who decides, when and based on what information --, not on their essence.  
1108 See Walter Oi, The Economic of Product Safety, Bell Journal of Economics and Management, vol.4, 
num 1, 3-28 (1973) for one of the first contributions on the relationship between liability and prices. Oi 
argued that given the tortfeasor’s internalization, in the product context this will imply that product prices 
will reflect the expected liability manufacturers are exposed to. 
1109 See generally William Landes and Richard Posner, The positive economics theory of tort law, 15 
Georgia Law Review 851 (1981), Steven Shavell, Strict liability versus negligence, 9 Journal of Legal 
Studies 1, 1-25 (1980). 
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minimizing the amount of defective products that cause product related accidents.1110 
Product liability, consistent with the deterrence and corrective justice goals of tort law, 
further aims to provide compensation to injured victims of defective products.1111
Law and economics literature have long viewed the two accident-minimizing 
mechanisms -- regulation and litigation -- as substitutes in deterring potentially harmful 
conduct. Today, as is the case with European product regulation, legal mechanisms often 
present a mix of regulation and litigation approaches, the performance of which will 
depend on the contexts in which they are applied. When the two mechanisms interact, it 
is possible that they will interfere with one another and jeopardize their shared goals. 
However, it is also possible for the complementary use of these two mechansims to be 
socially advantageous.
  
1112
From a theoretical perspective, the effectiveness of their joint use depends on the 
specific context in which the interaction takes place and on many parameters such as the 
availability of information concerning the product risk, the potential amount of damages 
the product may cause and the likelihood of product victims pursuing their claims. But 
the effectiveness of the interaction between product safety and product liability also 
depends on whether the specific strengths of each legal mechanism are coordinated.  
  
This chapter analyzes the regulatory context in which the product liability 
directive operates and the impact and effects of the interaction of ex ante product safety 
regulation with ex post product liability law in Europe. This chapter will further discuss 
how the two legal mechanisms could be better coordinated in order to enhance their joint 
performance.   
 
                                                 
1110 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984) for 
one of the first contributions analyzing the performance of each instrument. 
1111 See generally Gary Schwartz, Mixed Theories of tort law: affirming both deterrence and corrective 
justice, 75 Texas Law Review 1801 (1997). 
1112 Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law and 
Economics 20, 371-382 (2000). 
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1. The functioning of ex ante regulation and ex post liability as risk-minimizing 
mechanisms 
 
When producers introduce a product in the market, the product may increase the 
risk of harm to consumers and users. This increase in risk can be characterized as a 
negative externality derived from the market transaction.1113 Determining the most 
efficient way of dealing with this externality has been the focus of a broad literature in 
economics and, particularly, in the economic analysis of law.1114
Product safety regulation and product liability aim to minimize accident risks and, 
hence, create optimal incentives for product manufacturers to invest in product safety: 
safety regulation requires the potential injurer to take measures to prevent the accident 
from occurring while liability deters product accidents by making the potential injurer 
liable for the costs of such accident.
 
1115 Further, product liability aims to provide 
compensation for victims of accidents caused by defective products. Thus, product safety 
essentially impacts accident deterrence and product liability impacts both accident 
deterrence and victim compensation by making product manufacturers internalize the 
harm caused by defective products whenever product victims pursue their claims. 
Regulation has effects before the accident takes place while liability operates once the 
product accident has occurred as a consequence of a product defect.1116
                                                 
1113 John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, Journal of Legal Studies, 2, 323-50 (1973); 
Peter Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 Journal of Legal Studies 107-64 (1974) and Guido Calabresi, 
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press 
(1970) were the first authors who presented an analytical model of the use of liability as an instrument for 
controlling externalities.  
 In this sense, 
regulatory standards focus on establishing safety standards and not on compensating the 
1114 See, for example, W. Kip Viscusi, The Regulation–Litigation Interaction, AEI Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies Working Paper 01-13 (2001). Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=292645. 
1115 W. Landes and R. Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic Personal Injuries, Journal 
of Legal Studies 13, 417-434 (1984).  
1116 In a way, regulation and ex post liability becomes an example of the distinction between private and 
legal enforcement. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 Journal of Legal 
Studies 2, 357 (1984). 
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injured victim, assuming that such compensation will be provided by other means such as 
insurance, either private or public. In contrast, litigation aims at, in addition to making 
tortfeasors internalize the harm they cause, awarding compensation to the injured victim 
for the harm suffered.1117
The performance and effectiveness of product safety regulation in making product 
manufacturers invest in prescribed levels of care depend on whether a regulatory standard 
forces product manufacturers to invest a certain amount of care that may or may not be 
set at the optimal level. Likewise, product liability’s effectiveness in creating incentives 
for accident deterrence depends on whether product manufacturers are subsequently 
exposed to liability.  
 
 
 
1.1 Ex ante regulation  
 
Regulatory standards aim to modify the behavior of potential tortfeasors before 
harm occurs regardless of whether harm ever takes place.1118 The introduction of an ex 
ante regulation determining the required level of product safety is then justified not solely 
because a product presents risks, fails and causes accidents.1119
Government regulation of ex ante product safety is characterized by centralized 
government decisions about the level of investment in care that should be required for a 
  
                                                 
1117 W. Kip Viscusi, The Regulation–Litigation Interaction, AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies Working Paper 01-13 (2001). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=292645. 
1118 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984). 
1119 Michael Spence, Consumer misperceptions, product failure, and producer liability. Review of 
Economic Studies, 44(3):561-72 (1977); Mark Geistfeld. Manufacturer moral hazard and the tort-contracts 
issue in products liability, International Review of Law and Economics, 15:241—252 (1995); Steven 
Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Harvard University Press (2003). Some authors 
have suggested the possibility of limiting or even eliminating product liability under tort in favor if a 
contractually-based liability. See George L. Priest. Can absolute manufacturer liability be defended? Yale 
Journal on Regulation, 9:237-263 (1992) and Paul H. Rubin, Courts and the tort-contract boundary in 
product liability, in Frank Buckley, ed., THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, Duke University 
Press (1999) and see generally Abraham L. Wickelgren, The inefficiency of contractually-based liability 
with rational consumers, 22 J.L. Econ & Org. 168 (2006). 
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given product.1120 Thus, when ex ante regulation is used, the government defines and 
uniformly implements a safety standard that it has previously determined.1121 The 
government’s role does not end here, though. Once the safety standard is defined, it will 
aim to provide product manufacturers and potential tortfeasors with incentives to comply 
with the standard.1122 In order to ensure compliance, the government will establish 
sanctions for non compliance, and enforcing these sanctions requires monitoring 
behavior.1123
When designing a safety standard, the ultimate goal is for the standard to create 
incentives for firms to invest in care so that accidents are minimized and to realign social 
and private incentives. When the safety standard accomplishes this goal, it is considered 
to be optimal. In order for a safety standard to be optimal, the marginal cost of additional 
care induced by the regulation should be equal to the expected reduction of harm 
resulting from the additional care.
 Hence, ex ante regulation requires an active government role in designing 
safety standards, encouraging and monitoring compliance and imposing sanctions for 
non-compliance. 
1124
In order to reach optimality, agency officials need information.
  
1125
                                                 
1120 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini, Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument 
Choice in Environmental Policy in A. Heyes, ed., LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT, Edward 
Elgar Publishing Ltd, 416pp. (2001).  
 The 
availability, amount and kind of information are the biggest problems regulatory 
1121 In contrast, under tort, judges assign cases individually. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the 
law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no 2, 54 (1991). 
1122 See Jacob Nussim and Avraham D. Tabbach, Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation versus Ex-
Post Punishment, 46 Review of Law and Economics 4:1, 56 (2008) arguing that, in the criminal context, ex 
post punishment creates two opposing effects on incentives to comply awith the rule: increasing the price of 
avoidance of the rule while at the same time, increasing the benefit from investing in avoidance of the ex 
ante regulation of the criminal conduct. 
1123 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48, 30 (2004). 
1124 See Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand J. Econ. 
15(2), 271-280, 275-278 (1984) and Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984). 
1125 Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation. Rand Journal of 
Economics 15(2), 271-280 (1984) noting that whenever regulators do not have perfect information about 
risks, the safety standard will not be optimal.  
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standards present.1126 When performing risky activities, it is not uncommon that 
tortfeasors will have private information about the level of harm as well as about the 
probability of an accident. Regulators need this same information in order to establish 
optimal standards; if the regulator lacks information about either the probability or the 
level of harm it will not be in a good position to establish optimal standards.1127 However, 
it should be noted that despite the often incomplete information government agencies 
have when they establish standards of care, government regulation might still be an 
effective institution for centralizing and generating information regarding the risks 
presented by certain kind of products as well as for disseminating such information and 
hence assisting private parties’ as they take decisions.1128
But even when the government has perfect information about accident risks, 
government agencies often are too rigid in their structure to adjust standards to new 
technological developments. In addition, government agencies often must rely on expert 
advice and may be subject to pressure and potentiall "capture" by the regulated 
parties.
  
1129
                                                 
1126 Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of product safety and imperfect information, the Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5:2, 683-688, 685 (1974). 
 Moreover, government standards are uniformly set across different parties; to 
the extent that these parties present varying levels of risk, the standards cannot hope to be 
1127 The agency reference model has been proposed as a way to solve the informational problem of 
government agencies. This model suggests the creation of a repository of agency information focusing on 
the nature of the agency’s cost-benefit determinations as well as the economic consequences of the 
different safety government regulations. In light of this information available, courts would look at the 
agencies in order to obtain the empirical information necessary when taking decisions. See Catherine M. 
Sharkey, Products liability preemption: an institutional approach, 76 The George Washington Law Review 
101, 104-105, 134 (2008). 
1128 This is especially true in cases where information regarding risks is especially complex. In these kinds 
of cases, government regulation presents a comparative advantage with respect to litigation given the poor 
performance of the judicial system in producing risk-related information. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a 
diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and contemporary risks to health 
and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 75 (1989). 
1129 See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell. J. Econ. Man. Sci. 335 (1974). 
presenting different versions of capture theory and Michael E. Levine, Regulatory Capture, in 3 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 267 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). For a 
discussion of regulatory capture in the context of environmental policy see Marcel Boyer and Donatella 
Porrini, Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy 
in A. Heyes, ed., Law and Economics of the Environment, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 416 (2001).  
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optimal for all of them.1130
An additional aspect to be considered in the design of safety standards is the level 
of specificity of the law establishing the required level of care.
 Hence, global optimal standards are practically an 
unachievable goal.  
1131 In this sense, the 
literature has often differentiated between standards and rules. A standard is open ended 
so that the adjudicator might make determinations based on the circumstances of the 
specific case.1132 A rule is more specific and its application is more uniform and leaves 
no discretion to the adjudicator of the case.1133 The difference between these two kinds of 
ex ante government safety regulations is important given that they entail different kinds 
of costs relevant depending on the case. Hence, rules are more costly to design but 
cheaper to adjudicate while the situation for standards is the opposite.1134 From an ex ante 
perspective, rules provide better guidance to the subjects of the law, and from an ex post 
perspective, standards may be better able to adapt to the varying circumstances of the 
case.1135 The aggregate cost between design and determination of compliance should 
control the legislature’s determination.1136
As mentioned earlier, regulation entails not only designing the safety regulation 
but also enforcing compliance -- or controlling avoidance -- as well as imposing sanctions 
 
                                                 
1130 Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of 
Economics 15(2), 271-280, 273 (1984). 
1131 Francesco Parisi, Harmonization of European Private Law: An Economic Analysis, Minnesota Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 07-41 (2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014385 
1132 An example of a standard would be the general obligation of safety established by the GSPD in article 
3.2 of the GPSD and where compliance is established considering the specific circumstances of the case.  
1133 En example of rules would be the essential safety requirements included in some New Approach 
Directives. See Francesco Parisi, Vincy Fon and Nita Ghei The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 131–148 (2004) showing that the optimal level of specificity of laws 
increase when they are applied and interpreted by specialized courts.  
1134 Francesco Parisi, Harmonization of European Private Law: An Economic Analysis, Minnesota Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 07-41 (2007). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014385 
1135 Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi, On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules, George Mason University 
School of law, Law Studies Research Paper no. 04-32. This paper is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=569401 
1136 See Issac Ehrlich and R. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, Journal of Legal Studies 
3, 257-286 (1974). See also Vincy Fon and Francesco Parisi, On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules, 
George Mason University School of law, Law Studies Research Paper no. 04-32. This paper is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=569401 
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whenever pertinent. Both activities entail administrative costs.1137 When monitoring 
whether agents are complying with the level of safety required by government regulation, 
the government must decide how often to monitor, when to monitor and whether to 
observe care, the occurrence of an accidence, or both events. It must, further, choose the 
sanctions to impose in light of the information available.1138 Hence, safety regulation 
entails public costs in terms of maintaining regulatory agencies and the private costs of 
compliance. In contrast, the public cost of a liability system includes administrative 
expenses incurred by private and by public parties.1139
The administrative costs of regulation are incurred regardless of whether harm 
occurs. In this sense, ex ante regulation of care might be more efficient than imposing ex 
post liability for harm given that the government’s enforcement of regulation sanctions 
all negligent conduct while liability only plays a role when an accident occurs, harm takes 
places and the victim pursues a claim. As a result, the required level of care can be 
obtained with a smaller investment in monitoring.
  
1140
When monitoring or ensuring compliance, governments rely on observable 
variables in order to decide whether or not to impose sanctions. In this sense, whether 
care is observable or whether the occurrence of the accident is observable will condition 
  
                                                 
1137 Establishing product safety standards induces product manufacturers to invest so that they are not 
punished for non-compliance -- or avoidance. It should be noted that the costs of controlling avoidance or 
compliance are different from increasing the costs of avoidance. See generally Chris Sanchirico, Detection 
Avoidance, 81 New York University Law Review 1331 (2006).  
1138 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48, 30 (2004). See also Jacob 
Nussim and Avraham D. Tabbach, Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation versus Ex-Post 
Punishment, 46 Review of Law and Economics 4:1 (2008) arguing that, in the context of criminal detection 
and punishing, the probability of detecting and punishing a crime is positively correlated with the 
probability of detecting and ex post punishing avoidance. 
1139 Liability, in this sense, presents an important advantage given that most of administrative costs under 
liability are only incurred whenever harm occurs. Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini, Law versus 
Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy in A. Heyes, ed., 
Law and Economics of the Environment, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 416 (2001). 
1140 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48, 31 (2004). See also Steven 
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984). 
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the government strategy as well as the administrative costs of implementation of the 
government regulation.1141
In sum, although ex ante government regulation may be far from optimal as a 
result of imperfect information, the potential for agency capture, and the inefficiency of 
uniform application across varying parties, it has the potential, nonetheless, to 
significantly contribute to reducing product risks and hence to minimizing product-
related accidents.
  
1142
 
 
 
1.2 Ex post tort liability  
 
Eliminating product risks entirely is neither possible nor economically 
efficient.1143 An efficient level of risk reduction is one where the marginal costs of care 
equal the marginal benefits -- or marginal savings in expected harm and hence, expected 
liability. A liability system aims to create incentives for producers to control risks by 
internalizing expected damage costs (expected liability) in the form of production 
costs.1144
There are two major liability rules: strict liability and negligence. A pure strict 
liability system imposes liability for harm upon proof of the existence of the harm and of 
  
                                                 
1141 In cases where both the level of care and the accident occurrence are observable, the first best outcome 
will be reached but whenever one of these two parameters is not observable, the first best will not be 
achieved. Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet, On the optimal use of ex ante regulation 
and ex post liability, Economics Letters 84, 232 (2004). 
1142 See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010) arguing that product safety regulation contributes to reducing product risks and 
hence product-related accidents.  
1143 Jean C. Buzby and Paul D. Frenzen, Food safety and product liability, 24 Food policy, 637-651, 638 
(1999). 
1144 Liability is often questioned because of the availability of liability insurance and its potential impact on 
diluting the incentives created by the liability tortfeasors are exposed to. But even when tortfeasors insure 
against those risks, they still have incentives to invest in care and hence reduce risks because the insurance 
premiums often reflect the long-term risks they generate. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of 
tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale 
J. on Reg. 65 (1989). 
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a causal relationship between this harm and the torfeasor’s conduct.1145 Strict liability 
creates incentives for internalizing risks through the expected liability tortfeasors are 
exposed to, that is equivalent to the compensation awarded to the injured victim for the 
harm suffered. Under strict product liability, for example, product manufacturers will 
optimally invest in care and risk reduction depending on the expected liability to which 
they are exposed and on the cost of care. They will not invest in care when the cost of 
care is higher than the reduction in expected liability, as they would prefer to compensate 
victims for damages suffered than to invest in care, and hence risk reduction, that would 
be costlier than these damages.1146 In contrast, liability under negligence depends on the 
tortfeasor not acting in accordance with a set standard of care.1147
The effectiveness and performance of liability under tort is based on the deterrent 
effect of the damages and liability to which tortfeasors are exposed when damage 
occurs.
 
1148 Under liability, the care taken by parties is a function of the harm they may 
cause. So the level of care is expected to increase with the increase of the potential harm 
caused by the tortfeasor as long as the level of liability the firm is exposed to is lower 
than the firm’s assets.1149
The deterrent effect of tort law further depends on whether firms are able to 
anticipate the damage awards to which they will be subject whenever they cause harm. If 
information is perfect, potential tortfeasors can anticipate the probability of harm and its 
magnitude and hence the liability that courts will impose. Under these assumptions, 
 
                                                 
1145 It also presents some disadvantage in cases where victims may be spread and the amount of damages 
too small so that they would not have incentives to pursue their claims or harm could be latent and appear 
after the statute of limitations of the claim expired. In these cases, tortfeasors would no internalize the harm 
they caused and hence would not adopt the optimal level of care they ought to and the deterrent effect of 
strict product liability would not be efficient. See Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini, Law versus 
Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy in A. Heyes, ed., 
Law and Economics of the Environment, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 416 pp. (2001).  
1146 See Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1099 (2007). 
1147 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48, 30 (2004). 
1148 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J Legal Stud. 2, 357-374 (1984). 
1149 Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of 
Economics 15(2), 273 (1984). 
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investment in care will be optimal so that they can minimize their exposure to 
liability.1150
But perfect information is a very strong assumption. For example, when talking 
about products, the probability of harm does not only depend on product manufacturers 
but also depends on consumers.
   
1151 Hence, the probability of harm is not totally 
controlled by product manufacturers. So when some assumptions are relaxed and the 
analysis is more realistic, tortfeasors are not assumed to be able to assess all these 
parameters and hence internalize the harm they cause through the tort system, and 
consumers are not assumed aware of all the information about product risks and the 
potential harm they are exposed to when using such product.1152
Together with imperfect information, additional parameters also undermine the 
deterrent effect of tort liability. These include the fact that not all victims pursue their 
liability claims, the probability of court errors and the probability of tortfeasors being 
judgment proof and hence unable to pay out damages that are awarded.
  
1153
                                                 
1150 This is true when only compensatory damages are considered. Some have argued in favor of using 
punitive damages as an additional instrument to create incentives to invest in product safety given the 
public’s interest in safe products. Further, the lack of insurance policies insuring for punitive damages 
could become a factor to reduce future hazards if manufacturers were forced to internalize potential liability 
for punitive damages they could not be shifted to insurance companies. See Alan I. Widiss, Liability 
Insurance Coverage For Punitive Damages?  Discerning Answers To The Conundrum Created By Disputes 
Involving Conflicting Public Policies, Pragmatic Considerations And Political Actions, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 
455, 503 (1994). 
  
1151 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and 
Market Power, Bell Journal of Economics, The Rand Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589 (1983) 
comparing the effect of different liability regimes – strict liability, negligence and no liability – on the 
investment in safety and concluding that whenever consumers perceive the probability of harm to be lower 
than it is, it is socially optimal to shift liability to consumers in order to achieve a socially optimal 
equilibrium. See also  Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of 
Insurance Policies, 48 William and Mary Law Review 1389, 1400 (2007). This article is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=923423 
1152 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 83 (1989). 
1153 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) arguing that the limitations 
of tort liability are such that policy makers should rely on regulation to achieve accident minimization. See 
also Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 402, Aspen eds., 5th ed. (1998) noting that the fixed 
costs of lawsuits of tort liability is a strong argument in favor of regulation.  
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First, liability does not create optimal incentives for the adoption of care because 
not all victims file tort claims in court. This results in tortfeasors not fully internalizing 
the costs of the harm they cause.1154
When some victims do not pursue their claims under tort and hence the 
probability of being sued is lower than one, the tortfeasor´s exposure to liability is lower 
than the harm caused and liability is not efficient because the tortfeasor´s investment in 
care is lower than the socially optimal level.
 Regulation and liability are structured around the 
need for third party action for their implementation. Regulation is required ex ante and 
compliance is required regardless whether harm has been caused; the third party action in 
the case of regulation is government action. In contrast, in order for liability to be 
imposed, harm needs to have occurred and the victim needs to pursue a claim. 
1155 The lower the probability of being sued 
by an injured victim, the larger is the difference between the individual and the socially 
optimal investment in care.1156 Further, even if victims pursue their tort claims, harm may 
not always be traced to its cause and tortfeasors may escape from being held liable.1157
Second, courts may commit errors in determining whether the victim’s harm was 
caused by the tortfeasor’s conduct and in assessing the level of damages. Sometimes the 
damage awards determined by courts do not always reflect the actual damages suffered 
by injured victims. The difference between these two levels of damages distorts the 
incentives of the tortfeasors for care and hence on the deterrent effect of liability under 
 
                                                 
1154 Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of 
Economics 15(2), 271-280 (1984). 
1155 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 357-374 
(1984). See also Eric Helland and Jonathan Klicky, The Tradeoffs between Regulation and Litigation: 
Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, Journal of Tort Law, vol. 1 issue 3 (2007). 
1156 Further, the private and social incentives for brining a legal claim are often different. When a party is 
deciding whether to pursue her legal claim, it does not take into account the legal costs that he induces 
others to incur and that would be a negative externality -- like for example, the social costs of using the 
courts or the defendant’s legal costs -- and the positive externalities such as the deterrent effects on other 
potential tortfeasors that would result if the claim was brought. See Steven Shavell, The fundamental 
divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal system, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575, 589-
579 (1997). See also Eric Helland and Jonathan Klicky, The Tradeoffs between Regulation and Litigation: 
Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, Journal of Tort Law, vol. 1 issue 3 (2007). 
1157 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48, 31 (2004). 
  273 
tort. If the tort system created efficient deterrence, it should compensate all injured 
victims for the actual amount of harm suffered.1158 Tort law is sometimes considered 
ineffective in areas where courts may have difficulties regarding certain technical issues, 
as for example, products liability.1159 In cases like this, ex ante regulation is considered to 
have some advantages compared to liability under tort.1160
Third, the likelihood of a tortfeasor being judgment proof undermines the 
deterrent effect of tort liability as well. If there was no risk of the tortfeasor´s bankruptcy 
and a suit was always brought against the tortfeasor, tort liability would be optimal.
 
1161 
But whenever tortfeasors do not have enough assets to pay for the damages awarded 
against them, tort liability cannot create optimal incentives for care given that these 
tortfeasors do not fully internalize the total amount of damage they cause and adopt care 
only up to the level of damages they will be able to pay. In these cases, limited assets 
may mean limited care.1162
The tortfeasor’s judgment proof problem does not imply that tortfeasors do not 
internalize any liability. Tortfeasors internalize the liability level they can afford 
considering their assets and will determine their investment of care considering the level 
  
                                                 
1158 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 83 (1989). 
1159 Peter Huber, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, New York: Basic Books, 
(1988) and W. Kip Viscusi, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim Compensation 
and Risk Regulation, Yale Journal on Regulation, 2, 53-81 (1984).  
1160 See Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante 
Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (1990), 
888-901 developing a model of evidentiary uncertainty of the judicial standard of care. It should be noted 
that this argument for regulation is generally not robust enough to the optimal design of liability 
alternatives. See Aaron S. Edlin, Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent 
under comparative negligence?, International Review of Law and Economics, 14, 21–34 (1994) showing 
that despite the presence of evidentiary uncertainty, efficiency may be achieved with the implementation of 
negligence under tort as long as the negligence standard is set optimally.  See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Regulation and the Law of Torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2, Papers and Proceedings 
of the Hundred and Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association pp. 54 -58, 55 (1991).  
1161 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 357-374 
(1984).  
1162 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 83 (1989). 
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of liability they effectively will be able to afford.1163 Hence, beyond that expected level 
of harm, tortfeasors become judgment proof and will not increase their investment in care 
even when it is socially optimal for them to do so.1164
In cases where the tortfeasor’s judgment proof problem might be likely, 
regulation will become a better alternative because compliance with the regulatory 
standard is determined ex ante, that is, before the tortfeasor engages in the risky 
activity.
 
1165 Consequently, while the effectiveness of liability under tort is influenced by 
the potential bankruptcy of the tortfeasor, regulation is not affected by it because of the 
moment compliance is required.1166 Hence, regulation would be preferred in these 
cases.1167
The limitations of tort liability as a mechanism for deterrence of product-related 
accidents have been widely discussed in the literature.
 
1168
                                                 
1163 The level of care adopted in these cases will be lower than the socially optimal level of care that should 
be adopted. See Patrick W. Schmitz, On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, International 
Review of Law and Economics, 20:3, pp. 371-382 (2000) showing that whenever firms have heterogeneous 
assets, it may be optimal to supplement liability with regulation in order to increase the level of care poor 
firms would decide to adopt.  
 Some authors have argued that 
product liability might not create incentives to invest in product safety in addition to the 
1164 Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand J. Econ. 15(2), 
271-280, 275-278 (1984) and Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal 
Stud. 2, 357-374 (1984). 
1165 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357, 360 (1984). 
1166 Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements and Compulsory Liability Insurance as Solutions to the 
Judgment-proof Problem, Rand Journal of Economics, vol. 36, num 1, 67-77, 74-75 (2005) noting that 
direct safety regulation and criminal liability could be instruments to combat the judgment-proof problem 
and encouraging research on the determination of which instrument would perform better and considering 
whether a combination between them would be advantageous. 
1167 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984). 
1168 See George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND 
POLICY, 184, 187-94 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford L. Winston eds. 1988) studying the effect of the 
significant increase in product liability litigation during the 1970 and 1980 on accident rates. See also  
Donald N. Dewees, David Duff & Michael Trebilcock, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OFACCIDENT 
LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY, 202-05 (1996) and Mark Geistfeld, Products Liability, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, vol. 1, § 11.11, Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. (2009) intending to 
asses the impact of product liability on product-related accidents and concluding is not able to draw 
conclusions. See also Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010) arguing, based on limited evidence and limited literature, that product liability 
has had a marginal influence on product safety.   
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ones created by ex ante regulation and market forces in the form of loss of reputation.1169 
Ex ante regulation already requires product manufacturers to make certain investments in 
product safety, and these may not be enhanced by the incentives created by product 
liability.1170 Additionally, market forces will create incentives for product manufacturers 
to invest in safety given that consumers, through the information reflected by product 
prices, will choose products that entail a high level of safety.1171 The reputation that 
product manufacturers will lose as a consequence of manufacturing risky products 
already creates incentives for them to invest in product safety.1172 This is especially true 
in widely sold products, where consumers have a higher level of information regarding 
product risks and hence on their level of safety.1173
Despite an understanding of the limitations presented by the tort system as a 
deterrent mechanism, European regulators chose a tort liability regime for product-related 
accidents and adopted a strict liability system (at least facially) in the product liability 
  
                                                 
1169 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437 (2010) presenting some examples and arguing that market forces and ex ante product safety 
regulation might be sufficient to create optimal incentives for product safety for widely sold products such 
as drugs, automobiles and consumer appliances and that, in these cases, product liability might be 
undesirable. But in products not widely sold, market forces and regulation might not be sufficient to 
encourage an optimal level of safety and product liability could be socially beneficial.  
1170 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 
1472 (2010) arguing that the more widely sold product are, the bigger the regulator’s interest in adopting ex 
ante product safety regulation; the more information the regulation will have regarding risks presented by 
the product and the more accurate safety requirements will be.  
1171 It should be noted that cognitive biases may decrease the consumers’ ability to assess product risks and 
hence the impact of market forces on the incentives to invest in product safety. The more information 
consumers will have regarding product risks, the lower the impact of cognitive biases and the better the 
assessment of product risks. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A 
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998) and Matthew Rabin, 
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Literature 11, 24-31 (1998) analyzing the individual’s cognitive 
biases.   
1172 See Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 300 (2004) arguing that corporate reputation also 
plays a role in creating incentives for accident deterrence.  
1173 The importance of market forces in creating incentives for investing in product safety strongly depends 
on the information available to consumers regarding product risks or on whether they have contracted first 
party accident insurance. See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS, 24-33 (1970) and later developed by Jon D. Hanson and Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party 
Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129, 159-68 
(1990). One of the most recent contributions is Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for 
product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1451-1453 (2010). 
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directive. Product manufacturers are held liable for the harm caused by the products they 
market regardless of the adopted level of care as long as there is a determination that the 
product is defective. The underlying economic premise of strict product liability is that 
firms have incentives to produce safer products if they must fully compensate people 
harmed by them.1174 This potential liability is part of the firms’ anticipated costs of 
operation and firms will take the optimal amount of precautions when they intend to 
minimize them.1175
The asymmetric distribution of information between consumers and product 
manufacturers has also been an argument in favor of the adoption of the strict product 
liability regime. Product manufacturers are considered to have more and better 
information on product risks than consumers and hence are deemed to be in the position 
to most efficiently avoid accidents involving the products they manufacture and to 
provide instructions and warnings.
  
1176
 
 
 
2. The joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability: from substitutes to 
complements 
   
Ex ante regulation and ex post liability are very rarely applied individually.1177
                                                 
1174 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, 
no 2, 56 (1991) differentiating between strict liability and strict product liability, that requires a 
determination of product defect.  
 An 
example of the joint application of these mechanisms is European product regulation. In 
1175 For an application of these arguments to food products see Jean C. Buzby and Paul D. Frenzen, Food 
safety and product liability, 24 Food policy, 637-651 (1999).  
1176 Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1099 (2007). 
1177 In light of the limitations presented above regarding the application of regulation and liability, their 
joint use aims at better minimizing risks through the creation of efficient incentives. See Steven Shavell, 
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984) and Steven Shavell, A 
Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand J. Econ. 15(2), 271-280, 271 (1984).  
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light of the interaction of ex ante regulation and ex post liability in practice,1178 the law 
and economics literature on this issue has evolved in analyzing performance when both 
mechanisms are used together.1179
As shown in the previous section, the nature of these two mechanisms is 
significantly different and it is difficult to determine which instrument performs better in 
general terms because the advantages of each of the mechanisms depend on the context in 
which they operate, on the specific circumstances of the risk being regulated, and on the 
level of harm to which potential victims are exposed.
 This theoretical analysis will be very useful when 
analyzing the joint performance of European ex ante product safety and ex post liability 
and the potential improvements that could be made to the regulatory model. 
1180 Indeed, the differences in nature 
and performance between regulation and tort law as risk minimization mechanisms are 
essentially based on the amount and scope of the information needed, whether such 
information is available, which procedures -- whether judicial or administrative -- are 
relevant and what costs they entail, and finally, whether the remedies of each mechanism 
-- penalties and damage awards -- should cumulate or should be set off.1181
                                                 
1178 Ex ante and ex post instruments are frequently used jointly when minimizing the negative externalities 
caused by product related accidents. See in general Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, 
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (1990), pp. 888-901, section III. 
  
1179 See Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand J. Econ. 
15(2), 271-80 (1984) and Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal 
Studies 2, 357-74 (1984). 
1180 Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244 (1999). See also Andrew F., Daughety and 
Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products liability, signaling and disclosure, Vanderbilt University working paper 
no. 06-W25, 2 (2006) focusing on the incentives of both instruments in discloseing information about 
product risks and concluding that the performance of ex ante information regulation or the reliance on ex 
post liability depends on whether the firm faces substantial liability for the consumer’s harm. 
1181 See John P. Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 2, No. 
2, 323-349 (1973), Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 
1, 107-164 (1974), Donald Wittman Prior Regulation versus Post Liability: The Choice between Input and 
Output Monitoring, 6 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 193-211 (1977), Robert Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser, and 
David Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information and the Role of Precedent, Bell Journal of Economics, 
10, 366-73 (1979), Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 2, 357-374. (1984) and Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety 
Regulation, The Rand Journal of Economics 15(2), 271-280 (1984) for a discussion of the efficiency 
aspects of regulation and liability for minimizing the externalities. 
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Under perfect information of product risks, ex ante safety regulation can be 
optimal in the sense that the standard of care can be set at the optimal level and create 
optimal incentives for care.1182 In this case, safety regulation would be equivalent to tort 
liability since under both systems the tortfeasor would internalize the expected harm and 
hence would optimally invest in care.1183
When information is imperfect, the decision between ex ante regulation and ex 
post liability becomes complex. On one side, ex ante regulation may be inefficient 
because of the impossibility of setting the safety standard at the optimal level or the 
impossibility of verifying whether a product manufacturer or a tortfeasor has complied 
with such safety standard. Under these circumstances, liability is often considered to 
perform better than ex ante regulation given the information asymmetry between the 
regulator and the members of the industry where the industry is better informed than 
regulators regarding product risks, their probability of occurring, the cost of reducing 
such risks and the amount of product-related damages.
 
1184
Further, whenever the tortfeasor’s private information regarding product risks 
reflects a heterogeneous level of risk across tortfeasors, the optimal level of care should 
also be heterogeneous depending on the level of risk presented and hence liability would 
perform better than a uniform safety standard in these cases.
 
1185
                                                 
1182 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 71 (1989). 
 When the level of risk 
1183 In both cases, regulation and strict liability, a contributory negligence defense may be necessary. A. 
Mitchell Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 70, No. 2, 363-367 (1980). 
1184 See Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante 
Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 888-
901 (1990) noting that if ex ante regulation was used combined with ex posed liability under negligence, 
the level of care set by the regulation should be lower than if the ex post negligence rule was used alone.   
For additional literature on the issue see Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 
J. Legal Stud. 2, 359 (1984); Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety 
Regulation, Rand Journal of Economics, 15(2), 271-80 (1984); Martin L. Weitzman, Prices Versus 
Quantities, Review of Economic Studies, 41, 477-91 (1974) and Susan Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: 
A Critique, Canadian Journal of Economics, 6, 512-28 (1973). 
1185 However, if the tortfeasor’s heterogeneity would entail significantly high enforcement costs, liability 
would not necessarily be preferred to regulation. Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and 
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presented by tortfeasors is diverse and the regulatory standard is uniform for all of them, 
the application of the standard would result in over-regulation of tortfeasors that cause 
small accidents and under-regulation of tortfeasors that cause large accidents.1186 As a 
result, the investment in safety would also be inefficient given that tortfeasors causing 
small accidents would over-invest in care while tortfeasors causing a high level of 
accidents would under-invest in care.1187 From this perspective, when uncertainty is 
considered, liability under tort seems to perform better than ex ante regulation because it 
can better adjust to the specific circumstances of the case.1188
Additionally, the performance of ex ante regulation and export liability is also 
conditioned on the emergence of new risks. When new risks appear, liability seems to 
perform better given that information regarding the new risks could not be included in 
previously drafted safety standards.
 
1189
In order to create incentives to adopt action when new risks arise, product 
manufacturers are often subject to recall obligations so that they have incentives for 
recalling dangerous products or for withdrawing them from the market
 
1190 even though 
such obligations might result in too little recalls relative to the social optimum.1191
                                                                                                                                                 
the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 
24(1), 29-48, 46 (2004). 
 The 
argument is that product manufacturers have information -- that may or may not be public 
-- about product risks when the product has been marketed. Further, product 
manufacturers are aware that courts may or may not be able to determine whether there is 
1186 Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante 
Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. 888-
901, 894 (1990). 
1187 Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. 888-901, 895 
(1990). 
1188 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984). 
1189 Michael Baram, Liability and its influence on designing for product and process safety, Safety Science 
45, 11–30, 12 (2007). 
1190 The GPSD includes recall obligations for product manufacturers when new product risks appear. See 
recitals 16 and 23 and article 3(4) and 5(1) of the GPSD.   
1191 Omri Ben-Shahar, How Liability Distorts Incentives of Manufacturers to Recall Products (2005), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=655804 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.655804 
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a causal relationship between the product and the harm the victim suffered or even 
whether the victim increased the probability of harm. The uncertainty over these variables 
implies that the liability to which the manufacturer is exposed in practice is lower than 
what a given liability rule provides. Hence, the manufacturer has low incentives to recall 
products even when aware of new product risks. Further, even when otherwise 
determined to recall products, the manufacturer knows that such recall may spark some 
lawsuits that might not have been otherwise filed.1192
With respect to complex risks, sometimes private parties may have better 
knowledge of benefits and costs of reducing the risk of the activity in question. When that 
is the case, a liability system has the advantage of creating incentives to optimally invest 
in care given that parties have optimal information to avoid over-investing or under-
investing in care.
 Consequently, manufacturers will 
be reluctant to recall products and decide to leave the product in the market and be 
exposed to the liability for harm. As a result, the purpose of tort liability regarding 
recalling risky products might have the opposite effect than the one it intended. 
1193 If, in contrast, regulators have better knowledge of the risks 
involved in an activity because of the possibility of centralizing the information and 
decisions, regulation would be superior to liability given that public authorities may have 
higher expertise in establishing regulatory standards than individual judges when 
determining whether to impose liability in a certain case.1194
                                                 
1192 Because such recall may be interpreted as a confession of the manufacturer that the product is harmful 
and consider that the injury they suffered might have been caused by the product and not for other causes. 
See  Omri Ben-Shahar, How Liability Distorts Incentives of Manufacturers to Recall Products (2005), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=655804 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.655804 
 However, if the asymmetry 
of private information regarding risks is large, potential tortfeasors may be better 
informed than regulatory authorities regarding such complex risks and hence ex post 
1193 Marcel Boyer and Donatella Porrini, Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy Model of Instrument 
Choice in Environmental Policy in A. Heyes, ed., Law and Economics of the Environment, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, 416 (2001). 
1194 W. Kip Viscusi, The Regulation–Litigation Interaction, AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies Working Paper 01-13 (2001). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=292645.   
  281 
liability would perform better than ex ante regulation.1195
Ex ante regulatory standards and ex post liability are implemented independently 
from each other but the consequences and performance of each mechanism is linked to 
that of the other. There is an absence, however, of formal or informal mechanisms for 
coordinating their different roles.
 
1196
Neither ex ante regulation nor ex post liability alone leads all parties to exercise 
the socially desirable levels of care.
 This can be seen clearly in the case of European 
product regulation. 
1197 Their joint use may enhance the performance of 
each instrument1198 but the determination of the most efficient combination between ex 
ante regulation and ex post liability strongly depends on the specific circumstances of the 
risk being regulated and the level of harm to which potential victims are exposed.1199
The literature on this question has evolved from simple models based on the 
assumption of perfect information to more sophisticated models trying to introduce 
parameters that could better reflect the reality of government agencies when designing 
safety standards as well as the limitations faced by courts when establishing liability. The 
first contributions to the literature assumed perfect information under both regulation and 
 
                                                 
1195 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48, 46 (2004). 
1196 W. Kip Viscusi, The Regulation–Litigation Interaction, AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies Working Paper 01-13 (2001). Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=292645. 
1197 Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation. Rand Journal of 
Economics 15(2), 271-280 (1984) arguing that liability is inefficient due to the injurers’ limited wealth and 
court’s enforcement errors and regulation is inefficient because of the uniform care standard is applied to 
all injurers. See also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 
365 (1984) and Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and 
Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 1, 193, 193 (1977). 
1198 See Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of 
Economics 15(2), 271-280 (1984) for being the first to claim that a hybrid model of liability and regulation 
can do better than either of them alone. It should be noted that Shavell, in this first paper of 1984, strongly 
relies on the assumption that liability does not create optimal incentives because of enforcement errors. See 
Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 888-901 
(1990) also assuming that liability is inefficient due to the uncertainty about the court’s behavior.  
1199 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, 
no 2, 58 (1991) arguing for a comprehensive view of the relationship between tort law and statutory 
regulation in order to achieve deterrence and compensation. 
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liability.1200
The law and economics literature originally analyzed these two mechanisms as if 
they were substitutes
  
1201 for one another.1202 If both legal mechanisms were substitutes, a 
broad ex ante regulatory body would imply low litigation and at the same time, where 
there was no ex ante regulation, a significant amount of litigation should be expected.1203
For example, ex ante safety regulation aims to create incentives of care for 
potential tortfeasors so that the risk of an accident is minimized. When the standard of 
care is set at an optimal level, ex post liability is not necessary and the investment in 
safety will be optimal without it.
 
Hence, their joint use would not be necessary.  
1204
                                                 
1200 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, New Haven: Yale University Press (1970);  M.L. Weitzman, 
Prices versus Quantities, Review of Economic Studies 41, 447-491 (1974) and Donald Wittman, Prior 
Regulation vs Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 Journal of Legal Studies 
1, 193-212 (1977).  
 Consequently, exposing tortfeasors to liability is not 
optimal because such liability would require the same level of care set by the standard 
and hence would not provide any additional incentive to the tortfeasor regarding risk 
1201 The theoretical analysis on the optimal combination between regulation and litigation sometimes 
includes considerations of regulation and litigation as substitutes. Despite the lack of empirical evidence on 
whether regulation and litigation behave as substitutes in practice, in the context of class actions, there does 
not seem to be a tradeoff between regulation and litigation. Instead, evidence seems to suggest that 
regulation and litigation somehow induce levels of care that exceed the socially optimal. See Eric Helland 
and Jonathan Klicky, The Tradeoffs between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class 
Actions, Journal of Tort Law, vol. 1 issue 3 (2007). 
1202 The economics literature has characterized the harm caused by risky activities to third parties as an 
externality and suggested two instruments to reduce the impact of these externalities: regulation before the 
accident occurs, that is, regulation ex ante in the form of safety standards or Pigouvian taxes and ex post 
policies, in the form of tort liability. These instruments were often characterized as substitutes by the 
literature. See Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and 
Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 1, 193 (1977). Later developments in the literature discussed their joint 
implementation, not as substitute regulations but as complements. See Steven Shavell, A Model of the 
Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand J. Econ. 15(2), 271-280, 275-278 (1984) and Steven 
Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984). 
1203 So if ex ante regulation and ex post litigation were substitutes, one would expect that the higher the 
standard of care set by the regulation, the lower the role for litigation. See Eric Helland and Jonathan 
Klicky, The Tradeoffs between Regulation and Litigation: Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, Journal 
of Tort Law, vol. 1 issue 3 (2007). See also Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture and Tort Law: 
The Regulatory Compliance Defense, Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 2(1) (2000).  
1204 The optimal level of care will be achieved when either there is no ex post liability or the probability of 
bringing a tort claim is zero. Consequently, the regulatory standard alone will be optimal. See Mitchell 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010) arguing 
that product liability would be superfluous if the ex ante level of product safety is optimal.  
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reduction.1205
At the same time, ex post liability aims to create incentives for investment in care 
through the exposure to liability. Knowing that they will face liability, tortfeasors 
consider the probability of an accident and the liability amount and will have incentives 
to invest in care in order to avoid being held liable and having to compensate the injured 
victim.
 
1206 If liability would create optimal incentives for the adoption of care,1207 using 
in addition ex ante regulation would not be socially optimal.1208
Consequently, the choice between either mechanism in the early literature was 
conditioned only by the comparison between the imperfections of each mechanism and in 
light of their substitution; the optimal instrument was the one that would result in lower 
administrative costs.
  
1209
A second phase of this analysis in the literature was based on considering ex ante 
regulation and ex post liability as complements instead of substitutes. The 
complementary interaction between these two mechanisms may take place in cases 
where, for example, the law provides additional incentives for care whenever safety 
standards are not strict enough; where standards set minimum levels of safety and rely on 
litigation under tort to create incentives to adopt additional care or where regulatory 
standards are set at the optimal social level and litigation under tort imposes either strict 
liability or a standard of care lower than the one required by the regulation.
 
1210
                                                 
1205 Robert Innes, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-
ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics 24(1), 29-48 (2004). 
 
1206 This would be the case under, for example, a negligence tort rule. See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen eds. (2004).   
1207 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984). 
1208 This result is obtained under the assumption that all injurers face the same wealth constraint and hence 
are equally solvent. Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International 
Review of Law and Economics 20, 371-382, 372 (2000). 
1209 For a parallel analysis in the criminal law context see Jacob Nussim and Avraham D. Tabbach, 
Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation versus Ex-Post Punishment, 46 Review of Law and 
Economics 4:1 (2008). 
1210 In those cases, ex ante regulatory standards should be set at a level that, if regulation was used alone it 
would provide a suboptimal level of safety. If the regulatory standards were set at the socially optimal 
level, (meaning that the marginal costs of precaution were equal to the expected marginal benefits) the 
interaction with tort law would result in inefficient results. See Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary 
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A leading contributor in the analysis of the two mechanisms as complements was 
Shavell,1211 who showed that the joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability was 
socially advantageous considering that the use of either instrument alone did not result in 
the socially desirable level of care because of the information problems faced by 
regulatory agencies and the limitations of courts in determining liability.1212
Shavell noted that the efficient combination between ex ante regulation and ex 
post liability was strongly based on four different inefficiencies: the fact that the suit may 
not be brought against the injurer;
  
1213 the limited resources of the injurer and hence the 
possibility of the tortfeasor being judgment-proof;1214 the imperfect knowledge of the 
regulator regarding the damage, and the setting of one single standard of care for all 
tortfeasors presenting different levels of risk.1215
                                                                                                                                                 
V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4. (1990), pp. 888-901. at 891-92 
 For Shavell, the optimal complementary 
use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability followed from the limited efficiency of 
liability due to enforcement errors and from the tortfeasor’s potentially limited assets -- 
the judgment proof problem -- with the resulting possibility of escaping from liability as 
well as from the inefficient application of a single safety standard to all potential 
tortfeasors regardless their risk levels. These four scenarios represent the different 
combinations of ex ante regulation and ex post liability. 
1211 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984). 
1212 Models discussing the efficiency of each instrument separately such as the Shavell (Steven Shavell, 
Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud.2, 365 (1984)) concluded that liability is 
inefficient because of the risk of the tortfeasor’s judgment proof and regulation is also inefficient because 
the regulatory standard applies to all injurers uniformly while their behavior is different.  Some authors 
claimed that instead of substitutes, regulation and liability are complementary in a way that they may 
distort the effectiveness of each other. See Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz, Ex Post Liability for 
Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1027 (1998) presenting five propositions illustrating the distortion to the incentives 
to adopt care of ex post liability when ex ante regulation is available. 
1213 In these cases ex ante regulation would be preferred over liability. These would be cases where the 
harm was so diffused that individuals would have little incentive to sue and could not or would face great 
difficulties to organize class action lawsuits in order to seek compensation for the harm suffered.  
1214 In these cases ex post liability would not effectively create incentives to adopt care and hence deter 
accidents. Hence, ex ante regulation would be preferred to ex post liability. 
1215 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984). 
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The enforcement errors derived from not being able to verify compliance with the 
safety standard has been further analyzed in the literature. As mentioned above, whenever 
compliance with the safety standard cannot be observed, regulation might be inefficient 
because of moral hazard problems1216 and the joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post 
liability might be justified.1217 Regulation may result in over or under protection 
depending on the firm causing few or many accidents, while at the same time it may 
entail over or under investment in care.1218 In these cases ex post liability could be used 
to improve these inefficiencies1219 through a dual function: First, it would adjust the 
firm’s incentives to adopt the required level of care and at the same time, it would be a 
form of consumer insurance.1220
Firms would signal the safety of their products by providing information 
regarding the level of product risks
  
1221 and the potential damage they may cause.1222
                                                 
1216 If courts or adjudicators could not determine whether a firm has complied with the standard firms 
would not have incentives for compliance and for investing in care. Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and 
Jerome Pouyet, On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability, Economics Letters 84, 231–
235 (2004). 
 This 
information would benefit consumers that could have access to information regarding 
1217 Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet, On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex 
post liability, Economics Letters 84, 234 (2004). 
1218 Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 888-901, 894-
895 (1990). This result has led many authors to highlight the importance of setting the legal standard at the 
socially optimal level in order for negligence to create efficient incentives of precaution. Robert D. Cooter 
and Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, (1986). Available at: 
http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/25 
1219 Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain, Legal Standards, Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, 2, 279-303 (1986).  
1220 The problem of this approach is that the amount of optimal investment in care may not be equivalent to 
the optimal insurance for the consumer. See Michael Spence, Misperceptions, product failure and producer 
liability, the Review of Economic Studies, vol. 44, no 3, 561-572, 561 (1977) arguing that in order to be 
optimal, liability to the consumer should be supplemented with producer’s liability to the state.  
1221 Andrew F., Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products liability, signaling and disclosure, 
Vanderbilt University working paper no. 06-W25 (2006) deriving a relationship between the firm’s 
marginal cost in safety and the firm’s incentives to signal through prices or disclose through information 
and concluding that whenever the firm’s marginal cost is increasing in safety, a firm with a high-safety 
product should choose to disclose over signal through prices and choose the opposite when the firm’s 
marginal cost is decreasing. 
1222 Yolande Hiriart, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet, On the optimal use of ex ante regulation and ex 
post liability, Economics Letters 84, 234 (2004). 
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product risks that product manufacturers would not disclose if they did not have 
incentives provided by these two regulatory instruments to do so. 
Firms have private information about the level of product safety. Whenever firms 
do not voluntarily disclose the level of product safety, consumers might be able to infer 
the level of safety from the product’s price.1223 Product prices include, among other 
things, production costs as well as the manufacturer’s expected liability. Hence, the safer 
a product is, the lower the expected liability and the higher the product price will be.1224
When prices perfectly signal the firm’s investment in safety, consumers should be 
offered a lower price in exchange of higher risk and hence higher expected losses and 
should be asked for a higher price in exchange of a lower level of risk and hence lower 
expected losses.
  
1225 However, prices do not always reflect the firm’s safety 
investment.1226
                                                 
1223 There is a significant amount of literature analyzing the issue of firm’s disclosure of information 
regarding product risks. See Boyan Jovanovic, Truthful Disclosure of Information, Bell Journal of 
Economics 13, 36-44 (1982) assuming that the firm knows the product quality but its disclosure is costly. 
Kathleen M. Hagerty, and Michael J. Fishman. Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with 
Informed and Uninformed Customers, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19, 45-63 (2003) 
present a model in which disclosure and signaling are not substitutes (as they are in our model), but 
complements, due to an externality between different types of consumers; Mitchell A. Polinsky  and Steven 
Shavell, Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure of Product Risks, NBER Working Paper No. 12776  
(2006) where they analyze the impact of mandatory disclosure rule on the incentives to acquire it in a 
context where firms face liability for harm and can disclose information about product risks at no cost; 
Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Competition and Confidentiality: Signaling Quality in a 
Duopoly When There is Universal Private Information, in GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 58, 94 -120 
(2007); Andrew F., Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products liability, signaling and disclosure, 
Vanderbilt University working paper no. 06-W25 (2006) and Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. 
Reinganum. “Secrecy and Safety,” American Economic Review 95, 1074-91 (2005) assuming that the 
acquisition of information is costless but its disclosure is costly depending on the marginal cost of safety. 
The product safety level will be reflected by the product price. In their model, disclosure and signaling are 
substitutes.  
 There are cases where the firm has private information about the 
product’s safety and such information is not available to consumers. In these cases, prices 
1224 But this is not true when products are unsafe. When the firm faces a high level of expected liability, the 
higher the price should be. In order to avoid not selling products, the firm will signal safety by a lower price 
from its full information value. See generally Andrew F., Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products 
liability, signaling and disclosure, Vanderbilt University working paper no. 06-W25 (2006). See also 
Andrew F. Daughety, Jennifer F. Reinganum, Product Safety: liability, R&D and signaling, the American 
Economic Review, vol. 85 no. 5, 1187-1206, 1189 (1995). 
1225 Andrew F. Daughety, Jennifer F. Reinganum, Product Safety: liability, R&D and signaling, the 
American Economic Review, vol. 85 no. 5, 1187-1206, 1189 (1995). 
1226 Paul Burrows, Consumer Safety under Products Liability and Duty to Disclose, International Review of 
Law and Economics 12, 457-478 (1992). 
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are not a good mechanism to signal the firm’s investment in safety.1227
Sometimes, though, product manufacturers will have incentives to voluntarily 
disclose information about product risks. As long as the costs of disclosure are not 
prohibitive, the safer products are, the higher the incentives firms will have to voluntarily 
disclose their level of safety.
 
1228 The firm’s exposure to ex post liability, impacts the 
firms’ incentives to disclose the product’s level of safety. So when ex ante product safety 
regulation does not create optimal incentives to invest in safety, ex post liability may 
serve this function.1229
If the ordinary consumer faces low information costs and can judge product safety 
based on accurate information provided by the product manufacturer, the consumer's 
actual and reasonable expectations are equivalent.
  
1230 In a situation like this, products that 
allow for accurate expectations of safety should not be subject to subsequent liability 
under tort. But an ordinary consumer often cannot make an accurate assessment of safety 
because information costs are significant and products might be more dangerous than 
expected by the consumer.1231
                                                 
1227 Michael Baram, Liability and its influence on designing for product and process safety, Safety Science 
45, 11–30, 25, 29 (2007) arguing that the decision over design is one of the many decisions firms take and 
if such decision should be adopted with respect to product’s safety, a safer design should reduce the firm’s 
expected losses. Otherwise, the firm’s decisions over the product might not be adopted considering the 
product’s level of safety. 
 In such cases, the duties to warn about product risks as 
well as the consumer expectations test in force in European product liability play 
important roles in creating incentives for product manufacturers to provide a sufficient 
amount of product safety information so that they can avoid having their products 
1228 Andrew F., Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products liability, signaling and disclosure, 
Vanderbilt University working paper no. 06-W25, 18-19 (2006). 
1229 The consumers’ informational problem was one of the arguments used to justify the imposition of strict 
product liability on product sellers in the U.S. during the 1970s. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Products liability, 
New York University School Of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper NO. 09-
19, 320 (2009). 
1230 Mark A. Geistfeld, Products liability, New York University School of Law, Law & Economics 
Research Paper Series Working Paper NO. 09-19, 309 (2009). 
1231 Mark A. Geistfeld, Products liability, New York University School of Law, Law & Economics 
Research Paper Series Working Paper NO. 09-19, 309 (2009). 
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considered defective.1232 If the product’s level of safety is not the one the consumer is 
entitled to expect and causes harm, the consumer expectations test is not met and hence 
the product might be defective and liability will be imposed.1233 If some consumers are 
naively optimistic, they will always purchase a product as if it was of high safety and 
high safety firms will have less incentives to disclose safety information. Low safety 
firms will still not have incentives for voluntary disclosure.1234
In addition to the inefficiencies studied by Shavell, Kosltad, Ulen and Johnson
 Thus, the joint use of ex 
ante product safety regulation and ex post product liability might also be a way for 
creating efficient incentives for information disclosure. 
1235 
argued for the joint use of liability and regulation in light of the difficulty in defining the 
required standard of care and the risk that this results in firms choosing suboptimal care 
levels. Rose-Ackerman proposed three situations in which ex ante regulation and ex post 
liability could be complementary:1236
Schmitz
 First, tort may be used as a stopgap applicable in 
the absence of stringent safety statutes. Second, ex ante regulatory standards may be 
intended as minimums, with tort functioning to supplement them. Third, ex ante 
regulatory standards may be set at the optimal level, with tort imposing either strict 
liability or a negligence standard of care lower than the one required by the safety 
regulations.  
1237
                                                 
1232 It should be noted that this analysis is not applicable to bystanders, who do not have expectations about 
the product’s level of safety.  
 was critical with these analyses and argued that ex ante regulation and 
ex post liability did not have to be jointly applied because ex ante regulation alone could 
1233 See Mark A. Geistfeld, Products liability, New York University School Of Law, Law & Economics 
Research Paper Series Working Paper NO. 09-19, 309-310 (2009). 
1234 Andrew F., Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products liability, signaling and disclosure, 
Vanderbilt University working paper no. 06-W25 (2006). 
1235 Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4., 894-895, 888-
901 (1990). 
1236 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no 2, 
55 (1991). 
1237 Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law and 
Economics 20, 371-382 (2000).  
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always achieve a socially optimal outcome.1238
This is especially true in cases where wealth is uniform among tortfeasors.
 Liability could also result in efficient 
results as long as it was set to create optimal incentives. In cases where the optimal 
outcome could be achieved through the application of one instrument, it could never be 
advantageous to jointly apply ex ante regulation and ex post liability.  
1239 
Where tortfeasors have different wealth, liability would be preferred when tortfeasors 
have significant financial resources while regulation would be preferred when tortfeasors 
have limited ones.1240 Additionally, according to Schmitz, whenever parties are subject to 
ex ante regulation and ex post liability, tortfeasors will adopt the higher level of care 
derived from tort liability and hence it will be socially desirable to set the regulatory 
standard at a lower level than if ex ante regulation was used alone.1241 This result would 
hold as long as the level of care under regulation was verifiable and the level of harm and 
the tortfeasor’s wealth were also verifiable under tort.1242
Whenever ex ante regulation and ex post liability are jointly used, coordination 
might be needed in order to enhance the potential of each mechanism to create incentives 
  
                                                 
1238 Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law and 
Economics 20, 371-382, 372 (2000) questioning the model presented by Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. 
Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or 
Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 80, 888-901 (1990) and arguing that they 
could not explain why liability should be used at all given that their model of pure regulation could always 
reach and implement the socially optimal outcome.  
1239 See Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law 
and Economics 20, 371-382, 376 (2000). This result opposes the one obtained by Steven Shavell, A model 
of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of Economics 15(2), 271-280, 272 (1984) 
for which the joint use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability was optimal assuming uniform wealth 
across potential tortfeasors.  
1240 See Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law 
and Economics 20, 371-382, 376 (2000).  
1241 See Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law 
and Economics 20, 371-382 (2000). This confirms central conclusions Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm 
versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 357 (1984) and Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary 
V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 888-901, 894-895 (1990), even though the underlying logic is 
different.  
1242 Patrick W. Schmitz, On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International Review of Law and 
Economics 20, 371-382, 377 (2000).  
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for safety.1243 Without coordination, society will not invest optimally to achieve the goals 
of creating efficient incentives for risk minimization while at the same time providing 
appropriate compensation to injured parties.1244
 
 Such coordination depends on the tort 
law rule -- negligence or strict liability -- that interacts with ex ante safety regulations. 
The issues arising from ex ante regulation with negligence or with strict product liability 
are different and hence the optimal combination between them also differs.  
 
2.1 Ex ante safety regulation and negligence-based liability  
 
Under a negligence-based liability rule, tortfeasors are liable only for the harm 
caused when not complying with the standard of care required by the negligence rule. So 
in order to avoid being held liable, potential tortfeasors have incentives to comply with 
this rule. Ex ante regulation should be superior to negligence liability in cases where 
courts do not have access to sufficient information to determine the optimal level of care; 
but it should be inferior to negligence liability whenever the information obtained ex post 
is better than that available to the regulator ex ante when setting the level of due care.1245
The joint use of ex ante safety regulation and ex post negligence liability will 
result in firms modifying the investment in care in certain cases.
 
1246
                                                 
1243 See generally Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1437 (2010). See also Christopher Hodges, Competition Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: 
what is the case?, Common Market Law Review 43: 1381-1407 (2006) arguing that private liability 
litigation does not replace the function of ex ante regulation and in light of the overlapping scope of 
application of both instruments, the duplication of incentive mechanisms without coordination between 
them may result in inconsistencies.  
 Whenever the level 
of care required by ex ante safety regulation is equivalent to the one required by the 
1244 See in general W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government 
regulation, and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989). 
1245 Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 359 (1984). 
1246 Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 888-901, 900 
(1990). 
  291 
standard of negligence under tort, compliance with the standard will be the most efficient 
decision for the tortfeasor. In such cases, liability under negligence will not be effective 
and ex ante regulation will suffice.1247
If, instead, the level of care induced under negligence is too low and hence the 
level of accidents too high and the ex ante regulatory standard is higher than the standard 
set by the negligence rule, compliance with the ex ante regulatory standard will ensure 
avoiding liability under tort. But if the negligence standard under tort is higher than the 
standard of care set by the ex ante regulation, tortfeasors will comply with the negligence 
standard but the outcome will be inefficient
 
1248 and the existence of ex ante safety 
regulation will only exacerbate the inefficiency.1249
Another aspect that is worth noting is the impact of uncertainty regarding one or 
both standards of care on the tortfeasor’s level of care chosen.
 
1250
                                                 
1247 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no 2, 
57 (1991) 
 If, for example, the 
standard of care set by negligence liability is known by the potential tortfeasor and the ex 
ante government standard is not, the potential tortfeasor would decide to comply with the 
level of care under negligence to avoid liability. If, instead, the standard established by 
the regulation is known but the negligence standard under tort is uncertain, the injurer 
would reduce the investment in care because it would know that non-compliance with the 
1248 In such case, the marginal costs of safety set by negligence under tort will exceed its marginal benefits. 
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no 
2, 57 (1991). 
1249 Charles D. Kolstad; Thomas S. Ulen; Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety 
Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 4., 888-901, 898 
(1990). Obtaining the same result see also Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the 
Control of External Costs, International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 1999 at 238. See also 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2, 
Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association 
pp. 54 -58, 56 (1991) discussing the role of punitive damages in creating efficient incentives for care. 
1250 See Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 231 (1999) for the first discussion on the impact 
of uncertainty in the combination between ex ante regulation and negligence under tort.    
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negligence standard would not necessarily result in liability.1251
Consequently, it is not possible to draw general conclusions regarding the effects 
of the interaction between ex ante safety regulation and a negligence rule under tort given 
that their performance strongly hinges on the information available and on the context in 
which the interaction takes place.  
 
 
 
2.2 Ex ante safety regulation and strict liability under tort 
 
Whenever the liability rule under tort is strict liability instead of negligence, the 
tort system aims to minimize the accidents caused by products1252 through the creation of 
incentives for optimally investing in product safety based on the internalization of the 
expected liability to which tortfeasors are exposed regardless of their investment in care 
as a consequence of the compensation injured victims seek.1253
The amount of information available to the parties involved, including their 
perception of product risks, are key elements that will determine the performance of the 
strict liability system. Under perfect information, a strict liability rule will be optimal 
whenever damages are set to an amount equal to the harm caused by the tortfeasor. If an 
ex ante regulatory standard is added, the two mechanisms will not enhance their 
combined effectiveness. Their joint impact, instead, will be equivalent to that of each 
optimal mechanism functioning alone. 
  
In contrast, when the information about product risks is imperfect, the joint 
performance of ex ante regulation and ex post liability will depend on whether consumers 
                                                 
1251 In this case, certainty about the standard would improve the performance of the joint use of instruments. 
Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, International 
Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 235-236 (1999). 
1252 Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: the regulatory compliance defense, 
American Law and Economics Review 2(1), 6 (2000). 
1253 Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen eds. (2004) and Thomas J. Miceli, 
ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, Oxford University Press (1997).   
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can or cannot perceive product risks.1254 Some consumers will be able to correctly assess 
product risks (to the extent that such risks have not been eliminated by the ex ante safety 
standards) and they will decide whether they are willing to assume them. If consumers do 
not adequately perceive product risks, they may be eventually exposed to risks they did 
not knowingly choose to take. Whether more or less consumers are able to correctly 
perceive product risks will be crucial when determining whether the joint use of ex ante 
safety regulation combined with ex post strict liability is optimal. If consumers correctly 
perceive product risks and hence belong to the first group, strict product liability alone 
will allow them to decide whether they are willing to purchase cheaper but more 
dangerous products and hence the combination will be unnecessary.1255 But if consumers 
misperceive product risks, allowing them to negotiate the tradeoffs between price and 
safety will not be optimal for them. In these cases, introducing ex ante safety regulation 
could increase their welfare.1256
Consequently, depending on whether or not consumers can adequately assess 
product risks, introducing ex ante regulation together with strict product liability may or 
may not result in an increase in consumer welfare.  
  
 
 
2.3 Using ex ante regulation and ex post liability together: the decision over the 
compliance defense  
 
When ex ante regulation and ex post litigation are jointly used, one of the major 
questions that arises is whether their interaction enhances their individual performance 
                                                 
1254 Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of product safety and imperfect information, the Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5:2, 683-688, 685 (1974).  
1255 Walter Y. Oi, The economics of product safety, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, vol. 4, no. 1, 3-28 (1973).  
1256 Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of product safety and imperfect information, the Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5:2, 683-688, 687 (1974). 
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and if so, how the two mechanisms may be best coordinated.1257
One of the most important coordination mechanisms used is the compliance 
defense.
 As discussed above, the 
joint performance of the two mechanisms depends on context and circumstances in which 
these mechanisms are implemented.  
1258 This defense focuses on two major issues with evidentiary implications:1259 
whether a tortfeasor’s compliance with the regulatory standard should be a defense to 
subsequent liability under tort,1260 and whether non-compliance with the standard should 
amount to negligence per se under tort.1261 In the latter case, liability under tort is 
imposed not based on a specific liability rule but instead based on a violation of the 
regulatory safety standard.1262
When non-compliance with the safety standard constitutes negligence per se, 
parties have incentives to comply with the safety standard even when it is not optimal for 
them to do so. In these cases, imposing liability for non-compliance would clearly be 
inefficient because parties would not be investing optimally in care regardless of the 
liability rule under tort.
 
1263
                                                 
1257 Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: the regulatory compliance defense, 
American Law and Economics Review, 2(1), 6 (2000). 
  
1258 W. Kip Viscusi, The Regulation–Litigation Interaction, Working Paper 01-13, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=292645 (2001). 
1259 Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244 (1999). 
1260 In this case, the negligence standard could not be stricter than the regulated standard. Steven Shavell, 
Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 365 (1984).  
1261 In this case, the negligence standard could not be less strict than the regulated standard. See Steven 
Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 365 (1984). See also 
Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, International 
Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 228 (1999). 
1262 Two main factors will determine the outcome in preemption cases: the degree of consistency between 
the regulatory standard and the investment in care generated by liability and the perceived degree of 
independence of the agency defining the safety standard. See Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products 
Liability: a positive theory, Boston University School of Law, Working paper series, law and economics, 
no 03-17 (2007). 
1263 For a strong defense of the compliance defense that would shield firms from tort liability when 
complying with product safety standards see Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort 
Law: the regulatory compliance defense, American Law and Economics Review, 2(1), 6 (2000). 
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The compliance rule in European product liability law is that non-compliance 
with ex ante safety regulation triggers a rebuttable presumption of an unsafe product.1264 
In contrast, compliance with the standard is evidence of reasonable conduct but does not 
shield the tortfeasor from liability.1265
As can be observed, there is an asymmetry between the treatment of compliance 
with the standard and non-compliance with it. A possible justification for the different 
treatment might be the consideration of ex ante safety standards as minimum safety levels 
but not maximums. In other words, an injured plaintiff should be able to argue that a 
higher level of safety than the one required by the ex ante safety regulation should be 
applied in a certain case and hence liability should be imposed.
 In the product context, compliance with ex ante 
regulatory safety standards is evidence of investing in safety and hence of a safe product 
but may or may not result in subsequent liability.  
1266
Viewing the question more broadly, it is possible to distinguish three different 
forms of the compliance defense: First, compliance with product safety regulation could 
be a complete defense to ex post liability. Second, compliance could be incomplete, that 
is, could shield a product manufacturer from ex post liability or not depending on the 
circumstances. Finally, compliance could be a narrow defense that could operate only in a 
few specific cases.  
  
In the first form, a complete compliance defense, compliance with an ex ante 
regulatory standard would shield the injurer from subsequent liability. In such case, the 
regulatory standard would function as a signal of the standard of safety and hence of the 
                                                 
1264 Non-compliance with a safety standard would generally amount to negligence per se in a tort suit. 
European products regulation combines safety standards and strict liability in tort in that compliance with 
safety standards is presumption of safe product but does not shield the manufacturer from liability under 
tort. In contrast, non-compliance with safety regulations results in administrative fines and may or may not 
be combined with tort liability in case such product would be considered unsafe and defective.  
1265 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 100-101 (1989). 
1266 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, 
no 2, 55 (1991). 
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investment in safety required to product manufacturers.1267 Beyond this level of safety 
required by the ex ante regulatory standard, potential tortfeasors would not have any 
incentive to invest in safety. Hence, liability under tort as a consequence of the violation 
of ex ante safety regulation would not have any effect on efficiency. As a result, given 
that compliance with ex ante safety regulation would be optimal for the product 
manufacturer regardless of the optimality of the standard set by the regulation, if the 
regulatory standard were set at the optimal level, the investment in safety would be 
optimal but if the standard were sub-optimal, the outcome of this regulatory structure 
would also be suboptimal and hence inefficient.1268 It should be noted that ex ante safety 
regulations often are designed to create incentives to invest in a level of safety higher 
than the economically efficient level. In these cases, compliance would function as a 
signal of adequate investment in product safety even though the final outcome would be 
inefficient because potential tortfeasors would over-invest in safety.1269
A second possible interaction between ex ante safety regulation and ex post 
liability under tort is through an incomplete compliance defense. Under this scheme, 
compliance with ex ante regulation would be a defense only in certain circumstances. In 
these cases, the existence of the regulated standard would only reduce the probability of 
liability but would not eliminate it.
 
1270
                                                 
1267 Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs,  
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 242 (1999). 
 So for example, depending on whether the ex post 
negligence standard was uncertain or unknown, the joint use of ex ante regulation and ex 
post liability might be welfare-enhancing compared to the use of either ex ante regulation 
and ex post liability alone. So whenever the tort negligence standard was uncertain, the 
1268 See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional 
Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) arguing that 
whenever potential tortfeasors meet an efficient standard of care, there should be a coordinated strategy 
between the multiple instruments – ex ante safety regulation and ex post product liability - that overlap and 
allow some form of a compliance defense.   
1269 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988). 
1270 Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 241-243 (1999). 
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joint application of ex ante regulation and ex post liability with an incomplete compliance 
defense would be preferred to either instrument alone. In such cases, the uncertainty over 
the negligence standard combined with an incomplete compliance defense will create 
incentives for investing in product safety.1271
A third potential interaction would be a very restricted or entirely absent 
compliance defense, as currently in place in the European product regulation. Under this 
structure, potential tortfeasors who comply with ex ante safety standards are nonetheless 
subject to ex post liability under tort with some exceptions determined by the ex ante 
regulation. The potential liability costs under tort create incentives for an investment in 
safety above the efficient level, resulting in an inefficient outcome.
 In contrast, in cases where the liability 
standard is known, an incomplete compliance defense would introduce uncertainty that 
could result in over investment – and hence suboptimal investment – in product safety. In 
light of the structure of product regulation in Europe, such a scheme does not seem the 
most adequate given that ex ante product regulation is combined with ex post strict 
liability whereby the information available about an ex post negligence safety standard 
becomes irrelevant.  
1272
The absence or narrowness of a compliance defense may have additional effects 
depending on the expected liability to which potential tortfeasors might be subject. If 
expected liability is low, firms will have incentives to invest in product safety in order to 
reduce or even eliminate liability costs while still having incentives to market their 
products. But if expected liability is high, firms may have incentives to avoid liability and 
decide not to innovate or to even withdraw products from the market in order to avoid 
being subject to high liability levels.
 
1273
                                                 
1271 Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 241-243 (1999). 
 
1272 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988). 
1273 These effects may depend on the specific industry potential tortfeasors are part of. See Michael Moore 
and W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs 
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Under the current product regulation scheme in force in Europe, structured around 
a restrictive compliance defense, the tortfeasor can be sanctioned twice: first, through the 
administrative sanctions provided by the government's ex ante safety regulation and 
second, through the liability eventually imposed as a result of the claim brought by the 
injured victim.1274 Consequently, under this scheme, the tortfeasor could eventually face 
a double penalty.1275
The debate over the compliance defense has generated many arguments, both in 
favor of and against its use.
  
1276 While Shavell1277 assumes that in certain cases, denying 
the compliance defense and imposing liability would result in an efficient outcome, 
Viscusi1278 does not share this approach and asserts that denying the compliance defense 
will create inefficient incentives for safety because of the victim’s overcompensation 
resulting in the tortfeasor’s over-investment in safety.1279
                                                                                                                                                 
of Injury Insurance, Working Paper, Northwestern University (1988) showing the negative effects of 
liability in innovation in many areas such as aviation, chemicals, pharmaceuticals or medical industry. 
 Again, depending on the risk 
1274 Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, 
International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 231 (1999). 
1275 If there were full penalties from the two instruments, the impacts of the compliance defense and the 
negligence per se rule depend on the level of the safety standards relative to the social level of efficient 
precaution. But if penalties were coordinated and the regulatory standard efficiently established the result 
would be efficient. See Paul Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of 
External Costs, International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244, 237 (1999).  
1276 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Products liability preemption: an institutional approach, 76 The George 
Washington Law Review 101 (2008) arguing in favor of the application of a regulatory compliance defense 
considering the institutional – state or federal – agency framework. See also Keith N. Hylton, Preemption 
and Products Liability: A Positive Theory 7–8 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 03-17), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=433661 identifying tour factors that can be used to 
determine whether there will be preemption of regulatory agencies over courts before product cases: first, 
the agency’s expertise; second, the local knowledge of product risks; third, the likelihood of the agency 
capture and finally, the predictability of the standard. Depending on the importance of each of these factors, 
preemption will be desirable or not. 
1277 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984) 
arguing that ex post liability might induce parties who present an above average risk of harm to adopt 
additional precautions beyond the ones required by the ex ante regulatory standard and such outcome might 
be beneficial.  
1278 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institucional Division 
of Labor, 78 American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 300-304 (1988).  
1279 The denial of the compliance defenses is efficient as long as the damages are optimally set. See Paul 
Burrows, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External Costs, International 
Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244 (1999). 
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involved in the situations to be regulated and the evidentiary issues raised by them, the 
introduction of the compliance defense might be advisable or not.  
 
  
3 Toward a comprehensive approach to European product regulation: The 
interaction between ex ante safety regulation and ex post liability 
 
European product regulation, when viewed comprehensively, encompasses three 
major product phases:  before a product is marketed while the product is in the market, 
and once the product, while in the market, causes harm to a consumer or to a product 
user. The first phase, the pre-market phase, is regulated by the broad body of product 
safety law discussed in chapter 5. During the second product phase, European product 
regulation requires product recalls and imposes obligations on product manufacturers and 
distributers to provide notifications of product risks. The third phase, once a defective 
product has caused harm to a user or consumer, is discussed in chapter 2.1280
From a practical perspective, the regulatory interaction between ex ante product 
safety and ex post product liability in Europe is a fact.
 
1281
                                                 
1280 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) arguing for a diminished role of 
the tort system when reducing risks. 
 These two mechanisms are 
jointly applicable to many products and in different product phases, and they interact and 
share common goals: bringing safe products to the market while minimizing the amount 
of defective products that cause product-related accidents, while compensating victims 
1281 This interaction also takes places in the United States where the Consumer Product Safety 
Commissions issues voluntary ex ante standards while at the same time liability is imposed for the harm 
caused by defective products. The prospect of liability judgments directly impacts the manufacturer’s 
decisions on investment in care. See Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products 
Liability Cases:  Are The European Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact 
Approaches To Defendant Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629 (1993) and George L. 
Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY, PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184 
(Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988).  
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when products do cause harm.1282
Product safety law, presented earlier, represents the emphasis of the European 
model on regulation that adopts the form of a set of pre-market requirements for product 
manufacturers so that the amount of unsafe products that reach the market is 
minimized.
  
1283 European product safety regulation does not contain liability provisions 
but rather, as explained earlier, it is based on safety standards, enforcement mechanisms 
and the imposition of fines in case of non-compliance.1284
These standards and pre-requisites that manufacturers must comply with before a 
product is marketed should not be thought of as equivalent to a negligence standard. 
There are clear similarities between both concepts such as the fact that in both cases 
manufacturers have incentives to comply with them (which is their common goal). 
However, there are significant differences regarding the consequences of non-
compliance. Under negligence, compliance with the required level of care allows 
manufacturers to avoid liability whereas compliance with product safety regulations 
allows manufacturers to avoid fines and penalties but not liability, given that a product 
that causes harm may still be deemed defective. 
 
In order for product safety regulation to reach optimal deterrence, two conditions 
must be met. First, standards must be set at the optimal level so as to require optimal 
levels of investment in safety.1285
                                                 
1282 The compensation goal is exclusive of the product liability system. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Regulation and the Law of Torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2, 54, 57 (1991) noting that 
the difference between tort law and regulation might be explained from the perspective of the distribution 
of benefits and harms but mostly refers to procedures and further arguing that the relationship between tort 
law and regulation should be revisited from the perspective of the incentives they create. 
 If standards are not optimal, tortfeasors will be under-
deterred (in case they are required too little care) or will not comply with the rule (in case 
they were required to invest in excessive, and non-cost-effective care). Consequently, 
1283 See Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 11) 
(January 15, 2002). For U.S. product safety regulation and case law see Richard C. Ausness, The case for a 
“strong” regulatory compliance defense, 55 Maryland Law Review 1210 (1996). 
1284 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 8 (1996).  
1285 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 3rd ed. 113-125 (2003). 
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non-optimal standards do not result in the desired level of safety investment.  
Second, once the safety standard is established, they must be enforced. If non-
compliance is not penalized or the costs of not complying are low, manufacturers may 
decide to pay fines, when imposed, instead of altering their products’ characteristics to 
comply.1286
In sum, in order to maximize accident deterrence through product safety 
regulation, optimal standards must be defined and subsequently enforced.
 Consequently, compliance with such safety requirements must be monitored.  
1287 With 
respect to the optimality of safety standards, there is evidence suggesting that standards 
are very rarely set at the optimal level. Further, as explained earlier, the procedure for 
designing standards, which is often inflexible, long and complicated, makes it difficult to 
modify them once they become outdated.1288
At the same time, enforcement is far from perfect. The enforcement of the 
European product safety regulation is deferred to domestic authorities that must have 
adequate powers to ensure action is taken when dangerous products are detected in the 
market.
 Additionally, safety standards often are the 
result of the influence of lobbies, which tends to ensure that the standards are designed 
with some bias towards the interests of the industry.  
1289 Up to today, some member states have not provided the adequate resources to 
carry out market surveillance, provide information to the business community and impose 
penalties,1290
                                                 
1286 W. Kip Viscusi, REGULATING CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, American Enterprise institute for Public 
Policy Research, 26 (1984). 
 which weakens the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanisms. But there 
are reasons for optimism when considering the positive and increasing evolution of the 
1287 Which is defined as the level of care where the marginal costs of adopting care are equal to the 
marginal benefits in accident reduction. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND 
ECONOMICS, 3rd ed., 82 (2003). 
1288 Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a 
necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 
Washburn L. J. 305, 318 (2000). 
1289 Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341 (2000) arguing that enforcement of product safety is far from satisfactory. 
1290 See Christopher Hodges, EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, 206, Oxford 
University Press, (2005).  
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RAPEX notifications. Despite the existing room to improve, there are reasons to believe 
the ex ante enforcement mechanisms are increasingly used and effective.1291
 
    
 
Figure 6.1 – Total number of RAPEX notifications circulated 2001-2009 
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The strict product liability regime established by the product liability directive 
also impacts the minimization of product accidents through the creation of optimal 
incentives for potential tortfeasors so that they are forced to internalize the cost of the 
harm caused by def ective products.1292
But such incentives are effective only as long as there is enforcement of the strict 
liability rule to which injurers are subject.
 
1293
                                                 
1291 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 313 (2004). 
 The enforcement mechanisms under the 
1292 See A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, 3rd ed. 113-125 (2003) 
1293 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 311 (2004). 
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product liability directive, which are based on litigation, are quite different from those of 
the product safety regulation, which are based on enforcement by public authorities. 
Thus, product liability is effective only as long as injured victims pursue their product 
liability claims and those claims are properly adjudicated to ensure that the injurer 
provides compensation for harm caused.1294
In light of the diverse social, legal and cultural context in Europe, over twenty 
years after the adoption of the product liability directive it is impossible to assess the 
Directive's actual impact. The drafters and the industry
 
1295 had very strong expectations 
about how the Directive would change the European product liability reality but it seems 
clear that the Directive has caused neither a clear increase in the level of product liability 
litigation, nor an increase in the rate of insurance premiums nor an increase in the 
contracted private insurance coverage as was expected.1296
A possible explanation for the absence of greater litigation by product victims is 
that ex ante regulation may have simply increased the level of safety of products in the 
market (through pre-marketing requirements as well as recalls) and thereby kept the 
number of product victims low.
  
1297
This does not mean that the introduction of the product liability directive was 
without any effect. While litigation has not increased to the extent expected, there has 
been some increase during the past decade in the number and success rate of product 
 
                                                 
1294 The impact of the GPSD on claims is very indirect. See Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in 
Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 10 (1996). 
1295 Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 346 (2000). 
1296 See Anita Bernstein, L’Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the European 
Community, 31 VA. J INT’L L. 673, 677-79 (1991), Sandra N. Hurd & Frances E. Zollers, Desperately 
Seeking Harmony: The European Community's Search for Uniformity in Product Liability Law, 30 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 35, 47-65 (1992), Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 433, 441 (1997) and Andrew C. Spacone,  Strict Liability in the European 
Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341, 347- 348 (2000). 
1297 See Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 311 (2004) arguing that the tortfeasor’s loss of 
reputation might be stronger than the incentives created by the exposure to liability, that in Europe is quite 
low. 
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liability claims in Europe, as well as in the amount of settlements.1298 Strong conclusions 
on this issue are difficult to draw because there is an absence of data on product accidents 
and on product liability judgments at the European level. In Spain, however, there is a 
valuable source of information on this question: a comprehensive collection of Spanish 
product liability judgments performed by the professors and researchers of the Civil Law 
Department of Universitat Pompeu Fabra, in Barcelona.1299
Before presenting this information, some caveats should be made. First, the 
information provided by product liability judgments does not include cases where product 
victims decide not to pursue their claims. So the amount of judgments is not equivalent to 
the amount of injured victims. Further, product liability judgments do not include cases 
where the parties settle, either after the claim has been filed but before the judgment or 
before any claim has been filed. This information would be important for fully assessing 
product accidents and product liability in Spain or of the rest of Europe. 
  
The product liability judgments collected by this research group,1300
 
 while not 
reflecting all product accidents caused by defective products in Spain, provide the best 
available picture of product liability cases in Spain. As can be seen from Figure 6.2, 
despite the number of product liability judgments being relatively low -- just over 600 
cases in 20 years -- these cases have increased since the product liability directive has 
been in force. Looking at the evolution of product liability judgments, we can see an 
upward trend with a peak in the year 2003, followed by a downward trend. 
                                                 
1298 See LOVELLS, PRODUCT LIABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A REPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 31, 37 (2003) noting a noticeable increase in the number of product liability claims in the 
different European member states after the introduction of the product liability directive. See also John 
Meltzer Reform Of Product Liability in the EU: New Report Finds General Satisfaction, 71 Def. Counsl. J. 
42, 47 (2004). 
1299 For information of the research group see http://www.upf.edu/dretcivil/. It should be noted that these 
are cases filed and finished with a judgment, which does not necessarily mean that the product was deemed 
defective or that the injured victim obtained compensation. Hence, the judgments collected include all cases 
where a lawsuit was filed based on a product liability claim regardless of its outcome. See Pablo Salvador 
and Fernando Gómez (eds.), TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DEL FABRICANTE, Civitas, 979-1111 
(2008). 
1300 See table 6.1 of product liability judgments in Spain at the end of this chapter. 
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Figure 6.2 – Product liability judgments in Spain 
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Even though the diagram above shows that product liability judgments have 
increased in amount, it is not possible to conclude that these judgments are representative 
of product liability accidents or product liability claims filed in Spain.  
European product safety and product liability regulation are independent legal 
mechanisms that responded to different legislative motivations -- product liability was 
conceived to eliminate barriers to trade and product safety as an instrument of consumer 
protection. However, despite such formal autonomy,1301 from a normative perspective, 
European product safety regulation and the product liability directive are simultaneously 
applicable to certain products and hence interact.1302
                                                 
1301 European product safety and European product liability instruments are independent in the sense that 
any right afforded by one of them does not interfere with the ones provided under the other. See Frances E. 
Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in the United States and the European Community: a 
comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 177,  188 (1993).    
 Two major areas of interaction will 
1302 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 8 (1996).  
Transposition of 
the PL Directive 
into Spanish 
  
Introduction of 
the RAPEX 
alert system 
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be discussed here: their common scope of application and further, the interaction between 
their central parameters: the concepts of safe and of defective products. 
 
 
3.1 Movables v. Non-food consumer products   
 
The scope of application of the European product safety regulation and the 
product liability regime is quite similar.  
The GPSD applies only to products intended for consumers or likely to be used by 
consumers whether they are new, used or reconditioned and to products not covered by 
any specific community regulation applicable to them.1303 Therefore, manufacturers must 
comply with any specific provisions applicable to their products and with the general 
safety duty imposed by the GPSD1304 and enforced by member states.1305
Additionally, RAPEX is an alert system for dangerous consumer non-food 
products intended for consumers or likely under reasonably foreseeable conditions to be 
used by consumers.
  
1306 Hence, the RAPEX system provided by the GPSD is applied to 
consumer products -- not including food products -- covered by the GPSD,1307 as well as 
to products covered by New Approach Directives.1308
                                                 
1303 Article 2(a) of the GPSD. 
 
1304 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
1305 Frances E. Zollers, Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in the United States and the European 
Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 177,  189 (1993). 
1306 The RAPEX system does not cover all consumer products. For food and feed, a specific alert system 
(RASFF), similar to RAPEX, is in place. Specific systems are in place also for medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals. See European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on 
the operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is 
available at   
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf  
1307 The GPSD, in its article 2(a) defines consumer products as   
“any product intended for consumers or likely, …, to be used by consumers” 
1308 Some New Approach Directives include notification procedures known as “Safeguard Clause,” that 
aims to check the grounds for domestic measures which seek to restrict the free movement of products. 
However, this mechanism is different from the goals aimed by the RAPEX system, which intends to create 
the framework for a rapid exchange of information on dangerous products in order to protect the 
consumers’ health and safety. See the European Commission Guidelines for the management of the 
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In contrast, the product liability directive is applicable to movable products, which 
includes finished goods as well as raw materials and components incorporated in a 
finished product -- that could be movable or immovable.1309
Movables are not necessarily equivalent to consumer products.
  
1310 It seems 
reasonable to consider non-food consumer products as a subgroup to movables.  In other 
words, it seems reasonable to consider that non-food consumer products are movables but 
not all movables are non-food consumer products. Consequently, the scope of application 
of the GPSD and other safety regulation seems to fall within the scope of application of 
the product liability directive. Thus, it is possible to say that products subject to the 
European product safety regulation are also subject to product liability but not all 
products subject to the product liability directive are also subject to product safety 
regulation.1311
For the purpose of this research it is of special importance that both regulatory bodies 
apply to consumer products.
 
1312
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Community Rapid Information System (RAPEX) and for notifications presented in accordance with Article 
11 of Directive 2001/95/EC, 24. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/rapex_guid_en.pdf 
1309 Article 2 of the product liability directive. 
1310 The exact definition of movables I provided by the domestic laws of the member states. Patrick 
Thieffry, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice 
and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Insurance Law Journal 65, 70 (1989-
1990). 
1311 An example of this last group would be food products that are excluded from the scope of application 
of the GPSD but subject to the product liability directive. 
1312 Christopher J. S. Hodges, Product Liability In Europe: Politics, Reform And Reality, 27 Wm. Mitchell 
L. Rev. 121, 129 (2000). 
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Figure 6.3 – Scope of Application of Pre-Market and Post-Market Controls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Safe v. dangerous  
 
In addition to the common scope of application of European product safety and 
product liability regulations, the central concepts of both regulations are also related. Is 
an unsafe product under the GPSD1313 defective under the product liability directive?1314
From a general perspective or even from a linguistic standpoint, unsafe and 
defective are not synonymous concepts. As defined in the European regulatory bodies 
regarding consumer products, the two concepts have a lot in common given that safe 
  
Conversely, is a defective product under the product liability directive unsafe under 
European product safety regulation?  
                                                 
1313 See article 2 of the GPSD. Sometimes the directive refers to a "dangerous product," but this is simply a 
product which does not meet the definition of a "safe product." See article 2(c) of the GPSD 
1314 Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 
210) 29. 
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products are defined in article 2 of the GPSD and balance actual product risks1315 so that 
products do “not present any risk or only the minimum risks compatible with [their] 
use.”1316 This is similar -- but not equivalent -- to the assessment of consumer 
expectations established by the product liability directive to determine whether a product 
is defective.1317
Safety under the GPSD requires other aspects to be taken into account as well, 
including (1) the categories of consumers at risk from the product (especially children 
and the elderly), (2) the characteristics of the product, including composition, packaging, 
instructions for assembly or installation and maintenance; the product’s effect on other 
products, (3) the presentation of the product, including labeling, warnings, instructions 
for use and disposal, (4) and any other indications or information regarding the 
product.
  
1318
The GPSD defines safe products based on product characteristics and based on a 
product’s compliance with safety rules at both the European and the domestic levels.
   
1319 
In this sense, a product is deemed safe if it conforms to the specific European safety 
legislation applicable to it,1320 or, in the absence of such legislation, if it complies with 
the specific domestic safety rules in the member state in which the product is 
marketed.1321
As mentioned above, under the product liability directive a product is defective if 
it does not meet the consumer expectations test. The expectations of consumers are not 
  
                                                 
1315 The Directive uses the risk-utility test to define a safe product. Article 2(b) clearly states a risk-utility 
analysis by stating that a product is safe when it does present “only the minimum risks compatible with the 
product’s use.” Note that the defectiveness test used by the Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 
Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 is the consumer’s expectations test.  
1316 Article 2(b) of the GPSD. 
1317 Geraint G. Howells, The relationship between product liability and product safety – understanding a 
necessary element in the European Product Liability through a comparison with the U.S. position, 39 
Washburn L. J. 305, 336 (2000). 
1318 Article 2(b) of the GPSD. 
1319 See Article 3(2) and article 3(3) of the GPSD. 
1320 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
1321 Article 3(2) of the GPSD. 
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met when a product fails to provide the safety that a consumer is entitled to expect.1322 
The essential element of the defectiveness standard is the expectations of consumers on 
the product’s safety and hence there is no risk-utility balancing of the costs and benefits 
to product sellers and users.1323
Consequently, both concepts -- safety and defect -- are not equivalent but overlap, 
which results in an interaction between the legal norms and regulations laid out in 
Europe's product safety and product liability systems.
 
1324
 
  
 
3.3 The compliance defense in European product regulation: a restricted approach  
 
European product safety and product liability laws are independent and 
autonomous, but they are also related through a restricted version of a compliance 
defense. Compliance with, for example, the general safety duty or with any obligation 
stated in the GPSD, does not prevent a product from being subsequently considered 
defective under the product liability directive. And at the same time, non-compliance 
with the GPSD could raise a presumption of an unsafe or defective product and result in 
liability under the product liability directive.  
The product liability directive does not include a compliance defense as such, 
except in cases where the safety regulation, issued by public authorities, is mandatory and 
the product's defect results from compliance with it.1325
                                                 
1322 Article 6 of the product liability directive. See also Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European 
Products Liability More Protective Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. 
L. Rev. 985, 994 (1998). 
 This defense relates to the 
1323 The expectation of consumers is not the only element to consider given that “all relevant 
circumstances” such as the presentation of the product should also be taken into account. Preamble of the 
product liability directive.  
1324 The defectiveness standard of the product liability directive heavily relies on the expectations on safety 
a consumer -- or the public at large -- are entitled to expect and the safety standard under the GPSD relies 
on the level of safety compatible with the product’s use.  
1325 Article 7 (d ) of the product liability directive.  
  311 
relevance of safety standards in the context of product liability. The scope of this defense 
remains uncertain even today, but the idea behind it is that whenever regulatory standards 
exist, compliance should provide a defense to avoid liability.1326 However, not just any 
safety standard provides a defense to product manufacturers: only mandatory standards 
issued by public authorities. In order to be able to claim this defense, it is necessary to 
prove that it was not possible to manufacture the product in a non-defective way while at 
the same time complying with mandatory regulations applicable to it.1327 Hence, if the 
product could have been manufactured in a non-defective manner and still comply with 
mandatory regulations, the defense is not available.1328
The introduction of this defense has been justified based on the idea that 
producers "cannot be placed between disobedience and liability"
  
1329 but it has hardly 
been applied in the member states.1330 Some courts have understood that the violation of 
voluntary standards might be admissible evidence, even though not conclusive, of 
product defectiveness1331 but compliance with regulations or mandatory standards or the 
fact that the product has been licensed or tested is no defense to liability.1332
                                                 
1326 This is a way the European Commission understands encourages compliance with safety standards.  
   
1327 Article 7(d) of the product liability directive. However, it will be necessary to provide evidence to show 
that the product manufacturer has used all the information available at the time the product was 
manufactured and therefore that he complied with the state of the art or the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge of that time.  
1328 Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules, 371 Practising Law 
Institute 81 (1989) indicating that this provision should be strictly interpreted and very narrowly applied.  
1329 Hans C. Taschner, EEC Strict Liability in 1992: The New Product Liability Rules, 371 Practising Law 
Institute 81 (1989). 
1330 In Spain there is only one case where it is possible to interpret that the court justified not imposing 
liability on a manufacturer of defective prosthesis that caused depression to the patient based on the 
argument that under binding European regulation in force, imposing liability was not justified. Opinion 
written by Hon. Nicolás Díaz Méndez, Magistrate of the Appellate Court of Madrid (Court of Appeals of 
Madrid) of June 3, 2005 (AC 997). 
1331 This is the interpretation of this defense used by German and Austrian courts. See Stephan Lenze, 
Product Safety Regulations and Defect’ European Product Liability Review 24, 21 (2006). 
1332 But in cases where the scientific and technical knowledge did not allow discovering product risks, 
compliance with mandatory standards may be evidence that there is no product defect and therefore no 
liability is imposed. See Esther v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) y Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. 
(importer), Court of Appeals of Vizcaya 20.4.05 (JUR 2005\200889; Hon: María Carmen Keller 
Echevarría) and Blanca v. Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), Court of Appeals of 
Barcelona 4.3.05 (JUR 2005\116914; Hon: Joaquín de Oro-Pulido López).   
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It should be noted that despite the autonomy of European product safety and 
product liability regulations, non-compliance with product safety regulations might have 
an indirect, but significant impact in a subsequent liability trial given that non-compliance 
with product safety regulations improves the chances of success of a plaintiff’s claim 
while increasing the willingness of non-complying manufacturers to settle.1333
 
  
 
4 Ex ante and ex post liability: finding the adequate role for each mechanism 
 
European product safety and product liability overlap in their scope of application 
and in their shared goal of minimizing product risks and product-related accidents. The 
European legislature, however, does not seem to have a specific concern about the 
coordination measures that could be adopted to enhance their joint performance. As 
figure 6.4 reflects, product manufacturers -- or producers, using the GPSD terminology -- 
are subject to product safety regulations while at the same time exposed to product 
liability.  
 
Figure 6.4 - Interaction between 
European Product Safety and Product Liabiliy Regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
1333 See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional 
Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988); W. Kip Viscusi, 
The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and Compensation for Bodily Injury, 
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 15 No. 2, 321- 346 (1986) and W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability Litigation 
with Risk Aversion, 17 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (1988). 
Product Safety / 
Product Liability Liability No-liability 
Compliance Safe / Defective Safe / Non-Defective 
Non-compliance Unsafe / Defective Unsafe / Non-Defective 
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4.1. Reaching the ideal outcome: Safe and non-defective products 
 
The best imaginable situation in terms of effectiveness of product regulation 
would be where a product met the product safety requirements and consequently would 
be safe and at the same time, would not be subsequently defective. In this case, regardless 
of whether the product would cause harm to a consumer, the producer would be neither 
subject to administrative fines nor liable under the product liability directive.1334
As mentioned above, there is no information available regarding the exposure of 
products to safety and liability measures. This data would be crucial when determining 
whether the amount of safety notifications and product liability judgments is significant 
compared to the overall amount of products marketed -- regardless of their origin of 
manufacture.  
  
Despite missing such important data, it seems reasonable to consider that in light 
of the number of safety notifications -- less than 2000 in any given year since 20041335 -- 
and the number of product judgments in Spain -- always below 90 annually1336
 
 -- the vast 
majority of products are both safe and non-defective and hence fit in this category. It is 
difficult to determine the percentage of all marketed products that would fit into this 
optimal category but in light of the information available, it seems reasonable to state that 
a majority of products are both safe and non-defective. Hence, it seems possible to 
suggest that product regulation in Europe might not be optimal but is, nonetheless, 
performing reasonably well. 
                                                 
1334 In this case, if the product would cause harm the product manufacturer could have a regulatory 
compliance defense under which the product manufacturer would not be exposed to liability if he could 
prove that the product defect was a consequence of compliance with product safety regulation in force 
when the product was manufactured. See article 7 (d) of the product liability directive, stating that  
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves:  
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory regulations issued 
by the public authorities  
1335 See Figure 6.1 above.  
1336 See Figure 6.2 above.  
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4.2. When ex ante safety requirements are not effective: Unsafe but non defective 
products  
 
Another possible regulatory situation of a product marketed in Europe is one 
where the product is unsafe but non-defective. In this case, public authorities would 
impose a penalty for non-compliance with safety regulations and hence for being 
unreasonably risky -- unsafe -- but no liability would arise under the product liability 
directive. As explained earlier, an unsafe product is not conceptually equivalent to a 
defective product. In light of the different sanctions arising from product safety and 
defect regulations, injured victims, if any, would not be compensated for the harm 
suffered because product safety regulations do not include compensation mechanisms for 
victims. 
This situation would correspond to products that are in the RAPEX notifications 
chart but are not included in the product categories of product liability judgments.1337 
Examples of these products would be furniture, with an average of 12 safety notifications 
per year and jewelry,1338 with an average of 7 safety notifications per year since 2006.1339
A hypothesis that could explain this situation would be that ex ante safety 
measures are so effective that any unsafe product was recalled or withdrawn from the 
market and hence there is no further possibility for these products to cause harm and be 
deemed defective. If this were the case, ex ante measures would successfully prevent 
unsafe -- or dangerous -- products from causing harm once in the market.  
 
In Spain, for example, there is no recollection of judgments for harm caused by any of 
these two product categories.  
 
                                                 
1337 It should be noted that as explained earlier, RAPEX notifications are not equivalent to measures 
adopted. Hence, it could be that some products were notified as unsafe but that once examined, were not 
considered unsafe and hence adopting measures was not justified. 
1338 See table 5.2 above. 
1339 See table 5.2 above. 
  315 
4.3. Relying on ex post solutions: Safe but defective products  
 
Another possible situation is one where a product is safe and hence complies with 
the safety requirements established by product safety regulation but once marketed causes 
harm to a product user or consumer and such harm is a consequence of a product defect 
within the product liability directive.  
In such a case, product safety regulations would not preempt product liability and 
therefore compliance would not shield a product manufacturer from being exposed to 
subsequent liability. As mentioned above, the compliance defense under article 7(d) of 
the product liability directive is very restrictive, applicable only in the case of mandatory 
regulations issued by public authorities that result in the product being defective. Thus, 
liability may be imposed when the injured victim brings a product liability claim and the 
defect was not a consequence of compliance with mandatory regulations.  
Using the product categories of the tables above, these would be products 
included in table 6.1, product liability judgments in Spain, but of which there is no 
product safety notification, as shown in table 5.2. Examples of these products would be 
elevators, fireworks or bottles, where there are product liability judgments but there is no 
recollection of RAPEX safety notifications.1340
 
   
 
4.4. Ex ante product safety and ex post product liability responding together: Unsafe 
and defective products  
 
A last situation would be where both mechanisms -- product safety and product 
liability -- are applicable as a consequence of the unsafe and defective conditions of a 
                                                 
1340 See table 6.1 below. 
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certain product. This would be cases where a product does not meet product safety 
standards applicable to it and is therefore deemed unsafe -- and administrative penalties 
are imposed -- while at the same time, its defective condition causes harm to a victim and 
triggers liability.  
As mentioned above, both regulations would be simultaneously applicable so that 
product safety compliance would be evidence of safety but would not shield the product 
manufacturer from liability because compliance has no weight on the determination of a 
product being defective.1341
In the European context, these would be products that have had safety 
notifications -- and if the information was available, would have caused a safety measure 
to be adopted -- and there would further be a product liability judgment imposing a 
liability award. Examples of these products would be electrical appliances, motor 
vehicles or chemical products.
 At the same time, non-compliance with product safety 
standards is evidence of a product being unsafe but is not conclusive evidence of the 
product being defective. Hence, assuming that the product causes an injury and the victim 
brings a claim and meets the burden of proof under the product liability directive -- proof 
of defect, harm and a causal relationship between them -- the manufacturers of the unsafe 
product would have to pay both an administrative penalty to the responsible state or 
administrative agency and a liability award to the victim.  
1342
It would be interesting to observe whether product safety measures influence 
subsequent product liability judgments or, conversely, whether a significant amount of 
product liability judgments create incentives to adopt safety measures and hence result in 
lower safety notifications. Unfortunately, in light of the data available, it is not possible to 
draw conclusions regarding the incentives created by these two regulatory mechanisms 
and to determine whether there is any enhanced effect of their joint application.  
  
                                                 
1341 See article 7 (d) of the product liability directive. 
1342 See tables 5.2, above and 6.1, below.  
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5 Working together: a proposal for enhancing the joint performance of European 
product safety and product liability  
 
As explained above, the interaction between European product safety and product 
liability regulations is a fact despite their formal regulatory autonomy and 
independence.1343 A comprehensive approach in analyzing the relationship and 
interaction between statutory law and tort law as ways of minimizing product risks and 
improving victims’ compensation should be adopted in order to save administrative and 
litigation costs.1344
European product regulation holds product manufacturers to a voluntary standard-
based product safety regulation -- with some exceptions
 There is room for welfare enhancing measures in European product 
regulation. 
1345 -- while also exposing them 
to strict product liability under tort for the harm caused by defective products.1346
                                                 
1343 See generally Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: the regulatory 
compliance defense, American Law and Economics Review, 2(1) (2000) defending the role of the U.S. 
Congress in enacting product safety regulation that would preempt state law safety regulation and where 
compliance with federal safety standards would prevent a product manufacturer from potential claims 
under tort. See also Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National 
Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for Defective 
Products and Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121 (2002) for a discussion on the interaction between ex ante 
product regulation and ex post product liability in the U.S. system.  
  
1344 There is a broad body of literature arguing in favor of adopting a more comprehensive approach of the 
different legal instruments affecting the tortfeasors’ decision in investment in safety. See Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, The American Economic Review, vol. 81, no. 2, Papers and 
Proceedings of the Hundred and Third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association pp. 54 -58, 
57 (1991). See also W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate 
Institutional Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988). 
1345 As explained in Chapter 5 compliance with product safety standards is mostly voluntary except for 
products subject to New Approach Directives, that represent a relatively minor percentage of consumer 
products marketed in the European market, the manufacturers of which are mostly subject to the horizontal 
safety obligation included in article 3 (1) of the GPSD.    
1346 This relationship between product safety regulation and product liability – non compliance being 
negligence per se and compliance being evidence but not excluding liability under tort – is also included in 
the Restatement of the Law (1997), regarding federal statutes establishing product safety measures to be 
adopted and tort liability.  For a discussion on the European product regulation model within consumer law 
see Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law After The Treaty Of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy In Or 
Beyond The Internal Market?, Common Market Law Review 37: 367-400, 375 (2000). 
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Considering the theoretical background presented earlier and the European 
product regulation structured through ex ante product safety regulation and strict liability 
under tort, the key element that determines the joint performance of these two 
instruments when deterring product accidents is whether the information about product 
risks is available to all parties involved -- consumers, manufacturers or regulatory 
agencies -- and if not available to all parties, which one is better informed about product 
risks and hence is in a better position to adopt measures in order to reduce and if possible, 
avoid product-related accidents. The amount of information available regarding product 
risks will hence determine the relationship between the two regulatory bodies forming 
European product regulation -- ex ante safety regulation and ex post liability under tort.   
Two different situations should be distinguished: a context with perfect 
information about product risks and a context where consumers do not have access to all 
information regarding product risks.  
When information regarding product risks is perfect, either regulatory model of 
accident minimization, ex ante safety regulation and ex post liability, will perform 
optimally.1347 Under perfect information, regulatory agencies will be able to set the 
standard of care at an optimal level and hence efficiently minimize product-related 
accidents and strict liability under tort will also perform optimally as long as damages are 
set at the level of harm caused by the tortfeasor.1348
                                                 
1347 The equivalent outcomes of different rules -- regulation, liability rules or contracts -- when information 
about product risks is perfect has long been settled in the literature. For early discussions on this issue see 
A. Michael Spence, Consumer Misperception, Product Failure, and Producer Liability, Review of 
Economic Studies, vol. 44, núm. 3, pp. 561-572 (1977); Dennis Epple / Artur Raviv, Product Safety: 
Liability Rules, Market Structure, and Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, vol. 68, núm. 
1, 80-95 (1978).  
 In light of the optimal performance of 
each instrument when implemented alone, the joint use of ex ante regulation and strict 
product liability does not enhance or improve the performance of the regulatory system as 
a whole and hence one of the instruments ends up being redundant.  
1348 Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, New Haven: Yale University Press (1970) and Donald 
Wittman, Prior Regulation vs Post Liability: The Choice between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 Journal 
of Legal Studies 1, 193-212 (1977).  
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Information regarding product risks may be derived from either general 
knowledge about product risks or the manufacturers’ voluntary disclosure through 
instructions or warnings.1349
Consequently, whenever information is perfect, using ex ante safety regulation or 
ex post liability results in the same outcome: product manufacturers optimally invest in 
safety and consumers purchase the efficient amount of product and the use of either 
instrument alone would be enough to achieve an efficient outcome because the joint 
scope application and the effectiveness of both instruments overlaps.
 Hence, the availability of the information does not 
necessarily depend on manufacturers’ decisions to disclose. Rather, when dealing with 
widely sold products, risks are generally known and the information provided by product 
manufacturers becomes less essential.  
1350 Thus, in view of 
the horizontal obligation of introducing safe products into the market included in the 
GPSD,1351 it should be possible for consumers to waive or even to shield product 
manufacturers from ex post product liability through a compliance defense.1352
                                                 
1349 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 
1451-1453 (2010) differentiating the consumers’ level of information depending on whether products are 
widely or not widely sold.  
 In this 
1350 This result is consistent with the Coase theorem that predicts that when transaction costs are zero – and 
hence information is costless -- the initial assignment of property rights or liability rules is irrelevant 
because individuals will reach an optimal outcome regardless of the initial assignment. See 
Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960). 
1351 Article 3(1) of the GPSD. 
1352 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) arguing that regardless of 
the availability of a compliance defense, firms may introduce evidence of compliance in order to show that 
their investment in safety responded to a risk-utility analysis and that the product should not be deemed 
defective.  See also Catherine M. Sharkey, Products liability preemption: an institutional approach, 76 The 
George Washington Law Review 101 (2008) introducing an institutional approach to the interaction 
between product safety and product liability through the analysis of the preemption between state and 
federal product safety regulation. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 2, 365 (1984) arguing against the compliance defense based on the argument that liability may 
induce high risk individuals to take precautions at a level above the one required by the ex ante regulation. 
In these cases, Shavell suggests that the regulatory standard would not need to be as rigorous as if 
regulation was applied alone and should be interpreted as a minimum level of precaution. 
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context, ex post product liability would not be welfare enhancing and would entail an 
unnecessary waste of resources.1353
But there are other contexts in which consumers do not have access to perfect 
information of product risks. These are cases in which product manufacturers fail to 
disclose such information or in which general information about their risks is unavailable 
because the products are not widely sold or because the risks they present are not 
generally known. 
 
Whenever the information about product risks is not perfect, the joint performance 
of ex ante safety regulation and ex post strict liability depends on whether consumers can 
perceive product risks so that they can decide, according to their preferences, whether 
they accept the tradeoff between a lower price and higher product risks than the ones set 
by the ex ante regulatory standard of care.1354 If consumers could adequately -- even 
though imperfectly -- perceive product risks, they could accurately decide whether they 
are willing to trade a lower price for higher product risks and either regulatory model -- 
ex ante product safety or ex post product liability -- could result in optimal outcomes.1355
If consumers would have imperfect information about product risks or could not 
adequately perceive them, they could not accurately decide the tradeoff between product 
price and risks and hence would be subject to risks they would not be willing to accept. In 
these cases, the regulatory structure should be different and there could be room for 
jointly applying ex ante product safety regulation and ex post liability.
 
If that was the case, the reasoning presented above would apply.  
1356
                                                 
1353 Product safety would perform a deterrent function that might be effective because of the threat product 
manufacturers would face in reputation losses. See Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European 
Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 300 
(2004). 
  
1354 Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of product safety and imperfect information, the Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5:2, 683-688, 685 (1974).  
1355 Walter Y. Oi, The economics of product safety, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management 
Science, vol. 4, no. 1, 3-28 (1973).  
1356 Victor P. Goldberg, The Economics of product safety and imperfect information, the Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5:2, 683-688, 687 (1974). 
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When these two regulations are jointly implemented, the next question is how 
they should interact. Whenever ex ante regulation and ex post liability are jointly 
implemented, as explained above, four different situations potentially arise: (1) safe and 
defective products, (2) safe and non-defective products, (3) unsafe and defective 
products, and (4) unsafe and non-defective products. As mentioned above, given that 
safety and defectiveness are not synonymous concepts and one does not imply the other, 
the compliance defense is the most common mechanism used in order to allow 
coordination between them under certain circumstances.   
The compliance defense shields a product manufacturer from product liability in 
different degrees when products cause harm to consumers or users but comply with safety 
regulations applicable to them.  
As explained above, compliance with European safety regulation shields a 
product manufacturer from liability only in cases where the regulation was mandatory 
and because of compliance with such regulation, the product became defective.1357 In all 
other cases, compliance with product safety regulation prevents a product from being 
considered unsafe and is admissible but non-conclusive evidence in a subsequent liability 
claim.1358 Hence, compliance may prevent a product from being qualified as unsafe but 
not from being considered defective and therefore subject to liability under tort. At the 
same time, non-compliance is evidence of a product being unsafe and if subsequently 
caused harm, potentially defective.1359
                                                 
1357 See article 7(d) of the product liability directive. See also Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, 
Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for United States Business, 31 American 
Business Law Journal 245, 261 (1993). 
 The restrictive approach adopted by the European 
1358 The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability §4(b) also establishes that compliance with safety 
regulation does not preclude a finding of defect. Additionally, if compliance is with a federal statute 
intended to preempt state tort law, liability is precluded given that compliance with a federal statute raises 
an absolute defense.  
1359 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988). 
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model of product regulation is not the approach adopted in many other jurisdictions that 
opted for a broader scope of the defense.1360
The current regulatory scheme in Europe, uniformly applied regardless of the 
level of information about product risks and the consumers’ awareness of such risks, is 
not necessarily the most efficient scheme and may result in over-investment in safety, and 
in undermining the competitive position of European industry with respect to other legal 
systems with lower safety requirements.  
 
The interaction between ex ante product safety and ex post product liability in 
European product regulation as well as the scope of the compliance defense should be 
revisited and a parameter such as the information about product risks available to 
consumers should be taken into account when determining whether ex ante product safety 
regulation and ex post product liability should be jointly used and if so, how they should 
interact.  
If information about product risks was perfect, either because of the 
manufacturer’s voluntary disclosure through instructions or warnings or because of the 
nature of the product -- because the product is widely sold and its risks generally known,-
                                                 
1360 For example, in the U.S., the provisions regarding the compliance defense provided by the Restatement 
(Third) establishing that the violation of applicable product safety regulation renders a product defective 
have been adopted be different U.S. jurisdictions. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability 4 
provides that  
§4. Non compliance and compliance with product safety statutes or regulations  
In connection with liability for defective design or inadequate instructions or warning: 
(a) a product’s noncompliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative 
regulation renders the product defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by 
the statute or regulation; and 
(b) a product’s compliance with an applicable product safety statute or administrative 
regulation is properly considered in determining whether the product is defective with 
respect to the risks sought to be reduced by the statute or regulation, but such compliance 
does not preclude as a matter of law a finding of product defect.  
So in order to deem a product defective as a consequence of non-compliance with product safety 
regulation, the regulation must have been pertinent to the specific claim of defect in the sense that 
compliance would have reduced the product risks and the product non-defective. This is the solution 
adopted in the majority of jurisdictions but not in all of them. In some jurisdictions such as California, the 
violation of ex ante safety regulation creates a rebuttable presumption of defect. Finally, another group of 
jurisdictions such as New Jersey, consider that non-compliance is just admissible evidence of a product 
defect. See Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS, 1034 (2000).  
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- the joint use of ex ante safety regulation and ex post product liability does not bring any 
advantage but represents a waste of resources. Either ex ante product safety regulation or 
ex post product liability alone would allow for creating optimal incentives for investing in 
care. In light of the ex ante European product safety regulation and the horizontal safety 
obligation included in the GPSD, enforcing ex post liability under tort does not appear to 
be efficient given that consumers in this context can perform a trade-off between risks 
and price and hence product liability becomes redundant.1361 In this context, the 
European legislature should consider adopting a complete compliance defense that would 
shield product manufacturers who complied with ex ante product safety requirements 
from liability under tort.1362 In these cases, if a product was safe, and hence the level of 
risk presented by the product is shown to be efficient,1363 either through compliance or 
through instructions or warnings, ex post liability under tort should not be imposed.1364
A concern regarding product safety could arise. However, it should be 
remembered that this structure would be defined for widely sold products for which risks 
are generally known and for which regulatory agencies set safety standards. Hence, the 
incentives for investing in safety would be created through the safety requirements of 
government safety regulations as well as through market forces and the role of reputation 
that would encourage manufacturers to produce and introduce in the market safe 
 
                                                 
1361 W. Kip Viscusi, Steven R. Rowland, Howard L. Dorfman, Charles J. Walsh, The Effect of Products 
Liability Litigation on Innovation: Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale 
for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437 (1994). 
1362 See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional 
Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988). 
1363 In cases where the ex ante regulatory standard or the incentives to invest in safety were inefficient, 
product liability would still not become necessary given that market forces might be the principal force for 
the creation of incentives for investing in safety. See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: 
Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, 
No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) and Michael Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety through Workers' 
Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance, Working Paper, Northwestern 
University (1988). 
1364 W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol.. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988). 
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products.1365 In light of the emphasis on safety of European product regulation, the 
reported level of compliance with it and its increasing enforcement shown by the 
increasing level of notifications of unsafe products reported through the RAPEX 
system,1366 the diminished role of ex post products liability in this context should not be 
an issue.1367
In contrast, when information about product risks is not perfect, either because 
product manufacturers do not disclose it or because these products are not widely sold 
and hence their risks are less known, consumers cannot adequately assess product risks 
and hence cannot make optimal tradeoffs between higher or lower product risks for lower 
or higher product prices.
 
1368 In these cases there is a role for the joint use of ex ante 
product safety and ex post liability under tort. When information about product risks is 
not available to consumers, ex ante product safety and ex post product liability could be 
jointly used in order to achieve a more efficient outcome than if these two regulatory 
mechanisms were used alone. Hence, despite the broad European product safety 
regulation, when product risks are not widely known, there is a role for ex post liability 
under tort.1369
                                                 
1365 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437, 1451-1453 (2010) defending this approach and advocating for reducind the role of product liability in 
these cases.  
 The interaction between ex ante product safety and ex post liability in these 
1366 See section 4.3 of Chapter 5, above.  See also Annex II of the GPSD and European Commission, 
Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on the operation of the Rapid Alert System for 
non-food consumer products, RAPEX. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf  
1367 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437, 1450-1453 (2010) arguing that because of the volume of sales as well as the presence in the market 
of widely sold products, consumers have more information about product risks available as well as 
regulatory agencies have more incentives to issue regulations regarding a certain investment in safety. 
1368 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437 (2010) arguing that products liability is desirable for non-widely sold products and undesirable for 
widely-sold products, the risks of which are most commonly known.   
1369 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437 
(2010) considering that the role of product liability as a mechanism to create incentives to invest in care 
should be limited to non-widely sold products.  
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cases could be articulated through a restricted compliance defense like the one in force 
today in the product liability directive.1370
A step towards maximizing the coordination between the two regulatory models 
that jointly configure product regulation in Europe should be adopted in order to 
maximize the performance of the overall system of European product regulation. 
Consequently, European product law should, on one hand, broadly look at the overall 
regulation products are subject to in their different stages in order to assess their global 
impact in creating incentives for accident minimization and hence in minimizing product-
related accidents. The law should also distinguish between widely sold products and non-
widely sold products when the information ab out the risks they present is different and 
provide a different regulatory treatment for each product category. Such structure would 
enhance the joint performance of both mechanisms and would take advantage of the full 
potential of the nature and substance of each regulatory mechanism that configures 
European product regulation.  
 
 
                                                 
1370 Article 7(d) of the product liability directive. 
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Table 6.1 - Product Liability Judgments in Spain over Time 
 
PRODUCT CATEGORY BEF 19941371 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
FIREWORKS 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 16 6 2 3 4 6 2 0 3 0 48 
BOTTLES 2 0 2 2 1 1 3 9 5 9 4 1 4 6 0 2 0 51 
ELECTRICITY 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 5 4 14 25 6 2 14 0 13 13 101 
ELECTRICAL 
APPLIANCES 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 4 2 5 6 2 1 0 1 28 
GAS 2 2 0 1 1 5 5 18 15 13 25 12 0 5 1 3 2 110 
TOYS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3 
MACHINERY 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 0 1 0 0 11 
ELEVATORS 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
EXTINGUISHER 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
CONSTRUCTION 
MATERIALS 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 2 1 5 2 7 3 0 1 0 24 
MEDICINES  0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 3 1 0 2 0 4 0 17 
HEALTH PRODUCTS 0 1 0 0 0 1 3 1 3 2 2 3 9 5 0 0 0 30 
PROD. for DOMESTIC 
USE 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 2 6 2 4 5 2 0 5 1 32 
CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 4 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 3 3 3 7 4 1 2 0 34 
VEHICLES 0 1 0 2 0 0 1 3 8 15 12 10 18 12 0 15 3 100 
OFFICE SUPPLIES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
ELECTRONICS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
COSMETIC PRODUCTS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
BICYCLES 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 
TOTAL 15 8 3 8 10 9 19 61 51 74 88 54 68 59 4 51 21 603 
                                                 
1371 The Directive 85/374 was transposed into Spanish law by law 22/1994 (http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1994/07/07/pdfs/A21737-21739.pdf). Today it remains in force through the RDL 1/2007 (http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2007/11/30/pdfs/A49181-49215.pdf) 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
COMPENSATION OF PRODUCT-RELATED ACCIDENT VICTIMS IN 
EUROPE:  
SOURCES, INTERACTION AND EFFECTS 
 
The last chapter of this thesis focuses on the compensation of victims of product-
related accidents. As with other types of accidents, the basic sources of compensation to 
which the victims of product-related accidents may turn are the tortfeasor, via the 
imposition or threat of liability and damages awards, and collateral sources such as the 
providers of private and public insurance.  
Compensation is one of the most interesting aspects of the product regulation 
model in force in Europe. With the U.S. model of product liability as a reference, the 
structure and content of European product regulation have often been justified as a way to 
provide injured victims with an easy and effective mechanism for seeking compensation 
for product-related harm.1372
The nature of tort law as a compensation instrument has been widely discussed in 
the literature.
 The context of the U.S. and European product liability 
systems, however, are dramatically different. In particular, social insurance plays a 
crucial role in compensating victims in Europe, and this distorts the impact of product 
liability.  
1373 Tort law aims to compensate victims and place them in the same 
position they would have been in had the accident not taken place.1374
                                                 
1372 See the preamble of the product liability directive emphasizing the importance of compensation of 
injured victims of product-related acccidents.  
 The extent to 
1373 See Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 
75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801 (1997) and George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 
5 (1987) noting that modern tort law has two goals: minimizing accident rates as well as providing 
compensation for those who suffer accidents caused by products or services. See also Beatrice A. Beltran, 
Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153 (2000) arguing that today tort law serves more as a 
deterrence mechanism than as a compensatory instrument and hence should not be regarded primarily as a 
form of insurance.  
1374 Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 177- 220 (2004). 
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which tort law achieves this goal, of course, is conditioned on victims pursuing their 
claims. Product liability, as a subcategory of tort law, is no different in this respect.  
One of the European Commission's goals in adopting the product liability 
directive was to make tort law an effective compensation system for the harm caused by 
products. In particular, the Commission included the directive's strict liability regime on 
the assumption that this would facilitate product victims' claims for compensation.1375 In 
light of the scarce product liability litigation in Europe,1376
To understand how insurance operates as a compensation mechanism, it is 
important to distinguish between private and public insurance. Both share the same 
compensation rationale -- compensating victims regardless of fault -- but differ in their 
operation. In particular, private insurance is funded through insurance premiums that are 
 however, it does not appear 
that product liability is being used by product victims as their main compensation 
mechanism. This may be attributed, in part, to the parameters presented already -- 
procedural factors, the sometimes non-strict nature of the liability imposed by the 
directive, and the interaction between product liability and product safety regulations that 
in certain situations might have affected the probabilities of injured victims of prevailing 
in court. It may also be the result of the existence and role of European social insurance.  
                                                 
1375 See the preamble of the product liability directive. 
1376 See Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability in  Product liability in comparative 
perspective, edited by Duncan Fairgrieve, Cambridge, 295 (2005) noting that the level of product liability 
litigation remains significantly low because injured victims do not generally pursue their product claims. 
See also Robert W. McGee, Who Really Benefits from Liability Litigation?, num. 24, Dumont Institute 
Policy Analysis (1996) noting that Liability costs in the United States are 15 times higher than in Japan and 
twenty times higher than in Europe. See Eleonora Rajneri, Interaction between the European Directive on 
Product Liability and the former liability regime in Italy, in Product Liability in Comparative Perspective, 
Duncan Fairgrave (ed.) 67 - 84, Cambridge University Press (2005) for an analysis of the impact of the 
adoption of the product liability directive in Italy. See also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Legislative reform or 
retreat? A response to the product liability crisis, 14 Forum 251, 253 (1978-1979) noting that the 
introduction of strict product liability in the U.S. resulted in a substantial increase in the frequency of 
product liability cases as well as on the size of settlement awards. See also Sheila L. Birnbaum, Legislative 
reform or retreat? A response to the product liability crisis, 14 Forum 251, 253 (1978-1979) noting that the 
introduction of strict product liability in the U.S. resulted in a substantial increase in the frequency of 
product liability cases as well as on the size of settlement awards.  
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set for different pools of insured parties according to their levels of risk,1377
There is no comprehensive treatment of these basic systems for compensating the 
victims of product-related accidents.
 whereas 
public insurance -- social insurance -- is funded through taxpayer contributions that are 
not linked to risk. In addition, private insurance is often held by potential tortfeasors, and 
operates as part of the compensation system by ensuring that these parties are able to 
compensate victims if they cause harm; public insurance, on the other hand, is a direct 
source of compensastion for the victims themselves. 
1378
This Chapter lays out each of the compensation mechanisms as they exist in 
Europe, explains the mechanisms in place for coordination between them, and discusses 
the inefficiency and challenges presented by this overall system. The chapter suggests 
that social insurance systems may be bearing most of the costs of product-related 
accidents in Europe, and that this warrants a reconsideration of Europe's overall product 
liability model.
 Tort, private insurance, and public insurance are 
all regulated individually and independently, without attention to the combined role and 
effect of each system on the tortfeasor’s incentives for care and on the victim’s incentives 
to seek compensation.  
1379
 
  
 
                                                 
1377 See in general Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance and (the social construction of) Responsibility, University 
of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 8 (2002). This article is available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/8 considering that insurance is not only a loss spreading 
instrument but is also a form of social responsibility based on five different arguments: accountability, 
trustworthiness, causation, freedom and solidarity.  
1378 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision 
Of Compensation For Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 77 (1993) arguing for a comprehensive 
treatment of compensation schemes. 
1379 Eleonora Rajneri, Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and the Former 
Liability Regime in Italy, Global Jurist Topics, Vol. 4, Issue 1 num. 3 (2004) suggesting that European 
consumers do not have an interest in pursuing their product liability claims because they already receive 
compensation through social insurance.  
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1 Tort law -- product liability -- as a victim’s compensation system 
 
Tort law has two major functions: deterring accidents by creating incentives for 
care and compensating victims of accidents once they have occurred.1380 From an ex ante 
perspective -- before the accident has taken place -- tort law aims at creating incentives to 
potential tortfeasors for investing in care so that the amount of accidents is minimized.1381 
Preventing all accidents, however, would be infinitely costly and would require cessation 
of nearly all human activity, given that most activities can eventually cause harm. In 
other words, preventing all accident is impossible in practice. Therefore, rather than try to 
eliminate all risk,1382
The effectiveness of tort law as a deterrent mechanism is imperfect.
 tort law seeks to minimize the expected losses caused by accidents 
up to a level where the cost of preventing them is lower than the amount of damage they 
cause. 
1383 It reduces 
accidents but not at the predicted level.1384
                                                 
1380 See George L. Priest, Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1987) noting that there 
are two main goals of tort law: minimizing accidents and giving injured victims an insurance-like 
mechanism for seeking compensation. See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the Time Dimension 
in Products Liability, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 935-38 (1981) noting three values of products liability: first, 
compensating victims of defective products; second, requiring those who cause harm to make their victims 
whole and third, shifting the social costs of risky activities from innovent victims to who directly benefited 
from them.  
 However, the deterrent effect of tort law 
1381 Accident minimization does not mean aiming at eliminating accidents at any cost. From a law and 
economics perspective, only accidents that are cost effective to eliminate, that is, those where the cost of 
precautions is lower than the reduction in expected liability costs, should be eliminated. See Steven Shavell, 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 177 - 220 
(2004). See also Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153, 175 (2000) 
describing the incentives created by the tort system on potential tortfeasors to invest in safety. 
1382 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 555, 573,  fn.67 (1985) 
explaining that the goal of deterrence is not eliminating all accidents because that would imply ceasing all 
activities but seeking to achieve an optimal level of accidents. 
1383 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377, 378-79 (1994) considering that tort law provides a significant amount of deterrence 
but less than predictions indicate. See also Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. 
Ins. L. J. 153, 187 (2000) arguing that tort law should not be required to provide an absolute level of 
accident deterrence and arguing that its performance as a deterrent instruments should be evaluated in 
relative or marginal terms.  
1384 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, 10, Harvard 
University Press (1987) noting that tort law performs moderate deterrence.  
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should not be evaluated by itself but instead jointly with other parameters that 
simultaneously contribute to minimize tort accidents. These include market forces, which 
create incentives for accident minimization through reputation, and ex ante product safety 
regulation, which aims to minimize accidents by encouraging compliance with product 
safety standards.1385 In this sense the threat of liability under tort -- the threat of being 
exposed to liability -- alone or combined with other factors, serves as a deterrent 
mechanism.1386
In addition and related to its role in deterring accidents,
  
1387 tort liability is also an 
important instrument of compensation for injured victims.1388 Through tort law, injured 
victims may seek compensation1389 from those responsible for their harm.1390 Through 
the compensation function, the incentives to adopt care -- i.e., accident deterrence -- are 
enhanced and reinforced.1391
From a compensation perspective, the goal of tort law is to leave the injured 
victim in the same position she would have been in had the accident not taken place.
  
1392
                                                 
1385 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437 (2010) arguing that in light of all these factors, product liability has a marginal effect on deterrence. 
See also Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 300 (2004). 
 
1386 Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153, 190 (2000). 
1387 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 
313, 363 (1990) arguing that deterrence is a more important tort goal than retributive justice or loss 
spreading.  
1388 See Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no 
3, 115-136 (1991).  
1389 See Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability 
crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 300 (1988) noting that the judiciary has attempted 
to transform the tort system into a compensation mechanism.  
1390 See Paul H. Rubin, TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT, 49-51, American Enterprise Institute Press (1993) 
suggesting that deterrence is jointly achieved by tort law and ex ante government regulation and hence 
there is no need for tortfeasors to bear the full cost of the injuries they cause.   
1391 See generally Michael Faure, ed. Deterrence, insurability and Compensation in Environmental 
Liability, Future Developments in the European Union, Vol 5 Tort and Insurance Law, European Center of 
Tort and insurance law, Springer Wien (2003).  
1392 Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 257-279 (2004). It should be noted that the traditional goal of corrective justice of tort law is not 
shared by insurance theorists who understand that tort compensation should be based on the individual 
demand for first-party insurance. So if individuals would not have purchased first-party insurance against 
certain risks, compensation for accidents in these cases would be inadequate. See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm 
and Money: Against The Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 1596 (1997). See 
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The effectiveness of tort awards in compensating injured victims and making them whole 
turns on whether the accident modified the victim’s utility function after the accident.1393 
Whenever the injured victim’s utility function after the accident is not modified and just 
decreased to a lower utility level,1394 the tort system can and should perfectly compensate 
the victim and the two simultaneous goals of tort liability may be achieved: on one side, 
victims receive compensation that places them back in the same position as they were 
before the accident took place and on the other, tortfeasors have incentives to optimally 
invest in care -- or safety -- given that they would fully internalize the victim’s losses.1395 
If this outcome was achieved, the investment in care would be optimal and at the same 
time the level of accidents would be minimized.1396
But whenever the utility function of the injured victim is modified as a 
consequence of the accident,
 
1397 as for example in cases where the victim suffers serious 
injuries, the tort system does not provide perfect compensation and the injured victim is 
generally under-compensated1398
                                                                                                                                                 
also Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 313, 
363 (1990) arguing that compensatory justice provide the rational basis of the tort law.  
 given that it is not possible to leave the injured victim in 
1393 See generally Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 219, Aspen eds. (5th ed. 1998). See 
also Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153, 180 (2000) noting that the 
impact of the accident on the victim’s utility function and whether she can truly be made whole by the 
damage award is directly related on the issue of whether tort law can effectively perform its compensation 
function. 
1394 This would be cases where the shape of the injured victim’s utility function would not change but 
would decrease and the new utility function of the injured victim after the accident would be parallel to 
original utility function the victim had before the accident took place. See Hal R. Varian, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH, 55-72, 6W W Norton & Co Inc (Np); 5th ed. (1999). 
1395 See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 185, Aspen eds. (5th ed. 1998) noting that even 
if compensation was imperfect, the liability threat would be a way of deterring risky and undesirable 
behavior. 
1396 Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 177- 220 (2004). 
1397 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437, 1465 (2010) noting that in cases where the victim’s utility function changed, damage awards are 
incremental in nature, especially when they compensate for pain and suffering.  
1398 In fact, in cases where victims suffered serious injuries, the tort system under-compensates victims. See 
Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 285 and 214-215, Aspen Eds. (5th ed. 1998) noting that 
despite the supposed generous damage awards given to injured victims, whenever these victims have 
suffered serious injuries and are crippled, tort law significantly under-compensates them. See also Kenneth 
S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of 
Compensation for Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 108 (1993) arguing that tort law is a highly 
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the same position it was before the accident took place in light of the change of her utility 
function.1399
In addition to the impact and effect of the accident on the victim’s utility function, 
the effectiveness of the tort system as a compensation mechanism is strongly conditioned 
on the nature and scope of the system and the victim’s ability to successfully bring a 
claim.
 
1400 First, compensation under tort is not universally available for any kind of injury 
and for any amount of loss given that the tort system provides compensation for a limited 
amount of injuries. For example, European product liability provides a tort remedy for 
victims of defective products only when the damage suffered is higher than 500 euros.1401 
Victims suffering damages below this amount are not provided any remedy under the 
European product liability system.1402
Second, the prima facie case of an accident victim requires meeting a high burden 
of proof. Proving the damages is often difficult, especially when these damages include 
latent harm, continuous harm, or pain and suffering. Proving causation between the 
tortfeasor’s conduct and the victim’s damages can also be difficult.
 
1403 Additionally, in 
product liability cases, injured victims are required to prove product defect, and this is 
often a difficult task regardless of the defectiveness test used.1404
                                                                                                                                                 
unsatisfactory compensation system.  
 
1399 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 97-98 (1989) arguing that compensation 
under tort does not make inured victim’s whole given that the actual value of court awards and settlements 
is often less than the actual losses suffered by the victim. 
1400 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 69 (1989). 
1401 Article 9 b) of the product liability directive. 
1402 See Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The 
European Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 659 (1993) noting that social insurance programs 
allow victims not entitled to a compensation remedy under tort to receive benefits. 
1403 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 70 (1989) noting that the tort system can 
adequately handle risks that have traceable causes but has an extreme difficulty to handle cases with 
multiple potential causes as well as risks that are new and might have unknown causes when the tort claim 
is filed.  
1404 As explained in Section 6 of Chapter 2, there are two major defectiveness tests: the consumer 
expectations test and the reasonable alternative design test. The product liability directive, in its article 6, 
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Third, even when victims pursue their claims and meet the required burden of 
proof, they are unable to receive compensation when tortfeasors turn out to be judgment-
proof, uninsured, or underinsured.1405 Whenever tortfeasors do not compensate injured 
victims the liability system fails both from the compensation perspective, as the victim is 
left without full relief, and from the deterrence perspective, as the tortfeasor does not 
fully internalize the victim's losses and hence is not given efficient incentives for care.1406
In addition to the challenges presented above, compensating injured victims 
through the tort system is very expensive,
  
1407 both privately and socially.1408 The private 
costs of the tort system result from the cost of litigation. It is well settled that damage 
awards received by injured victims represent only a fraction of the funds awarded by 
courts.1409 On top of these private costs, administrative costs of the court system 
necessary to adjudicate tort claims are borne largely by the society as a whole.1410
                                                                                                                                                 
establishes the consumer expectations test as the defectiveness test applicable in Europe. Some U.S. states 
apply the consumer expectations test while others apply the reasonable alternative design test for defect. 
See Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 994 (1998) comparing the tests 
for defect applied in Europe and in the Restatement (Third). 
 
1405 See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, The New Zeland Experience and Alternative Compensation 
Schemes, 15 U. Haw. L. Rev. 659 (1993) analyzing the experience of no-fault compensation in New 
Zeland and pointing out the challenges presented by the U.S. tort system as a compensation mechanism. 
1406 See generally Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements And Compulsory Liability Insurance as 
Solutions to the Judgment-Proof Problem, Rand Journal of Economics, vol 36, num. 1, 63-77, 64 (2005) 
suggesting the use of asset and liability insurance requirements as mechanisms to ensure victim’s 
compensation instead of using the legal system in light of its costly way of providing compensation to 
victims. 
1407 See Jeffrey O’Connell, A Correct Diagnosis Of The Ills Of Liability Insurance -- And A False Cure: A 
Comment On The Reports Of The Federal Tort Policy Working Group, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 161, 178 
(1988) arguing that the problem of liability under tort is not its costs but how these costs are distributed 
among the different parties involved.  
1408 Stephen D. Sugarman, The New Zeland Experience and Alternative Compensation Schemes, 15 U. 
Haw. L. Rev. 659, 664 (1993). See also Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. 
L. J. 153, 159 (2000) concluding that the tort system does not effectively perform its compensation 
function.  
1409 Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of 
Compensation for Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 108 (1993) noting that a significant fraction of 
the tort awards are for the injured victim’s lawyers instead for compensating victim.  
1410 Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1096 (2007) noting the 
high costs involved in using the tort system as a compensation mechanism.   
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These challenges and imperfections of tort law as a compensation mechanism1411 
does not mean that tort law should be discarded as an instrument for compensation.1412 
Liability under tort can and does play a valuable role in compensating injured parties.1413 
Alternative compensation systems, however, should be considered to complement and 
supplement tort liability.1414 When victims’ compensation is analyzed from a broad 
perspective, the role and effects of alternative compensation systems such as private and 
public insurance should be taken into account given that when injured victims receive 
insurance compensation, tort compensation becomes incremental1415 to the compensation 
already received or in certain cases even superfluous.1416 From an economic perspective, 
the role and effects of tort liability in compensating injured victims are strongly 
influenced by the benefits victims might have previously received from alternative 
sources.1417
                                                 
1411 Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of 
Compensation for Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 108 (1993). See also Michael G. Faure, Ton 
Hartlief and Niels J. Philipsen, Funding of personal injury litigation and claims culture, Evidence from the 
Netherlands, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, issue 2, 20 (2006) considering the tort system victim 
unfriendly and arguing in favor of moving away from tort law towards an alternative insurance based 
compensation system. 
 When injured victims receive compensation from insurance, such 
compensation often addresses their most necessary and urgent needs. If, after receiving 
insurance compensation, the victim decides to pursue a product liability claim, the 
compensation awarded under tort does not provide the same utility as if the victim would 
1412 Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability crisis 
and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 307-308 (1988). 
1413 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward A Diminished Role For Tort Liability:  Social Insurance, Government 
Regulation, And Contemporary Risks To Health And Safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 103 (1989). 
1414 Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of 
Compensation for Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 108 (1993) arguing that tort law is an 
unsatisfactory system of compensation and hence alternative systems such as private and social insurance 
systems should be contemplated while leaving the corrective justice and deterring function to tort law. 
1415 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 
1462-1469 (2010).  
1416 Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153, 158 (2000). 
1417 See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 
1437, 1465 (2010).  
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only be compensated under tort.1418
So if these alternative compensation instruments are accessible to victims -- either 
because the tortfeasor purchased insurance coverage or because she is entitled to social 
insurance benefits, -- coordination between the different sources of compensation will be 
necessary in order to preserve the parties’ incentives and reach a socially optimal 
outcome.  
 So the utility of tort liability is only incremental to 
the utility of the benefits previously provided by the collateral source.  
 
 
2 Private insurance as an instrument to compensate injured victims 
 
Whenever tortfeasors are involved in risky activities and hence exposed to 
liability they can buy insurance coverage in exchange for an insurance premium.1419 
Insurance coverage allows individuals to smooth the amount of money available to them 
over the diverse states of the world -- before and after the accident takes place -- and 
hence in situations in which the victim has not suffered any loss or where there are 
losses.1420
Private insurance can play a role in reconciling the two goals of tort: minimizing 
accidents and compensating victims through spreading the costs of accidents.
 
1421
                                                 
1418 If individuals are assumed to have a decreasing marginal utility of money, the marginal utility of the 
award received from the insurance coverage is higher than the marginal utility of the monetary damages 
awarded under tort. See Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 1465 (2010).  
  
1419 See in general Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance and (the social construction of) Responsibility, University 
of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 8 (2002). This article is available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/8 considering that insurance is not only a loss spreading 
instrument but is also a form of social responsibility.  
1420 Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 257-280 (2004). 
1421 See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 46-54, Yale 
University Press (1970). See also Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 
1067, 1096 (2007) noting that the risk spreading rationale conflict with efficient deterrence to the extent 
that a loss can be shifted or spread the incentives to avoid it decrease. 
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From a compensation perspective, liability insurance is highly desirable because it 
ensures that victims receive compensation regardless of the financial condition of the 
tortfeasor.1422 At the same time, insurance ensures that the manufacturer is financially 
viable, even after the accident takes place and liability is established.1423 In addition of 
the advantages that the tortfeasor’s insurance coverage provides for the victims, it also 
has serious benefits for potential tortfeasors given that they are able to transfer the risk to 
an insurer who spreads the risk and cost of the loss.1424
But the existence and availability of private insurance also undermines corrective 
justice and deterrence rationales of tort law in a certain way. When a tortfeasor purchases 
insurance coverage the tortfeasor does not internalize the cost of the damages he 
caused
  
1425 and optimal deterrence is undermined whenever a tortfeasor externalizes the 
expected liability costs through purchasing private insurance coverage.1426
In order for private insurance coverage to be viable two requirements must be 
met: The risk faced by the insured must be predictable -- with a positive probability but 
 
                                                 
1422 But if the goal is corrective justice, liability insurance would be inadequate. See Gary T. Schwartz, The 
Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 313, 363 (1990). See also Tom 
Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort Law in 
Action, Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, Vol. 12:1, 4 (2006) noting that insurance has a fundamental 
effect on the victim’s collectibility. However, often potential tortfeasfors locate risk in entities with no 
assets and place their assets in entities with no risks and hence leave injured victims with not compensated. 
See Lynn Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L. J. 1 (1996). See also Al H. Ringleb and Steven N. 
Wiggins, Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 3, 
574-595 (1990) studying the trade offs presented by the costly decision of reorganizing vertically in order 
to allocate risk and avoid liability payments and maintaining the same firm’s structure but being exposed to 
liability payments and concluding that large integrated firms working in hazardous sectors of the economy -
- especially in latent hazard -- have an incentive to locate risky activities and minimize the exposure of 
assets to potential liability claims. 
1423 Beatrice A. Beltran, Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153, 175 (2000). 
1424 Calabresi offered three main justifications for risk distribution: spreading the risk of loss; placing the 
risk on the party who is in a better position to bear it and requiring tortfeasors to bear the burden of the loss. 
See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale Law Journal 4, 
499-553 (1961). 
1425 The corrective justice function of tort law is even more diluted when the insurance premiums do not 
reflect the amount of the harm caused by the tortfeasor. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social 
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of Compensation for Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. 
Rev. 75, 86 (1993). 
1426 Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision Of 
Compensation For Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 86 (1993). 
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lower than one -- and the probability of each harmful event occuring must be 
independent.1427
If the undesired outcome and hence the losses would occur with certainty, they 
would not be insurable
 When both of these conditions are met, it is possible to spread risk 
among a large and homogeneous group of insured parties.  
1428 and if the probability of the harmful event -- that is, the risk of 
harm -- was not predictable, such risk would be very difficult to insure.1429
The risk of each potential loss must independent so that insurers can create risk 
pools of independent risks.
  
1430
The degree to which insurance functions as a risk spreading mechanism depends 
on the capacity of differentiating among different categories of insured when setting 
premium rates. The lower the differentiation between risk premiums, the more the risk is 
spread and the more differentiation in risk premiums, the lower loss spreading there 
is.
 This is a crucial assumption given that when the 
probability of the different events causing losses is independent, insurance companies are 
able to compensate the victim who suffered the loss with the premiums paid by the others 
who purchased insurance. If the different events causing losses would occur at the same 
time, there could not be insurance offered given that compensation could not be paid to 
all the insured at the same time.  
1431
                                                 
1427 Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability crisis 
and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1988). 
  
1428 If losses were certain, the decision would be either saving the cost of insurance before losses occurred 
or being compensated once losses take place.  
1429 See Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability 
crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1988) noting that if risks are not predictable, 
insurers would have to increase significantly insurance premiums in order to cover unknown risks or not 
offer insurance.  
1430 Independent risks are risks the probability of which of occurring is independent from each other. See 
Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 257-280 (2004).  
1431 See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 47, Yale 
University Press (1970). 
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In order for insurance coverage to be offered, the risk premium must reflect the 
level of risk engaged in by the potential tortfeasor seeking to be insured.1432 So it is 
necessary that the insurance premium is higher or equal to the expected value of the 
damages suffered by the insured plus administrative costs of running the insurance 
system.1433
So in order for private insurance systems to be able to work efficiently, two 
information parameters will be necessary: the insured’s level of risk -- probability and 
amount of losses -- and the amount of administrative costs necessary to manage the 
insurance system. Additionally, information regarding the insured’s level of care is of 
crucial importance given that insurance premiums should be linked to the expected level 
of accident losses and such losses might depend on the insured’s level of care 
adopted.
  
1434
The interests of tortfeasors in insuring risks of losses they may cause are directly 
related to their exposure to liability under tort.
  
1435
                                                 
1432 See in general Gary T. Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell 
L. Rev. 313 (1990) noting that insurance premiums somehow adjusted to the risk engaged by the insured 
would allow achieving simultaneously compensatory and corrective justice goals.  See also  
 The literature on insurance has broadly 
discussed whether insurance coverage should be mandatory or voluntary for potential 
tortfeasors. Mandatory insurance for tort accidents is often considered to present 
Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability crisis and 
its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1988). 
1433 It should be noted that this way of calculating the insurance premium assumes a neutral attitude towards 
risk by the insured. If the insured was adverse to risk or risk lover, the premium would be differently 
calculated and would reflect the insured’s attitude towards risk. See Hal R. Varian, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH, 213-227, 6W W Norton & Co Inc (Np); 5th ed. (1999) and 
Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS, 163, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 5th ed. 
(2001). See also Jürg Spühler, Swiss Re Liability and liability insurance: yesterday – today – tomorrow, 19 
(2001).  
1434 Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements And Compulsory Liability Insurance As Solutions To 
The Judgment-Proof Problem, Rand Journal of Economics, vol 36, num. 1, 63-77, 64 (2005) noting that 
when the insured’s level of care is not observable, purchasing insurance coverage might dilute the 
incentives to take care because of moral hazard problems that would arise.  
1435 See Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction Of The Tort System And Liability Insurance Regulation: 
Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 Conn. Ins. L.J. 91, 153 (1996). See also Robert G. Berger, The impact of 
tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 285, 288 (1988) noting that the legal transformation of tort law changed the expectations of 
manufacturers, consumers and insurers.  
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significant advantages given that it is cheaper to administer and manage than a system of 
liability under tort.1436  Insurance policies allow injured victims to know who will bear 
the cost of the damages they suffered as well as avoid the need to go to court and hence 
avoid the litigation and the administrative costs involved in a court proceeding. It should 
be noted that in certain contexts, potential victims might also have incentives to buy 
insurance coverage and receive compensation in case the accident occurred.1437
 
 This is 
less true in Europe, however, given the strong social insurance systems, and so it will not 
be addressed in detail here.   
 
2.1 The role and positive effects of private insurance coverage in compensating 
injured victims of tort accidents  
 
Whenever the incentives to reduce risk created by the tort system are not optimal, 
purchasing insurance coverage for expected losses is socially desirable. Incentives to 
reduce risk are inadequate mostly in two situations: when the tortfeasor’s assets might not 
be sufficient to compensate the injured victim for the damages caused -- the judgment 
proof problem -- and when the victim might not pursue her tort claim and hence the 
tortfeasor could avoid liability.1438
                                                 
1436 Göran Skogh, Mandatory insurance: Transaction Cost Analysis of Insurance, Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics, 521-527 (2000). See also Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 263 (1987) discussing the relative costs of the liability and the 
insurance system as compensation mechanisms.  
 In these cases, incentives to reduce risk are not 
efficient.  
1437 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. Legal Stud.  645 (1985) 
arguing that the tort system -- specifically, product liability -- was not a good insurance system given that 
the tortfeasor’s liability would be more efficiently insured by victims.   
1438 Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, Geneva papers on 
risk and insurance, 25(2), 166-179 (2000). 
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Whenever tortfeasors have limited assets compared to the damages they may 
cause, liability rules are not efficient for deterrence and or victim compensation1439 and 
tortfeasors may not take cost-justified precautions because they may be aware that their 
liability exposure is limited to their assets.1440
In such cases, tortfeasors do not fully internalize the costs of their actions, instead 
internalize liability costs only up to their assets. This means they will have suboptimal 
incentives for care, will engage in too much harmful activity
  
1441 and the resulting 
outcome will then be inefficient.1442
At the same time, whenever injured victims do not pursue their claims under tort, 
tortfeasors may escape from liability and hence not have incentives to adopt efficient 
levels of care.
   
1443
Insurance coverage is socially desirable in these cases because it compensates 
injured victims regardless of the tortfeasor’s financial circumstances and regardless of the 
victims’ incentives and abilities to pursue tort claims.
  
1444
 
  
                                                 
1439 The use of insurance coverage as a mechanism to reduce the impact of the judgment proof problem has 
been widely discussed in the literature. See Mattias K. Polborn, Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-
Proof Problem, International Review of Law and Economics, 18: 141-146 (1998), Peter J. Jost, Limited 
Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, International Review of Law and Economics 16: 259-
276 (1996) and Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 International Review of Law and 
Economics 47-50 (1986). 
1440 Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 International Review of Law and Economics, 45-58, 
46 (1986) and Shavell, Steven, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 275-280, Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press (2004). 
1441 Steven Shavell, Minimum Asset Requirements And Compulsory Liability Insurance As Solutions To 
The Judgment-Proof Problem, Rand Journal of Economics, 36 (1), 63-77, 64 (2005) suggesting that 
requiring a minimum level of assets to engage in a certain activity may prevent individuals with limited 
assets from engaging too often in it.  However Shavell also noted that requiring a minimum level of assets 
would also have a disadvantageous effect given that it would exclude individuals with assets below the 
required level that would engage in the activity because the benefits involved in it would outweigh the costs 
they would cause to others but they would but they would not be able to engage in that activity because of 
the lack of minimum assets.  
1442 Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 International Review of Law and Economics 45-58, 46 
(1986). 
1443 Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, Geneva papers on 
Risk and Insurance, 25(2), 166-179 (2000). 
1444 Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 International Review of Law and Economics 45-58 
(1986). 
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2.2 Imperfect private insurance markets 
 
Markets of risk are often imperfect for several reasons. First, insurance companies 
in some cases sell policies at premiums that are not actuarially fair, especially in cases 
where risk cannot be properly valued.1445 Second, adverse selection results in high risk 
individuals being the ones buying insurance coverage. Third, moral hazard problems 
affect the risk involved in the actions of the insured, increasing the number of injuries. 
Fourth, the profits of insurance companies are included in their premiums, resulting in 
excessively high premiums. Fifth, victims’ limited perceptions of risk often affect the 
functioning of private insurance markets. Sixth, tortfeasors have reduced incentives to 
take care when they are judgment proof. Finally, there is variation in the involved parties' 
abilities to insure.1446
As for the problem of actuarial fairness, in order for insurance premiums to be 
adequately determined, information must be known regarding the probability of accidents 
and their costs, as well as of associated administrative costs. But this information is often 
difficult to obtain and its absence or imperfection results in distorted premiums and the 
payment of suboptimal benefits.
  
1447
The second and third issues, adverse selection and moral hazard, are of special 
importance when talking about private insurance coverage. Adverse selection refers to 
the tendency for low risk individuals to avoid voluntary insurance pools and hence leave 
insurance pools with a disproportionately high percentage of high-risk individuals.
  
1448
                                                 
1445 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989). 
 
1446 See Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 59-60, Yale 
University Press (1970). 
1447 Evidence suggests that often, insurers tend to over-compensate small losses and under-compensate 
large losses. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government 
regulation, and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 97 (1989). 
1448 See Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay 
on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Quarterly Journal of Econ. 90:629-49 (1976) noting that one of 
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Whenever insurance premiums cannot be individualized in order to reflect the 
individual’s level of risk,1449 it is often economically worth purchasing insurance 
coverage for high-risk individuals given that the level of risk they present is higher than 
the premium they have to pay.1450
A response often used to address the adverse selection problem has been risk 
classification and the possibility of binding risks to the insurance pool. Insurance risk 
classification aims at matching insurance policies with respect to the level of expected 
risk presented by the insured individual through charging different insurance premiums or 
defining different insurance contract provisions depending on the expected level of risk 
of the insured individual.
 Consequently, low-risk individuals do not purchase 
insurance coverage at the price offered to them given that they find insurance premiums 
too expensive and insurance pools contain a disproportionate percentage of high-risk 
individuals. 
1451 Risk classification reduces the risk-spreading element 
inherent to insurance pools because it aims at having risk premiums reflect as much as 
possible the level of risk individuals are exposed to. If risk can be classified, low-risk 
individuals of the risk-pool do not financially contribute to finance the losses experienced 
by high-risk individuals.1452
                                                                                                                                                 
the most important problems facing insurance markets is the asymmetry between insurers and insured 
regarding the level of risk involved. 
  
1449 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 
University of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 3 (2001)  arguing that insurers create and 
shape adverse selection. This article is available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/3.  
1450 See in general Priest, George, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 
(1987) analyzing the impact of adverse selection effects on the insurance crisis experienced by the United 
States during the 1980s.  
1451 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 
University of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 3 (2001). This article is available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/3 offering examples of risk classification such as sorting life 
insurance applicants by age, health insurance applicants by health status, workers compensation insurance 
applicants by type of industry, or by the nature of the construction of the property to be insured. 
1452 The possibility of risk classification has often been referred to as adverse selection on the insured’ side 
given that this mechanism allows insurers to select risks in an adverse way to the insurance pool. At the 
extreme, if risk classification is perfect, the ability of the insurance pool to spread risk would be eliminated. 
Both adverse selection problems -- from the insured and from the insurers are collective action problems 
given that they inhibit the risk spreading nature of insurance contracts. See Tom Baker, Containing the 
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An additional and frequently used solution to the adverse selection problem is 
mandatory insurance policies provided by a single insurer such as for example the state. 
Even though mandatory insurance significantly reduces adverse selection problems, it 
increases moral hazard given that the risk of all potential tortfeasors is transferred to the 
insurer. Against the increase of the probability of the accident resulting from moral 
hazard problems, the literature has proposed two possible remedies: incomplete insurance 
coverage for victims so that they continue to bear part of the risk and hence have 
incentives to avoid accidents, and the possibility of insurers observing insured parties’ 
behavior to determine their level of care.1453
The moral hazard problem may arise ex ante or ex post.
 
1454 Ex ante moral hazard 
refers to the change in victims’ incentives to avoid accidents that can result from 
insurance protection.1455 Whenever victims have purchased insurance coverage against a 
certain risk, the incentives to avoid the accident diminish and hence the likelihood of the 
accident increases. Ex post moral hazard refers to the increase in claims against the 
insurance policy beyond what the victims would claim if uninsured.1456
Despite these challenges that private insurance faces, private insurers take 
measures to align individual incentives with the goal of minimizing the probability and 
amount of insured losses and they have created mechanisms to respond to adverse 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, University of Connecticut School of Law 
Working Paper Series 3 (2001). This article is available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/3 
1453 See generally, Shavell, Steven, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 257-280, Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press (2004) and Steven Shavell, On moral hazard and insurance, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(4), 541-562 (1979). 
1454 See Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531-537, 535 
(1968).  
1455 The moral hazard problem has been widely discussed in the literature. See, for example,  
Wondon Lee, James A. Ligon, Moral Hazard in Risk Pooling Arrangements, The Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, 68 (1), 175-190 (2001); Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, Texas Law Review 75: 
237-92 (1996), Carol Heimer, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS (1985), (Berkeley: University of California Press) and Steven Shavell, On moral 
hazard and insurance, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(4), 541-562 (1979). 
1456 Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard:  Comment, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531-537, 535 (1968). 
See Kenneth S. Abraham, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision of 
Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75, 88 (1993) noting that ex post moral hazard is 
also present under tort whenever compensation is not subject to deductibles or coinsurance.  
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selection and moral hazard problems. For example, in light of the fact that the probability 
of the loss occurring can be influenced by the insured parties' ex ante behavior and ex 
post claim decisions, private insurance policies include deductibles and coinsurance 
provisions in order to dilute the insured parties’ potential incentives to increase the 
likelihood of the loss from occurring as well as their incentives to excessively seek 
compensation under the insurance policy.1457
It should be noted that even if adverse selection and moral hazard were not 
present in a certain insurance market, the insurance premiums charged to potential 
victims should be slightly higher than their exact level of risk given that they should 
include a certain profit for the insurance company to function.  
 Deductibles limit the amount the insured 
may recover under the insurance policy and require the insured to bear a share of the 
amount of the loss. Coinsurance requires the insured to pay a share of the amount of each 
claim against the insurance.  
Finally, the limitation of the victim’s risk perception also influences the efficiency 
of insurance markets. Whenever victims do not adequately percieve the risks they are 
exposed to, their decisions to purchase insurance are distorted and hence inefficient.1458
 
  
 
3 Mixing tort law and insurance: Finding the adequate role for each instrument 
 
 Tort law and insurance are conceptually distinct, respond to different objectives 
and function in different ways. At the same time, however, their functions and 
performance overlap when it comes to acting as compensation mechanisms for injured 
                                                 
1457 For an application of deductibles and coinsurance in the automobile insurance market and in hospital 
insurance policies see Catherine S. Elliott, Implications of Uncollectibles for Hospitalization Coinsurance 
Rates, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, Vol. 58 (4), 616-641 (1991) and Chu-Shiu Li, Chwen-Chi Liu, 
Jia-Hsing Yeh, The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile 
Insurance, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 74 (2), 441-459 (2007).  
1458 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 95-115, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Cass R. Susntein (ed.), Cambridge University Press (2000). 
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victims of accidents. The scope of compensation under tort law and the conditions under 
which it is granted directly affects incentives to offer and purchase insurance; at the same 
time, the availability and coverage of private insurance directly affects the incentives 
injured victims may have to pursue their tort claims.1459
 As mentioned earlier, facilitating victims’ compensation and providing them with 
some form of insurance
  
1460 were arguments often presented in order to justify the 
adoption of strict liability in the product liability directive. Product manufacturers were 
considered effective and efficient insurers of potential injured victims given that they 
were considered to be able to pool the risks their products presented and spread the costs 
of these risks through product prices.1461 As a result, under strict product liability injured 
victims were considered to be insured against product accidents.1462
                                                 
1459 See Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against The Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 
Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 1596 (1997) noting that the compensation role of tort law was one of the major 
arguments suggested in favor of the introduction of strict product liability. 
 
1460 See the preamble of the product liability directive and James A. Henderson, Why Negligence 
Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 377, 392 (2002), noting that the main objectives of strict enterprise 
liability are loss shifting and spreading. See also Oliver Holmes, THE COMMON LAW, 94-98 (M. Howe ed. 
1963) arguing that the only difference between negligence and strict liability was that strict liability 
provided a form of accident insurance and opposing this role of tort law on the basis that the State has no 
role in providing insurance. See also Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against The Insurance Theory 
Of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 1575 (1997) noting that strict product liability – even tort 
liability in general – was seen as an insurance mechanism for early legal economists. For an opposite view 
see Landes & Posner The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 851, 852-53 (1981) 
arguing that tort law should provide insurance to those who fail to insure themselves for injuries caused by 
accidents and Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, Geneva 
papers on Risk and Insurance, 25(2), 166-179 (2000) arguing that it is much more expensive to insure 
victims via the legal system than directly through insurance coverage.  
1461 See W. Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional 
Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, 300-304 (1988) noting that the 
emergence of strict liability was due in part to the belief that firms could act as insurers through spreading 
these risks and incorporating the cost of insurance in the product price, that would be spread among all 
consumers buying the product. See also Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against The Insurance 
Theory Of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 1575, 1595 (1997) describing the evolution of the 
role of strict product liability and arguing that product manufacturers are in a better position to create a risk 
pool and transfer the costs of this risk. See also Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 196, 
Aspen eds., 5th ed. (1998) discussing generally strict liability.  
1462 Strict product liability represents then an insurance system for injured victims even for unavoidable 
accidents and for accidents for which it would be inefficient to avoid them. See Richard W. Wright, The 
principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1096 (2007) arguing that risk spreading through the tort 
system is a remarkably expensive solution and that risk spreading would be more efficient if done through a 
universal and publicly funded system such as a no-fault social insurance program.  
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 When the product liability directive was introduced in 1985, the debate was 
focused on ensuring the efficient functioning of the common internal market, and the 
strict product liability then in force in the United States1463 seemed the most adequate rule 
and the one that could be most easily implemented in the different member states to 
achieve a harmonized law.1464
 As mentioned earlier, in order for insurance to function, it is necessary for the 
risks of insured parties to be ascertainable and quantifiable and for insurance costs to be 
capable of being transfered through product prices.
   
1465 Assuming these conditions are 
met, the use of tort law as an insurance mechanism would be desirable as long as the cost 
of insurance through the tort system is lower than the victim’s cost of buying insurance 
coverage in the insurance market.1466 Evidence shows, however, that providing insurance 
under tort is significantly more expensive than purchasing private insurance coverage.1467
Additionally, insuring victims through the tort system might affect the amount of 
private insurance offered in the market. An example of the effect of using tort liability as 
an insurance mechanism on the supply of insurance coverage may be found in the 
insurance crisis that took place in the United States during the 1980s. As George Priest 
noted at the time,
  
1468
                                                 
1463 § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
 insuring injured victims through expanding liability under tort had a 
1464 The discussion in Europe regarding the product liability rule that should be adopted was not focused on 
the evidentiary advantages of strict liability compared to the burden of proof required under negligence 
liability. See Mark A. Geistfeld, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 23-26, Foundation Press, New York 
(2006) comparing the evidentiary requirements of both liability rules. 
1465 James A. Henderson, Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. Rev. 377, 392 (2002). See also W. 
Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 97-98 (1989) noting that when a product 
involves some risk and the chance of a damage award, the product price incorporates the expected award or 
the firm’s liability insurance premium. In this sense, Viscusi concludes, through the product price 
consumers purchase a product-specific insurance within the limits established by the tort system. These 
product specific insurance are less efficient than broader policies of multiple risks.  
1466 See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 196, Aspen eds., 5th ed. (1998). 
1467 Steven Shavell, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, Geneva papers on 
Risk and Insurance, 25(2), 166-179 (2000) noting that it is much more expensive to insure victims via the 
legal system than directly through insurance coverage. 
1468 See George L. Priest, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 (1987) 
discussing the role of liability under tort on the market of private insurance coverage. 
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profound effect on the decision of supplying and demanding liability insurance 
coverage.1469
During the 1980s, the liability exposure of potential tortfeasors increased
 
1470 
based on an increase in tort awards.1471 Because of the high expected liability costs 
manufacturers were exposed to, the demand of insurance coverage increased1472 but at the 
same time, the risk of having to pay such claims increased as well.1473 As a result, the 
joint effect of an increase in liability exposure and the uncertainty involved in the 
outcome of product liability claims resulted in an increase in insurance premiums.1474
These phenomena had two major effects: first, even though the goal of the 
increase of tort exposure was increasing the insurance coverage of potential injured 
victims, there was actually a reduction of the insurance coverage available to society as a 
whole.
  
1475
                                                 
1469 George L. Priest, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1526 (1987). 
 Consequently, despite using tort law as an insurance mechanism, the 
expansion of its scope resulted in undermining the function and role of private coverage 
1470 George L. Priest, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1525 (1987). 
1471 Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no 3, 
115-136, 134 (1991).  
1472 See George L. Priest, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1522-1524 
(1987) explaining the crisis of the insurance industry in the U.S. during the mid 1980s and noting that the 
U.S. Justice Department attributed such crisis to the expansion of corporate liability exposure. 
1473 Ralph A. Winter, The Liability Insurance Market, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, no 3, 
115-136, 134 (1991). 
1474 This was especially important when comparing the liability insurance premiums paid by U.S. 
manufacturers during the 80s when compared with European manufacturers, who bore significantly lower 
insurance costs. See Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the 
availability/affordability crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 313 (1988) arguing that 
the different insurance costs for U.S. and European manufacturers directly affected their competitive 
advantage.  However, see Douglas A. Kysar, Thomas O. Mcgarity, and Karen Sokol, Medical Malpractice 
Myths And Realities: Why An Insurance Crisis Is Not A Lawsuit Crisis, 39 Loy. Law Rev. 2, 785-818, 794 
- 796(2006) noting that in some cases, an insurance crisis is not due to a liability crisis as for example, in 
the context of malpractice insurance, and hence liability under tort should not be reconsidered in order to 
solve a potential insurance crisis. Instead, Kysar et al. argue that the insurance crisis such as the malpractice 
insurance crisis were mostly due to the management and investment decisions of the insurance industry and 
not to their exposure to malpractice liability.  
1475 See Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability 
crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 288-289 (1988) noting that the increase of the 
scope of liability exposure, together with the shift from fault-based negligence to strict liability and with 
high punitive damages awarded, was one of the major factors that contributed to the a crisis of availability 
and affordability of insurance.  
  349 
and hence resulted in a reduction of private insurance being offered and available in the 
market.1476 Second, based on the fear of high losses, product manufacturers could have 
been deterred from introducing potentially useful products in the market.1477
The potential of tort liability to act as an effective insurance mechanism is 
remarkably limited
 
1478 given that neither product manufacturers nor insurers have the 
ability to pool the risks and spread them indefinitely.1479 Moreover, as Priest noted, using 
tort liability as an insurance mechanism can have the unintended effect of reducing the 
amount of insurance coverage available to society.1480
Conversely, the scope and availability of insurance coverage also has effects on 
tort law at different levels. Tom Baker points out six major areas where insurance 
coverage influences liability under tort. First, private insurance coverage allows for the 
compensation of individuals regardless of their financial abilities to pursue tort claims; 
second, liability insurance represents a de facto cap on tort damages; third, liability under 
tort is limited as a consequence of insurance exclusions; fourth, lawsuits against 
individuals and organizations often become a cost for defendants instead of becoming a 
legal claim focused on the tortfeasor’s fault; fifth, liability insurance affects tort rules in 
 
                                                 
1476 George L. Priest, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1550 - 1551 
(1987). 
1477 Victor E. Schwartz & Thomas C. Means, The Need for Federal Product Liability-- and Toxic Tort 
Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 Vill L. Rev. 1088, 1110 (1982-83) noting that exposure of high 
liability costs might result in not marketing potentially useful products.  
1478 Jeffrey O’Connell, A Correct Diagnosis Of The Ills Of Liability Insurance -- And A False Cure: A 
Comment On The Reports Of The Federal Tort Policy Working Group, 63 Notre Dame L. Rev. 161, 178 
(1988). 
1479 Robert G. Berger, The impact of tort law development on insurance: the availability/affordability crisis 
and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285, 288 (1988)  
1480 See generally George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its 
Reform, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 31 (1991) noting the reduction of the availability of insurance did not have a 
uniform effect across injured victims and had an asymmetric effect that the mostly affected were the low-
income and the poor, who precisely were the ones who were intended to protect. See generally George L. 
Priest, The current insurance crisis and modern tort law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 (1987) noting that some of the 
effects derived from the insurance crisis might have become permanent.  
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that fault becomes less relevant; and sixth, negotiations over insurance coverage are 
directly related to the scope and content of the tort claim.1481
Despite the interaction, effects and the overlap of tort liability and private 
insurance as compensation mechanisms, there are also important differences in the nature 
and functioning of each of them.
  
1482
First, under tort law, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses, such as pain and 
suffering, are compensable. In contrast, non-pecuniary losses are not compensated under 
private insurance policies because individuals would not privately insure against this kind 
of loss.
 
1483 Second, under tort law there are no such things as deductibles or coinsurance 
provisions and hence tort law does not include ex ante provisions to dilute victims’ moral 
hazard incentives.  There may be comparative and contributory negligence considerations 
but these do not specifically address moral hazard given that they are based on the 
victim’s negligent behavior and not on the victim’s incentives to increase the probability 
of the accident to occur. Third, the scope of victims’ compensation under tort has also 
evolved based on insurance considerations. Tort compensation has evolved from its 
initial goal of placing the victim in the same position as if the accident had not taken 
place, to a situation in which the victim’s demand for insurance coverage should be a key 
parameter when determining the scope of the damages to be compensated under tort.1484
                                                 
1481 See Tom Baker, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance Shapes Tort 
Law in Action, Connecticut Insurance L. J., Vol. 12:1, 3-4 (2006). 
 
1482 See W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Reform and insurance markets, John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and 
Business, Discussion Paper No. 440. 10/2003 (2003) noting that there is a role for both instruments in that 
there is a tradeoff between optimal insurance and optimal deterrence in that optimal insurance provides for 
little deterrence while optimal deterrence provides for excessive levels of insurance.  
1483 It should be noted that when victims suffer pain and suffering, ex ante they would not insure given that 
their utility function would be modified as a consequence of these non-pecuniary losses and hence the value 
of money ex post would be lower than its value ex ante. Consequently, if victims would act rationally, they 
would not buy insurance for non-pecuniary losses. See Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 257-280 (2004). 
1484 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) arguing that in order to provide 
appropriate levels of compensation, the amount of insurance an individual would purchase at fair prices 
should determine the compensation the injured victim should be entitles to. Following the same argument 
see Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1567, 1595 (1997). 
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Consequently, in light of the different nature, goals and performance of insurance 
and tort liability as compensation systems and as incentive creation mechanisms, each 
regime should be focused on the role it performs best: insurance as compensation and tort 
liability as deterrence. 1485
 
 
 
4 Product liability insurance coverage in Europe: the importance of the 
phenomenon 
 
One of the major fears generated by the adoption of the product liability directive 
was its impact on insurance rates and, consequently, on the prices of European products 
to which increased insurance costs would be transferred. In particular, it was feared that 
European products would suffer a competitive disadvantage compared to other products 
produced in countries without strict product liability regimes. The business community 
feared that the Directive's strict liability regime and its resulting increase on the liability 
exposure of product manufacturers, would significantly increase insurance premiums and 
reduce insurance availability, leading to the type of insurance crisis experience in the 
United States during the 1980s.1486 The European Commission1487
                                                 
1485 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and 
Litigation, Rand Journal 22 (4), 562-570 (1993) arguing in favor of limiting tort liability to deterrence and 
relying on insurance for compensation. 
 also considered these 
risks but concluded that the insurance industry would be able to provide the necessary 
coverage without a significant increase on product prices.  
1486 R. Patrick Thomas, Risk Management in the New Europe: Insurance and Financial Management Issues, 
139, 148, in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY (Patrick Thieffry & G. Marc Whitehead eds. 1990). 
1487 Report on the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a 
directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning liability for defective products, 1979-1980. EUR PARL. Doc. (DOC 71/79) 4 
(1979).  
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In fact, the business community's fears appear to have been misplaced.1488 
Insurance premiums may have slightly increased in some member states but at a 
significantly lower rate than expected.1489 Explanations for this result can be found in the 
particularities of the European system discussed in previous chapters. European legal 
rules and procedures, for instance, operate in a way that keeps litigation costs and damage 
awards significantly lower than in the United States, and this keeps insurance costs within 
a reasonable range.1490 Other explanations include the design of product liability 
insurance policies in Europe,1491 the scope of the insurance coverage provided, the 
important role of settlements in product cases that result in few cases reaching the 
courts,1492
The regulation of insurance contracts in Europe is not harmonized. Member states 
tend to place domestic insurance regulation in special insurance laws or in their civil 
codes. In the United Kingdom, the regulation of insurance contracts finds its basis in the 
common law. In states with statutory regulation of insurance contracts, provisions are in 
some cases mandatory and in others semi-mandatory.
 and the low incentives of tortfeasors to purchase private insurance coverage.  
1493
                                                 
1488 See Dana Kerr, Ma, Yu-Len and Schmit, Joan T., Is liability a substitute for social insurance?, 
Proceedings of the International Insurance Society, New York (2004) analyzing the relationship between 
private insurance premiums and the existence, scope and role of the social insurance and suggesting that 
there was a negative relationship between liability insurance premiums and the scope of social insurance 
programs. For an opposite conclusion see G. Wagner, TORT LIABILITY AND INSURANCE: COMPARATIVE 
REPORT AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS, in Gerhard Wagner (ed) Tort Law and Liability Insurance, Wien: 
Springer (2005). 
 Whenever a contract provision 
1489 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 304 (2004) noting that Austria is an example of 
member state where the product liability directive has had no effect because Austrian manufacturers, based 
on internal Austrian regulation, already had private liability insurance before the product liability directive 
entered into force. 
1490 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 261 (1993). 
1491 Some have argued that in light of the poor design of product liability insurance policies, they are a 
defective product themselves. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial 
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 William and Mary Law Review 1389 (2007). This article is available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923423 
1492 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 37 (1996).  
1493 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 31 (1996) 
noting that departure from mandatory provisions might be possible as long as the provisions included in the 
insurance contract are to the advantage of the insured.  
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is ambiguous, it is generally interpreted according to the general principles of law in the 
country where the contract is entered into and if the ambiguity remains, the contract is 
interpreted in favor of the insured or claimant.1494
Typical European insurance policies do not only cover the potential liability a 
product manufacturer might be exposed to for the harm caused by a defective product but 
extend to include product safety obligations as well. As explained in Chapters 5 and 6, 
European product manufacturers are subject to ex ante safety regulations that also include 
post-marketing obligations.
  
1495 Insurance policies for European manufacturers aim at 
creating incentives for loss prevention -- through safety measures before a product causes 
harm -- and through loss reduction once a product has been marketed and whenever 
possible, before it caused harm.1496
Product liability insurance policies in Europe, as in the United States, are usually 
integrated in the general insurance conditions of a comprehensive general liability 
policy.
 
1497 This formal uniformity is due not to any specific harmonized regulation but to 
the market standards established by professional associations.1498
Insuring damage caused by defective products is not easy given that the time 
frame between when a product is manufactured and when it is put into circulation in the 
market and causes harm may be very long. Moreover, the product liability directive 
includes a three-year period in which a victim may file a product claim after suffering 
 
                                                 
1494 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 32 (1996) 
noting that the regulation and interpretation of insurance contracts is a consumer friendly regulation.  
1495 Jürg Spühler, Swiss re Product recall and product tampering insurance, Swiss Reinsurance Company, 6 
(1998) noting that this is a way to keep companies linked with the products they sell from the 
manufacturing process to the liability phase.  
1496 Jürg Spühler, Swiss re Product recall and product tampering insurance, Swiss Reinsurance Company, 
10 (1998) noting that costs in prevention are often lower than costs for compensation of losses caused.  
1497 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 28 (1996) 
noting that product liability provisions are either included in the special provisions or defined in special 
articles. An exception of this general design is Germany, the U.K. and Italy that use separate standard 
product liability policies independent from the comprehensive general liability provisions. 
1498 This does not mean the insurance policies are uniform across the different member states given that 
they might provide coverage for different geographical area. See Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in 
Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 28 (1996) explaining the different geographical coverage 
included in Spanish and Portugal insurance policies.  
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harm1499 as well as a ten-year repose period1500
General coverage includes personal property, consequential damages and any 
interest applicable to the amount insured.
 from when a product is put into 
circulation after which any liability claim is extinguished. 
1501 Insurance coverage also includes the 
primary costs incurred for product recall or, when necessary, product withdrawal.1502 
These costs include the costs of notifying the affected consumers, transporting the 
recalled or withdrawn products back to the producer, importer or distributor, any cost for 
storing the recalled products and any expenses for repairing, replacing the defective 
products or even for reimbursing consumers for the defective products.1503 Additionally, 
European product liability insurance policies include a serial claims clause so that all 
damages that can be traced to the same cause or the same product defect are regarded as a 
single loss and hence entitled to a single claim.1504
But there are also important exclusions. Pure financial losses are not covered in 
the general provisions but in certain cases they might be included through supplementary 
coverage purchased.
 In these cases, the insurer of a serial 
claim compensates these serials claims as if there was only one claim for damage losses.  
1505 Similarly, recall costs, beyond the costs of notifying consumers 
and transporting recalled or withdrawn products,1506 and guarantee and warranty claims 
are generally excluded.1507
                                                 
1499 Article 10 (1) of the product liability directive.  
 
1500 Article 11 of the product liability directive.  
1501 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 28 (1996).  
1502 Jürg Spühler, Swiss re Product recall and product tampering insurance, Swiss Reinsurance Company, 
25 (1998). 
1503 Jürg Spühler, Swiss re Product recall and product tampering insurance, Swiss Reinsurance Company, 
25 (1998) noting that insurance coverage has evolved towards including what often might be considered as 
uninsurable entrepreneurial risk. 
1504 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 30 (1996) 
noting that product liability insurance policies provide coverage for serial claims.  
1505 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 28 (1996).  
1506 As mentioned earlier, insurance coverage for product recall and withdrawal is very limited. See Jürg 
Spühler, Swiss re Product recall and product tampering insurance, Swiss Reinsurance Company, 25 (1998). 
1507 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 29-30 (1996) 
noting that Spain covers recall costs in the context of loss prevention.   
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Regarding the geographical coverage of private insurance policies, standard 
policies in Europe are not exclusively limited to the territory of the party subscribing the 
insurance coverage. Coverage might be offered in countries different to the one where the 
manufacturer has its headquarters at an additional premium.1508
Regarding legal provisions included in insurance policies, two major issues might 
be highlighted. First is the issue of clauses regarding choice of jurisdiction and applicable 
law. The introduction of clauses regarding jurisdiction and applicable law are used mostly 
in France and Switzerland.
 
1509 Insurance policies in Italy, Poland and Spain include a 
clause on jurisdiction but none on applicable law.1510 Second is the issue of provisions 
regarding who will bear the potential litigation costs involved in product claims. When 
admitted under the domestic insurance contract law of a certain state, coverage for 
defense costs is generally specified in the general insurance conditions of the insurance 
policy.1511
Even though it is possible to draw certain general characteristics shared by 
insurance contract law across the different European member states, it should be noted 
that insurance contract law, including the regulation of product liability insurance 
coverage, is subject to the domestic legislation of each member state. Consequently, 
while liability exposure is harmonized to a certain degree across the different European 
member states, many other aspects of product liability such as the economic 
consequences derived from the violation of post-sale duties, the calculation of damage 
awards and the admissibility and determination of damages for pain and suffering, are left 
  
                                                 
1508 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 30 (1996) 
noting that this is an important difference with private insurance coverage in the United States, where 
obtaining coverage in foreign markets is often difficult.  
1509 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 31 (1996).  
1510 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 31 (1996).  
1511 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 33  (1996) 
noting that German insurance contract law is the only law of an EU member state that explicitly allows for 
the introduction of a provision regarding defense costs. In Germany, the insurer is liable for defense costs 
as long as such defense costs together with the losses insured do not exceed the total amount insured.  In 
contrast, defense costs are limited under a liability insurance policy in Spain.  
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to domestic regulation. Hence, it is difficult to draw general characteristics of insurance 
coverage of the different European member states in light of the different coverage 
provided to the potential tortfeasors as a consequence of the different expected damages 
and liability tortfeasors might demand coverage for.1512
Since the adoption of the product liability directive in 1985, product liability cases 
have rarely reached courts and are instead mostly settled out of court by insurance 
companies.
 
1513 Product claims brought by insured victims have been rare but insurance 
coverage litigation is even rarer.1514 Hence, the increase in the product liability insurance 
premiums that was feared when the product liability directive was introduced has not 
taken place. In fact, despite of manufacturers being exposed to strict product liability and 
product safety regulations, Spanish firms have tended to reduce the level of insurance 
coverage they purchased.1515 Although it is not possible to conclude that this is the 
general tendency in all European member states, of all industry sectors and for all firm 
sizes, the Spanish case is instructive.1516
It seems fair to conclude that the adoption and implementation of the European 
product liability directive in the different member states and the subsequent adoption of 
ex ante product safety regulation has not resulted in an increase in product liability 
insurance premiums or in an increase of product liability insurance coverage purchased 
by the firms exposed to liability. The feared insurance crisis and significant price 
  
                                                 
1512 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 36 (1996).  
1513 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 37-38 (1996).  
1514 Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 38 (1996).  
1515 Luis Ramírez, RC alerta roja: sanidad y productos son los dos sectores más sensibles: el nivel de 
cobertura se ha reducido notablemente, Mercado previsor, núm. 400, 32-33 (2004). 
1516 It should be noted that Southern European firms tend to purchase a lower level of insurance coverage 
than compared with northern European firms. The amount of insurance coverage purchased also depends 
on the industry sector the firm is in. In this sense, pharmaceutical and chemical firms buy the highest 
insurance policies. Finally, the insurance coverage purchased also depends on the size of the firm. Bigger 
firms tend to buy more insurance coverage than smaller firms. See Luis Ramírez, RC alerta roja : sanidad y 
productos son los dos sectores más sensibles: el nivel de cobertura se ha reducido notablemente, Mercado 
previsor, núm. 400, 32-33 (2004).  
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increases have not taken place and the effect of the product liability directive on the 
private insurance coverage purchased has been remarkably limited. 
 
4.1 Product liability insurance coverage in Spain 
 
The product liability directive does not require product manufacturers to purchase 
mandatory insurance for the harm caused by defective products, nor does it require the 
creation and administration of a compensation fund. The Spanish law of insurance 
contracts1517 allows the government to introduce mandatory insurance coverage for 
liability for harm caused by defective products.1518 Further, the transposition of the 
product liability directive into Spanish law -- with law 22/19941519 and the current law 
1/20071520 -- requires mandatory insurance coverage depending on the kind of damage 
the defective product can cause. For damages resulting in death, intoxication and personal 
harm, a warranty fund for compensating victims is required,1521
                                                 
1517 Law 50/1980, of October 8, of Insurance Contracts (BOE-A-1980-22501, available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1980-22501) 
 and for any other kind of 
1518 Article 75 of Law 50/1980, of October 8, of Insurance Contracts provides that 
Artículo 75.  
Será obligatorio el seguro de responsabilidad civil para el ejercicio de aquéllas actividades que 
por el Gobierno se determinen. La Administración no autorizará el ejercicio de tales actividades 
sin que previamente se acredite por el interesado la existencia del seguro. La falta de seguro, en 
los casos en que sea obligatorio, será sancionada administrativamente. 
 
Article 75. 
Liability insurnace will be mandatory for exercising the activites established by the Government. 
Public authorities will not authorize the exercise of such activities without first showing insurance 
coverage has been purchased. Proving the existence of insurance. Lacking insurance coverage in 
cases where it is compulsory will be sanctioned through an administrative fine. 
1519 Law No. 22/1994 of July 6, 1994 de Responsabilidad Civil por los Daños Causados por Productos 
Defectuosos transposed the product liability directive into Spanish law. 
1520 Royal Law Decree 1/2007 of November 16, 2007 approving the merged text of the General Law for the 
Defense of Consumers and users and other complementary laws (BOE núm. 287, de 30-11-2007, pp. 
49181-49215) overruled law 22/1994. RDL 1/2007, in its article 131, maintains the different insurance 
requirements depending on whether damages are caused for defective products or services, where 
mandatory insurance could be required, or where damages resulted in death, intoxication or personal harm 
in which cases they would still be compensated through funds from mandatory insurance.   
1521 See article 131 of the RDL 1/2007. 
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damages caused by defective products, the injured victim will have seek a remedy under 
tort based on the product liability directive and its transposition laws.1522
 
  
5 Public insurance in Europe: a safety net 
 
5.1 The origin and evolution of welfare systems in European countries 
 
One of the defining characteristics of European countries is the shared 
understanding of the role of the state in ensuring and providing a certain level of welfare 
to its citizens.1523 The welfare systems in place across the different European states 
include a variety of programs aimed at integrating economically disfavored social groups 
into the social structure and offering citizens similar possibilities regardless of their levels 
of income. European states try to reduce social inequalities by balancing market-oriented 
efficiency with solidarity-based state intervention.1524
Initial attempts to provide social security in Europe were focused on those who 
were economically poor, and particularly industrial sector workers.
  
1525 After the Second 
World War there was an increase in the scope of state intervention and social schemes, 
which expanded to include additional social groups and more types of subsidies such as 
unemployment.1526
                                                 
1522 See article 135 and following of the RDL 1/2007.  
  
1523 Niels Ploug and Jon Kvist, Kluwer Sovac, SOCIAL SECURITY IN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OR 
DISMANTELMENT?, 1 (Series on Social Security, (1996)) noting that the welfare state has often been defined 
as a “national compromise.” 
1524 Thomas Wilhemlsson, SOCIAL CONTRACT LAW AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, Darmouth, 33-34 
(1995).  
1525 Niels Ploug and Jon Kvist, Kluwer Sovac, SOCIAL SECURITY IN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OR 
DISMANTELMENT? , Series on Social Security, 3 (1996).  
1526 Social security included income maintenance in cases of unemployment, sickness and the elderly. Niels 
Ploug and Jon Kvist, Kluwer Sovac, SOCIAL SECURITY IN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OR DISMANTELMENT?, 
Series on Social Security, 16 (1996).  
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Through their introduction and development, social welfare programs became one 
of the major pillars of the growth of the modern European welfare states1527 based on the 
idea of the need for solidarity between citizens and social groups and social cohesion. 
Welfare programs not only provided income in cases of unemployment but incorporated 
additional public services such as education, health, and pensions.1528
The introduction, existence, and development of welfare programs in the different 
European countries have not always had support. In the early 1980s many European 
social programs were questioned and from the 1990s until today many concerns about the 
sustainability and future of the systems have been raised.
 
1529 Up to today, many European 
countries have seriously questioned the role of social programs based on the costs they 
entail and the different social composition and evolution of the societies of the different 
countries.1530
European countries have gone through a variety of social changes that can be 
classified into three major categories: First are changes in the labor market. During the 
last twenty years, European labor markets have become less stable, with higher rates 
unemployment and with increasing part-time and temporary jobs. Second, family 
structures have also gone through significant changes that often have not been reflected in 
social programs. The traditional family structure, under which the man had a paid job for 
which the woman and the children were beneficiaries, no longer reflects the diversity of 
today's European family structures. The rise in the participation of women in the labor 
market and in the number of single-parent families has upended the traditional structure 
  
                                                 
1527 Welfare state is a vague concept that for the purpose of this research will be used as the frame of social 
policies where social security is integrated in. Professor LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, LEGAL CULTURE AND THE 
WELFARE STATE, 13 (Gunther Teubner ed., Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin New York, (1986).   
1528 Jochen Clasen & Wim Van Oorschot, CHANGING PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL SECURITY, 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY, volume 4/2, 97 (2002). 
1529 Jochen Clasen and Wim Van Oorschot, CHANGING PRINCIPLES IN EUROPEAN SOCIAL SECURITY, 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY, volume 4/2, 90 (2002). 
1530 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), Springer ed. (2003). 
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of benefits and beneficiaries.1531 Finally, Europe has experienced a significant 
demographic change, with an increase in life expectancy and decrease in fertility that has 
put pressure on pay-as-you-go pension systems by creating an imbalance between 
contributors and beneficiaries.1532
These changes have been taking place over the course of the past decades framed 
in a context of increasing challenges to the role of the state and to government spending 
from both economic and political perspectives.  
  
Currently, European welfare systems are not moving in the direction of covering 
new risks or expanding benefits. Instead, the major concern of policy makers is costs, 
level of expenditure of social insurance programs and their viability and sustainability in 
the future.1533 There is a general impression that the expenditure on social insurance 
programs needs to be reconsidered and somehow reduced. However, there is also strong 
public support for such programs and Europeans view these programs as inherent rights 
as citizens.1534 Therefore, talk of reductions or termination is very unpopular.1535
The goals, nature and challenges of welfare systems are mostly shared -- albeit 
with slight differences -- in the different European countries.
  
1536
 
 However, the design and 
roles of welfare programs, the programs included in the welfare systems, the scope of 
beneficiaries, and the benefits provided vary across Europe.  
 
                                                 
1531 European Commission (1994), Employment in Europe, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities and Webb, S. Social Security Policy in a changing Labor market, Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, num. 3, 11-24 (1995). 
1532 See van Ginneken W., Finding the balance: Financing and coverage of social protection in Europe, in 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON SOCIAL SECURITY, van Ginneken W. ed., International Social Security Association, 
Geneva (1996).  
1533 See generally Gösta Esping-Andersen, WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION, London: Sage (1996). 
1534 Jochen Clasen, WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS IN NATIONAL AND 
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, Policy Press, 34 (2002).  
1535 Jochen Clasen, WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS IN NATIONAL AND 
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, Policy Press, 34 (2002).  
1536 See generally Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and 
Insurance Law), Springer ed. (2003). 
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5.2 European Social Insurance Systems: a unique concept with different 
implementations, structures and functioning 
 
European countries do not present a uniform concept and implementation of 
social insurance. Their differences, instead, reflect different understandings of what 
welfare state programs should encompass.1537 For example, the U.K. provides a 
comprehensive system of income protection and flat-rate benefits to the poor through a 
program designed by statute and managed by the government. Germany and France base 
their systems on the direct relationship between benefits and contributions.1538 At the 
same time, in Sweden and Denmark,1539 earnings-related social insurance programs, such 
as basic pensions, are universal. Other differences between member states regarding 
social insurance programs include, among other things, the scope of coverage, the levels 
of contributions, qualification criteria and the existence and amount of benefit 
ceilings.1540
While all European countries are advanced welfare states, they are structured 
differently and require different funding and economic resources.
  
1541
                                                 
1537 See Table 7.2 in this chapter for an overview of the content of the social welfare programs of the 
different European Union countries. See also generally Thierry Warin and Peter Hannessy, One welfare 
state for Europe: a Costly utopia?, Middlebury college economics discussion paper no. 03-25 (2003) for a 
description of the different content and social programs of the welfare state in the different European 
countries.  
 European authorities 
have been considering whether social insurance programs and more broadly, welfare 
programs generally, should be harmonized. The Lisbon Labor and Social Affairs 
1538 Both Germany and France have adopted a selective welfare system under which benefits are limited to 
workers and assistance is given to individuals without other resources. Thus, participation to the labor 
market is the central precondition for coverage by social security even though often benefits are extended to 
the whole family. See Council of Europe, Social Affairs, Rationalization and simplification of social 
security systems, Strasbourg, p. 45 (1987). 
1539 Nordic states have adopted comprehensive welfare systems under which population, both national or 
resident has the right to benefits and to social security regardless of their occupation.  Council of Europe, 
Social Affairs, Rationalization and simplification of social security systems, Strasbourg, 1987. P. 45. 
1540 See Table 7.2. See also Jochen Clasen and Wim Van Oorschot, Changing Principles in European Social 
Security, European Journal of Social Security, volume 4/2, 98 (2002). 
1541 Thierry Warin and Peter Hannessy, One welfare state for Europe: a Costly utopia?, Middlebury college 
economics discussion paper no. 03-25 (2003) 
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Councils have issued recommendations on convergence of social protection since 
1992,1542
Despite of the existing differences between the social programs of the different 
European states, it is possible to conclude that there is a reasonably high level of 
protection through medical care, income maintenance and disability protection shared 
across all of them.
 but up until today such harmonization has not taken place and member states 
have approached the issue through the coordination of their programs instead of through 
harmonization.  
1543 The different social insurance systems share a number of common 
features that distinguish them from other forms of social protection.1544 First is their 
function. In all member states, social insurance is a risk pooling mechanisms -- like 
private insurance -- under which individuals’ contributions are not related to their 
personal exposure to risk or to the risk they impose on third parties.1545 European social 
security systems are funded through the so-called “solidarity contract” between 
generations under which those gainfully employed today contribute from their wages to 
social security while the elderly receive social security funds in order to maintain their 
living standards.1546
                                                 
1542 See European Council, Fight against poverty and social exclusion - Definition of appropriate objectives 
(2000). The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm. For a follow up report of the provisions 
subsequently included in the Nice Treaty (2001) see The Social Protection Committee Coreper/Council 
(Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs), Fight against poverty and social exclusion: 
common objectives for the second round of National Action Plans (2002). The report is available at 
ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/docs/counciltext_en.pdf. See also Thierry Warin and 
Peter Hannessy, One welfare state for Europe: a Costly utopia?, Middlebury college economics discussion 
paper no. 03-25 (2003) considering whether, in light of the harmonized monetary policy and increasingly 
harmonized economic policies, social policy should be harmonized in the European Union concluding that 
he did not find evidence to support policy harmonization on the European welfare programs. 
 At the same time, the contributions for minimum coverage are not 
1543 Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 689-690 (1991). 
1544 Jochen Clasen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, 241, Bristol: Policy Press, ed. (1997). 
1545 From pyramid to pillar, Population Change And Social Security In Europe, International Labor 
organization Working paper, 81 (1989) See also van Ginneken W., Finding the balance: Financing and 
coverage of social protection in Europe, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON SOCIAL SECURITY, 16, van Ginneken 
W. ed., International Social Security Association, Geneva (1996) for a discussion of alternatives to improve 
the deteriorated pay-as-you-go pension system.  
1546 For example, European pensions are based on the pay-as-go principle under which productive 
population of today has to provide the resources required to cover the current cost of pensions while future 
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determined by the extent of the coverage provided, but are either flat-rate (the same for 
all contributors) or related to the income of contributors up to a ceiling.1547
Second, in all member states the state has an active role in establishing the 
minimum standards for contributions and benefits and in regulating social insurance 
schemes.
 In most 
countries, some benefits, such as pensions, may have a second complementary 
contribution, which increases the basic minimum provision. However, the extent of 
coverage is usually not determined by the contributors’ decision to complement their 
benefits.  
1548 Social insurance schemes are generally of a compulsory nature for the 
majority of wage earners, which enhances their redistributive impact.1549 For that reason, 
the entitlement to benefits depends upon contribution and not upon causation or non-
faulty conduct, as would be the case under tort. The risks or contingencies that social 
insurance typically covers, such as old age, ill, health, occupational injuries and 
unemployment, are generally those associated with contributions paid through 
salaries.1550
 
  
 
5.3 European welfare state programs: the joint role of social assistance and social 
insurance  
 
The concept of welfare programs provided by the different European countries is 
often related to the concept of social insurance programs. However, a shared 
                                                                                                                                                 
generations will have to finance the pensions of the ones who are working today. RECENT TRENDS IN CASH 
BENEFITS IN EUROPE, Niels Ploug & Jon Kvist, eds. (1994). 
1547 See generally COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. 
Koch and Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law vol 4 (2003). 
1548 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. Koch and 
Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law vol 4, 406 (2003). 
1549 Jochen Clasen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, Bristol: Policy Press, ed. (1997). 
1550 Jochen Clasen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, Bristol: Policy Press, ed. (1997). 
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characteristic of the European welfare programs is the difference between social 
assistance and social insurance.  
 Social assistance programs aim to support individuals who are in economic need 
due to their personal and social situations -- for example, those who are unemployed or 
permanently disabled. In contrast, social insurance aims to compensate individuals for 
economic losses they suffer as a consequence of certain contingencies -- for example, 
those who suffer product-related accidents.1551 The assistance relevant for the 
compensation of victims of product related accidents is social insurance, which includes 
disability payments, employment compensation and lost earnings,1552 medical care and 
economic benefits resulting from having suffered personal injuries.1553 Victims rely on 
social insurance programs for compensation,1554
Social insurance functions as a risk-pooling mechanism. In this sense, it can be 
considered a special type of insurance system. The major goal of social insurance is not 
efficiency, as can be seen from the fact that insurance premiums do not reflect 
 and so these programs will be the focus 
of this section.  
                                                 
1551 Social insurance will refer to the part of social security that provides for cash in order to compensate the 
loss incurred by an individual even though it is not an equivalent concept of the New Zealand social 
insurance system that provides no-fault compensation and functions as a truly insurance system but run by 
the government.     
1552 Sandra N. Hurd and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: Implications for 
United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245, 254 (1993). 
1553 See Lucille M. Ponte, Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are The 
European Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact Approaches To Defendant 
Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629, 659 (1993) noting that the availability of social 
insurance programs in Europe is one of the major differences between Europe and the United States and 
further arguing that part of the driving force behind the reforms of product liability in the United States has 
been the lack of regulation and social insurance necessary for providing a high level of consumer 
protection. 
1554 See Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 688-690, 714-715 (1991) and Patrick Thieffry et al., Strict product 
liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 
Tort & Ins. Law Journal 65, 65-66 (1989) noting that the product liability directive, despite intending to 
shift the costs of product-related accidents from private and public insurance systems to tortfeasors, it was 
unlikely to change the fact that Europeans would continue to use the social health and welfare programs 
rather than utilizing the limited course of litigation as their safety net as found in the United States.    
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individuals’ risk.1555 Instead, the goal is one of distributive justice:1556 the solidarity and 
reciprocity between individuals who participate in the system by providing benefits 
whenever contingencies occur.1557 Because of this social function based on solidarity and 
reciprocity, participation in social insurance is compulsory.1558 At the same time, there is 
variation in levels of participation, with contributions sometimes based on labor market 
participation, citizenship or residence, or economic need.1559 For example, cash benefits 
are directed to citizens and in some cases also to residents, but other benefits are attached 
to participation in the labor market.1560
Another factor that leads social insurance programs to depart from efficiency 
parameters is the determination of individuals’ contributions. The contributions to social 
insurance programs, known as social insurance premiums, do not depend upon the risk 
posed but instead on the individual’s level of income.
  
1561 Given the lack of individual 
differentiation of risk, the premium does not reflect the risk posed, and this leads to 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection.1562
                                                 
1555 See Michael Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety through Workers' Compensation: The 
Effcacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance, Working Paper, Northwestern University (1988). See also 
W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989). 
  
1556 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 307-308 (2004). 
1557 Jochen Clasen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, Bristol: Policy Press, ed. (1997). 
1558 Jochen Clasen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, Bristol: Policy Press, ed. (1997). 
1559 RECENT TRENDS IN CASH BENEFITS IN EUROPE, Niels Ploug & Jon Kvist, eds. (1994). 
1560 Arrow pointed out that the demand for health care increases as soon as full insurance coverage is 
provided. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, American 
Economic Review, vol. LIII, number 5, 941-973 (1963). 
1561 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), Springer ed. (2003). See also Michael Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety through 
Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance, Working Paper, 
Northwestern University (1988) noting that if insurance premiums are not merit based and hence do not 
reflect the tortfeasor’s level of risk, there is a problem of inefficient incentives for risk-reduction. An 
example of social insurance with contributions regardless of the level of risk is the Spanish insurance 
system regulated in the Royal Law Decree RDL 1/1994 of June 20, approving the General Law on Social 
insurance (BOE 154, p. 20658 of June 29, 1994). The text of the Royal Decree is available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-14960 
1562 Steven Shavell, On moral hazard and insurance, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 93(4), 541-562 
(1979). See also W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government 
regulation, and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) noting that when 
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Sometimes, although not often, social insurance systems use risk classification 
techniques to determine social insurance contributions linked to insured parties'  
individual levels of risk instead of setting premiums based on income.1563 Whenever 
social insurance systems use risk classification, the premiums are experience-rated and 
are established based on the past level of risk presented by the insured party.1564
The state is crucial to the functioning of the social insurance system.
  
1565 Social 
insurance is generally financed through contributions paid by employees and employers 
and through taxes.1566
In terms of benefits, the systems of the different European countries differ but the 
general principles are similar and include guaranteed access to health care and to cash 
benefits, sometimes dependent on the amount contributed,
 Therefore, the public agencies play important roles in managing 
the system, and public funds are used to cover whatever deficit the system ends up in.  
1567
                                                                                                                                                 
premiums are not determined with respect to the level of risk presented, tortfeasors have no incentives to 
reduce the risks their activity or product involves.  
 sometimes not. It is 
possible to differentiate between three types of benefits (1) earnings and contribution-
related benefits, such as retirement pensions, (2) means-tested benefits, which are 
adjusted to the particular circumstances of the individual, and (3) flat-rate benefits, which 
1563 Experience rating refers to the mechanism by which insurance premiums are determined based on the 
past risk experience of the insured. It is, thus, a form of risk classification because past risks are used to 
establish future premiums. See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and 
Risk Classification, University of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 3, 10 (2001). This 
article is available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/3. See also W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a 
diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and contemporary risks to health 
and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) noting that when social insurance contributions are related to the 
risk presented, tortfeasors have incentives to minimize the risks of their activity or product and hence social 
insurance systems have an effect on ex ante accident minimization and deterrence.  
1564 For an empirical analysis of the different impact of the different compensation mechanisms and the 
different impact of flat rate and experience rated contributions in job related accidents see Michael J. 
Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: WAGES, WORKERS 
COMPENSATION AND PRODUCT LIABILITY, Princeton University Press (1990). 
1565 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), Springer ed. (2003). 
1566 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 70 (1989). 
1567 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 232, Springer ed. (2003). 
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provide a minimum level of income irrespective of the individual's present or past 
income.1568
The importance and impact of the benefits provided by European social insurance 
systems
  
1569 to victims of product-related accidents cannot be understated. Such benefits 
are the major source of compensation for these victims.1570 In a way, social insurance 
programs provide compensation for damages similar to the damages provided by tort 
litigation.1571 So the role of a public no-fault system in providing benefits to victims is of 
special importance for the overall performance of the product liability system.1572 Injured 
victims are entitled to no-fault social insurance benefits and such compensation has a 
direct effect on the victim’s incentives on either buying private insurance coverage or on 
eventually pursuing a liability claim under tort as well as on the tortfeasor’s incentives on 
whether to purchase private insurance liability coverage.1573
 
  
 
6 Tort law and social insurance: finding the adequate role of each instrument 
 
                                                 
1568 RECENT TRENDS IN CASH BENEFITS IN EUROPE, Niels Ploug & Jon Kvist, eds. (1994).  
1569 This is a remarkable difference form U.S. social insurance programs that are significantly more 
restricted compared to the European programs implemented in the different member states. See Silva, F. & 
Cavaliere, A. The Economic Impact of Product Liability: Lessons from the US and the EU Experience, in 
G. Galli and J. Pelkmans (Eds.), REGULATORY REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS IN EUROPE. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar (2000). 
1570 Commission of the European Communities, Grenn Paper on Product Liability, COM (1999) 396 final, 
8 (1999). 
1571 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 311 (2006). 
1572 In light of the limited funds available for social insurance programs there are voices who argue that, in 
cases where the injurer can be identified, compensation paid by social insurance should be borne by private 
insurance so that the viability of the system is ensured. See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward A Diminished Role 
For Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government Regulation, And Contemporary Risks to Health and 
Safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 103 (1989).  
1573 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 241, Springer ed. (2003). 
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As mentioned above, tort law may in some senses be considered a system of 
social insurance.1574 Tort law is similar to social insurance in that it performs an 
insurance function based on the compensation it provides to injured victims and in that it 
has the general purpose of providing broad-based compensation for accident risks.1575
At the same time, however, tort law and social insurance are significantly 
different in terms of underlying principles, eligibility criteria, process, and amount and 
content of the compensation itself.  
  
 
 
6.1 Public v. Private concerns 
 
Tort law and social insurance are compensation systems based on different 
underlying ideas about interactions between individuals and justice. When focusing on 
the compensation goal of tort law, corrective justice is the element to determine the 
interactions between individuals.1576 In contrast, social insurance responds to distributive 
justice considerations.1577
Despite of their emphasis on compensation, tort law also aims to create the 
adequate incentives to deter accidents.
   
1578
                                                 
1574 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 97-98 (1989) 
 In fact, tort law is often deemed a better 
1575 The social function of tort law is exacerbated when strict liability is the liability system in place. See W. 
Kip Viscusi, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division of Labor, 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 300-304 (1988) noting that the emergence of strict 
liability was partly based on the belief that firms could act as consumers’ insurers. See also Heidi Li 
Feldman, Harm and Money: Against The Insurance Theory Of Tort Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567, 
1575, 1595 (1997)  and Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 196, Aspen eds., 5th ed. (1998).  
1576 See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and 
Corrective Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801 (1997). 
1577 Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-
Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, article 1, 8 (2003). 
1578 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen Eds. 201-214 (6th ed.) (2003). See also W. Kip 
Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) noting that in addition to its 
compensation goal, tort law aims also at creating incentives to potential tortfeasors to invest in safety 
whereas social insurance has no role in creating ex ante incentives to minimize accidents.  
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deterrence instrument than a compensation system.1579 Social insurance, in contrast, is a 
compensation mechanism based on solidarity and reciprocity between individuals1580 that 
provides benefits to injured victims (albeit not full compensation) immediately -- without 
their needing to file legal claims -- regardless of the cause of the accident and regardless 
of the level of care adopted.1581 Social insurance does not have, as one of its goals, the 
creation of incentives to deter or minimize accidents. The tortfeasor’s incentives to 
minimize accidents and invest in care derive from the internalization of accident costs. 
Under social insurance, injured victims are under-compensated and the costs of this 
compensation are not internalized by tortfeasors unless social insurance systems seek 
reimbursement from them.1582
 
 Although this type of reimbursement is an option in many 
European countries, the administrators of their social insurance systems rarely pursue it.  
 
6.2 The individuals entitled to compensation under tort versus social insurance  
 
The set of individuals entitled to compensation under tort law -- and, more 
specifically, under product liability -- differs from that covered by social insurance. 
Under product liability, for example, only individuals injured by a defective product may 
seek compensation from the tortfeasor. To the extent that compensation creates efficient 
risk-reduction incentives, restricting eligibility for compensation to individuals injured by 
the risky product is economically efficient.1583
                                                 
1579 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen Eds., 201-214 (6th ed.) (2003). 
  
1580 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 225, Springer ed. (2003). 
1581 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. Koch and 
Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law vol 4, 407 (2003). 
1582 W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Reform and Insurance Markets 3, Discussion Paper No. 440, 10/2003, Harvard 
Law School (2003). 
1583 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989). 
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In contrast, social insurance constitutes an egalitarian compensation scheme 
because victims who suffer personal injury are compensated regardless of the cause of the 
harm.1584
 
 Entitlement is determined based on the individual's status in the system -- as a 
participant of the labor market, as a citizen or as a resident -- and on the existence of the 
damage suffered. It does not depend on issues of causation or contributory or 
comparative negligence. Consequently, the range of individuals entitled to compensation 
under a social insurance system is significantly broader than that of individuals entitled to 
compensation under tort. 
 
6.3 Seeking compensation under tort versus social insurance: The story of two 
different processes  
 
Another important difference between tort law and social insurance is the process 
injured victims must follow to seek compensation. The procedural differences between 
the two systems can be seen at different levels: the nature of the process, its costs and 
length, the standard of proof, and the uncertainty of whether compensation will be 
awarded.  
Tort processes are often lengthy1585 and entail significant private and public 
expenses. This is particularly true of the process and judicial systems involved in 
adjudicating product liability claims.1586
                                                 
1584 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. Koch and 
Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law vol 4, 407 (2003). 
 Compensation under tort is awarded once the 
1585 Stephen D. Sugarman, Personal Injury and Social Policy – Institutional and Ideological Alternatives, 
302, in Nicholas Mullany and Allen Linden, ed., TORTS TOMORROW, Australia: LBC Information Services, 
(1998). 
1586 Additionally, the private value of litigation is different than the public cost of it, which internalizes the 
deterrence created by the information gained from the trial and the public exposure of the defendant’s 
misbehavior. Therefore, too much litigation from private parties could also lead to an inefficient outcome 
from a social perspective. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between The Private And The 
Social Motive To Use The Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 2, 575-612, 579 (1997). See also W. Kip 
  371 
victim has filed a claim, met the required burden of proof and received the court-
determined compensation from the injurer. This process, when successful may take a 
significant length of time. In contrast, compensation under social insurance is given 
relatively shortly after the accident has taken place. This is possible because only 
entitlement to compensation, instead of fault or causation, must be proved.1587
Universal compensation regardless of causation is advantageous for victims 
because they do not have to meet any standard of proof and thus avoid having to prove 
the prima facie product liability claim.
 In this 
sense, the information requirements of social insurance programs are much lower than 
those under tort.  
1588 Meeting the burden of proof under tort can 
sometimes be very difficult and can discourage victims from seeking compensation.1589
Universal and immediate compensation under social insurance systems also 
allows government agencies and public hospitals to capture economies of scale and 
information regarding product risks and types of product-related harm suffered by 
individuals. This places these institutions in a better position to manage these risks.
  
1590
                                                                                                                                                 
Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989). 
 
1587 The no-fault benefits provided by social insurance systems imply that some victims entitled and 
receiving benefits from social insurance would not be compensated under tort. Hence, the scope of victims 
compensated under social insurance is broader than the scope of victims compensated under tort. See 
Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance Law), 
230, Springer ed. (2003). 
1588 Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-
Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, Article 1, 10 (2003). 
1589 For example, the asymmetry of information between victim and injurer and the lack of discovery rules 
in most of the European member states may become the key parameter when deciding the outcome of a 
case when the victim tries to overcome the defendant’s defenses under the product liability directive but 
does not have access to the state of the art and the scientific knowledge regarding product risks. Thus, the 
lack of access to information necessary to grant a symmetric defense can become the factor that may decide 
a case.  
1590 The savings derived from these economies of scale could even compensate the decreased efficiency that 
could result from the absence of a competitive insurance environment but due to the lack of data, it is not 
possible to conduct this assessment in the European context.  See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental 
Divergence Between The Private And The Social Motive To Use The Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 2, 
575-612, 578-579 (1997) and Kenneth S. Abraham and Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social 
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A New Vision Of Compensation For Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. 
Rev. 75, 107 (1993). 
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Another relevant aspect is the risk of injured victims encountering judgment proof 
defendants.1591
Finally, under social insurance, injured victims are not exposed to the uncertainty 
of the outcome of the case given that compensation is immediate. Social insurance 
systems potentially cover all risk to which the individual is exposed as long as there are 
available funds.
 The tortfeasor’s financial capacity is a crucial parameter that strongly 
conditions whether potential tortfeasors have incentives to purchase private insurance. If 
potential tortfeasors are judgment proof or do not have enough financial means to afford 
the full damages they cause to others, they may not have incentives to buy private 
insurance and injured victims may be left without compensation. Social insurance 
eliminates such uncertainty for injured victims given that it compensates them regardless 
of the financial situation of their injurer.   
1592
From a procedural standpoint, social insurance presents remarkable advantages 
for injured victims. Overall, the combination of immediate compensation, greater 
certainty, and avoidance of the judgment-proof-defendant problem makes social 
insurance in many ways a better system for compensation than tort.
 This allows victims, who often need immediate funds, to recover their 
financial means.  
1593
 
  
 
                                                 
1591 Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-
Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, Article 1, 9 (2003). 
1592 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 70 (1989) noting that there is no barrier to 
risk coverage under social insurance systems. 
1593 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, 
and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989) noting that social insurance 
systems generally provide more appropriate compensation to the injured. See also COMPENSATION FOR 
PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. Koch and Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and 
Insurance Law vol 4, 408 (2003). See also Alf Erling Risa, The Welfare State as provider of accident 
insurance in the workplace: efficiency and distribution in equilibrium, The Economic Journal, Vo. 105, no. 
458, 129-144 (1995). 
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6.4  Immediate but incomplete: The compensation trade-off 
 
The compensation awarded to injured victims under tort and social insurance is 
remarkably different in terms of the amount to which injured victims are entitled and the 
range of eligible victims.  
Regarding the compensation amount, tort law and social insurance aim at different 
goals: While social insurance programs aim at compensating those who need such 
compensation the most, tort law aims at making the injured victim whole. The universal 
entitlement and the immediate payment of benefits represent a trade-off, with social 
insurance compensation limited in time and amount and tort compensation offering 
undertain but potentially full compensation.1594 Social insurance benefits are often lower 
than private insurance payments because the programs cover a broad range of individuals 
and injuries. Often, social insurance does not include compensation for certain types of 
harm,1595 such as mental distress or pain and suffering.1596
In theory, a victim who manages to succeed in a tort claim will be fully 
compensated, whereas a victim who seeks social insurance under a no-fault system will 
not.
 In addition, the amounts paid 
under social insurance are often limited by caps and statutory ceilings.  
1597 However, this does not seem to be a problem in Europe, where victims appear to 
prefer immediate compensation, even if incomplete, under social insurance.1598
                                                 
1594 The capacity of tort law to provide full compensation to victims is also arguable given that there is 
evidence that only about 10-15 percent of costs of the tort system go to compensating victims for out-of-
pocket medical expenses and for example, lost income and the rest is for lawyers’ fees, administrative 
costs, among others. See Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort 
Liability and No-Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, article 1, 12 (2003). 
 
1595 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 97-98 (1989) noting that in light of the 
diverse range of individuals and injuries presenting different levels of risk, the reduction incentives of the 
social insurance system result inefficient. 
1596 Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-
Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, article 1, 15 (2003). 
1597 Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-
Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1 article 1, 15 (2003). 
1598 Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Product Liability, COM (1999) 396 final, 
p. 8 (1999). See also Stephen D. Sugarman, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW, Westport, 
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In terms of the range of victims compensated, there are also differences between 
social insurance and tort. Some injured victims who are able to receive benefits from 
social insurance programs would not be entitled to compensation under tort due to their 
inability to meet the burden of proof.  
 
 
7 The interaction between social insurance compensation and product liability 
claims in Europe: Visible and invisible effects 
 
The availability of social insurance as a compensation mechanism for victims of 
product-related accidents generates three major -- and related -- effects. It directly 
impacts the incentives of injured victims to pursue their product liability claims and, at 
the same time, it affects the incentives of tortfeasors -- product manufacturers -- for 
adopting risk-minimizing measures. Further, social insurance systems bear the costs of 
accidents that should be borne by tortfeasors. 
The existence and availability of compensation -- even if imperfect -- under social 
insurance dilutes victims’ incentives to file product liability claims and seek 
compensation for their injurers under tort. When injured victims are compensated -- even 
if imperfectly -- through the public insurance system, they have less reason to incur the 
litigation costs and face the uncertainty inherent in the judicial process. For this reason, 
they may choose to forego pursuing product liability claims.  
The lack of incentives for injured victims to pursue their product liability claims 
has a second major effect -- this one on product manufacturers. Tort law aims to induce 
accident deterrence by making the tortfeasor internalize the cost of accidents through 
litigation, either by the victim or by a party subrogated in the victim’s position. When 
                                                                                                                                                 
Connecticut: Quorum Books, 56 (1989) discussing the theoretical implications of the compensation trade-
off between tort liability and private and public insurance.  
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injured victims do not pursue their claims for the harm they suffer, product manufacturers 
are not exposed to the compensation for the harm they cause and do not internalize the 
cost of the accidents they cause and hence have no incentives to adopt optimal precaution 
or optimally invest in care -- i.e., product safety.1599
Further, given that social insurance covers certain types of injuries regardless their 
cause, whenever social insurance provides compensation to injured victims for the harm 
caused by tortfeasors, the public system bears these costs and tortfeasors do not 
internalize the costs of the accidents they cause.
 Similarly, when social insurance 
systems do not seek reimbursement from tortfeasors -- in this case, product manufacturers 
-- for the benefits paid to injured victims, the cost of accidents is not internalized and 
optimal accident deterrence is not achieved.  
1600 This implicit subsidy that social 
insurance provides to tortfeasors and, specifically, product manufacturers, has been 
cricized as resulting in moral hazard.1601
 
 This seems to be the structure of compensation 
of victims of product-related accidents in Europe where victims are being under-
compensated by social insurance and tortfeasors, while complying with product safety 
regulations, are not reacting to the incentives that the product liability directive's strict 
liability regime aims to create.  
 
7.1 The need for coordination mechanisms between compensation systems 
 
As presented in this chapter, victims of product-related accidents in Europe have 
three major compensation mechanisms available to them: First, they can rely on tort law, 
which entitles them to bring claims against tortfeasors for the damages caused by 
                                                 
1599 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 300 (2004). 
1600 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen eds. 201-214 (6th ed.) (2003). 
1601 Alf Erling Risa,  The Welfare State as provider of accident insurance in the workplace: efficiency and 
distribution in equilibrium, The Economic Journal, Vo. 105, no. 458, 129-144 (1995). 
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defective products under strict liability. Second, they can rely on social insurance, which 
plays an important role by avoiding some of the downsides of tort litigation. Third, they 
can rely on private insurance. In the beginning of this chapter we noted that private 
insurance coverage and social insurance have important differences but share a common 
goal: providing benefits to accident victims regardless of fault.  
In light of the different compensation mechanisms available to victims, their 
individual roles and their effects on one another, there are good reasons to introduce 
coordination mechanisms between them. A mechanism to coordinate between tort law -- 
and, more specifically, product liability, -- and public and private insurance is necessary 
to avoid distortions.  
Without such coordination, the availability of alternative compensation systems 
for injured victims could result in inefficiencies for tortfeasors, for injured victims, and 
for society as a whole. Injured victims could eventually receive compensation under tort, 
private insurance and social insurance.1602
                                                 
1602 See W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government 
Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 103 (1989) arguing for the 
need of coordination mechanisms between alternative compensation systems in the context of worker’s 
compensation.  
 Hence, if accumulation of benefits were 
possible, victims would be over-compensated and thus would profit from the harm they 
suffer. At the same time, victims’ overcompensation could result in torfeasors’ over-
deterrence and thus in an inefficient investment in care. If the different compensation 
mechanisms were properly coordinated, however, victims’ over-compensation and 
tortfeasors’ over-deterrence would be avoided and the incentives for risk minimization 
would be efficient.  If, instead, victims would receive social insurance benefits and decide 
not to pursue their product claims, victims would end up under-compensated, tortfeasors 
would be under-deterred and social insurance systems would bear costs that should not be 
borne by the public system. 
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This section will present the mechanics and effects of the coordination 
mechanisms between the different compensation systems in Europe. It will focus on the 
current regulations in force in the different European states and will discuss measures that 
could be adopted at the European Union level to enhance the effectiveness of product 
regulation and victim compensation while preserving optimal accident deterrence and a 
cost-effective social insurance system.  
 
 
7.2 Coordination mechanisms between social insurance and product liability  
 
It is possible for tort and insurance to work together to encourage product 
manufacturers to adopt optimal care while also compensating accident victims for harm 
that occurs. Even if the two systems are structurally and conceptually different, there is a 
strong relationship in practice between tort law and insurance, both private and publicly 
funded.1603 Given the interaction between insurance and tort liability, and more 
specifically, product liability, the efficiency of a compensation system depends on the 
overall performance of the deterrence/compensation goals in the prevention of product-
related accidents by both systems. In light of the different compensation mechanisms 
available, the question is how they should be coordinated so that each party involved has 
adequate incentives and the outcome is socially desirable. The optimal situation would be 
one in which injurers pay for the victims’ loss -- which is necessary in order to maintain 
the injurers’ incentive to adopt care1604
                                                 
1603 See Seth J. Chandler, The Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: 
Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 Conn. Ins. L.J. 91, 1996, P 93, Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-
Party Insurance Externality: An Economic Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 
(1990) and Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 
33 Vand. L. Rev. 1281, 1298-1300 (1980)). 
 -- and the victim would be fully compensated for 
1604 Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen Eds., 201-214, (6th ed.) (2003) 
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the harm suffered while social insurance systems would not bear the costs of the damages 
suffered by the injured victim as the consequence of the tortfeasor’s actions.  
Coordination between tort and insurance would not be necessary in a world where 
the tort system would function perfectly.1605 For example, under a perfect negligence 
system, injurers would know the optimal standard of care and, therefore, would not 
deviate from it. Under strict liability, victims would not care about collateral benefits1606 
because they would be fully compensated by their injurers.1607 Unfortunately it is well 
known that the tort system does not operate perfectly and is subject to limitations such as 
insufficient enforcement, the plaintiffs’ difficulty in meeting the burden of proof, the 
possibility of judgment proof defendants, and the possibility of misassessment of 
damages. As a result, coordination systems are necessary. 1608
The European case is quite peculiar given that social insurance provides 
immediate benefits (albeit not full compensation) regardless of fault and, consequently, 
reduces victims’ incentives to seek damages from tortfeasors.
  
1609
The legal systems of the member states
  
1610 include mechanisms to coordinate 
their alternative compensation systems in order to correct this distortion, by encouraging 
reimbursement claims against tortfeasors for the benefits already paid by insurance,1611
                                                 
1605 See Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
 
1606 And therefore would not buy insurance coverage because they would be insured by the injurer. 
1607 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, 224, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1608 For an analysis of the conditions of the optimal interaction between insurance and tort see Steven 
Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, The Bell Journal of Economics 13(1), 120-132 (1982) and Steven 
Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 215 (1987) Cambridge (Mass.) where optimal insurance 
is defined as the level of coverage that provides identical marginal utility of income in the absence or in the 
presence of an accident.  
1609 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. Koch and 
Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law vol 4 (2003). 
1610 See Table 7.2 of this chapter.  
1611 See generally Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and 
Insurance Law), Springer ed. (2003). 
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and by trying to ensure that victims are compensated for the harm they suffered. This 
coordination improves the situation but still does not create optimal incentives for 
tortfeasors given that social insurance only provides compensation for personal injury,1612 
and thus without liability claims under the product liability directive tortfeasors avoid 
liability for property damage.1613
There are three major coordination mechanisms at work in the member states: 
First, insurers are allowed to seek reimbursement from tortfeasors for the benefits paid to 
the injured victims. Second, there is a collateral source rule, and third, there is a collateral 
benefit offset.
  
1614
In principle, injured victims should have no preferences with respect to the 
mechanism providing compensation to them.
  
1615
 
 However, as explained above, each 
compensation system presents different trade-offs -- time, compensation amount, 
uncertainty, possibility of judicial error -- and these may result in the victim preferring 
one compensation system over another. 
 
7.2.1 The insurer’s right of reimbursement for the benefits paid to the injured 
victim 
 
The first coordination mechanism, the insurers' right of reimbursement, may be 
implemented in different ways: a direct cause of action from the insurance -- either 
                                                 
1612 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, Bernhard A. Koch and 
Helmut Koziol (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law vol 4 (2003). 
1613 But non-material damage is not covered. See article 9 of the product liability directive.  
1614 See Tung Yin, Nailing Jello to a Wall: A Uniform Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage 
Disputes in Products Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 
1243, 1302 (1995) suggesting that the existence of simultaneously applicable coordination mechanisms 
generates negative externalities on society. 
1615 See Kenneth S. Abraham and Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: 
Toward A New Vision Of Compensation For Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75 (1993) for a general 
overview of the different compensation systems interacting in the U.S. 
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private or public, referred to as collateral source -- against the tortfeasor, an insurer's 
subrogation right, or a cession of the victim’s tort claim against the tortfeasor in favor of 
the insurer.1616
The right of reimbursement does not rule out the implementation of either of the 
other two coordination mechanisms -- the collateral source rule and the collateral benefit 
offset.  If liability under tort is awarded, the insurance benefits already received by the 
victim from the insurer might be either added to the tort award -- if the collateral source 
rule is applicable -- or deducted from the tort award -- if the collateral benefit offset rule 
is applicable. 
 Under the first system, the insurer is entitled to seek reimbursement of the 
benefits already paid to the injured victims, but the victims may still seek damages from 
the tortfeasor beyond this amount. In contrast, under subrogation or cession rules, victims 
are not entitled to seek damages from the tortfeasor at all once they have been 
compensated by an insurer.  
The reimbursement of the benefits provided by the insurance system may come 
from either the tortfeasor or from the victim depending on whether damages were 
reduced by the compensation received from other sources or not. In cases where the 
compensation from the collateral sources was deducted from the victim’s damage award, 
the victim would be fully compensated but the tortfeasor would only pay the difference 
between the damage award and the compensation from other sources. In this case the 
tortfeasor would reimburse the collateral compensation scheme. If the tort award would 
not be reduced by the amount of the benefits already received, the tortfeasor as well as 
the alternative compensation scheme would compensate the injured victim and hence the 
victim would be overcompensated. In order to avoid overcompensation, the victim has to 
reimburse the collateral source for the benefits paid.  
                                                 
1616 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
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It should be noted that when the collateral source is a social insurance agency, the 
claim against the tortfeasor mostly adopts two different forms: first, a direct cause of 
action against the injurer or a subrogation to step in the shoes of the injured victim when 
seeking damages from the tortfeasor under tort.1617
 
 
 
a. The insurer’s direct cause of action against the liable tortfeasor  
 
One of the major goals of enabling insurers to seek reimbursement from the 
tortfeasor for the benefits paid to the injured victim is leaving the victim whole while 
avoiding any dislocation of accident costs and minimizing the administrative costs 
involved in the compensation process.1618 If the administrative costs involved in the 
reimbursement claim would be relatively low, this would appear as an attractive 
solution.1619
In order to ensure that insurance systems -- private or public -- are reimbursed for 
the benefits paid to injured victims, they are often entitled to a direct cause of action 
against the tortfeasor in order to be able to seek reimbursement for the benefits already 
paid.
  
1620
                                                 
1617 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
  
1618 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 306, Springer ed. (2003). 
1619 Guido Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, Yale University Press 
(1970) and Calabresi, Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of torts, 70 Yale Law Journal 4, 499-
553 (1961). Given that in some member states such administrative costs are significantly high, the 
Netherlands, Germany and France exercise a collective right of recourse, which means that part of the 
compensation paid by social security agencies is shifted to liability insurers. See Ulrich Magnus, THE 
IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance Law), 258, Springer ed. 
(2003). 
1620 Fernando Gómez Pomar, Tort Liability and Other Means of Redress: “Collateral Source Rule” and 
Related Topics, www.Indret.com 1/00 (2000) noting that excluding the right of recourse would result in the 
tortfeasor’s under-deterrence. 
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From an economic perspective this system seems rational and efficient given that 
each party has efficient incentives.1621 But it also presents some implementation problems 
given that it may be difficult to bring all the parties into the judicial reimbursement 
proceedings, the collateral payments need to be assessed and doing so can be expensive, 
and there needs to be a mechanism under which either the tortfeasor or the victim will 
have to reimburse the collateral source. In some cases, exercising the reimbursement 
claim may not be cost-effective when compared to the amount to be recovered.1622
As mentioned earlier, social insurance agencies are often given a direct cause of 
action against the injurer.
  
1623 Once the social insurance system is reimbursed for the 
benefits paid to the victim there is a perfect allocation of costs given that the tortfeasor 
has paid full compensation to the victim under tort, the victim has been fully 
compensated under tort, and the collateral source has been reimbursed for the benefits 
paid.1624
Therefore, allowing a direct action from social insurance systems against the 
tortfeasor results in an optimal outcome.  
 
 
 
b. Subrogation right for the tort claim to the insurer against the injurer 
 
                                                 
1621 Hassan El Menyawi, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort Liability and No-
Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, Article 1, P. 18 (2003). 
1622 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 37, Oxford University 
Press (2000).   
1623 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1624 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, Oxford University Press 
(2000). 
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Subrogation is generally defined as “stepping into someone else’s shoes” for the 
purpose of making a legal claim.1625
If the victim pursues a tort claim, any insurance benefit would either be cumulated 
to the tort award if the coordination rule is a collateral source rule or would be deducted 
from the tort award in order to avoid the victim of being over-compensated under a 
collateral benefit offset rule. This latter case would lead to the optimal outcome regarding 
both deterrence and compensation given that the collateral source would break even, the 
victim would be compensated under tort and the tortfeasor would bear the full accident 
costs.
 When a victim suffers a loss, the insurance system 
will provide benefits according to the insurance coverage. Once the victim receives these 
benefits from the insurer, the victim may or may not claim damages under tort from the 
tortfeasor. The victim’s decision to pursue a claim under tort after receiving insurance 
benefits has overall consequences for the parties involved as already discussed.  
1626
If the victim does not pursue a claim and the collateral source -- the insurance 
system -- declines to seek reimbursement from the tortfeasor, the collateral source will 
end up paying benefits to the victim and the tortfeasor will not bear any accident costs. 
But if subrogation rights are available, the collateral source could step into the shoes of 
the injured victim and seek compensation in full, including compensation for damages 
potentially not covered and hence not compensated under insurance and for damages 
exceeding the insurance benefits received by the insured.
 
1627
                                                 
1625 On insurance subrogation, see Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, INSURANCE LAW, §3.10(a)(1), 220 
West Group (1988). 
 Whenever the collateral 
source exercises the subrogation right and hence pursues a tort claim on behalf of the 
victim, two additional conditions are necessary so that the injurer does not have to pay 
1626 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 41, Oxford University 
Press (2000).  
1627 See generally David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in 
Tort Claims. Harvard Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 43; Harvard Law and Economics 
Discussion Paper No. 395. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=350940 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.350940 
(2002). 
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damages to both the injured victim and the collateral source:1628 First, injured victims 
must be barred from pursuing tort claims whenever they have been compensated in full 
by the collateral source. Second, if injured victims have been only partly compensated by 
the collateral source and pursue their tort claim against their injurers, their damages must 
be reduced accordingly. As a result, whenever subrogation rights are available, the 
collateral benefit offset is essential for the optimal performance of the overall system and 
for the optimal incentives of each of the parties’ involved.1629
This structure is equivalent (in terms of its result) to one in which insured parties 
transfer any tort award to their insurers. If the insurer prevails under subrogation, it may 
retain all or part of the judgment or settlement up to the amount paid to the insured,
 
1630 
while paying to the victim anything over this amount.1631 Hence, the collateral source will 
have incentives to settle for amounts lower than the ones the victims might have settled 
for.1632
The transfer of a tort claim from the injured victim to the insurer can have three 
major positive effects:
 
1633
                                                 
1628  Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
 First, insurance premiums may be reduced so as to take into 
1629 See Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008) noting that the collateral benefit offset is an 
essential part of the performance of the insurance subrogation structure. 
1630 Tom Baker, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, 391-407 (2003) 
1631 It is also possible to distinguish between limited and unlimited subrogation. See David Rosenberg, 
Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in Tort Claims. Harvard Law School, 
Public Law Research Paper No. 43; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 395. Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=350940 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.350940 (2002).  
1632 Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1437, 
1463 (2010).  
1633 David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in Tort Claims, 
10, Harvard Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 43; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion 
Paper No. 395. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=350940 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.350940 (2002) 
presenting these positive effects of introducing subrogation rights in tort claims but also noting that the 
potential existence of an ex ante market of claims could have long term positive effects in terms of the 
parties’ incentives, deterrence and policy making. 
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account the subrogation right and the damages the insurer may potentially recover. 
Second, the deterrence effects of tort law may be preserved, as tortfeasors will internalize 
the damage caused and will be exposed to greater liability than they would without a 
subrogation system. If subrogation rights are not available, tortfeasors are exposed to 
liability only in cases in which injured victims pursue their tort claims. Under 
subrogation, tortfeasors are exposed to liability in those cases, but also in cases where 
insurers pursue tort claims in the shoes of injured victims. Consequently, deterrence 
effects will be higher.1634
As can be seen, giving the collateral source a subrogation right is in the best 
interest in the victim.
 Finally, administration costs may be reduced given that insurers 
have access to better information due to the number of claims they pursue on behalf of 
insured parties, and this allows them to manage the litigation more efficiently.  
1635
An important disadvantage of subrogation rights is that the functioning of the 
system involves high costs
  
1636 -- both in administration and in litigation -- given that it 
increases the volume of suits and entails also subsequent payments to victims whenever 
insurers are able to collect more than they have already paid out.1637
There is an important difference between the subrogation right and the direct 
action explained above. Whenever the collateral source stands in the position of the 
injured victim through subrogation, the amount of damages awarded is not limited to the 
benefits amount previously paid; instead, the insurer may collect the total amount of the 
  
                                                 
1634 See Alan O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 383-399 (2001) 
available at http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/v30y2001i2p383-99.html analyzing the positive effect of 
subrogation provisions in insurance contracts in cases of tortfeasor’s insolvency. 
1635 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 235-255, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press (1987) and Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance 
Markets, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 3, 517–549 (1984). 
1636 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1637 John G. Fleming, The collateral source rule and loss allocation in tort, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1478, 1556 
(1966) suggests that the cost of subrogation in less serious accidents could amount to half of the amount of 
money claimed.  
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victim's damages. Furthermore, the insurance agency has to return the difference between 
the insurance benefits and the tort award. Under direct action, whenever the insurance 
agency seeks reimbursement from the tortfeasor, the tort award is limited to the amount 
of benefits already paid and therefore there is under-deterrence. The advantage presented 
by giving insurers the right of subrogation1638
 
 is due to the position of the parties under 
each structure: under the direct action, insurers claim reimbursement in their own names 
and are therefore entitled only to what they have paid out; under subrogation, they stand 
in the victim's shoes and so can recover everything the victim was entitled to.  
 
c. Compulsory cession of the victim’s tort claim in favor of the insurer  
 
Under the compulsory cession system, the victim cedes their claim under tort to 
the collateral source, in this case, social insurance agencies. The compulsory cession of 
the victim’s claim under tort in favor of the insurer is quite rare in European legal 
systems. Germany and Austria are the only member states that allow an action by social 
insurance agencies in the form of a cession.  Germany provides social insurance with a 
right of recourse against the person who caused the injury in the form of a cession 
legis,1639 but only under certain conditions:1640 The victim’s claim cannot be based on 
social insurance law and it must not be likely that social insurance systems would have to 
provide additional benefits to the victim due to an identical event, for identical purposes 
and occurring within the same period of time.1641
                                                 
1638 See Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 235-36, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press (1987). In addition, as Shavell points out, subrogation eliminates the moral hazard problem of double 
indemnity. Unlimited insurance subrogation would effectively solve the conflict between deterrence and 
compensation created by the collateral source rule. 
 
1639 See art I §116 I SGB X of the German Social Security Law.  
1640 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 65 (1997). 
1641 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 106, Springer ed. (2003). 
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Given that the exercise of the right is derived from a cession, social insurance 
agencies have the same limitations as the victims’ when exercising the right. So if the 
victim’s claim against the tortfeasor was limited by law, social insurance agencies would 
only be able to exercise the cession as long as social insurance benefits would have 
covered the damages subsequently awarded under tort.1642
Austria also provides a legal cession
 Similarly, whenever the victim 
was contributory negligent, the social insurance recourse would be limited to the 
tortfeasor’s share.  
1643 under which the victim’s claim against 
the tortfeasor passes to the social insurance agency as long as social insurance has 
previously paid benefits to the injured victim.1644 As in the case for Germany, there are 
certain pre-requisites that evolve around the concept of “congruence.” Social insurance 
agencies can exercise the ceded right as long as the claims are equivalent to the social 
benefits in a factual, personal and temporal manner.1645
This system has some advocates
 As soon as the claim is ceded to 
the social insurance agency, the injured person loses his or her right to file a claim for 
compensation under tort arising out of the same accident. 
1646
 
 even though it is a relatively less frequent 
structure of subrogation rights in Europe. 
 
7.2.2 Collateral Source Rule  
 
                                                 
1642 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 207, Springer ed. (2003). 
1643 See §332 ASVG. 
1644 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 17, Springer ed. (2003). 
1645 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 17, Springer ed. (2003). 
1646 David Rosenberg, Deregulating Insurance Subrogation: Towards an Ex Ante Market in Tort Claims. 
Harvard Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 43; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper 
No. 395. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=350940 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.350940 (2002).  
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Under the collateral source rule, injured victims can accumulate insurance 
benefits -- from private insurance, social insurance, or both collateral sources -- and 
damage awards under tort in full.1647 The collateral source rule does not differentiate 
between the nature and sources of the compensation paid to the victim. Even if the 
injured victim manages to obtain compensation from alternative private sources 
(previously purchased private insurance or publicly funded social insurance), the 
tortfeasor must still pay full damages in any tort suit. The court in the tort action does not 
take the compensation received from the collateral source into account when determining 
the damage award to which the victim is entitled.1648
From the victims’ perspective, this is the best solution because it enables them to 
receive full compensation for the harm suffered from any compensation system available 
to them.
  
1649
At the same time, from the tortfeasor’s perspective, the tortfeasor is liable for the 
full damage caused to the victim, regardless of whether the victim has already been 
compensated for such damage through another source of compensation. Hence, under a 
 This system could even result in the victim being over-compensated (which 
would obviously be beneficial for the victim).  
                                                 
1647 See Stephen B. Presser, How should the Law of Products Liability be Harmonized? What Americans 
Can Learn from Europeans, Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute (2002) noting that the 
collateral source rule allows for “double recovery” given that it prevents evidence from any benefits 
already paid to the injured victim to be taken into account when determining the damage award under tort. 
See also Elaine W. Shoben et al., REMEDIES, CASES AND PROBLEMS, 646, Foundation Press (3rd ed. 2002) 
and James M. Fischer, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES, 76, LexisNexis/Matthew Bender; 1st ed (2000) pointing 
out the double recovery problem of the collateral source rule. For a history of the application of the 
collateral source rule see Jeremy L. Kidd and Michael I. Krauss, Collateral source and tort’s law, George 
mason university Law and Economics research paper series 08-57, 7-19 (2008). 
1648 Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule And Its Abolition: An 
Economic Perspective, 15 Fall Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 58-60 (2005) analyzing the effects of the 
collateral source rule on accident deterrence.   
1649 See Collateral Source Rule Reform, American Tort Reform Association, available at 
http://www.atra.org/show/7344 (last visited April, 10 2011). See also Fernando Gómez Pomar, Tort 
Liability and Other Means of Redress: “Collateral Source Rule” and Related Topics, www.Indret.com 1/00 
(2000) for an analysis of the functioning, effects and implications of the collateral source rule and 
Collateral Source Rule Reform, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, available at 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited April 10, 2011). 
  389 
collateral source rule the tortfeasor fully internalizes the damage caused to the victim 
given that no reduction is allowed.  
The main critique of the collateral source rule is that it can result in victims’ 
overcompensation, which is undesirable.1650 This important challenge might explain why 
the collateral source rule is not implemented in any of the European member states.1651 In 
the states of the United States where the collateral source rule or some form of it is 
applicable,1652 the collateral source rule is both a substantive rule of compensation as well 
as a procedural rule of evidence.1653
The accumulation of benefits seems contrary to economic efficiency.
 As a substantive rule of compensation, injured 
victims are entitled to collect full damage awards or benefits from the different sources of 
compensation available without any compensation system being able to offset or reduce 
the amount already received from another compensation system. As a rule of evidence, 
the collateral source rule is a rule that precludes the defendant from introducing evidence 
of any benefits already paid to the victims through other alternative compensation 
mechanisms such as private or social insurance.  
1654
                                                 
1650 See Elaine W. Shoben et al., REMEDIES, CASES AND PROBLEMS, 646, Foundation Press (3d ed. 2002) 
noting that the collateral source rule may result in an injured victim receiving double compensation for a 
single harm. See also James M. Fischer, Understanding Remedies, 76 (2000) noting that under this rule 
injured victims might obtain benefits he would not have obtained but for the legal accumulation of 
remedies.  
 Thus, if 
the goal of compensation systems is to leave injured victims in the position in which they 
1651 See Table 7.2 of this chapter. 
1652 For a list of the different U.S. states where the collateral source rule or some similar rule is in force see 
Collateral Source Rule Reform, American Tort Reform Association, available at 
http://www.atra.org/show/7344 (last visited April, 10 2011). See also Collateral Source Rule Reform, 
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, available at 
http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp (last visited April 10, 2011). See also  
Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule And Its Abolition: An Economic 
Perspective, 15 Fall Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 66 (2005) noting that many states in the United States have 
eliminated or minimized the application of the collateral source rule. See also Paul H. Rubin and Joanna M. 
Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, 
vol. 50, 221-238 (2007) showing empirically that the shift from the collateral source rule and the collateral 
benefit offset rule in some U.S. states has resulted in a negative effect on the levels of investment in care 
and on the accident level.  
1653 See generally James L. Branton, The Collateral Source Rule, 18 St. Mary's L. J. 883 (1987). 
1654 Victor E. Schwartz, Tort law reform: strict liability and the collateral source rule do not mix, 39 
Vanderbilt Law Review 569 (1986) discussing the history of the collateral source rule in the different 
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would have been before the accident occurred, any source and amount of compensation 
should be arguably taken into account when determining tort awards.1655 Some justify the 
accumulation of damages by arguing that the victim is entitled to certain damages under 
the law as a right granted by the legal system and that receiving other payments from 
other sources such as insurance should not be relevant given that the these benefits were 
awarded because the insurance coverage was previously purchased.1656 However, 
whenever the additional benefits are provided by the state, the victim’s over-
compensation is more difficult to justify,1657
It should be noted that if accident deterrence was the main goal, the collateral 
source rule would be the best instrument of corrective justice because it forces potential 
tortfeasors to fully internalize the economic costs of their risky activity or products.
 which may explain why this coordination 
system has not been adopted in any of the European member states.  
1658 
But if efficient victim compensation was the goal, the collateral source rule would 
perform sub-optimally.1659
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdictions of U.S. states implementing it and arguing that state statutes have misled courts regarding the 
substantive and evidence component of the rule.   
 
1655 See David W. Robertson et al., William Powers, Jr., David A. Anderson, and Olin Guy Wellborn, III, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 325 (3d ed., 2004) noting that damage compensation under tort aims at 
leaving the injured victim in the situation he was in before the accident took place. See also Richard Lewis, 
DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 12, Oxford University Press (2000). 
1656 See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 
Journal of Legal Studies 3, 517-550 (1984) where Danzon stated that in situations where there is a buyer-
seller or employee-employer relationship, victims have also indirectly paid for the compulsory insurance 
provided by the tort system and thus are entitled to what they paid for. See also Fleming, “Collateral 
benefits” in international encyclopedia of comparative law (Vo, XI)(1983) chapter 11-18. See  
also Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule And Its Abolition: An 
Economic Perspective, 15 Fall Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 66 (2005) justifying the potential 
overcompensation of injured victims based on the fundamental purposes of tort law of compensation, 
indemnity, restitution and deterrence.   
1657 See Stephen B. Presser, How should the Law of Products Liability be Harmonized? What Americans 
Can Learn from Europeans, Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute (2002) noting the difficulty 
to justify over-compensation when part of the compensation comes from public funds. See also S. 
Sugarman, Doing away with personal injury law, 79 (1989) suggesting changes in social insurance and 
employment benefits in order to justify the accumulation of compensation from different sources.  
1658 Kevin S. Marshall and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule And Its Abolition: An 
Economic Perspective, 15 Fall Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 66 (2005). 
1659 Jeremy L. Kidd and Michael I. Krauss, Collateral source and tort’s law, George mason university Law 
and Economics research paper series 08-57 (2008) arguing that the justification of the application of the 
collateral source rule can be found in the essence of tort law. 
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7.2.3 Collateral benefits offset (deduction rule) 
 
The collateral benefits offset rule seeks to avoid the victim’s overcompensation 
eventually resulting from allowing the victim to accumulate several compensations, by 
reducing the damage award in the amount of the benefits already received by the victim 
from other alternative sources.1660
This rule does not provide private or social insurance with a specific right of 
reimbursement from the tortfeasor. It is the victim, not the insurer, who is able to seek 
damages under tort for the additional amount not compensated by the social insurance 
system.  
  
This is the best system for tortfeasors because they are responsible for an amount 
lower than the full accident cost and have no duty to return the benefits paid by other 
compensation schemes. Consequently, tortfeasors are under-deterred and, in a way, 
subsidized.  
From an administrative cost perspective, the collateral benefits offset is the 
simplest system to manage because it avoids the costs associated with reimbursement 
actions and the duplicity of payments to the victim.1661
However, this rule it does not lead to an optimal outcome given that the victim is 
indifferent between increasing the scope of insurance benefits or receiving tort 
damages.
 
1662
                                                 
1660 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
 The reason why this happens is that the benefits of having more insurance 
coverage go not only to the victim but also to the injurer, due to offsetting the collateral 
1661 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 43, Oxford University 
Press (2000). 
1662 See generally Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and 
Imperfect Liability Rules, 217-237, 226, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE 
ANALYSE. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, 
and Georg von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
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benefits from the damage awards. However, the costs of the alternative compensation 
system are born not by tortfeasors but by either victims, if the collateral system is private 
insurance, or by society as a whole, if the collateral system is social insurance.1663
As Table 7.2 shows, Finland provides a right of priority of the state over the 
plaintiff’s damages such that when compensation is paid to the plaintiff in the form of a 
damage award, the benefits from the state are deducted.
 
1664 Denmark and France also 
have set off rules under which social insurance benefits are deducted from victims’ tort 
awards.1665 The Danish and French systems combine a victim’s benefit offset with a 
direct action of social insurance agencies to seek reimbursement of the compensation 
benefits already paid.1666
 
   
 
7.2.4 No right of recourse 
 
The absence of a right of recourse of collateral sources -- specifically, social 
insurance agencies -- leaves all the decision to the victim, who is the one entitled to 
decide whether to pursue the tort claim against the tortfeasor. This system does not lead 
to an optimal outcome because if the victim does not pursue a tort claim, the social 
insurance system cannot be reimbursed for the benefits it provides. Victims are not fully 
compensated because they only receive benefits under social insurance, and tortfeasors 
                                                 
1663 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1664 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 41 (1997). 
1665 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 20 (1997) 
1666 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 76, Springer ed. (2003). 
  393 
do not internalize accident costs because they are neither forced to compensate the 
victims nor forced to reimburse the social insurance agency.  
If the victim decides to pursue a tort claim against the tortfeasor and prevails, the 
collateral benefit offset rule is often applied and the tort award is reduced by the 
compensation received from any other source.1667
Sweden is the only country where social insurance agencies have no right of 
recourse against tortfeasors in order to recover the benefits provided to the victim.
 This situation does not lead to an 
optimal outcome either, because even though the victim is fully compensated, the 
tortfeasor does not internalize the full cost of the accident and the social insurance system 
is not reimbursed for the benefits paid. Hence, a positive externality for the tortfeasor is 
generated and part of the cost of the accident is born by society as a whole. 
1668
Even though the idea not to provide this right of recourse to social insurance 
agencies is intended to reduce and avoid transaction costs, this perception is currently 
changing based on the belief that tortfeasors should be forced to internalize the cost of the 
accidents they cause.
  
1669
 
  
 
8 The difficult balance between ex ante incentives, compensation and low 
administrative costs of the different coordination systems 
 
In light of the different compensation systems available to victims of product-
related accidents, coordination rules are necessary to preserve injurers’ incentives while 
preventing victims’ overcompensation. The implementation of the coordination rules 
                                                 
1667 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 181, Springer ed. (2003). 
1668 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 183, Springer ed. (2003). 
1669 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 183, Springer ed. (2003). 
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presented above -- the collateral source rule, the collateral benefits offset and the 
reimbursement action of the collateral source against the torfeasor, specifically the 
subrogation right -- have different effects on the compensation of victims, on tortfeasors’ 
incentives for care, and on administrative costs (private litigation costs as well as public 
costs of the court system). Each of these dimensions conditions the efficient performance 
of each of the coordination rules.1670
The coordination mechanisms of the different compensation rules have 
remarkable effects on victims’ compensation. The collateral source rule results in 
victims’ overcompensation given that they are allowed to accumulate the compensation 
received from any of the available sources. In contrast, the reimbursement action of the 
insurer against the torfeasor in any of its forms results in victims receiving the same 
compensation to which they would be entitled to under tort. The result of the collateral 
benefit offset is different given that victims’ tort awards are reduced by the benefits they 
receive from other compensation sources. Under this rule, as explained above, victims 
might be fully compensated but tortfeasors do not internalize the full costs of the 
damages caused and so are under-deterred. 
 
With respect to the victims’ incentives for care, the collateral source rule does not 
create efficient incentives.1671
                                                 
1670 Michael G. Faure, Ton Hartlief and Niels J. Philipsen, Funding of personal injury litigation and claims 
culture, Evidence from the Netherlands, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, issue 2, 18 (2006) arguing that 
these costs should not be neglected. 
 This is because the victim can receive compensation from 
both the collateral source and the tortfeasor. Therefore, both benefits accumulate and the 
final compensation is higher than the actual damage suffered. Thus, in such situations, the 
victim has incentives to engage in risky conduct since any resulting harm is overly 
1671 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
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compensated ex post.1672
From the perspective of the tortfeasor’s incentives for care, the collateral source 
rule and the subrogation or the direct action rules result in efficient care because under 
any of these rules the tortfeasor faces a damage payment equal to the cost of the injury 
caused to victim,
 Consequently, the collateral source rule may generate the 
opposite effect than it intends.  
1673 which is the socially optimal outcome.1674 Hence, none of these 
rules has an impact on accident deterrence. But the outcome is different when the 
collateral benefit offset rule is in place since it does not result in a socially optimal 
outcome1675 because it allows for the victim’s full compensation and thus causes an 
indirect effect through which the compensation under tort is reduced the higher the 
benefits from the alternative compensation schemes are. Therefore, the injurer’s 
incentives for care are diluted in light of the externality generated by the deduction of the 
victim’s benefits from the tort award that results in tortfeasors being exposed to a lower 
level of liability than the actual damage they caused.1676
                                                 
1672 The marginal utility of money is not equal before and after the accident has taken place and therefore 
the victim does not have optimal incentives to adopt care. See Fernando Gómez Pomar, Tort Liability and 
Other means of redress: “collateral source rule” and related topics, Indret 1/00, 6-7 (2000). Available at  
 In contrast, under subrogation 
www.indret.com/code/getPdf.php?id=29&pdf=005_en.pdf 
1673 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1674 Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 256, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
(1987) where it showed that insurance subrogation was the preferred by victims and lead to a pareto-
optimal outcome. See also Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private 
Insurance Markets, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 3, 517-532 (1984). 
1675 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1676 See also Paul H. Rubin and Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, Journal of Law 
& Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, 221-238 (2007) for an empirical analysis of the impact 
of these rules on the torfeasor’s incentives for care. See also R. B. Stewart, Liability for Natural Resource 
Injury: Beyond Tort. Revesz R. L. & Stewart, R. B. (editors). Analyzing Superfund: Economics, Science 
and Law, Washington, 219-241 (1995) discussing this issue in the context of liability for environmental 
harm.   
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and the collateral source rule, the tortfeasor is exposed to the full cost of the harm caused 
to the victim and this results in optimal incentives for care.  
Another important parameter that should be taken into account when evaluating 
the performance of the different coordination systems is the administrative costs involved 
in their implementation.1677 Subrogation is often considered to involve significantly high 
administrative costs because either the victim or the collateral source -- private or public 
insurance -- will pursue the liability claim against the tortfeasor and they will have to bear 
the significant costs of the court system.1678
The collateral benefits offset rule, under which the victim’s compensation under 
tort is reduced by the compensation the victim receives from collateral sources, reduces 
the victim’s incentives to pursue her claim under tort.
 Similarly, under the collateral source rule, 
the victim also has incentives to pursue her claim under tort as long as the expected tort 
award is significantly high so that she will be fully -- or even overly -- compensated for 
the damage suffered. As a result, under this rule, administrative and litigation costs, both 
private and social costs, are significant. 
1679
                                                 
1677 For an analysis of the performance of the different coordination rules see in general Fernando Gomez 
and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect Liability Rules, 217-237, in 
INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND 
SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler 
Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
 This rule is the coordination 
system that involves the lowest administrative and transaction costs given that the 
collateral source -- public and private insurers -- will not pursue the victim’s claim under 
tort and hence will not incur the costs involved in litigation. In addition, the victims’ 
1678 See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between The Private And The Social Motive To Use 
The Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 2, 575-612, 579 (1997) and Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, 
Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect Liability Rules, 217-237, in 
INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND 
SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler 
Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1679 Further, the cost of each trial is also reduced given that only the tort award needs to be determined and 
the collateral benefits are reduced. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical 
Malpractice Claims, Law and Contemporary Problems 49, 57-72 (1986) where evidence is presented of the 
effects of the set-off rule inducing reductions in the frequency and amount of claims in medical 
malpractice. 
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incentives to pursue claims under tort significantly decrease. Consequently, when 
compared to the other coordination rules, the administration and litigation costs involved 
in the implementation of the collateral benefit offset rule are the lowest. 
 
Table 7.1  
Performance of the Coordination Systems of Alternative Compensation Schemes with 
respect to three dimensions 
 
 Victim’s 
compensation 
Tortfeasor’s 
incentives for care 
Administrative 
costs 
Collateral source rule Suboptimal Optimal High 
Subrogation right Optimal Optimal Highest 
Collateral benefit offset Optimal Suboptimal Low 
 
In sum, it is well settled in the literature that when liability under tort operates 
perfectly, any of the coordination rules result in an efficient outcome. But whenever 
liability under tort functions imperfectly, only subrogation rights of the insurer against the 
tortfeasor result in an optimal outcome from both the tortfeasor’s and the victim’s 
perspectives.1680
                                                 
1680 Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 235-255 Cambridge (Mass.) (1987) and Alan 
O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 2, 383- 399 (2001) available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/v30y2001i2p383-99.html. 
 From the tortfeasor’s perspective, the availability of subrogation rights 
results in optimal incentives for care and hence in the full internalization of the damages 
caused given that the tortfeasor is exposed to the full liability costs derived from the 
accident. From the victim’s perspective, subrogation allows the victim to be fully 
compensated, if not from the tortfeasor under tort then from the collateral source. Hence, 
under subrogation, potential victims have incentives to purchase insurance coverage to 
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make them whole.1681
 
 Despite creating efficient incentives for compensation and for 
deterrence, subrogation rights involve high administrative costs that should also be taken 
into account when determining the coordination system that would perform best in a 
certain context.  
 
9 The variability of the coordination systems implemented in the different 
European member states 
 
In most European countries social insurance authorities bear the financial burden 
of compensating accident victims -- including victims of product-related accidents -- and 
are entitled to seek reimbursement from tortfeasors -- in the case of products, against the 
manufacturers of defective products that cause harm.1682A remarkable exception to this 
general scheme is Sweden, where social insurance agencies have no recourse against the 
tortfeasor that caused the victim’s damages.1683
The Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Greece, have similar systems that 
include reimbursement rights for social insurance agencies. In Italy, social insurance 
agencies have a direct right of reimbursement against tortfeasors for personal 
damages.
 
1684 This direct right is exercised in an administrative procedure.1685
                                                 
1681 The tortfeasor could not fully compensate the injured victim under tort in cases where, for example, the 
injured victim could not meet the burden of proof; there was judicial error or the tortfeasor was judgment 
proof and hence did not have sufficient assets to pay the liability award to the victim.  
 If the victim 
1682 See generally Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and 
Insurance Law), 106, Springer ed. (2003) for an overview of the different social insurance systems in the 
different European countries and the different coordination mechanisms adopted when interacting with tort 
liability. However, could not gather information about Ireland, Luxemburg and Portugal in the different 
sources consulted.  
1683 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 183, Springer ed. (2003). See also Susan Narita, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss 
Reinsurance Company, Zurich, 32 (1996) noting that in 1996 there was a project to introduce 
reimbursement right from Swedish social insurance agencies. However, this revision does not seem to have 
resulted in introducing such claim.  
1684 However, recourse actions do not seem to be “fully coordinated.” See Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance Law), 135, Springer ed. (2003).  See 
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instead pursues her tort claim, then the victim must reimburse the Italian social insurance 
system for the benefits received.1686 The structure in Greece is quite similar to the one in 
Italy. Greece allows a reimbursement right for the social insurance agency against the 
tortfeasor for all benefits the agency has granted to the victim. Greek law aims at 
avoiding the victim’s overcompensation and enables the exercise of the reimbursement 
right against the tortfeasor -- under negligence or under strict liability -- or under another 
collateral source such as private insurance.1687
Northern European countries also have adopted a right of recourse of social 
insurance agencies against tortfeasors for the benefits paid. This is the system in force in 
Denmark, France and Germany. In Denmark, social insurance systems may seek 
reimbursement for the sickness benefits provided while in France, social insurance 
agencies may seek reimbursement as long as the benefits provided to the victim are a 
consequence of the accident and damages caused by the tortfeasor.
 
1688 Under French, 
Danish and German law, the reimbursement right of social insurance agencies is 
independent from the victim’s potential tort claim against the tortfeasor.1689 But in 
Germany, there is no record of any decision where social insurance agencies have 
pursued reimbursement.1690
                                                                                                                                                 
Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 307 (2004) noting that the reimbursement right 
against a product manufacturer has never been exercised in Italy. 
 Under French and Danish law, the social insurance agencies’ 
1685 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 135, Springer ed. (2003). 
1686 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 89 (1997). 
1687 The Greek reimbursement right against another collateral source such as private insurance would be 
limited to the amount of benefits provided under the insurance coverage purchased. This right is granted by 
the Sickness Benefits Act, Compulsory Health Insurance Act and the Invalidity insurance Act. Ulrich 
Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance Law), 129, 
Springer ed. (2003). 
1688 Martha Warren Neocelous, Personal injury, Practice and Procedure in Europe, Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 52 (1997).  
1689 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 76, Springer ed. (2003). 
1690 Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 307 (2004). 
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reimbursement right and the victim’s tort claim are combined with a collateral benefit 
offset rule such that if the injured victim pursues a tort claim, any benefit received from 
the Danish or French social insurance services is deducted from the victim’s tort 
award.1691
Belgian
 
1692 and Dutch1693 social insurance agencies are also entitled to 
reimbursement of the benefits paid to injured victims but such recourse action against the 
tortfeasor is limited to the amount of benefits payments made by the social insurance, as 
long as this compensation does not exceed the damages due by the tortfeasor.1694 It 
should be noted that under Belgian law, compensation under tort -- including product 
liability -- is justified whenever social insurance benefits are not sufficient to compensate 
the victim for the harm suffered.1695 Dutch law does not give priority to the claim of the 
social insurance right of reimbursement and the victim’s claim under tort even though in 
practice Dutch social insurance agencies generally give priority to the victim’s tort claim 
against the tortfeasor.1696
Finland gives a subrogation right to social insurance agencies to step into the 
position of injured victims for the purpose of seeking compensation under tort.
  
1697
                                                 
1691 See Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 20 (1997) noting that Danish social insurance agencies have a right of reimbursement 
since 1996.  
 Based 
1692 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 38, Springer ed. (2003). 
1693 See Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 111 (1997) and Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, 
Tort and insurance Law vol. 3, 160 (2003). 
1694 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 49, Springer ed. (2003). 
1695 This situation contrasts with regulation in France, Finland and Spain where compensation by social 
insurance systems does not prevent the injured victim from seeking compensation under tort. See 
Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Product Liability, COM (1999) 396 final, p. 8 
(1999). 
1696 See Michael G. Faure, Ton Hartlief and Niels J. Philipsen, Funding of personal injury litigation and 
claims culture, Evidence from the Netherlands, Utrecht Law Review, Volume 2, issue 2 (2006) noting that 
Dutch social insurance agencies generally give priority to the victim’s tort claim against the tortfeasor even 
though from a legal perspective, there is no priority between the social insurance right of reimbursement 
and the victim’s claim under tort. 
1697 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 41 (1997). 
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on this subrogation right, Finnish social insurance agencies enjoy a right of priority over 
the victim’s claim under tort. When Finnish social insurance agencies do not exercise this 
right and injured victims instead pursue their tort claims and prevail, the collateral benefit 
offset rule in force requires deducting the benefits already received from social insurance 
from the tort award.1698
English social security agencies had no right of recourse until 1989.
  
1699 Today 
social insurance agencies have a statutory claim against the tortfeasor.1700 The only 
precondition for this subrogated right is that the benefits obtained must have been a 
consequence of the accident caused by the tortfeasor. The agency’s recourse claim is 
independent of whether the victim would sue the tortfeasor. If she does, any social 
insurance benefit received will be deducted from the damage award.1701 However, the 
reimbursement right is hardly ever exercised given that in 1989, a Compensation 
Recovery Unit was established with the purpose of ensuring that insurers would seek the 
benefits paid to the injured victim as a result of an accident.1702 The party responsible for 
the victim’s damages has the duty to reimburse the full amount of benefits to the 
Compensation Recovery Unit.1703
                                                 
1698 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 41 (1997). 
 Given that social insurance is reimbursed for the 
benefits paid to injured victims through the Compensation Recovery Unit, the recourse 
action is very rarely exercised since the economic incentives to litigate are reduced when 
1699 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 63, Springer ed. (2003). 
1700 Article 30 of the English Social insurance Act of July 5, 1985. 
1701 Martha Warren Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 52 (1997). 
1702 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 67, Springer ed. (2003). 
1703 The collection of the Compensation Recovery Unit is a consequence of the duty imposed on the injurer 
or whoever compensated the victim to inquire about the benefits paid to the victim.  See Martha Warren 
Neocelous, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, Cavendish Publishing Limited, 31 
(1997). 
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social insurance agencies recover the expenses they incurred in when they compensated 
the victim.1704
Spain presents a mixed situation where, depending on the context in which the 
product accident takes place and hence the court with jurisdiction over the issue, different 
coordination mechanisms are applicable.
  
1705 The general rule of Spanish civil law does 
not preclude an injured victim who has already received insurance benefits (regardless 
whether these benefits are private or public) from seeking compensation under tort. At 
the same time, Spanish social insurance agencies have a right of recourse against the 
person who causes the injury with respect only to the victim’s medical expenses 
previously paid by the social insurance system.1706 This reimbursement right can be 
exercised judicially against the tortfeasor regardless of the victim’s behavior.1707 The 
coordination between both compensation sources can be articulated through the collateral 
source rule1708 or through the collateral benefits offset rule applied by the third section of 
the Spanish Supreme Court (the administrative law section),1709
                                                 
1704 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 67, Springer ed. (2003). 
 under which 
1705 See Fernando Gómez Pomar, Responsabilidad extracontractual y otras fuentes de reparación de daños: 
“Collateral Source Rule” y afines, InDret 1/00, available at www.indret.com presenting an overview of the 
different coordination mechanisms available under Spanish law and their interpretation and implementation 
by the different sections of the Spanish Supreme Court. 
1706 See Article 127.3 of the Royal Law Decree RDL 1/1994 of June 20, approving the General Law on 
Social insurance (BOE 154, p. 20658 of June 29, 1994). The text of the Royal Decree is available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-14960.  
1707 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 172, Springer ed. (2003). 
1708 The collateral source rule, followed by the Civil and Labor Law sections of the Spanish Supreme Court, 
is the rule applied in civil, as well as in labor law cases. See, for example, Judgment of the Spanish 
Supreme Court (Civil Section), num. 409/1999, of May 18, 1999 (Hon. Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta) (RJ 
1999\4112); Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Section), Auto of April 15, 1997 (RJ 1997\5280); Judgment of 
the Spanish Supreme Court (Labor Law Section), num. 124/1997, of February 2nd, 1998 (Hon. Pablo 
Manuel Cachón Villar) (RJ 1998/3250) and Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Labor Law section), 
num. 1663/2002, of February 7th, 2003 (Hon. José María Botana López)(RJ 2004\1828). 
1709 The collateral benefit offset rule is the coordination mechanism used for compensating victims of 
product-related accidents. See articles 132 and 133 of the Royal Law Decree 1/2007 of November 16, for 
which approved the merged text of the General Law for the Defense of Consumers and users and other 
complementary laws (BOE núm. 287, de 30-11-2007, pp. 49181-49215). 
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compensation received by the injured victim from different sources such as public and 
private insurance are deducted from liability awards obtained under tort.1710
The third possibility, the subrogation right, is also contemplated by Spanish 
legislation even though this is not the solution generally implemented when coordinating 
compensation awards received from different sources.
  
1711 As mentioned earlier, this 
solution is the most efficient one given that the tortfeasor internalizes the full cost of the 
damage caused to the injured victim, the victim is made whole and is not over-
compensated, and the insurer -- private or public -- is reimbursed for the amount of 
benefits paid to the injured victim.1712
The subrogation right of the insurer against the tortfeasor is the coordination rule 
contemplated by the Spanish transposition law of the product liability directive
 
1713 within 
certain limits.1714 Additionally, social insurance law also gives social insurance agencies 
a direct claim against the tortfeasor under tort to seek reimbursement of the amount 
already paid to the injured victim.1715
 
  
                                                 
1710 See for example, Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative law section), num. 
1770/1994, of March 27, 1998 (Hon. Francisco José Hernando Santiago) (RJ 1998/2942) and Judgment of 
the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative law section), num 2694/1995, of April 17, 1998 (Hon. José 
Manuel Sieira Míguez)(RJ 1998\3832). 
1711 Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect 
Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg 
von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1712 See Alan O. Sykes, Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 J. Leg. Stud. 383, 388 (2001) available at 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jlstud/v30y2001i2p383-99.html. See also Fernando Gomez and Jose Penalva, 
Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and Imperfect Liability Rules, 217-237, in 
INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HANS-BERND 
SCHÄFER ZUM 65 GEBURTSTAGS, Jochen Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler 
Verlag, Wiesbaden (2008). 
1713 Articles 132 and 133 of the Royal Law Decree 1/2007 of November 16, for which approved the merged 
text of the General Law for the Defense of Consumers and users and other complementary laws (BOE núm. 
287, de 30-11-2007, pp. 49181-49215). 
1714 The liability limits are established in article 141 (a), that provides for a deductible of 390.66 euros, and 
141 (b) that provides for a maximum liability of 63 106 270.66 euros.  
1715 See article 127.3 of the Royal Law Decree RDL 1/1994 of June 20, approving the General Law on 
Social insurance (BOE 154, p. 20658 of June 29, 1994). The text of the Royal Decree is available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-14960.  
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10 The collision of alternative compensation systems in Europe: reaching an 
equilibrium between product liability and struggling social insurance systems  
 
All coordination systems present advantages and disadvantages that have different 
effects on victims’ compensation, tortfeasors’ incentives for care, and administrative and 
litigation costs. The choice of one coordination system over another should turn on the 
priority given to compensation, deterrence or on the reduction of administrative costs in a 
given situation.  
One of the parameters of special importance when discussing the efficiency and 
effects of the different coordination systems in European product liability is the public 
nature of the most important collateral source in compensating victims of product-related 
accidents: social insurance.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the European product liability directive intended to 
provide a high level of protection to victims of product-related accidents and to make it 
easier for them to seek compensation for the harm suffered.1716 The adoption of strict 
product liability was expected to increase the number of product liability claims in 
Europe but as shown earlier, the number of judgments as well as the amount of the 
damage awards is still significantly low, especially when compared to those in the United 
States.1717
In addition to liability under tort, victims of product related accidents also have 
collateral sources of compensation such as private insurance coverage and public 
insurance benefits.  
 
                                                 
1716 Paula Giliker, Strict Liability for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business Law Review 4, 
87-90 (2003). 
1717 Green Paper: Access of consumers to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the Single 
market, COM/93/576FINAL, 56, November 16 (1993). Available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32023_en.htm 
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The introduction of the product liability directive has not had a significant effect 
on the private insurance coverage purchased,1718 and in some cases such as in Spain, it 
may have even resulted in lower levels of insurance coverage of potential tortfeasors 
subject to the different transposition laws of the member states.1719 Considering the role 
of social insurance systems in European countries, private insurance coverage for 
product-related accidents might not have been necessary. Social insurance programs 
provide a comprehensive safety net for victims of product related accidents through a 
system of no-fault,1720 incomplete, but immediate compensation to injured victims. 
Hence, the incentives to purchase private insurance coverage as well as the incentives to 
pursue a product liability claim are diluted.1721
In light of the different compensation systems available and the importance of 
social insurance benefits for compensating victims of product related accidents, it 
becomes necessary to coordinate the different systems involved in order to align the 
incentives of the different parties involved and ensure optimal outcomes. If European 
product liability would prioritize the compensation of victims over accident deterrence, a 
collateral source rule would be preferred to the collateral benefits offset solution because 
it would ensure that the victim was fully -- or even overly -- compensated both from the 
tort system and from the collateral source. The questionable issue would be whether it is 
  
                                                 
1718 See Dana Kerr, Yu-Len Ma, and Joan T. Schmit, Is liability a substitute for social insurance?, 
Proceedings of the International Insurance Society, New York. (2004) arguing for the existence of a 
negative relationship between liability insurance premiums and the scope of social insurance programs. For 
an opposite conclusion see G. Wagner, Tort liability and insurance: Comparative report and final 
conclusions, in Gerhard Wagner (ed) Tort Law and Liability Insurance, Wien: Springer (2005). 
1719 See Luis Ramírez, RC alerta roja: sanidad y productos son los dos sectores más sensibles: el nivel de 
cobertura se ha reducido notablemente, Mercado previsor, núm. 400, 32-33 (2004) noting that since the 
product liability directive was introduced the level of insurance coverage purchased by potential tortfeasors 
in Spain has decreased. 
1720 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 230, Springer ed. (2003). 
1721 Lawrence C. Mann and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on PL: the promise or progress ?, 
18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, 415 (1988) arguing that there is a lower need to use product liability 
litigation in order to have access to necessary and sufficient medical, rehabilitative and living assistance in 
Europe. However, empirical support for this conclusion is not available. See Lawrence C. Mann and Peter 
R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on PL: the promise or progress?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391, fn 
115 (1988). 
  406 
reasonable for part of that overcompensation to come from public funds.1722
The special question arising in the compensation of victims of product-related 
accidents in Europe is the existence, role and importance of a publicly funded collateral 
source such as the no-fault social insurance system.
 If accident 
deterrence was the major goal of the system, again a collateral source rule or a 
reimbursement right would achieve the efficient outcome.  
1723 The existence of the welfare state 
provides basic benefits to injured victims that are necessary right after these victims have 
been injured without having to go through an often lengthy litigation process of pursuing 
the claim for damages.1724 Under this structure a collateral benefit offset rule combined 
with a subrogation right could arguably be preferred to the collateral source rule.1725 
However, one of the potential problems of this solution is the certainly high private and 
public costs of combining two compensation mechanisms like social insurance and tort 
with their significant administrative costs.1726
One of the basic assumptions entailed when analyzing the differences in all these 
coordination systems and their outcomes is that the collateral source -- either private or 
publicly funded -- will seek reimbursement from the tortfeasor for the benefits already 
paid. But private and public insurers do not have the same incentives to do so and 
practical evidence suggests that neither of them do it frequently. As explained earlier, 
most European member states provide for a reimbursement right in favor of social 
  
                                                 
1722 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 113, Oxford University 
Press (2000). 
1723 See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1006-1007 (1994) arguing that 
the existence and availability of mandatory health care coverage dilutes the victim’s incentives to bring a 
product liability claim and hence seek compensation under tort.   
1724 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 116, Oxford University 
Press (2000).  
1725 Shavell has shown that this solution leads to the Pareto-optimal outcome. Steven Shavell, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, 235-255, Cambridge (Mass.) (1987). 
1726 See Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 1096 (2007) suggesting 
the use of a universal and publicly funded compensation system of victims of product-related accidents in 
order to avoid the high administrative costs involved in the tort system.  
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insurance systems against the tortfeasor for the benefits already paid to the injured victim. 
However, such action is hardly ever pursued by social insurance systems.  
The product liability directive was adopted over twenty years ago and the level of 
product liability litigation initiated by either injured victims,1727 private insurance 
companies or social insurance agencies, has been and still today remains remarkably 
low.1728 From a litigation perspective, the product liability directive has not had a 
significant impact.1729 It is difficult to provide quantitative evidence of this situation in 
light of the lack of a systematic collection of information regarding the identity of the 
tortfeasor or the product that might have caused damages to the victim and the benefits 
paid to the victim.1730 The lack of a systematic collection of information about product 
liability accidents, health care provided to injured victims and the benefits received by 
them might explain why, in light of the difficulty of meeting the required burden of proof, 
social insurance systems hesitate and do not exercise their subrogation right against 
tortfeasors in order to seek reimbursement for the benefits already paid to the victim.1731 
Considering the new technologies available today, the lack of collection of information 
seems a poor explanation of this situation but up to today, the information available on 
product accidents in the different European states is scarce.1732
                                                 
1727 Eleonora Rajneri, Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and the Former 
Liability Regime in Italy, Global Jurist Topics, Vol. 4, Issue 1 num. 3, 8 (2004). 
 Regardless of its cause, 
1728 Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, 295, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, edited by Duncan Fairgrieve, Cambridge (2005). 
1729 Eleonora Rajneri, Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and the Former 
Liability Regime in Italy, Global Jurist Topics, Vol. 4, Issue 1 num. 3, 8 (2004). 
1730 The European Commission has initiated different projects -- the IPP-project “A surveillance based 
model to calculate the direct medical costs in Europe: Eurocost;” the ECOSA European Working Group 
and the EHLASS project on Collection of data on Home and Leisure Accidents (former EHLASS) -- in 
order to be able to assess and compare the direct medical costs afforded by public hospitals in the different 
member states as well as identify which of these costs are caused by product-related accidents. Their 
success has been quite limited. 
1731 Willem H. van Boom/ Michael G. Faure, Concluding Remarks to the book Shifts in Compensation 
between Private and Public Systems, in Tort and Insurance Law in Shifts in Compensation between  Private 
and Public Systems, Willem H. van Boom/ Michael G. Faure (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law, vol. 22, 219-
235 (2007) noting that information on medical costs and benefits as well as their variation among the 
different member states is a necessary step in the economic assessment of injury measures in Europe. 
1732 Richard Lewis, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, 114, Oxford University 
Press (2000). 
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practical evidence shows that social insurance systems do not seek reimbursement from 
the tortfeasor for the benefits paid to the victim.1733
In addition to the reimbursement right to which social insurance systems are 
entitled, injured victims are not precluded from seeking compensation through the tort 
system for damages not covered by their social insurance benefits.
 
1734
Injured victims, however, often lack incentives to pursue their product liability 
claims
 The legal regimes 
of the different European member states provide coordination systems between damage 
awards a victim may receive through tort and the compensation received from social 
insurance. 
1735 due to several factors that have been aleady explained: the negligence elements 
of the Directive,1736 procedural rules that become procedural barriers to claims, 
substantive legal aspects of product liability regulation that do not contribute to make 
litigation attractive for injured victims, and the general cultural attitudes of Europeans 
against the idea of litigating.1737
But the most important factor that may dissuade Europeans from litigating is the 
availability of immediate compensation regardless of fault through social insurance.
  
1738
                                                 
1733 See Alberto Cavaliere, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and Deterrence Issues, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318, 307 (2004) noting that there is no record showing 
social insurance agencies in Germany, Italy or Spain pursuing the reimbursement action they are entitled to.   
 
1734 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1006-1007 (1994). 
1735 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 242, Springer ed. (2003) arguing that injured victims do not have incentives to bring their product 
claims. 
1736 Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 433, 435 (1997) noting that the standard of liability under the Directive is complicated to determine 
based on the vagueness of defining important terms such as producer and defect.  
1737 Mark Mildred, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 433, 441 (1997). See also J.G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 507, 519 (1994) noting 
that Europeans do not rely on the judicial process as much as U.S. citizens do.  
1738 Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1006-1007 (1994). See also 
Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance Law), 
241, Springer ed. (2003) noting that a large part of the costs of the victim’s personal injuries is 
compensated via social security and not under tort law. 
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Victims of product-related accidents in Europe turn to social insurance programs to seek 
remedies for their personal and economic injuries1739 and they appear to accept the trade-
off between the immediate but incomplete compensation they receive under this system 
instead of full compensation they could receive under tort, with its costly and uncertain 
litigation.1740
The fact that injured victims do not pursue their product liability claims only 
partially explains the lack of effectiveness of product liability in the different European 
member states. Deterrence could also be achieved through social insurance, if insurance 
agencies would pursue reimbursement actions against tortfeasors for the benefits paid to 
victims for the personal injuries suffered.
 Even though social insurance agencies could exercise their reimbursement 
right against the tortfeasor, they do not seem to do so either.  
1741 However, social insurance systems do not 
seem to do so and hence do not exercise the subrogation action available to them.1742 In 
light of the scarce number of product liability decisions and the parties involved, it seems 
that neither injured victims nor social insurance systems have incentives to pursue their 
product liability claims under tort.1743
                                                 
1739 See Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In The European 
Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 688-689 (1991) and Patrick Thieffry et al., Strict product liability in the 
EEC: Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort & Ins. Law 
Journal 65, 90 (1989). 
  
1740 This is a well settled view in the literature. See Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability 
Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation 
For Reform So As To Accomplish Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 
983, 1006-1007 (1994) and Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted In 
The European Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 688-689, 714-715 (1991) noting that seeking 
compensation under tort involves a more expensive and uncertain process than receiving social insurance 
benefits. 
1741 See Table 7.2 at the end of this chapter. See generally Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance Law), 288, Springer ed. (2003). See also Alf 
Erling Risa, The Welfare State as provider of accident insurance in the workplace: efficiency and 
distribution in equilibrium, The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, no. 458, 129-144 (1995). 
1742 See Table 7.2 at the end of this chapter.  
1743 Andrew C. Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States Analog, 5 Roger 
Williams U. L. Rev. 341,. 373-374 (2000) noting that some suggest that because of the respect Europeans 
have for businesses, the lack of tort litigation would be a result of a conscious decision to give a free pass to 
manufacturers.   
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The outcome of this situation in product liability accidents in Europe is 
remarkably inefficient: Victims are under-compensated through being compensated by 
social insurance benefits and have no incentives to pursue their claims under tort and 
social insurance programs bear the cost of the benefits provided to injured victims and do 
not have incentives to exercise their subrogation rights.1744
The low impact of the product liability directive together with the existing 
dislocation of product-related accidents costs result in a lack of an effective product 
liability regime in Europe. Even though this situation and its outcome have come to be 
accepted, they generate a significant amount of waste in terms of incentive creation, 
damage internalization and administrative costs.  
 As a result, tortfeasors do not 
fully internalize the cost of the accidents they cause and consequently are not effectively 
deterred given that they are not fully exposed to the full costs of the damages they cause 
and social insurance systems bear most of the product-related accident costs.  
Over the last three decades, European welfare states have experienced 
development and economic pressures1745 with many years of economic crisis, 
demographic pressures1746 including the need of long-term care and the drop in birth 
rates,1747 recent labor market changes and changes in family structures with the 
participation of married women in the labor market and the emergence of new family 
forms.1748
                                                 
1744 Göran Skogh, Public insurance and accident prevention, The international review of law and 
economics, vol 2, 67-80 (1982). See also James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping With the Time Dimension in 
Products Liability, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 935-38 (1981) noting that when products liability functions 
adequately, compensation, deterrence and shifting the social costs of risky activities to tortfeasors are goals 
achieved by products liability.  
 All these parameters together have lead to a debate on welfare systems and 
1745 Joan T. Schmit, Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The Geneva Papers 
31, 304–313, 311 (2006) noting that the role of social insurance in compensating victims of product-related 
accidents is of crucial importance considering the debate that has taken place during the last years 
concerning the reduction of the coverage of social insurance programs in Europe. 
1746 For an analysis of the social security reforms regarding the aging population process in Europe see 
“Social Security in Europe: the impact of an aging population: and information paper prepared for use by 
the Special Committee on aging, United States Senate,” 38 (1981). 
1747 See From pyramid to pillar, population change and social security in Europe, International Labor 
organization, 85 (1989) for an analysis of the influence of demographic changes on pension policies. 
1748 Jochen Clasen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, The policy press, 244 (1997).  
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questions about the sustainability of social insurance systems.1749 From different 
perspectives, sociologists, economists, political scientists and social policy analysts are 
discussing the normative foundations of the existing welfare state and are suggesting new 
principles of social protection and the development of new systems that may improve the 
capacity to adapt to changing environments.1750
There seems to be a broad social consensus that social insurance systems should 
not disappear (as this would change the entire European social model) but should adapt to 
the new reality in many European societies.
   
1751
Compensation of victims of product-related accidents in Europe can be seen as a 
case study for considering whether the objectives of the European welfare state and its 
interaction with tort law should be redefined. The costs of product-related accidents born 
by social insurance systems might be partially contributing to the financial crisis of social 
insurance and more generally, welfare states in Europe.
 These issues have generated a remarkable 
amount of research regarding the reforms that should be made. However, surprisingly 
enough, most of the reforms and changes that have been made to address the financial 
problems of the social insurance systems are neither substantial nor fundamental, and 
have often increased the resources used by the systems or restructured the existing ones. 
Thus, the tendency has been to make relatively minor changes and to avoid any radical 
restructuring of programs, which seems urgent.  
1752
                                                 
1749 Social Security in Europe: Development or Dismantelment?, Niels Ploug and Jon Kvist, Kluwer Sovac, 
Series on Social Security, 25 (1996). 
 If, instead, it is determined 
that the costs of the product liability system should be absorbed by social insurance 
systems, it would then become necessary to determine what the social cost of such 
1750 Jochen Clasen, WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS IN NATIONAL AND 
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, Policy Press, 1-10 (2002). 
1751 G. Bagdy, Policies for national consensus and reform, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON SOCIAL SECURITY: 
FINDING THE BALANCE: FINANCING AND COVERAGE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN EUROPE, W. van Ginneken 
ed., International social security association, Geneva (1996).  
1752 Due to the lack of data it is not possible to determine the volume of these costs.  
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damages is and whether and how tortfeasors should be contributing to social insurance 
systems in order to bear part or if possible, all of its costs.1753
This inefficient situation is a consequence of the structure of European product 
regulation that, to say the least, is quite patchy. It is often suggested that society can 
choose between tort (for deterrence) and insurance (for compensation) or on the other 
hand a system of regulation (for deterrence)
 
1754 and social insurance (for 
compensation).1755 However, Europe has chosen neither one model nor the other. 
European product regulation has adopted a product liability directive, based on the belief 
of the higher capacity of product manufacturers to bear and spread accident costs,1756
The composition and nature of the European product regulation is mixed between 
private remedies and public programs and results in an ineffective regime. Despite such 
inefficiency it may be accepted and determined that this is a good system. However, until 
there is data and an analysis of the cost of this decision it does not seem that such 
conclusion can be reached. In light of the social insurance crisis currently being 
 and 
a broad ex ante product safety regulatory body to ensure a certain level of safety of the 
products marketed in the European market. Thus, the model seems to rely on ex ante 
product safety regulation for deterrence and on ex post liability -- strict product liability -- 
for compensation. But the practical implementation of the model does not seem to 
function as the theoretical model would predict given that the role of social insurance 
seems to have a great impact on victims’ compensation and on parties’ incentives. 
                                                 
1753 SOCIAL SECURITY IN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OR DISMANTELMENT?, Niels Ploug and Jon Kvist, Kluwer 
Sovac, Series on Social Security, 29 (1996). 
1754 See Steven Shavell, Liability for harm versus regulation of safety, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 2, 374 
(1984) and Steven Shavell, A model of the optimal use of liability and safety regulation, Rand Journal of 
Economics, 15(2), 271-280 (1984).  
1755 Göran Skogh, Public insurance and accident prevention, The international review of law and 
economics, vol 2,  67-80 (1982) and Göran Skogh, The combination of private and public regulation of 
safety, in ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS. CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION 
FOR LOSSES, 87-101 M Fuare/R. van den Bergh (Eds.) (1987).  
1756 Sheila L. Birnbaum, Legislative reform or retreat? A response to the product liability crisis, 14 Forum 
251, 253 (1978-1979). See also Richard W. Wright, The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067, 
1096 (2007) questioning the use of tort law as a risk spreading mechanism. 
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experienced in Europe, it seems that some kind of reform is necessary to alleviate the 
public system of these additional costs.  
Product-related accident costs, despite not being quantifiable, might not solve the 
current problems of social insurance programs in Europe. But even if such costs were not 
relevant, from a policy perspective, the distortion on the allocation of costs has major 
effects for the incentives of the parties’ involved and for the system as a whole: first, 
economically, even if they are not the major problem of the social insurance system, the 
public system bears costs that should be placed on the private parties who cause harm so 
that these parties are not implicitly receiving a public subsidy through social insurance. 
Second, there is a moral hazard problem caused by victims’ reliance on no-fault benefits 
from social insurance systems that even if not full, provide benefits regardless of the level 
of care the victim adopted.1757 Third, there is a dislocation of accident costs whenever the 
social insurance system ends up bearing them in cases where neither the victim not the 
social insurance agency pursues the products claim.1758 Such dislocation causes a major 
distortion in the torfeasor’s incentives for care and thus on deterrence given that 
tortfeasors do not internalize the cost of the damages they cause.1759 As a result, 
tortfeasors have suboptimal incentives for care and are under-deterred.1760
                                                 
1757 Ulrich Magnus, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW, vol. 3 (Tort and Insurance 
Law), 230, Springer ed. (2003). 
  
1758 This situation contrasts with the U.S. practice where private insurers pay much of the costs for which 
European governments assume responsibility. See Anita Bernstein, L'harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products 
Liability Attempted In The European Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673, 688-690 (1991). 
1759 This effect is surely present. However, the magnitude of this effect is difficult to quantify given that 
there is no data available to determine the amount of resources that the different social insurance systems in 
Europe devote to injured victims of product-related accidents.  
1760 The implementation of strict liability under the Directive has had little impact on the costs born by 
industry. Alfred E. Mottur, The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. Law, An 
Analysis of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As To Accomplish 
Harmonization and Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983, 1007 (1994). See also Willem H. 
van Boom/ Michael G. Faure, Concluding Remarks to the book Shifts in Compensation between Private 
and Public Systems, 219-235, in TORT AND INSURANCE LAW IN SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS, Willem H. van Boom/ Michael G. Faure (eds.) (Tort and Insurance Law), 
vol. 22, (2007) noting that the under-deterrence is justified in light that it provides easier and quicker 
compensation to injured victims. 
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The shift from private to public funding is generally defended on victim’s 
protection grounds.1761
This is not the place to discuss whether compensation under tort, under private or 
under social insurance is preferred. The goal of this chapter is not determining whether 
compensation should be mostly provided through social insurance
 But the effects and performance of the interaction between 
product liability and social insurance in Europe is not just a matter of efficiency but also a 
matter on the effectiveness of the law -- in this case, tort law -- and on the viability of 
social insurance systems in Europe.  
1762 and tort law should 
have a secondary role1763
The issue is whether, in light of the inefficiencies arising from the current product 
liability regulatory structure and context, there is room for improvement and for reaching 
a more efficient and less disruptive structure. This is of special importance when 
considering that the welfare systems and more specifically, social insurance systems of 
the different European member states enjoy significant support among citizens,
 or whether accident deterrence should be the priority when 
talking about accidents and hence liability under tort should be the major compensation 
source and the role of private or public insurance should be secondary.  
1764
                                                 
1761 Willem H. van Boom/ Michael G. Faure, Concluding Remarks to the book Shifts in Compensation 
between Private and Public Systems, TORT AND INSURANCE LAW IN SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS, Willem H. van Boom/ Michael G. Faure (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law, 
vol. 22, 219-235 (2007). 
 who 
generally endorse their principles and operations and accept their requirements and 
1762 See Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 
University of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 3, 15 (2001). This article is available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/3 noting that the insurance literature often assumes that private 
insurance is better than public insurance without much inquiry on whether it is true. 
1763 W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government regulation, and 
contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65, 67 (1989). 
1764 See Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law After The Treaty Of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy In Or 
Beyond The Internal Market?, Common Market Law Review 37: 367-400, 370, 375 (2000) noting that the 
role of the European states in protecting consumers in their market transactions is more paternalistic than 
the role of the U.S. In this sense, European member states and regulations take greater care of consumer 
interests in providing information rights, education and instruments of organization in order to safeguard 
their interests.   
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outcomes.1765 If, as it seems today, viability and sustainability is an issue and challenge, 
the interaction between social insurance and product liability in Europe should be 
revisited. Placing the costs of product-related accidents on the party who should bear 
them or instead, having social insurance systems bearing the costs of such accidents 
through contributions of potential tortfeasors subject to the product liability directive 
would be a first step to rationalize the social insurance system that today is in serious 
struggle.1766
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
1765 Jochen Clasen, WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS IN NATIONAL AND 
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, 33, Policy Press (2002). 
1766 Geraint G. Howells & Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective Than The 
Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985, 1029 (1998). 
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Table 7.2 - European Social Insurance Systems 
 
The information of this chart has been mostly obtained from two different sources: 
• Social Security Administration (SSA) and the International Social Security Association (ISSA), Social security programs throughout the World: Europe, 
2010 (2010). Available at http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2010-2011/europe/index.html 
• Bernard A. Koch and Helmut Koziol (eds.), COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, (Tort and Insurance Law, vol. 4), 
European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law, Springer-Verlag, Wien (2003). 
 
STATE 
GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
AUSTRIA 
Current social insurance 
applicable laws: law of 
1955 (employees) and law of 
1978 (self-employed). 
 
Wage earners and 
salaried employees 
(separate systems with 
essentially identical 
provisions) earning at 
least €366.33 a month, 
and apprentices.  
Special systems for 
miners, notaries, public 
employees, and self-
employed persons in 
trade, industry, and 
agriculture. 
Insured person: 
10.25% of earnings. 
Employer: 12.55% of 
payroll. 
Government: A 
subsidy and the cost 
of the care benefit and 
income-tested 
allowance. 
Maximum earnings for 
contribution and benefit 
purposes are 
€4.795 a month. 
Employed persons 
earning €366.33 or 
more a month, 
apprentices, and 
pensioners. 
Special systems for 
public and railway 
employees and self-
employed in 
agriculture and trade. 
 
Insured person: Wage 
earners, 3.95% of 
wages; salaried 
employees, 3.82% of 
covered salary; 
pensioners, 5.10% of the 
pension. 
Employer: Wage 
earners, 3.70% of 
payroll; salaried 
employees, 3.83%. 
Government: 70% of 
cash maternity benefits. 
Maximum earnings for 
contribution and benefit 
calculation purposes are 
€4.110 a month. 
Employer pays 100% of 
earnings for up to 12 
weeks (plus additional 4 
weeks at 50%) depending 
on length of service. After 
right to full benefit from 
employer is exhausted, 
sickness funds pay 50% 
(60% after 6 weeks) of 
assessment base (25% to 
those receiving 50% of 
earnings from employer) 
plus family supplements 
for 26 to 52 weeks 
depending on length of 
contributions. Maximum 
is 75% of covered 
earnings. 
 
RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN AUSTRIA 
Where the injured person does have a tort claim against a tortfeasor, this claims passes by way of legal cession to the social insurance agency insofar and to the extent 
that the agency is bound to satisfy the claim by granting benefits to the victim. This cession presupposes that the tort claim and the social insurance benefits have the 
same purpose.  
Where tort liability of certain persons is mainly excluded, the social insurance agency has a statutory claim of its own against the liable person but only in case of this 
person’s intentional or grossly negligent conduct.  
The employer has to continue payment of full wages even if the employee is unable to work because of an injury caused by another person. The employer has also then a 
right of recourse against the tortfeasor for those paid wages.  
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STATE 
GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
BELGIUM 
Current social insurance 
laws: 1967, 1994 and 2001 
(guaranteed income)  
Employed persons 
(special provision for 
miners and seamen). 
Special systems for self-
employed persons and 
civil servants. 
Insured person: 7.5% 
of earnings. Pensioners 
contribute 
0.5% to 2% of pensions 
or pre-pensions. 
Employer: 8.86% of 
payroll (100% of gross 
earnings for white-collar 
workers and 108% of the 
insured’s gross earnings 
for blue-collar workers). 
Government: Annual 
subsidies. 
Employed persons 
who are members of 
a mutual benefit 
society or an 
auxiliary sickness and 
disability fund. 
Pensioners and other 
social insurance 
beneficiaries are also 
covered for medical 
benefits. 
Special systems 
operate for self-
employed persons 
(basic protection 
only) and seamen. 
Voluntary affiliation 
is possible. 
 
Insured person: Medical 
benefits, 3.55% of 
earnings. Cash benefits and 
disability pensions, 1.15% 
of earnings. Pensioner, 
3.55% of old-age and 
survivor pension (low-
income pensioners are 
exempt from contribution). 
Employer: Medical 
benefits, 3.8% of reference 
earnings (100% gross 
earnings for white collar 
workers and 108% of gross 
earnings for blue-collar 
workers).  Government: 
Subsidy for the 
management of the social 
insurance system. Proceeds 
from a surcharge on 
automobile 
insurance and on 
hospitalization insurance 
premiums, and a tax on the 
profit made on certain 
prescribed medicines and 
other taxes. 
Cash sickness benefit: 
60% of average lifetime 
earnings (the basis salary 
taken into account for the 
calculation of sickness and 
disability benefits has a 
ceiling of €118.36 per 
day). After the 31st day of 
incapacity the entitlement 
is 55%; 60% if there are 
dependents or if the 
insured is the sole 
breadwinner. In general, 
benefits are not payable if 
the employer provides a 
guaranteed salary. 
RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN BELGIUM1767
Recourse action is a quasi-subrogation action given that it is limited to the amount of compensatory payments that have been effectively paid by the public health 
insurance, at least in as far as this effective compensation does not exceed the damages paid by the tortfeasor (regulated in art 136 §2 Act 14 July 1994). 
 
Social insurance compensation for industrial accidents and for health care measures differs in so far as the latter is only available in addition to compensation in tort 
while the first excludes tort compensation in many situations.  
With reference to a recourse claim both social insurance agencies are entitled to reimbursement of the benefits rendered to the injured person as far as those benefits 
compensate for bodily impairment.  
                                                 
1767 See D. Simoens, Beginselen van Belgisch Privaatrecht: Buitencontractuele aansprakelijheid – Schade en schadeloosstelling, 329-411 (1999). 
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STATE 
GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
DENMARK 
Current laws:  
2005 (partial early 
retirement pension), 2006 
(ATP pension), 2007 (social 
pensions), and 2007 
(anticipatory pensions). 
Type of program: 
Universal and social 
insurance systems. 
Universal basic and 
universal supplement 
pensions: 
Citizens residing in 
Denmark and non-
citizens meeting the 
minimum residency 
requirements or covered 
by reciprocal agreements. 
 
Labor-market 
supplementary pension 
(ATP): Employees aged 
16 to 65 (including 
recipients of disability 
(voluntary for disability 
pensions granted before 
2003) cash sickness, 
maternity, 
unemployment, and 
social assistance benefits. 
Voluntary coverage for 
persons previously 
insured for at least 3 
years who begin non-
salaried or self-employed 
work and for recipients 
of disability pensions 
(mandatory for disability 
pensions granted as of 
2003), or early retirement 
benefits. 
Exclusions: Employees 
working less than 9 hours 
a week. 
 
Insured person 
Universal basic and 
universal supplement 
pensions: None. 
ATP: Up to the 
maximum of 1080kroner 
a year for a full-time 
worker. Recipients of 
unemployment benefits, 
sickness and maternity 
benefits, and certain 
vocational training 
benefits pay double 
contributions. 
Employer 
Universal basic and 
universal supplement 
pensions: None. 
ATP: Up to a maximum 
of 2,160 kroner (for a 
full-time worker per 
employee per year) 
Government 
Universal basic and 
universal supplement 
pensions: Total cost  
ATP: Up to a maximum 
of 2,160 kroner (for a 
full-time worker) per 
year for recipients of 
social assistance 
benefits. 
Contributions are paid in 
doubled amounts for 
recipients of 
unemployment benefits, 
sickness and maternity 
benefits, and certain 
vocational training 
benefits. 
Medical benefits: 
All residents. 
Cash sickness and 
cash maternity 
benefits: Employees 
and self-employed 
persons. 
 
Insured person: None. 
Employer: The total 
cost of cash benefits for 
the first 2 weeks if the 
same employer has 
employed the employee 
for 8 weeks before the 
incapacity began. No 
contribution is made for 
medical benefits.  
Government: Local 
government meets the 
total cost of cash 
benefits from the third 
week (beginning on day 
1 if ineligible for the 2-
week benefit from 
employer) and is 
reimbursed fully by 
central government up 
to the end of the fourth 
week. After the cost is 
split equally between 
local and central 
governments.  
 
Sickness benefit: Up to 
3,760 kroner a week, 
based on the hourly wage; 
for employees, benefit is 
payable from the first day 
of illness; for the self-
employed, benefit is 
payable from the third 
week of illness (may 
insure voluntarily for the 
first 2 weeks).  
Benefits under the 
national cash benefit 
program are payable 
weekly for 52 weeks 
within any 18-month 
period. Benefit may be 
extended under specified 
circumstances. 
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STATE 
GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
FINLAND 
Current laws:  
1961 (earnings-related 
pensions); 1969 (survivor 
pensions); 1986 (partial 
pension and early pension); 
2007 (universal pensions), 
implemented in 2008; and 
2007 (disability benefit), 
implemented in 2008. 
 
Type of program: 
Universal and social 
insurance systems 
 
Universal pension 
(income-tested): All 
persons residing in 
Finland for at least 3 
years after age 16; 
persons whose 
disabilities began while 
living in Finland and 
before reaching age 19, 
regardless of the length 
of residence in Finland. 
 
Earnings-related 
pension: All employees 
aged 18 to 68, persons 
caring for a child 
younger than age 3, and 
students who received a 
degree for study periods 
up to 5 years. 
Special systems for 
maritime workers, 
public-sector employees, 
and farmers. 
Insured person 
Universal pension: none. 
Earnings-related pension: 
Employees, 4.5% of 
earnings for employees 
younger than 53; 5.7%of 
gross monthly earnings for 
employees 53 or older.  
Minimum monthly earnings 
to calculate contributions 
are €51.57. There is no 
maximum limit on the 
earnings used to calculate 
contributions.  
Employer 
Universal pension: None.  
Earnings-related pension: 
The average monthly 
contribution is 17.1%. The 
minimum monthly earnings 
used to calculate contribu-
tions are €51.57. There is 
no maximum limit on the 
earnings used to calculated 
contributions. 
Government 
Universal pension: Total 
cost of universal pensions, 
housing allowances, 
disability allowances, 
pensioner care allowances, 
survivor pensions, and war 
veterans’ benefits. 
Earnings-related pension: 
The total cost of the 
earnings-related pension for 
self-employed persons 
whose earnings are less 
than the minimum annual 
earnings used to calculate 
contributions. The 
minimum annual earnings 
used to calculate contribu-
tions for self-employed 
persons are €6,775.60. 
 
Medical benefits: 
All residents. 
Cash benefits:  
All residents. 
Insured person: 1.47% 
of earnings. Pensioners 
contribute 1.64% of 
earnings. 
Employer: 2.23% of 
payroll. 
Government: 
Remaining cost. 
Subsidies as required. 
Sickness benefit: 70% of 
daily earnings, if annual 
earnings are €32,892; 40% 
of daily earnings for 
annual earnings between 
€32.893 to €50.606 and 
25% of daily earnings for 
annual earnings of 
€50,607 or more.  
 
Sickness allowance 
(means-tested): The 
allowance is paid after 55 
days of incapacity 
provided that annual earn-
ings are less than €1,264. 
The daily benefit is 
€22.04. 
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STATE 
GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
FRANCE 
Current laws: 1945 
(nonagricultural 
employees); 1975 
(disabled persons); 1996 
(social security 
organization); 2001 
(dependency benefits); 
2003 (pension reform); 
2006 (retirement reform); 
and 2009 (combination of 
disability benefit and 
gainful activity). 
 
Type of program: Social 
insurance system and social 
assistance system.  
Social insurance: 
Employed persons in 
commerce and industry; 
housewives under certain 
conditions. 
Voluntary coverage for 
nonworking heads of 
household (old-age 
pension only), non-
covered persons who 
previously had 
mandatory coverage for 
at least 6 months, non-
employed persons caring 
for a family member with 
a disability, and French 
citizens working abroad. 
Special systems for 
agricultural, mining, 
railroad, public utility, 
and public-sector 
employees; seamen; 
nonagricultural self-
employed persons; and 
agricultural self-
employed persons. 
Social assistance: All 
elderly and dependent 
persons residing in 
France. 
Insured person: 6.55% 
of covered earnings for 
old-age benefits (up to a 
maximum) plus 0.1% of 
total earnings for 
survivor allowance.  
Employer: 8.3% of 
insurable earnings plus 
1.6% of total payroll. 
Government: Variable 
subsidies.  
Coverage 
Employed persons. 
Pensioners and some 
groups of non-
employed persons. 
Special systems for 
agricultural, clergy, 
mining, railroad, 
public utility, and 
public employees; 
seamen; non-
agricultural self-
employed; and 
agricultural self-
employed (medical 
benefits are provided 
under the general 
system for some 
groups). 
Voluntary coverage is 
possible including for 
French citizens 
working abroad. . 
Insured person: 0.75% of total 
earnings; old-age pensioners 
(low-income pensioners are 
exempt), 1.4% of old-age 
pension and 2.4% of private 
pension; unemployed, 1.7% of 
the pre-retirement allowance or 
2% of the guaranteed minimum 
income plus 1% of 
unemployment benefits and 
training allowances. Flat-rate 
contributions for students, 
young persons, and others not 
covered otherwise. 
Employer: 12.80% of total 
payroll. 
Government: Proceeds from a 
12% surcharge on automobile 
insurance premiums plus 
proceeds from an earmarked 
tax on the costs of 
pharmaceutical advertising, 
alcohol, and tobacco. Proceeds 
from a contribution levied on 
all individual income finance 
sickness insurance and family 
benefits. 
Government also provides 
funds for new hospital 
construction and part of the 
cost for certain health and 
social services. 
Government contributions also 
finance disability and survivor 
benefits 
Sickness benefit: The benefit 
is 50% of the insured’s 
average daily wage in the 3 
months before the incapacity 
began and is paid for the first 
30 days of sick leave; 
thereafter, 66.7% if the 
insured has at least three 
dependent children. The 
benefit is paid after a 3-day 
waiting period for up to 360 
days in a 3-year period. For a 
chronic or prolonged illness, 
the total payment period is 3 
years. 
The maximum monthly 
earnings used to calculate 
benefits are € 2,885. 
The minimum daily benefit is 
€ 8.64 (€ 11.51 if the insured 
has dependent children). 
The maximum daily benefit is 
€ 48.08 (€ 65.94 if the insured 
has dependent children). 
Benefits are adjusted 
according to changes in 
wages once benefits have 
been paid for more than 3 
months. 
 RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN FRANCE1768
Social insurance agencies have a statutory claim of their own against the wrongdoer who is liable in tort towards the victim to whom social insurance benefits are 
awarded. The only precondition for this subrogated right is that the benefits must be obtained as a result of the incident tortiously caused by the tortfeasor. The agency’s 
recourse claim is independent of whether the victim would sue the tortfeasor. Reimbursement of future benefits can also be claimed.   
 
                                                 
1768 See Law of 1985 expanded the provisions of law of December 27, 1973 (current articles L 376-1 and 454-1 of the Social Security Code). 
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GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
GERMANY 
Current law: 2002. 
Type of program: Social 
insurance system. 
 
Note: Following the 
unification of the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) 
and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) on October 
3, 1990, the social insurance 
system of the FRG remained 
in force and the system of 
the GDR continued to apply 
on an interim basis within 
the former GDR territory. 
The FRG and GDR systems 
were merged effective 
January 1, 1992, at which 
time Part VI of the Social 
Act came into force 
throughout the entire federal 
territory. In the summary 
that follows, particular 
provisions that were in place 
on January 1, 2002, in the 
new federal states are 
preceded by the designation 
“E”. 
Employed persons 
(including apprentices), 
certain self-employed 
persons, persons caring 
for a child under age 3, 
recipients of social 
benefits (such as 
unemployment benefits), 
conscripts or persons 
doing community service 
instead of military 
service, and voluntary 
care workers. 
Special systems for 
certain self-employed 
persons, miners, public 
employees 
(supplementary 
insurance), and farmers. 
Voluntary affiliation for 
all others aged 16 or 
older who are currently 
exempt from compulsory 
insurance, including 
German citizens residing 
abroad and resident 
foreigners. 
Insured person: 9.55% 
of earnings; none if 
earnings are below €400 
a month; reduced 
contribution is paid if 
monthly earnings are 
from €401 to €800. 
The maximum annual 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €66,000 (E–€55,800) 
if covered by the 
German Pension 
Insurance; €81,600 (E–
€68,400) if covered by 
the German Pension 
Insurance for Miners-
Railwaymen-Seamen. 
 
Employer: 9.95% of 
payroll. 
 
Government: Pays the 
cost of noninsurance-
related benefits. 
All wage and salary 
earners earning up to 
€49,950 a year; 
including the 
insured’s spouse or 
civil partner and 
children up to age 18, 
pensioners, students, 
and persons with 
disabilities under 
certain conditions; 
apprentices and 
beneficiaries of 
unemployment 
benefits. 
Special systems for 
miners, artists, public 
employees, and self-
employed farmers. 
Voluntary insurance 
in particular for 
persons whose 
compulsory insurance 
ends, subject to 
certain conditions. 
Long-term care for 
all persons covered 
by the statutory 
sickness insurance 
scheme and some 
special groups subject 
to certain conditions. 
Persons with private 
sickness insurance 
must buy equivalent 
private coverage for 
long-term care. 
Insured person: On 
average, 7.9% of 
covered earnings, 
according to fund; no 
contribution if earning 
less than €400 a month. 
Pensioners contribute on 
average 7.9% of 
pension. 
Employer: On average, 
7% of payroll, according 
to fund, and 13% for 
employees earning less 
than €400 a month. 
Government: Subsidy 
for maternity benefits; 
pensioned farmers’ 
health benefits and 
noninsurance-related 
benefits.  
Maximum earnings for 
benefit and contribution 
purposes are €45,000 a 
year. 
Sickness benefit:  
The employer 
pays 100% of the 
insured’s earnings for 
up to 6 weeks; 
thereafter,  
Sickness funds pay 70% 
of gross earnings (up to a 
maximum of 90% of net 
earnings) for up to 78 
weeks in 3 years for the 
same illness. r. 
 
RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN GERMANY 
The tort claim of an injured person against a tortfeasor passes through cession to the social insurance agency to the extent that the latter compensates the damage. The 
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claim of the German social insurance agency is established by §110-111 SGV (law on social insurance). The reimbursement is calculated not according to the damages 
caused to the victim but through standardized amounts depending on the victim’s salary.  
If tortuous liability is limited in amount the recourse right ranks below the victim’s own claim against the tortfeasor which must be satisfied first. In the field of work 
accidents where tort liability of employers, co-employees and further persons is mostly excluded, the recourse action of the social insurance agency against those 
persons is also restricted to cases where these persons acted with intent or gross negligence.  
Employers are also obliged to continue payment of full wages for 6 weeks when their employees are injured and unable to work. La recourse action lies against the 
tortfeasor and social insurance has a similar right of recourse when an employer fails to continue payment and the agency has stepped instead.  
GREECE 
Current laws: 2004 (social 
security), 2008 (social 
security reform). 
Type of program: Social 
insurance system.  
Employees in industry, 
commerce and related 
occupations, and certain 
urban self-employed 
workers. 
 
Exclusions: Employed 
and self-employed 
persons covered by 
approved occupational 
and public-sector funds 
providing equivalent 
benefits. 
Voluntary coverage is 
possible, subject to 
conditions. 
Special systems for 
agricultural workers, 
public-sector employees, 
doctors and dentists, 
architects, notaries, 
commercial motor 
vehicle operators, 
shipping agents, 
tradesmen, and 
craftsmen. 
Insured person: 6.67% 
of earnings; 8.87% if in 
arduous or unhealthy 
employment. 
Employer: 13.33% of 
payroll; 14.73% if in 
arduous or unhealthy 
employment. 
Government: 10% of 
annual payroll as an 
employer and a 
guaranteed annual state. 
Employees in 
industry, commerce 
and related 
occupations, and 
certain urban self-
employed workers 
are covered. 
Pensioners are also 
covered for medical 
benefits.  
 
Exclusions: 
Employed and self-
employed persons 
covered by approved 
occupational and 
public sector funds 
providing equivalent 
benefits. 
Special systems for 
agricultural workers, 
public-sector 
employees, doctors 
and dentists, 
architects, notaries, 
commercial motor 
vehicle operators, 
shipping agents, 
trades- men, and 
craftsmen. 
Insured person: 0.4% 
of covered monthly 
earnings (cash benefits) 
and 2.15% of covered 
monthly earnings 
(medical benefits). 
Pensioners contribute 
4% of the monthly 
pension. 
Employer: 0.8% of 
covered monthly payroll 
(cash benefits) and 4.3% 
of covered monthly 
payroll (medical 
benefits). 
There are no minimum 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions.  
Government: 
Guaranteed annual state 
subsidy.  
Cash sickness benefit:  
The insured must have 
at least 120 days of 
contributions (100 if 
working in 
construction) in the 
calendar year before the 
incapacity began or 100 
days of contributions in 
the last 15 months 
excluding the last 
quarter. The benefit is 
paid for 182 days to 
720 days, according to 
the insured’s 
contribution period. 
 RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN GREECE 
The right of recourse of Greek social insurance agencies against the liable tortfeasor is for all the benefits the agency has granted to the victim of the tort. In cases 
concerning accidents at work the recourse action against the employer, co-employer ….etc. is restricted to situations where these persons acted with intent.   
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IRELAND 
Current law: 2005 (social 
welfare). 
Type of program: Dual 
social insurance and social 
assistance (means-tested) 
system.  
Employed persons aged 
16 to 65 with €38 or 
more in weekly covered 
earnings. 
Self-employed persons 
(annual earnings €3,174 
or over and covered for 
contributory old-age and 
survivor benefits). 
Excludes part-time 
employees earning less 
than €38 a week, public 
servants who were 
permanent and 
pensionable before April 
6, 1995, and casual 
domestic workers.  
Insured person:  
With weekly earnings of 
€352 or less, none; with 
weekly earnings over 
€352, none for the first 
€127 of covered weekly 
earnings and 4% of 
covered weekly earnings 
from €128 to €75,036 
and 5% of earnings over 
€75,036. 
The insured’s 
contributions also pay 
for sickness and 
maternity, medical, work 
injury, unemployment, 
and adop- tion benefits. 
If weekly earnings are 
greater than €500, the 
insured pays an 
additional 4% of weekly 
earnings for medical 
benefits; the contribution 
is waived if the insured 
has a means-tested 
medical card or receives 
specified benefits or 
allowances. 
Self-employed person: 
With an annual income 
of €26,000 or less, 3% of 
covered income; with an 
annual income over 
€26,000, 7% of covered 
income, of which the 
self-employed person 
pays 4% of covered 
income for medical 
benefits. 
Employer:  
For employees with 
Cash benefits: 
Employees under age 
66. Excludes part-
time employees 
earning less than €38 
per week, self-
employed (covered 
for maternity only), 
public servants who 
were permanent and 
eligible for pension 
before April 6, 1995, 
and casual domestic 
workers. 
Medical services: 
All residents. 
 
Government: Medical 
care, total cost for low-
income residents; partial 
cost for remainder of 
population. 
Sickness benefit 
(disability benefit): Up to 
€196 a week, depending 
on weekly income. 
Payable after a 3-day 
waiting period for up to 52 
weeks, or longer if 
contribution weeks total 
260 or more.  
 
Dependent supplement: 
Up to €130.1 a week for 
qualified adult; €29.80 a 
week for each dependent 
child) or €14.90 if the 
qualified adult supplement 
is not paid. 
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weekly earnings of €356 
or less, 8.5% of gross 
wages; for employees 
with weekly earn- ings 
greater than €356, 
10.75% of gross wages. 
There are no maximum 
earnings used to 
calculate the employer’s 
contributions. 
Government: Any 
deficit in the social 
insurance fund and the 
total cost of means-
tested allowances. 
ITALY  
Current laws: 2009. 
Type of program: National 
defined contribution (NDC) 
and social insurance system. 
Employed persons 
(including domestic 
employees). 
Special systems for 
public-sector workers 
and the self-employed. 
 
Insured person: 9.19% 
of gross earnings. 
Employer: 23.81% of 
payroll. (A lower 
contribution rate is paid 
by some employers, 
including employers in 
certain economically 
depressed areas.) 
Government: Full cost 
of income-tested 
allowances and any 
overall deficit. 
The minimum daily 
earnings used to 
calculate workers’ 
contributions in industry 
are €43.79 or the 
minimum daily wage, 
whichever is greater.  
Sickness benefit: 
Employed persons 
and contract workers. 
Medical benefits: 
All residents. 
 
Insured person: None. 
Employer: 2.68% of 
gross earnings for 
industrial blue-collar 
workers; 0.46% of gross 
earnings for industrial 
white-collar workers; 
2.68% of gross earnings 
for employees in 
commerce and the 
service sector. Variable 
contributions are made 
for some categories of 
contract workers. 
Government: The total 
cost of maternity 
benefits for certain 
categories of workers, 
including home based, 
agricultural, and 
household workers. 
50% of the insured’s 
average daily earnings is 
paid for the first 20 days 
of incapacity; thereafter, 
66.6%. The benefit is paid 
after a 3-day waiting 
period for up to 180 days 
a year; may be extended in 
special cases. For contract 
workers, the daily benefit 
is paid for up to 180 days 
of hospitalization, and the 
benefit varies according 
to the number of 
contributions made in the 
12 months before 
hospitalization. The daily 
benefit may be paid under 
certain exceptions for 
sicknesses not requiring 
hospitalization, for up to 
61 days a year. 
 RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN ITALY 
In cases where the liable subject is neither identified nor identifiable and hence a tort claim is not available, social insurance replaces completely tort law in 
compensating the injured victim.  
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In other cases, when social insurance compensates an injured victim, social insurance agencies have a right of recourse against the liable tortfeasor under very restricted 
circumstances, while in others it is excluded. In some cases such as crime victims of victims of terrorism the social insurance agency might seek reimbursement from the 
tortfeasor. In the field of accidents in the work-place the social insurance recourse is restricted to cases where the employer or co-employer has been sentenced and held 
liable by a criminal court. 
LUXEMBURG 
Current law: 1987 (unified 
pension insurance), 1989 
(pension scheme), 1998 
(special schemes), and 2000 
(pension scheme). 
Type of program: Social 
insurance system. 
All economically active 
persons in the private and 
public sectors including 
self-employed persons.  
General system for the 
private sector.  
Special systems for 
railway and public 
employees who entered 
employment before 
January 1, 1999. 
Insured person: 8% of 
earnings. 
Employer: 8% of 
covered payroll. 
Government: 8% of 
covered earnings. 
The minimum amount 
for contribution and 
benefit calculation 
purposes is 100% of the 
social minimum wage 
(€1,682.76 per month); 
the maximum amount is 
five times the social 
minimum wage.  
All private- and 
public-sector 
employees and social 
insurance 
beneficiaries. Self-
employed persons, 
artists, and farmers 
are covered for 
medical and 
attendance benefits. 
Voluntary coverage 
for those without 
compulsory coverage. 
Special systems for 
self-employed 
persons, artists, and 
farmers (cash 
benefits). 
Insured person:  
Cash benefits: 0.25% of 
covered earnings. 
Medical benefits: 2.7% 
of covered earnings. 
Employer:  
Cash benefits: 0.25% of 
covered payroll. 
Medical benefits: 2.7% 
of covered payroll. 
Government:  
Cash benefits: A 
subsidy of 29.5% of 
contributions covering 
cash benefits and the 
total cost of maternity 
allowances. 
Medical benefits: A 
subsidy of 37% of 
contributions covering 
health care benefits. 
Cash sickness benefit: 
100% of earnings, payable 
from the first day of 
incapacity for up to 52 
weeks in a 104 week 
period (employer 
generally pays the first 13 
weeks of benefits). 
THE 
NETHERLANDS 
Current laws: 1957 (old-
age pension), 1959 (survivor 
pension), 1966 (disability 
pension for employed 
persons), 1998 (disability 
pension for self-employed 
workers), and 1998 
(disability assistance for 
handicapped young persons) 
and 2006 (disability pension 
for employed persons). 
Type of program: Social 
insurance system. 
 
Old-age and survivor 
pensions: All residents. 
Disability pension: 
Employed workers, 
persons receiving 
benefits since before 
2006, persons disabled 
since childhood and 
students residing in the 
Netherlands.  
Insured person: 
17.90% of income for 
the old-age pension, 
1.1% for the survivor 
pension.  
The maximum annual 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €32,738. 
Employer: 5.7% of 
payroll, plus a variable 
rate contribution for 
persons receiving 
disability benefits since 
before 2006. 
Government: A subsidy 
Medical benefits: 
All persons residing 
in the Netherlands 
and persons who 
reside outside the 
Netherlands but 
conduct their 
professional activities 
in the Netherlands. 
Cash benefits:  
Coverage is mostly 
through private 
providers. (Under the 
Civil Code, 
employers must pay 
70% of wages during 
Insured person: Flat-
rate contribution set by 
the sickness fund, 
earnings up to €33,189; 
12.15% of annual 
earnings up to €32,738 
for exceptional medical 
expenses insurance. 
Employer: 7.05% of 
covered payroll for 
medical benefits. 
The maximum annual 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €33,189 
Government: Annually 
Sickness benefit:  
70% of earnings up to the 
daily maximum earnings 
up to €186.65 a day, and 
is paid for up to 
104 weeks; may be 
extended for an additional 
52 weeks.  
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to increase all benefits 
up to the applicable 
social minimum; the cost 
of pensions for persons 
disabled since childhood 
and students. 
sick leave periods for 
up to 104 weeks.) 
Social insurance 
covers workers who 
have no employer or 
no longer have an 
employer (and, in a 
few special circum-
stances, wage earners 
and salaried 
employees), 
including employees 
who have lost their 
jobs in the first 
2 years of incapacity, 
incapacitated 
unemployed persons, 
temporary workers on 
sick leave without a 
permanent contract, 
the voluntarily 
insured, apprentices, 
organ donors, 
vocationally 
rehabilitated persons, 
and women 
incapacitated due to 
pregnancy or 
childbirth. 
(Entrepreneurs and 
directors with a major 
shareholding in a 
company are 
excluded.) 
determined contribution 
toward the financing of 
medical benefits. 
 RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Most social insurance agencies have a right of recourse against the tortfeasor. Has adopted the traditional recourse solution regulated in (art 52aZw Sickness benefits act; 
art 6:107a BW Civil code and art 83b ZfW Public Health insurance act).  Even though this right of recourse is not a subrogation right by itself, it takes the form and has 
the same effects than a subrogation right given that social insurance agencies might exercise it under the same conditions that would apply to a tort claim in tort pursued 
by the injured victim herself. 
If the injured party was contributorily negligent the recourse claim is reduced in proportion to the contribution of the injured party to the accident or his subsequent 
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injuries.  
This right of recourse might not be exercised against employers and colleagues except when they intentionally or consciously injure victims or the injuries are caused by 
the tortfeasor’s gross negligence. Family members are also excluded. 
The law is silent regarding priority but consensus and practice seem to agree that the victim’s claim has priority over the agency’s recourse right.  
 
The tort claim of the injured person in most cases passes on to the social insurance agency from which the victim obtains benefits for the tortuous damage. Employers 
and co-employees are not subjected to recourse actions unless they have caused damage to another employee either to recourse actions unless they have caused damage 
to another employee either with intent or consciously and with gross negligence. However, in 1992 legislation excluded most recourse actions where liability of the 
tortfeasor is only founded in strict liability the right of recourse presupposes negligence o the part of the tortfeasor. 
PORTUGAL 
Current laws: 1980 
(noncontributory scheme), 
2007 (general scheme), 2007 
(social security), and 2009 
(disability). 
 
Type of program: Social 
insurance and social 
assistance program. 
 
 
Social insurance: 
Employed persons and 
self-employed persons 
with gross annual income 
greater than 6 times the 
social benefit rate. 
Voluntary coverage for 
self-employed persons 
with gross annual income 
up to 6 times the value of 
the social benefit rate and 
for persons not covered 
by the contributory 
program. 
The social benefit rate is 
€419.22 a month. 
Special systems for 
miners, longshoremen, 
fishermen, merchant 
seamen, civil aviation 
workers, air traffic 
controllers, and dancers. 
(Special systems are 
being gradually unified 
with the general system.) 
Social assistance: 
Persons not covered 
under a contributory 
program. 
Insured person: 11% of 
earnings. Of the total 
34.75% of gross 
earnings contributed by 
the insured person and 
employer, 16.01% 
finances old-age ben-
efits, 3.42% finances 
disability benefits, and 
3.67% finances survivor 
benefits. 
The insured’s 
contributions also 
finance sickness and 
maternity, occupational 
disease, unemployment, 
and family benefits. 
Employer: 23.75% of 
payroll. Of the total 
34.75% of payroll 
contributed by the 
insured person and 
employer, 16.01% 
finances old-age 
benefits, 3.42% finances 
disability benefits, 
3.67% finances survivor 
benefits. 
The employer’s 
contributions also 
finance sickness and 
maternity, occupational 
Medical benefits:  
 
All Portuguese 
citizens; foreign 
citizens residing in 
Portugal whose home 
country has a 
reciprocal agreement 
with Portugal. 
Cash sickness 
benefits: 
Employed persons. 
Voluntary coverage 
for self-employed 
persons and certain 
categories of persons 
not covered by any 
other contributory 
program. 
Insured person: Of the 
total 34.75% of gross 
earnings contributed by 
the insured person and 
the employer under Old 
Age, disability, and 
survivors, 3.05% of 
gross earnings finances 
sickness benefits and 
0.73% finances 
maternity benefits. 
Employer: Of the total 
34.75% of payroll 
contributed by the 
insured person and the 
employer under Old 
Age, Disability, and 
Survivors, 3.05% 
finances sickness 
benefits and 0.73% 
finances maternity 
benefits. 
Government: The cost 
of cash benefits for 
social assistance 
recipients; subsidizes 
medical benefits. 
Sickness benefit: 65% of 
the insured’s average daily 
earnings are paid for the 
first 90 days and 70% 
from the 91st up to the 
365th day; thereafter, 
75%. For cases of 
tuberculosis, 80% of the 
insured’s average daily 
earnings are paid if the 
insured has at least 
two dependents; 100% if 
there are three of more 
dependents. The benefit is 
paid after a 3-day waiting 
period (30 days for self-
employed persons); the 
waiting period is waived 
in cases of hospitalization 
or tuberculosis or during 
the postpartum period. 
The benefit is paid for up 
to 1,095 days (365 days 
for self-employed 
persons); no limit for 
cases of tuberculosis. 
Average daily earnings are 
based on the insured’s 
earnings in the 6 months 
prior to the last 2 months 
before the incapacity 
began. 
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disease, unemployment, 
and family benefits. 
Government: Subsidy 
for the social pension. 
The minimum sickness 
benefit is either 30% of 
the social benefit rate or 
the average daily earnings 
used for cash sickness 
benefit calculation, 
whichever is less. 
The social benefit rate is 
€419.22 a month. 
SPAIN 
Current law: 1994. 
Type of program: Social 
insurance system. 
 
Employees in industry 
and services (classified 
according to 11 
occupational classes).  
Voluntary coverage is 
not possible.  
Special systems for 
agricultural workers and 
small farmers, domestic 
servants, self-employed, 
seamen, and coal miners. 
Insured person: 4.7% 
of covered earnings. 
The insured’s 
contributions also 
finance sickness, mater-
nity, paternity, and work 
injury benefits. 
The minimum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €738.85; the 
minimum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions are €24.27. 
The maximum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €3,198; the 
maximum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions for certain 
occupational classes are 
€106.6. 
Employer: 23.6% of 
covered earnings. The 
employer’s contributions 
also finance sickness, 
maternity, paternity, and 
work injury benefits. 
The minimum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
Employed persons 
and certain self-
employed persons. 
(Insured persons who 
leave covered 
employment may 
sign a special 
agreement to 
continue coverage.) 
Pensioners are 
covered for medical 
benefits. 
Voluntary coverage 
for temporary 
disability is possible 
for agricultural 
workers. 
Special systems for 
public-sector 
employees, armed 
forces personnel, 
certain self-employed 
persons, agricultural 
workers and small 
farmers, household 
workers, seamen, and 
coal miners. 
Insured person: 4.7% 
of covered earnings. The 
insured’s contributions 
also finance sickness, 
maternity, paternity, and 
work injury benefits. 
The minimum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €738.85; the 
minimum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions are 
€24.27. The maximum 
monthly earnings used 
to calculate contri-
butions are €3,198; the 
maximum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions for certain 
occupational classes are 
€106.6. 
Employer: 23.6% of 
covered earnings. The 
employer’s 
contributions also 
finance sickness, mater-
nity, paternity, and work 
injury benefits. 
The minimum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
Sickness benefit: The 
insured must have at least 
180 days of contributions 
in the last 5 years. 
There is no minimum 
contribution period for 
non-work-related 
accidents.  
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are €738.85; the 
minimum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions are €24.27. 
The maximum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €3,198; the 
maximum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions for certain 
occupational classes are 
€106.6. 
Government: Annual 
subsidy.  
are €738.85; the 
minimum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions are 
€24.27. 
The maximum monthly 
earnings used to 
calculate contributions 
are €3,198; the 
maximum daily earnings 
used to calculate 
contributions for certain 
occupational classes are 
€106.6. 
Government: Annual 
subsidy.  
 RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN SPAIN 
Based on article 127.3 of the Law 1/1994 on Social insurance, the Spanish social insurance agency which has borne the injured person’s medical expenses can recover 
these costs from the tortfeasor who is liable for the injury under civil law. Other heads of damages cannot be recovered.  
Spanish court practice is divided on the question whether social insurance benefits should be taken into account for the computation of the amount of damages is liable 
for. Section 1st and 3rd of the Spanish Supreme Court apply the collateral source rule while Section 4th of the Spanish Supreme Court applies the collateral benefit offset. 
SWEDEN 
Current laws: 1962, 1998 
(implemented in 1999), 
2000; and 2008.  
Type of program:  
Universal and social 
insurance system (old 
system) and universal, 
notional defined contribution 
(NDC), and mandatory 
individual accounts system 
(new system). 
Earnings-related 
pension (old system): 
All employees and self-
employed persons 
43,300 kronor a year. 
There is a gradual 
transition from the old to 
the new system for 
persons born 
between 1938 and 1953. 
Earnings-related 
pension (new system):  
All employed and self-
employed persons born 
in 1954 or later and earn-
ing more than 
17,935 kronor a year. 
Premium pension (new 
Insured person: 7% of 
assessable income; no 
contribution for the 
survivor pension. 
The maximum annual 
income used to calculate 
contributions is 
412,377 kronor. 
In addition, insured 
persons covered by the 
new system pay 
administrative fees for 
the premium pension (an 
average of 0.5% of 
assets in 2009). 
Employer:  
10.21% of payroll for 
old-age insurance plus 
Cash benefits: 
Gainfully occupied 
persons earning 
10.176 kronor a year 
or more. 
Medical benefits: 
All residents in 
Sweden. 
 
Insured person  
Cash benefits: none 
Medical benefits: none.  
Employer 
Cash benefits: 8.645% 
of payroll plus 2.2% for 
parents’ cash benefits 
(parental insurance). 
Medical care: None. 
Government 
Cash benefits: None. 
Medical care: Total cost 
met by regional 
councils. 
 
Sickness benefit: The 
insured’s annual income 
from employment exceeds 
10,176 kronor; or 
involuntarily unemployed 
and registered with the 
employment service. 
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system): All employed 
and self-employed 
persons earning more 
than 17,935 kronor a 
year. 
Guarantee pension: All 
residents in Sweden. 
1.7% of payroll for the 
survivor pension. 
Of the total 
contributions, 16% 
finances the earnings-
related component and 
2.5% finances the 
premium pension 
component. 
Government: The total 
cost of the guarantee 
pension (new system) 
and permanent disability 
benefits. The 
government pays 
earnings-related 
contributions for central 
government civil 
servants.  
 
RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN SWEDEN 
Since 1976, a recourse action from social insurance agencies against a liable tortfeasor is prohibited. This is the only European country where the social insurance 
agency has no recourse right with respect to the benefits granted to the victim of a liable tortfeasor. This solution if accompanied by a reduction of tort damages in the 
amount of such benefits.  
In 1999, a Parliamentary Committee set up by the government aimed at revisit this situation and consider the introduction of the recourse right. The work was presented 
in January 2002 but rejected the right of recourse based on solidarity and in considering that all socially should bear these damage costs. Further, the exclusion of 
recourse rights was justified on avoiding transaction costs. It seems to be a political question.  
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Current laws: 1992 
(consolidated legislation), 
1995 (pensions), 1999 
(welfare reform and 
pensions), 2000 (child 
support, pensions and social 
security), 2002 (pension 
credit), 2004 (pensions), and 
2007 (pensions). 
Type of program: Dual 
social insurance and social 
assistance system.  
Contributory benefits: 
Employed persons 
aged 16 to 65 (men) or 
aged 16 to 60 (women) 
with weekly earnings of 
£97 to £844 (April 2010). 
Self-employed persons 
aged 16 to 65 (men) or 
aged 16 to 60 (women) 
with annual income of at 
least £5,075 are covered 
for all benefits except the 
state second pension, 
Insured person:  
11% of weekly earnings 
from £110 to £844 
(April 2010); certain 
married women and 
widows contribute 
4.85% of weekly 
earnings from £110 to 
£844 plus 1% of weekly 
earnings greater than 
£844. 
Voluntary contributors 
pay a flat-rate of £12.05 
Statutory sick pay: 
Paid by the employer 
to employees with 
average weekly 
earnings of at least 
£97 (April 2010). 
Employment and 
support allowance: 
All employed and 
self-employed who 
are not eligible for 
statutory sick pay; 
unemployed and non-
Insured person: For 
employment and support 
allowance (incapacity 
benefit) and maternity 
allowance, see source of 
funds under Old Age, 
Disability, and 
Survivors. 
Employer: for 
employment and support 
allowance (incapacity 
benefit) and maternity 
allowance, see source of 
Statutory sick pay: 
£79.15 a week 
(April 2010) is paid for up 
to 28 weeks of incapacity 
after a 3-day waiting 
period. 
Employment and 
support allowance: 
£65.45 a week 
(April 2010) is paid after a 
3-day waiting period for 
13 weeks while capacity 
for work is assessed. After 
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GENERAL SOCIAL INSURANCE SYSTEM MEDICAL CARE 
Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
work injury benefits, and 
contributory job seeker’s 
allowance. 
Voluntary contributors 
are covered for the basic 
state retirement pension 
and survivor benefits 
only. 
Employment and 
support allowance 
(incapacity benefit): All 
employed and self-
employed who are not 
eligible for statutory sick 
pay; unemployed and 
non-employed persons 
who satisfy contribution 
conditions. 
Noncontributory 
benefits: All persons 
residing in the United 
Kingdom.  
a week. 
From the insured’s 
contributions, 2.05% on 
earnings from £110 to 
£844 a week and 1% 
over £844 is allocated to 
the National Health 
Service for medical 
benefits. The insured’s 
contributions also 
finance sickness and 
maternity benefits, work 
injury benefits, and 
unemployment benefits. 
Employer: 12.8% of 
each employee’s 
earnings greater than 
£110 a week 
(April 2010). 
1.9% of the employer’s 
contribution is allocated 
to the National Health 
Service for medical 
benefits. The employer’s 
contributions also 
finance sickness and 
maternity benefits, work 
injury benefits, and 
unemployment benefits. 
Government: The total 
cost of means-tested 
allowances and other 
noncontributory 
benefits. Also pays a 
treasury grant to 
contributory programs 
for any deficit. 
employed persons 
who satisfy contri-
bution conditions. 
Statutory sick pay: 
Paid by employer to 
employees with 
average earnings of 
£97 or more a week 
(April 2010).  
Medical care: All 
residents, irrespective 
of nationality, 
payment of 
contributions or 
income tax. 
 
funds under Old Age, 
Disability, and 
Survivors. The total cost 
of statutory sick pay (in 
certain cases, part of the 
cost) and 8% of 
statutory maternity and 
paternity pay. 
Government: 92% of 
statutory maternity pay 
(100% in the case of 
some small employers); 
small portion of 
statutory sick pay; most 
of medical care 
(National Health 
Service). Total cost of 
means-tested 
allowances. 
Medical care: Funded 
mainly from general 
taxation. 
 
the assessment, £65.45 a 
week plus £31.40 a week 
(if the disability has a 
severe effect on the ability 
to work) or £25.95 a week 
(if there is capacity for 
limited work) is paid 
(April 2010). 
 
RIGHT OF RECOURSE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 The state social insurance agencies had no right of recourse until 1989. Since then, the Compensatory Recovery Unit was established with the purpose to claw back 
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Regulatory Framework Coverage Source of Funds Coverage Source of Funds Medical  Benefits 
those benefits whenever a tortfeasor is liable for the damage of the person receiving insurance benefits. Nevertheless recourse actions of the Compensation Recovery 
Unit are an exception.  This is achieved through a duty to inquire into the benefits which have been paid to the victim. This duty is placed on the “compensator” either 
the tortfeasor or an insurer who is in turn obliged to repay all benefits to the Unit and compensate the victim for the remaining loss.  
There are also limitations in the time and substance on the recoverable benefits.  
However, it is understood that the impact of this recourse is not only on the value of the tort claim but also on the speed and method tort claims are handled since it gives 
a string incentive to settle tort claims rapidly.  
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 Using European product liability as its focus, this thesis reaches beyond liability 
in order to address the context of product liability regulation, its nature, its interaction 
with other regulatory mechanisms and the effects of its interaction with alternative 
compensation mechanisms.   
The original question that sparked this thesis was why Europe's product liability 
directive has ended up having such different effects than the U.S. law on which it was 
modeled, section 402A of the Restatement Second of Torts. Many and different factors 
can help to explain how similar regulations may lead to different results depending on 
their contexts. In this thesis, we have considered a number of arguments for the different 
results achieved by the European product liability directive and the U.S. Restatement. 
Chapter 2 extensively analyzed and discussed the European product liability 
directive. Being part of European product regulation, the product liability directive 
introduced a strict product liability regime for the first time in Europe. Framed in a 
context where the functioning of the European internal market was a priority, the 
authorities of the different member states represented a threat to the internal market 
because they had other priorities and were tempted to introduce regulations or protective 
measures in favor of their own companies and domestic markets. In light of the different 
interests of some member states and of European authorities, the European Commission 
viewed the harmonization of product liability as a need.  The product liability directive 
was a way for the European Commission to respond to the goal of ensuring the 
functioning of the European internal common market while also harmonizing the rights 
of injured victims throughout the European member states.  
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 The product liability directive aimed to facilitate the tort claims of people who 
had been injured by products. Yet, although the directive provided injured victims with a 
previously unavailable legal claim or, at least, a legal claim with a lower burden of proof 
than they previously faced, it does not appear to have been relied on to a large extent by 
these victims. Despite being entitled to seek redress through litigation based on a strict 
product liability claim, injured victims still face challenges that affect their incentives for 
doing so and often lead them to avoid litigation. 
 This thesis offers four major factors that may explain the reluctance of European 
product victims to seek redress through the court system: the rules of civil procedure in 
force in most European member states, the abstract wording and content of the product 
liability directive, which tends towards negligence standards even while holding out strict 
liability on its face, the effects of broad ex ante product safety regulations and the 
interaction of these regulations with product liability, and finally, the role of alternative 
compensation systems such as social insurance which plays such an important role in the 
model of economic and social welfare state of most European member states. 
Chapter 3 presented the major differences between the rules of civil procedure in 
force in the different member states and those in force in the United States. It argued that 
the European procedural rules have functioned as barriers to product liability claims for 
the victims of product-related accidents. Procedural rules often act to dissuade plaintiffs 
from pursuing tort claims generally. They are of special importance in product liability 
cases where victims often suffer damages of little value that are not worth pursuing in 
court when the litigation process is lengthy, costly and uncertain. The product liability 
directive's approach to facilitating product liability claims did not include adjustments of 
procedural rules to give injured victims easier access to courts. Even though access to 
courts is one of the concerns of the European Commission, the issue falls within the 
internal jurisdiction of the states and not within the jurisdiction of European authorities. 
This remains a pending issue given that the legislatures of the different member states 
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have not introduced any regulations that might help reduce the procedural barriers faced 
by the victims of product-related accidents in exercising their rights in court.  
 A second element that affects the victims’ incentives to bring their product 
liability claims in Europe is the content of the product liability directive itself. Despite the 
European Commission’s intent to introduce strict product liability in Europe, the product 
liability directive includes various provisions that function as escape valves from the 
strict liability regime and introduce negligence considerations that significantly 
undermine its strictness and effectiveness. Chapter 4 discussed these valves, highlighting 
the ways in which they are echo negligence standards. These negligence-based elements 
may be the result of the difficult negotiation process between the member states and 
European authorities when drafting the final text of the product liability directive. These 
negotiations resulted in a more diluted liability regime than the one initially intended by 
the European Commission in the text of the directive. The distance between the goals of 
the European Commission and the content of the regulatory instruments adopted is a 
common phenomenon in the European harmonization processes. Initial goals of the 
European Commission often are diluted during the negotiation process among the 
different member states. The difficult drafting process of the product liability directive, 
with a European Commission aiming at harmonizing product liability by making product 
manufacturers liable for the harm caused by defective products regardless of care and 
with member states fearing the consequences that such liability regime would have for 
their domestic industries, resulted in the introduction of a defectiveness test -- the 
consumer expectation test -- and of some optional provisions such as the development 
risk defense that introduce considerations of care and thus of negligence when 
establishing both defect and knowledge of product risks.  
 In addition to the procedural rules and the provisions included in the product 
liability directive, the regulatory context in which the directive is framed is of crucial 
importance. Chapters 5 and 6 looked beyond product liability and focused on the 
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regulatory context, with special attention to the existence, application and interaction 
with the broad ex ante safety regulation in force in Europe. Product regulation in Europe 
has been designed and adopted in a non-systematic way, which has caused the regime to 
be inconsistent at times. While product liability is part of the European common internal 
market regulation, ex ante safety regulation is part of the European consumer protection 
regulation that aims to ensure a high level of consumer protection across the European 
market.  These two regulatory bodies, with different goals and different natures, directly 
impact product manufacturers’ decisions about investing in care, and the effects of each 
regulatory body sometimes dilute the effects of the other.  
  Product manufacturers must comply with broad ex ante safety regulations before 
introducing products into the European market. European product safety regulation mixes 
mandatory as well as voluntary safety requirements that have direct effects on 
manufacturers’ investments in care and on their potential exposure to subsequent liability 
under tort. Chapter 6 focused on the joint use of product safety and product liability laws 
in Europe. This chapter discussed the implications of the joint use of these regulations 
and of their interaction through the compliance defense. Today, the compliance defense 
included in the product liability directive is significantly restricted. Thus, product 
manufacturers are generally subject to ex ante safety regulations, which require a certain 
level of product safety, but also are subject to product liability in case they manufacture 
defective products that caused harm to a consumer or user. The current interaction 
between ex ante product safety and ex post product liability results in potential tortfeasors 
over-investing in care. This is because potential tortfeasors must meet the safety 
requirements established by ex ante product safety while at the same time being exposed 
to strict product liability and thus having to perform cost-benefit analyses to determine 
the optimal investment in care under that rule. Hence, the current interaction between 
product safety and product liability results in an inefficient outcome as compared to the 
outcome of each regulatory mechanism alone. Reconsidering the interaction and structure 
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of these two regulatory bodies as well as the scope of the compliance defense could 
enhance the performance of the overall system and could result in more efficient 
investments in care and hence in better accident deterrence.   
An additional major goal of the product liability directive was to facilitate 
victim’s compensation. As explained in chapters 2 and 6, the introduction of strict 
product liability was often presented as a way to lower plaintiffs' burdens of proof in 
product liability litigation, making it easier for them to obtain compensation. This 
argument relied on the assumption that victims would seek redress through tort for the 
harm suffered. But in light of the relatively low level of product liability litigation, it does 
not seem that victims of product-related accidents in Europe have turned to the court 
systems of the different member states in order to seek redress for the accidents they 
suffered.  
As explained in Chapter 2, the product liability directive does not entitle to 
compensation for all types of injuries or all amounts of harm suffered by injured victims. 
Instead, it includes a mandatory minimum damage threshold and an optional damage cap. 
Further, compensation under tort is framed within different alternative compensation 
mechanisms available to victims of product-related accidents.  
Chapter 7 addressed the compensation function of tort law and its interaction with 
alternative compensation sources and presented, from theoretical and economic 
perspectives, the main compensation mechanisms available, their role, their coordination 
-- or absence of coordination -- and the resulting efficiency of the system.  
There are three major compensation mechanisms for victims of product-related 
accidents in Europe: the tort system -- through the product liability directive and its 
transposition laws -- private insurance, and public insurance. If these different 
compensation systems were simultaneously applied, victims could be over-compensated 
and tortfeasors would be over-deterred. Hence, the outcome would be significantly 
inefficient. In order to avoid such an inefficient situation, there are three main systems 
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available for coordinating the different alternative compensation mechanisms: a right of 
reimbursement by the collateral source, a collateral source rule, and a collateral benefit 
offset rule. Each of these mechanisms has advantages and disadvantages when analyzed 
from the perspective of compensating victims and creating efficient incentives for 
potential tortfeasors to invest in care. The most common coordination system in place in 
the different member states is a right of reimbursement, often in the form of a subrogation 
right, by the collateral source against the tortfeasor for benefits already paid to the injured 
victim.  
 Evidence from private insurance companies suggests that liability insurance 
premiums have not increased after the introduction of the product liability directive and 
its subsequent transposition laws. Thus, the compensation system that seems to bear most 
of the costs of victims of product-related accidents seems to be social insurance. As 
shown in Chapter 7, the existence and important role of European welfare systems 
suggests that the low level of product liability litigation in Europe is due to the role of 
collateral sources, such as public social insurance, in compensating victims of product 
accidents.  
European product liability would create better incentives for deterrence to 
tortfeasors if social insurance agencies would seek reimbursement for the benefits paid to 
injured victims or if victims would have effective tools -- both procedural as well as 
substantive -- to facilitate their tort claims. But neither social insurance agencies nor 
victims seem to be pursuing such claims. Under the current structure the costs of product-
related accidents become hidden costs born by social insurance systems. 
This dislocation of costs has three major effects: First, the social insurance system 
bears costs that should be privately born by the tortfeasors responsible for causing them. 
Second, victims are under-compensated since social insurance benefits do not provide 
full compensation as tort would. Finally, product manufacturers are under-deterred since 
they do not internalize the costs of the accidents they cause. The current structure should 
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be revised in order to better compensate victims, create efficient incentives for tortfeasors 
and protect social insurance systems from a burden they should not bear. Social insurance 
agencies should use new technologies and keep records of injuries and benefits paid in 
order improve their abilities to exercise reimbursement rights.  
 Today, social insurance systems and the entire European welfare state are 
struggling in the face of budget cuts and increasing questions about their future viability. 
Revising and restructuring the allocation of costs of product-related accidents could help 
these systems conserve economic resources. Most importantly, this could also help 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the product liability system as a whole.   
 European product liability faces many challenges in ensuring victims’ access to 
justice from procedural and substantive perspectives, achieving efficient interaction with 
other product regulations such as ex ante safety regulation, and placing the burden of the 
costs of product-related accidents on the parties who should bear them instead on the 
public insurance system. This arises as an important task when considering the current 
economic situation and the step back that the different welfare systems are undergoing 
today.  
 The product liability directive and its subsequent transposition laws were adopted 
and introduced over twenty years ago. It is time to reconsider the private or public nature 
of the regime, the incentives that it generates for the different parties involved and its 
overall performance. The current structure presents enough distortions to justify 
revisiting the overall model so that its goals can be achieved and its effectiveness 
maximized. 
  440 
REFERENCES  
 
Abraham, Kenneth S., Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward A 
New Vision of Compensation for Illness And Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75 (1993)  
 
Alpa, Guido, Manufacturer, Importer and Supplier Liability in Italy Before and After the 
Implementation of the E.E.C. Directive on Damages for Defective Products, 6 & 7 Tul. 
Civ. L.F. 233 (1991-92).  
 
Ann, Christoph, Innovators In The Crossfire: A Policy Sketch For Unknowable Risks In 
European And United States Product Liability Law, 10 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 173 (1995). 
 
Arrow, Kenneth J., Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, American 
Economic Review, 941-973 (1963). 
 
Artigot-Golobardes, Mireia and Gómez-Pomar, Fernando, Contributory and comparative 
negligence in the law and economics literature, 46-79 in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS: TORTS (Michael Faure, ed.), Edward Elgar (2009). 
 
Atiyah, Patrick S., Tort law and the alternatives: some Anglo-American comparisons, 6 
Duke Law Journal 1002–1044 (1987)  
 
Ausness, Richard C., The case for a “strong” regulatory compliance defense, 55 
Maryland Law Review 1210 (1996). 
 
Awad, Abed, The concept of defect in American and English products liability discourse: 
despite strict liability linguistics, negligence is back with a vengeance!, 10 Pace Int’l L. 
Rev. 275 (1998)  
 
Bagdy G, Policies for national consensus and reform, in Occasional papers on social 
security: Finding the balance: Financing and coverage of social protection in Europe, W. 
van Ginneken ed., International social security association, Geneva (1996).  
 
Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law, 
79-121, Harvard University Press (1994). 
 
Baker, Tom, Liability Insurance as Tort Regulation: Six Ways that Liability Insurance 
Shapes Tort Law in Action, Connecticut Insurance L. J., Vol. 12:1 (2006)  
 
Baker, Tom, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS, Aspen 
Law & Business (2003) 
 
Baker, Tom, Risk, Insurance and (the social construction of) Responsibility, University 
of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series (2002). Available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/8 
  441 
Baker, Tom, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk 
Classification, University of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series 3 (2001). 
Available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/3 
 
Baker, Tom, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, Texas Law Review 75: 237-92 (1996)  
 
Baniak, Andrzej and Peter Grajzl, Industry Self Regulation, Subversion of Justice, and 
Social Control of Torts (2007). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1031324 
 
Baram, Michael, Liability and its influence on designing for product and process safety, 
in Symposium Safety by Design - Based on a Workshop of the New Technology and 
Work Network, 45 Safety Science 11, 11-30 (2007).  
 
Barron, Mark R., Creating consumer confidence or confusion? The role of product 
certification marks in the market today, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 413 (2007)  
 
Ben-Shahar, Omri, How Liability Distorts Incentives of Manufacturers to Recall Products 
(2005), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=655804 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.655804 
 
Beltran, Beatrice A., Posner and tort law as insurance, 7 Conn. Ins. L. J. 153 (2000)  
 
Bercovitz, R., LA RESPONSABILIDAD POR LOS DAÑOS Y PERJUICIOS DERIVADOS DEL 
CONSUMO DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS, ed. Tecnos, Madrid (1987) 
 
Berger, Robert G., The impact of tort law development on insurance: the 
availability/affordability crisis and its potential solutions, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 285 (1988). 
 
Bernstein, Anita, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted in the 
European Community, 31 Va. J. Int'l L. 673 (1991) 
 
Bernstein, Anita, Looking at Europe for the Difference Between Strict and Fault-Based 
Liability, 14 Journal of Products Liability 207 (1992) 
 
Birbmaum, Sheila L., Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: from Negligence to Strict 
liability to Negligence, 33 Van d L. Rev. 593 (1980). 
 
Birnbaum, Sheila L., Legislative reform or retreat? A response to the product liability 
crisis, 14 Forum 251 (1978-1979). 
 
Boyer, Marcel and Donatella Porrini, Modeling the Choice between Regulation and 
Liability in Terms of Social Welfare, Canadian Journal of Economics, 37:3, 590-612 
(2004) 
 
Boyer, Marcel and Donatella Porrini, Law versus Regulation: A Political Economy 
Model of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy in A. Heyes, ed., Law and 
Economics of the Environment, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 416 (2001).  
  442 
Branton, James L., The Collateral Source Rule, 18 St. Mary's L. J. 883 (1987). 
 
Brown, John Prather, Toward and Economic Theory of Liability, 2 Journal Legal Stud. 2, 
323-349 (1973). 
 
Bungert, Hartwin, Compensating harm to the defective product itself - A comparative 
analysis of American and German products liability law, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1179 (1992) 
 
Burrows, Paul, Combining Regulation and Legal Liability for the Control of External 
Costs, International Review of Law and Economics 19:227-244 (1999) 
 
Burrows, Paul, Consumer Safety under Products Liability and Duty to Disclose, 12 
International Review of Law and Economics 4, 457- 478 (1992) 
 
Buzby Jean C., and Paul D. Frenzen, Food safety and product liability, 24 Food policy 
637-651 (1999) 
 
Calabresi, Guido, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, New 
Haven, CN:Yale University Press  (1970)  
 
Calabresi, Guido, and Jon T. Hirshoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 Yale 
Law Journal 1055 (1972) 
 
Calabresi, Guido, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale 
Law Journal 4, 499-553 (1961) 
 
Calnan, Alan, Perpetuating Negligence Principles in Strict Products Liability: The Use of 
State of the Art Concepts in Design Cases, 36 Syracuse Law Review 797 (1985) 
 
Campbell, Dennis, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY, Christian T. Campbell ed., 
London, New York: Lloyd's of London Press (1993) 
 
Casad, Robert C. and Kevin M. Clermont, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, 
DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE, Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press (2001)   
 
Cartwright, Peter, Product Safety and Consumer Protection, 58 The Modern Law Review 
2, 222-231 (1995) 
 
Cavaliere, Alberto, Product Liability in the European Union: Compensation and 
Deterrence Issues, European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 299–318 (2004) 
 
Chandler, Seth J., The Interaction Of The Tort System And Liability Insurance 
Regulation: Understanding Moral Hazard, 2 Conn. Ins. L.J. 91 (1996) 
 
Cirace, John, A Theory of Negligence and Products Liability, 66 St. Johns L. Rev. 1 
(1992).  
  443 
Clark, Alistair M., PRODUCT LIABILITY, Sweet & Maxwell (1989)  
 
Clasen, Jochen WHAT FUTURE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? DEBATES AND REFORMS IN 
NATIONAL AND CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, Policy Press (2002). 
 
Clasen, Jochen and Wim Van Oorschot, Changing Principles in European Social 
Security, European Journal of Social Security, volume 4/2, 89-115 (2002) 
 
Clasen, Jochen, SOCIAL INSURANCE IN EUROPE, Bristol: Policy Press ed. (1997). 
 
Clermont, Kevin M. and Emily Sherwin, A Comparative View of Standards of Proof, 50 
Am. J. Comp. L. 243 (2002) 
 
Coase, Ronald H. The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal Law Econ. 1 (1960). 
 
Corr, Marianne, Problems with the EC Approach to Harmonization of Product Liability 
Law, 22 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 235 (1990). 
 
Cooter, Robert D., and Thomas S. Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence 
(1986). Available at: http://works.bepress.com/robert_cooter/25 
 
Cooter, Robert D., Lewis Kornhauser, and David Lane, Liability Rules, Limited 
Information and the Role of Precedent, Bell Journal of Economics, 10:366-73 (1979)  
 
Craswell, Richard, and John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain, Legal Standards, 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2:2, 279-303 (1986).  
 
Craufurd Smith (ed.), Rachael, CULTURE AND EUROPEAN UNION LAw, Oxford University 
Press (2004). 
 
Crowley, Meghan A., From Punishment to Annihilation: Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
Co. – No More Butts – Punitive Damages Have Gone Too Far, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 
1513 (2001)  
 
Culhane, John G., The Limits of Product Liability Reform Within a Consumer 
Expectation Model: A Comparison of Approaches Taken by the United States and the 
European Union, 19 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 1 (1995) 
 
Danzon, Patricia M., The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, Law 
and Contemporary Problems 49(2), 57-84 (1986)  
 
Danzon, Patricia M., Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance 
Markets, 13 Journal of Legal Studies 3, 517–549 (1984) 
 
  444 
Darden, William R., James B. DeConinck, Barry J. Babin and Mitch Griffin, The role of 
consumer sympathy in product liability suits. An experimental investigation of loose 
coupling, Journal of Business Research 22, 65-89 (1991) 
 
Daughety, Andrew F. and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Competition and Confidentiality: 
Signaling Quality in a Duopoly When There is Universal Private Information, in Games 
and Economic Behavior, 58, 94-120 (2007) 
 
Daughety Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Products liability, signaling and 
disclosure, Vanderbilt University Working Paper no. 06-W25 (2006)  
 
Daughety, Andrew F. and Jennifer F. Reinganum. Secrecy and Safety, American 
Economic Review 95, 1074-91 (2005)  
 
Daughety, Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum, Product Safety: liability, R&D and 
signaling, the American Economic Review, vol. 85 no. 5, 1187-1206 (1995). 
 
Davis, Mary J., Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative 
Fault In Products Liability, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 281 (1994). 
 
Davis, Mary J., Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 
Wayne L. Rev. 1217 (1993) 
 
De Geest, Gerrit and Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Soft Regulators, Tough Judges, Supreme 
Court Economic Review, 15, 119-140 (2007) 
 
Dewees, Donald N., David Duff and Michael Trebilcock, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF 
ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY, Oxford University Press (1996)  
 
Diamond, Peter A., Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1974) 
 
Díez-Picazo, Luis, DERECHO DE DAÑOS, Cívitas ed., Madrid (1999) 
 
Dobbs, Dan B., THE LAW OF TORTS, West ed. (2000).  
 
Dreyfuss, Richard H., The Italian law on strict products liability, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l. 
& Comp. L. 37 (1997) 
 
Edlin, Aaron S., Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties 
negligent under comparative negligence? 14 International Review of Law and Economics 
1, 21–34 (1994)  
 
Ehrlich, Isaac, and Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 
Journal of Legal Studies 1, 257-286 (1974). 
 
  445 
Eisenberg, Theodore, et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Court: A Statistical 
Portrait, 19 Seattle U. L. Rev. 433 (1996).  
 
El Menyawi, Hassan, Public Tort Liability: Recommending an Alternative to Tort 
Liability and No-Fault Compensation, Global Jurist Advances, Volume 3, Issue 1, article 
1 (2003). 
 
Elliott, Catherine S., Implications of Uncollectibles for Hospitalization Coinsurance 
Rates, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 58 (4), 616-641 (1991)  
 
Epple, Dennis, and Artur Raviv, Product Safety: Liability Rules, Market Structure, and 
Imperfect Information, 68 American Economic Review 80 (1978)  
 
Epstein, Richard A., The risks of risk/utility, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 469 (1987)  
 
Epstein, Richard A., Product liability as an insurance market, 14 Journal of Legal Studies 
645 (1985) 
 
Epstein, Richard A., MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, Greenwood Press (1980). 
 
Esping-Andersen, Gösta, WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION, London: Sage (1996). 
 
Ewerhart, Christian, and Patrick W. Schmitz, Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante 
Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 88, No. 4 (1998)  
 
Fairgrieve, Duncan and Geraint Howells, Rethinking Product Liability: A Missing 
Element in the European Commission’s Third Review of the European Product Liability 
Directive, The modern law review, 70(6) 962-978 (2007)  
 
Fairhurst, John and Chrsitopher Vincenzi, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Pearson 
Education Limited, 4th ed. (2003). 
 
Faure, Michael G., Ton Hartlief and Niels J. Philipsen, Funding of personal injury 
litigation and claims culture, Evidence from the Netherlands, Utrecht Law Review, 
Volume 2, issue 2, 1-21 (2006)  
 
Faure, Michael G.,  DETERRENCE, INSURABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, Vol 5, Tort and Insurance 
Law, European Center of Tort and insurance law, Michael Faure ed., Springer Wien 
(2003) 
 
Faure, Michael G., Product Liability and Product Safety in Europe: Harmonization or 
Differentiation?, Kylos, vol 53, 467-508 (2000)  
 
  446 
Faure, Michael G., and Ton Hartlief, Towards an expanding enterprise liability in 
Europe? How to analyze the scope of liability of industrial operators and their insurers, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 3, num 3, 235-270 (1996) 
 
Feldman, Heidi Li, Harm and Money: Against The Insurance Theory Of Tort 
Compensation, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1567 (1997) 
 
Field, Richard H., Benjamin Kaplan and Kevin M. Clemont, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE, 8th ed., Foundation Press Thomson Reuters (2003) 
 
Finsinger, Jorg and Simon Jurgen, An Economic Assessment of the EC Product Liability 
Directive and the Product Liability Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in ESSAYS 
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION 
FOR LOSSES, Michael Faure & Roger van den Bergh eds. (1989). 
 
Fischer, James M., UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES, LexisNexis/Matthew Bender; 1st ed 
(2000)  
 
Fleming, John G., Mass Torts, 42 Am J Comp L 507 (1994)  
 
Fleming, John G., Collateral benefits, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, vol XI, chapter 11-18 (1983)   
 
Fleming, John G., The collateral source rule and loss allocation in tort, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 
1478 (1966)  
 
Fon, Vincy and Francesco Parisi, On the Optimal Specificity of Legal Rules, George 
Mason University School of law, Law Studies Research Paper no. 04-32. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=569401 
 
Freedman, Warren, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL MANUAL OF PRACTICE, 
London, New York: Oceana Publications (1987). 
 
Freedman, Warren, DEFENSES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A PRIMER FOR PLAINTIFFS AND 
DEFENDANTS, Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein (1996) 
 
Friedman, Lawrence, Legal Culture and the Welfare State, in Gunther Teubner ed., 
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin (1986)   
 
Fumitoshi, Takahashi, Japan's Product Liability Law: Issues and Implications, 22 Journal 
of Japanese Studies 1 (1996). 
 
Fulton, John A., Punitive Damages in Product liability Cases, 15 Forum 117 (1979) 
 
  447 
Ganuza, Juanjo and Gomez, Fernando, Caution, children crossing: heterogeneity of 
victim’s costs of care and the negligence rule, Volume 1: Issue 3, Article 3, Review of 
Law and Economics (2005) 
 
Garoupa, Nuno, and Fernando Gomez-Pomar, Cashing by the hour: why large law firms 
prefer hourly fees over contingent fees (2006). Available at 
http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/2  
 
Geddes, Andrew, PRODUCT AND SERVICE LIABILITY IN THE EEC, THE NEW STRICT 
LIABILITY REGIME, Sweet & Maxwell (1992) 
 
Geistfeld, Mark, Products Liability, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, vol.1, 
Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. (2009)  
 
Geistfeld, Mark, Products liability, New York University School of Law, Law & 
Economics Research Paper Series Working Paper NO. 09-19 (2009). 
 
Geistfeld, Mark, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, Foundation Press, New York 
(2006). 
 
Geistfeld, Mark, Manufacturer moral hazard and the tort-contracts issue in products 
liability, International Review of Law and Economics, 15:241-252 (1995) 
 
Giliker, Paula, Strict Liability for Defective Products: The Ongoing Debate, 24 Business 
Law Review 4, 87-90 (2003)  
 
Glaeser, Edward and Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 41:2, 401-425 (2003) 
 
Glasscock, Judith C., Emptying the Deep Pockets in Mass Markets, 18 St. Mary’s Law J. 
977-1017 (1987) 
 
Goldberg, John C. P. and Benjamin C. Zipursky, The easy case for products liability law: 
a response to professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1919 (2010)  
 
Goldberg, Victor P., The Economics of product safety and imperfect information, the 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 5:2, 683-688 (1974) 
 
Gómez, Fernando, and Pablo Salvador, APÉNDICE 2009 AL TRATADO DE 
RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL DEL FABRICANTE, Civitas, Madrid (2010) 
 
Gómez, Fernando, and Jose Penalva, Insurance and Tort: Coordination Mechanisms and 
Imperfect Liability Rules, 217-237, in INTERNALISIERUNGS DES RECHTS UND SEINE 
ÖKONOMISCHE ANALYSE, Festschrift für Hans-Bernd Schäfer zum 65 Geburtstags, Jochen 
Bigus, Tomas Eger, and Georg von Wangenheim (eds.) Gabler Verlag, Wiesbaden 
(2008) 
  448 
Gómez, Fernando, Burden of Proof and strict liability: an economic analysis of a 
misconception, Indret 01/2001 
 
Gómez Pomar, Fernando, Tort Liability and Other Means of Redress: “Collateral Source 
Rule” and Related Topics, www.Indret.com 1/00 (2000)  
 
Gómez Pomar, Fernando, Responsabilidad extracontractual y otras fuentes de reparación 
de daños: “Collateral Source Rule” y afines, InDret 1/00, available at www.indret.com  
 
Goyens, M., Directive 85/374/EEC on Product Liability: ten years after (Centre de Droit 
de la Consommation, Louvain-la-Neuve) (1996) 
 
Guía InDret de jurisprudencia sobre responsabilidad de producto, available at 
www.InDret.com  
 
Gutiérrez de Cabiedes and Hidalgo de Cabiedes, P., Comentario al art. 11 LEC, in 
AAVV, COMENTARIOS A LA LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO CIVIL, vol 1, 144 Aranzadi, Madrid 
(2001) 
 
Hagerty, Kathleen M., and Michael J. Fishman. Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure 
in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 19, 45-63 (2003)  
 
Hamada, Koichi, Liability Rules and Income Distribution in Product Liability, The 
American Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 1, 228-234 (1976) 
 
Hanson, Jon D., and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of 
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 630 (1999) 
 
Hanson, Jon D., and Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence 
of Market Manipulation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1420 (1999) 
 
Hanson, Jon D., and Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An Economic 
Justification for Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 129 (1990) 
 
Hartley, Trevor C., THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, Oxford, 
Clarendon Law Series (1994) 
 
Heimer, Carol, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN 
INSURANCE CONTRACTS, Berkeley: University of California Press (1985) 
 
Helland, Eric, and Jonathan Klicky, The Tradeoffs between Regulation and Litigation: 
Evidence from Insurance Class Actions, Journal of Tort Law, vol. 1 issue 3 (2007) 
 
  449 
Henderson, James A. Jr., Sellers Of Safe Products Should Not Be Required To Rescue 
Users From Risks Presented By Other, More Dangerous Products, 37 Sw. U.L. Rev. 595 
(2008) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., Richard N. Pearson, John A. Siliciano, THE TORTS PROCESS, 
Aspen (6th ed.) (2003) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., Why negligence dominates tort, 50 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377 
(2002) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restatement In 
The Courts: an Initial Assessment, 27 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 7 (2000) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Intuition and Technology in Product 
Design Litigation: An Essay on Proximate Causation, 88 Geo. L.J. 659 (2000) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, What Europe, Japan, and Other 
Countries Can Learn From the New American Restatement of Products Liability, 34 Tex. 
Int'l L.J. 1 (1999) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective 
Product Design, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 867 (1998) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Arriving at Reasonable Alternative 
Design: The Reporters' Travelogue, 30 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 563 (1997) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., Revising Section 402 A: the limits of tort as social insurance, 10 
Touro L. Rev. 107 (1993-1994)  
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512 (1992)  
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: 
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265 (1990) 
 
Henderson, James A. Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 Cal. 
L. Rev. 919 (1981) 
 
Hersch, Joni, and Kip W. Viscusi, Punitive damages: How judges and juries perform, 
Journal of Legal Studies 33: 1–36 (2004) 
 
Hiriart, Yolande, David Martimort and Jerome Pouyet, On the optimal use of ex ante 
regulation and ex post liability, Economics Letters 84:2, 231–235 (2004) 
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., Competition Enforcement, Regulation and civil justice: what is 
the case? Common Market Law Review 43: 1381-1407 (2006)  
  450 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., EUROPEAN REGULATION OF CONSUMER PROTECTION SAFETY, 
Oxford University Press (2005) 
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., Reform of the Product Liability Directive 1998-99, Cameron 
McKenna (1999)  
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., Multi-party actions: A European Approach, 11 Duke J. Comp. 
& Int’ L. 321 (2001) 
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., A new EC Directive on the Safety of Consumer Products, Eur. 
Buss. Law Review, vol. 12, num. 11-12, 274-280 (2001) 
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., Product Liability in Europe: Politics, Reform and Reality, 27 
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 121 (2000) 
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., UNKNOWN RISKS AND THE COMMUNITY INTEREST: THE 
DEVELOPMENT RISKS DEFENCE IN THE PRODUCT LIABILITY DIRECTIVE, McKenna & Co. 
(1996) 
 
Hodges, Christopher J.S., PRODUCT LIABILITY: EUROPEAN LAWS AND PRACTICE, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London (1993)  
 
Hoffman, William C., and Susanne Hill-Arning, GUIDE TO PRODUCT LIABILITY IN 
EUROPE: THE NEW STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY LAWS, PRE-EXISTING REMEDIES, PROCEDURE 
AND COSTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 
Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers (1994)   
 
Holmes, Oliver, THE COMMON LAW, M. Howe ed. (1963)  
 
Howells, Geraint G., The rise of European Consumer Law - Whither National Consumer 
Law?, 28 Sydney Law Review 63-88, 70 (2006) 
 
Howells, Geraint G., and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW (MARKETS 
AND THE LAW), Ashgate Publishing Limited (2005) 
 
Howells, Geraint G.,The relationship between product liability and product safety – 
understanding a necessary element in the European Product Liability through a 
comparison with the U.S. position, 39 Washburn L. J. 305 (2000) 
 
Howells, Geraint G., and Mark Mildred, Is European Products Liability More Protective 
Than The Restatement (Third) Of Torts: Products Liability?, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 985 (1998) 
 
Howells, Geraint G., and Stephen Weatherill, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW, Ashgate 
Publishing Company (2005).  
 
  451 
Howells, Geraint G., CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY, Dartmouth publishing Company 
Limited (1998) 
 
Howells, Geraint G., COMPARATIVE PRODUCT LIABILITY, Dartmouth Publishing 
Company (1993) 
 
Howells, Geraint G., Consumer safety in Europe: in search of the proper standards, 
LEGAL VISIONS OF THE NEW EUROPE, in B. Jackson and D. McGoldrick (eds), Graham & 
Trotman (1993)  
 
Howells, Geraint G., Europe’s Solution to the Product liability phenomenon, 20 Anglo-
Am. L. Rev. 204 (1991)  
 
Howells, Geraint G., EC ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS, available at 
http://www.iaclaw.org/Research_papers/ecaccesstojustice.pdf. 
 
Huber, Peter, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, New York: 
Basic Books (1988)  
 
Hulsenbek, Rudolph, and Dennis Campbell, PRODUCT LIABILITY: PREVENTION, PRACTICE, 
AND PROCESS IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, Deventer; Boston: Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers (1989) 
 
Hurd, Sandra N. and Frances E. Zollers, European Community: Council Directive on the 
Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member 
States Concerning Liability for Defective Products, 32 Int'l Legal Materials 1347 (1993)  
 
Hurd, Sandra N., and Frances E. Zollers, Statutes Of The European Community Member 
States Passed In Response To The Product Liability Directive, 32 I.L.M. 1347 (1993) 
 
Hurd, Sandra N., and Frances E. Zollers, Product Liability in the European Community: 
Implications for United States Business, 31 American Business Law Journal 245 (1993) 
 
Hurd, Sandra N., and Frances E. Zollers, Desperately Seeking Harmony: The European 
Community's Search for Uniformity in Product Liability Law, 30 Am. Bus.L.J. 35 (1992) 
 
Hylton, Keith N., Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory, Boston Univ. 
Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 03-17, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=433661  
 
Innes, Robert, Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post 
liability and ex-ante regulation, International Review of Law and Economics, vol. 24, 
issue 1, 29-48 (2004) 
International Labor organization, From pyramid to pillar, Population Change and Social 
Security In Europe, Working paper, Geneva (1989)  
 
  452 
Joerges, Christian, Law, science and the management of risks to health at the national, 
European and international level - stories on baby dummies, mad cows and hormones in 
beef, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 1 (2001) 
 
Jolls, Christine, et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 
1471 (1998) 
 
Jost, Peter J., Limited Liability and the Requirement to Purchase Insurance, International 
Review of Law and Economics 16: 259-276 (1996)  
 
Jovanovic, Boyan, Truthful Disclosure of Information, Bell Journal of Economics 13, 36-
44 (1982)  
 
Kaplan, Martin F., and Kemmerick, G., Juror Judgment as Information Integration: 
Combining Evidential and Nonevidential Information. J. Personality Social Psychol. 30: 
493-499 (1974) 
 
Kelly, Patrick, Rebecca Attree, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY, London: Butterworths, 
(1992)  
 
Keeton, W. Page, Products Liability - Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 
Cumb. L. Rev. 293 (1979) 
 
Keeton, Robert E. & Alan I. Widiss, INSURANCE LAW, West Group (1988) 
 
Kerr, Dana, Ma, Yu-Len and Schmit, Joan T., Is liability a substitute for social 
insurance?, Proceedings of the International Insurance Society, New York (2004) 
 
Kidd, Jeremy L. and Michael I. Krauss, Collateral source and tort’s law, George mason 
university Law and Economics research paper series 08-57 (2008) 
 
Knightley, Phillip, et al., Suffer the Children: The Story of Thalidomide, London: Andre 
Deutsch (1979) 
 
Koch, Bernard A., and Helmut Koziol (eds.), COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, (Tort and Insurance Law, vol. 4), European Centre of Tort 
and Insurance Law, Springer-Verlag, Wien (2003) 
 
Koch, Bernanrd A., and Helmut Koziol (eds.), UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW: STRICT 
LIABILITY, (Tort and Insurance Law, vol. 6), European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague (2002) 
 
Kolstad, Charles D.; Thomas S. Ulen and Gary V. Johnson, Ex Post Liability for Harm 
vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, The American Economic 
Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, 888-901 (1990) 
 
  453 
Korzec, Rebecca, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability and the Demise of 
the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 227 (1997) 
 
Kotz, Hein, Civil Justice Systems In Europe And The United States, 13 Duke J. Comp. & 
Int'l L. 61 (2003) 
 
Kysar, Douglas A., Thomas O. Mcgarity, and Karen Sokol, Medical Malpractice Myths 
And Realities: Why An Insurance Crisis Is Not A Lawsuit Crisis, 39 Loy. Law Rev. 2, 
785-818 (2006)  
 
Kysar, Douglas A., The Expectations Of Consumers, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1700 (2003) 
 
Landes, William and Richard Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge (MA) (1987) 
 
Landes, William and Richard Posner, Tort Law as a Regulatory Regime for Catastrophic 
Personal Injuries, Journal of Legal Studies 13, 417-434 (1984) 
 
Landes, William and Richard Posner, The positive economics theory of tort law, 15 
Georgia Law Review 851 (1981) 
 
Landsman, Stephan, Civil Jury in American, The Law and Contemporary Problems 62: 
285 (1999) 
 
Lannetti, David. W., Toward a Revised Definition of “Product” Under the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 35 Tort & Ins. L. J. 845 (2000) 
 
Laplante, Suzanne, The European Union’s General Product Safety Directive: another call 
for US exporters to comply with the ISO 9000 series, 22 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 155 
(1996) 
 
Larsen, Kim D., Strict products liability and the risk-utility test for design defect: an 
economic analysis, 84 Columbia Law Review 8 (1984)  
 
Lee, Thomas H., A Purposeful Approach to Products Liability Warnings and Non-
English Speaking Consumers, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1107 (1994) 
 
Lee, Wondon and James A. Ligon, Moral Hazard in Risk Pooling Arrangements, The 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 68 (1), 175-190 (2001) 
 
Lenze, Stephan, Product Safety Regulations and Defect, European Product Liability 
Review 24 (2006) 
Levine, Michael E., Regulatory Capture, in 3, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, Peter Newman ed. (1998) 
 
  454 
Lewis, Richard, DEDUCTING BENEFITS FROM DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY, Oxford 
University Press (2000) 
 
Li, Chu-Shiu, Chwen-Chi Liu, Jia-Hsing Yeh, The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-
Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile Insurance, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 
74 (2), 441-459 (2007) 
 
Liu, Josephine, Two roads diverged in a yellow wood: the European Community stays on 
the path to strict liability, 27 Fordham Int’l L J. 1940 (2004) 
 
Lopez Jimenez, Jose Maria, Las Acciones Colectivas como medio de proteccion de los 
derechos e intereses de los consumidores, La Ley, num. 6851 (2008) 
 
Lopucki, Lynn, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L. J. 1 (1996) 
 
Lovells, Product Liability In The European Union: A Report For The European 
Commission (2003) available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-
goods/files/goods/docs/liability/studies/lovells-study_en.pdf 
 
Lundmark, Thomas, The Restatement Of Torts (Third) And The European Product 
Liability Directive, 5 D.C.L. J. Int'l L. & Prac. 239 (1996) 
 
McIntosch, David, and Marjorie Holmes, PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS IN E.C. COUNTRIES, 
Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. (1990)  
 
Magnus, Ulrich, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ON TORT LAW (Tort and 
Insurance Law, vol. 3), Springer ed. (2003) 
 
Majone, Giandomenico, REGULATING EUROPE, Routledge (1996)  
 
Mann, Lawrence C., and Peter R. Rodrigues, The European Directive on PL: the promise 
or progress?, 18 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 391 (1988) 
 
Marino, Anthony M., A Model of Product Recalls with Asymmetric Information, Journal 
of Regulatory Economics, 12:245-265 (1997)  
 
Marshall, Kevin S., and Patrick W. Fitzgerald, The Collateral Source Rule And Its 
Abolition: An Economic Perspective, 15 Fall Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 57 (2005) 
 
Mathijsen, P.S.R.F., A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW, Sweet & Maxwell, 7th ed. 
(1999)  
 
McGee, Robert W., Who Really Benefits from Liability Litigation?, num. 24, Dumont 
Institute Policy Analysis (1996)  
 
  455 
Meltzer, John, Reform of Product Liability in the EU: New Report Finds General 
Satisfaction, 71 Defense Counsel Journal 42 (2004) 
 
Miceli, Thomas J., ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, Oxford University Press (1997) 
 
Micklitz, Hans -W., Principles of Justice in Private Law Within the European Union, in 
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND THE LAW AT THE EUROPEAN UNION, E. Paasivirta and K. 
Rissanen (eds.), Institute of International Economic Law, University of Helsinki (1995) 
 
Micklitz, Hans-W., Inquiry on EC and current national certification schemes for 
particular consumer goods, SECO (1990) 
 
Mildred, Mark, Litigation Rules and Culture: The European Perspective, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. 
L. & Soc. Change 433 (1997) 
 
Mitchell, Mark, A Manufacturer's Duty to Warn in a Modern Day Tower of Babel, 29 
Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 573 (2001) 
 
Mollers, Thomas M.J., The Role of Law in European Integration, 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 
679 (2000) 
 
Moore, Michael J. and W. Kip Viscusi, Product liability entering the twenty-first century, 
AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies (2001) 
 
Moore, Michael J. and W. Kip Viscusi, COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR JOB RISKS: 
WAGES, WORKERS COMPENSATION AND PRODUCT LIABILITY, Princeton University Press 
(1990) 
 
Moore, Michael J. and W. Kip Viscusi, Promoting Safety through Workers' 
Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance, Working Paper, 
Northwestern University (1988) 
 
Mottur, Alfred E., The European Product Liability Directive: A Comparison With U.S. 
Law, An Analysis Of Its Impact On Trade, And A Recommendation For Reform So As 
To Accomplish Harmonization And Consumer Protection, 25 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 983 
(1994) 
 
Munich Re., Personal Injuries and medical malpractice, available at 
http://www.munichre.com  
 
Narita, Susan, Product Liability Claims in Europe, Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich 
(1996) 
 
Neocelous, Martha Warren, PERSONAL INJURY, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN EUROPE, 
Cavendish Publishing Limited (1997) 
 
  456 
Newdick, Christopher, Risk, Uncertainty and "Knowledge" in the Development Risk 
Defence, 20 Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 309 (1991)  
 
Newdick, Christopher, The Development Risk Defense of the Consumer Protection Act 
1987, 47 Cambridge Law Journal 3 (1988) 
 
Nilles, Kathleen M., Note, Defining the Limits of liability: A legal and political analysis 
of the European Community Products Liability Directive, 25 Va. J. Int’l L., 729 (1985) 
 
Nussim, Jacob and Avraham D. Tabbach, Controlling Avoidance: Ex-Ante Regulation 
versus Ex-Post Punishment, 46 Review of Law and Economics 4:1 (2008)  
 
Ogus, Anthony, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY, Oxford University 
Press (1994)   
 
Oi, Walter Y., The Economic Analysis of Product Safety, Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 4 (1), 3-28 (1974) 
 
O’Connell, Jeffrey, A Correct Diagnosis Of The Ills Of Liability Insurance - And A False 
Cure: A Comment On The Reports Of The Federal Tort Policy Working Group, 63 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 161 (1988)  
 
O'Reilly, James T., and Nancy C. Code, Products liability resource manual: an attorney's 
guide to analyzing issues, developing strategies, and winning cases, Chicago, Ill.: 
American Bar Association, General Practice Section (1993) 
 
Owen, David G, The evolution of products liability law, 6 Rev. Litig. 955 (2007) 
 
Owen, David G., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW, Thomson/West (2005) 
 
Owen, David G., Toward a proper test for design defectiveness: “Micro-balancing” costs 
and benefits, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1661 (1997)  
 
Owen, David G., Defectiveness Restated: Exploding The "Strict" Products Liability 
Myth, 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev. 743 (1996)  
 
Owen, David G., The moral foundations of products liability law: toward first principles, 
68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 427 (1992-1993) 
 
Owen, David G., The Fault Pit, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 703 (1992) 
 
Owen, David G., Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 
681 (1980) 
Owen, David G., Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Liability for 
Defective Products, 17 S.C.L. Rev. 803 (1976)   
 
  457 
Owen, David G., Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 
1257 (1976)  
 
Parchomovsky, Gideon, and Alex Stein, The anti-innovation bias of tort law, research 
paper no. 07-31, 3,18 (2007)  
 
Parisi, Francesco, Harmonization of European Private Law: An Economic Analysis, 
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-41 (2007). Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014385 
 
Parisi, Francesco, Vincy Fon and Nita Ghei The Value of Waiting in Lawmaking, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, 18: 131–148 (2004)  
 
Pasquau Liaño, Miguel, El Nuevo marco para la protección judicial de los intereses 
colectivos y difusos de los consumidores y usuarios, Consejería de Gobernación de la 
Junta de Andalucía, Sevilla (2003) 
 
Pauly, Mark V., The Economics of Moral Hazard:  Comment, 58 Am. Econ. Rev. 531-
537 (1968) 
 
Pelkmans, Jacques, The New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standardization, 
25 J. Comm. Mkt. Stud. 249 (1987)  
 
Pelkmans, Jacques, and Michelle Egan, Fixing European Standards: Moving Beyond The 
Green Paper, CEPS Working Document No. 65, Brussels (1992) 
 
Peterson, John, and Michael Shackleton, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Oxford University Press, 2nd ed. (2006)  
 
Pierce, Richard J. Jr., Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government 
Regulation, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 1281 (1980) 
  
Pindyck, Robert S. and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, MICROECONOMICS, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, 5th ed. (2001) 
 
Ploug, Niels and Jon Kvist, SOCIAL SECURITY IN EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OR 
DISMANTELMENT?, Kluwer Sovac Series on Social Security (1996) 
 
Ploug, Niels and John Kvist eds., RECENT TRENDS IN CASH BENEFITS IN EUROPE (SOCIAL 
SECURITY IN EUROPE), Danish National Institute of Social Research (1994) 
 
Polborn, Mattias K., Mandatory Insurance and the Judgment-Proof Problem. 
International Review of Law and Economics, 18: 141-146 (1998) 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS, Gaithersburg, Md.: 
Aspen Publishers, 3rd ed. (2003) 
 
  458 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, The American 
Economic Review, Vol. 70, No. 2, 363-367 (1980) 
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and William P. Rogerson, Products Liability, Consumer 
Misperceptions, and Market Power, Bell Journal of Economics, The Rand Corporation, 
vol. 14(2), 581-589 (1983)  
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell, The uneasy case for product liability, 123 
Harv. L. Rev. 1437 (2010)  
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell, A Skeptical attitude about product liability is 
justified: a reply to professor Goldberg and Zipursky, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 1949 (2010) 
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell, Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure of 
Product Risks, NBER Working Paper No. 12776 (2006)  
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
Harvard Law Review. 111, 869–962 (1998) 
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for 
Care and Litigation, Rand Journal 22 (4), 562-570 (1993)  
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, and Rogerson, William P., Products Liability, Consumer 
Misperceptions and Market Power, 14 Bell J. Econ. 2 (1983) 
 
Polinsky, A. Mitchell, Economic Analysis as a potentially defective product: a buyer’s 
guide to Posner’s economic analysis of law, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1655 (1974)  
 
Ponte, Lucille M., Guilt By Association In United States Products Liability Cases:  Are 
The European Community And Japan Likely To Develop Similar Cause-In-Fact 
Approaches To Defendant Identification?, 15 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 629 (1993) 
 
Posner, Richard A., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Aspen eds. (6th ed.) (2003) 
 
Posner, Richard A., Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell. J. Econ. Man. Sci. 335 
(1974)  
 
Powers, William Jr., A modest proposal to abandon strict products liability, 1991 U. Ill. 
L. Rev. 639 (1991) 
 
Prechal, Sacha, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, Oxford Law Library, 2nd ed. (2005)  
 
Presser, Stephen B., How should the Law of Products Liability be Harmonized? What 
Americans Can Learn from Europeans, Center for Legal Policy at the Manhattan Institute 
(2002) 
 
  459 
Priest. George L., Can absolute manufacturer liability be defended? Yale Journal on 
Regulation, 9:237-263 (1992)  
 
Priest, George L., The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and 
Its Reform, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 31 (1991)  
 
Priest, George L., PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW AND THE ACCIDENT RATE, IN LIABILITY: 
PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY, Robert E. Litan & Clifford L. Winston eds. (1988)  
 
Priest, George L., Modern Tort Law and Its Reform, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 1 (1987)  
 
Priest, George L., The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521 
(1987)  
 
Rabin, Matthew, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. Econ. Literature 11, 24-31 (1998)  
 
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., Symposium: Responsibility And Blame: Psychological And Legal 
Perspectives: Misunderstanding Ability, Misallocating Responsibility, 68 Brooklyn L. 
Rev. 1055 (2003) 
 
Rachlinski, Jeffrey J., A positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Cass R. Sunstein (ed.), Cambridge University Press 
(2000) 
 
Rajneri, Eleonora, Interaction between the European Directive on Product Liability and 
the former liability regime in Italy, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, Duncan Fairgrave (ed.), Cambridge University Press (2005)  
 
Rajneri, Eleonora, Interaction Between the European Directive on Product Liability and 
the Former Liability Regime in Italy, Global Jurist Topics, Vol. 4: Issue 1, num. 3 (2004) 
 
Ramírez, Luis, RC alerta roja: sanidad y productos son los dos sectores más sensibles: el 
nivel de cobertura se ha reducido notablemente, Mercado previsor, núm. 400, 32-33 
(2004) 
 
Reich, Norbert, Christopher Goddard and Ksenija Vasiljeva, UNDERSTANDING EU LAW, 
OBJECTIVES, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF COMMUNITY LAW, Interscentia (2003) 
 
Reimann, Mathias, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First 
Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 751 (2003) 
 
Reinmann, Mathias, Product Liability in a Global Context: The Hollow Victory of the 
European Model, European Review of Private Law, 11(2): 128-155 (2003) 
 
Reindl, Andreas P., Consumer Protection and the Uniform Commercial Code: Consumer 
Contracts and European Community Law, 75 Wash. U.L.Q. 627 (1997)  
  460 
 
Reglero Campos, L. Fernando, (Coord.), TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL, 3ª ed., 
Cizur Menor, Thomson-Aranzadi (2006) 
 
Revesz, Richard and Lewis A. Kornhauser, Multi-Defendant Settlements: The Impact of 
Joint and Several Liability, New York University C.V. Starr Center for Applied 
Economics Working Paper num. 92-37 (1992) 
 
Rickman, Neil, Contingent fees and litigation settlement, International Review of Law 
and Economics 19: 295–317 (1999) 
 
Ringleb, Al H., and Steven N. Wiggins, Liability and Large-Scale, Long-Term Hazards, 
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 3, 574-595 (1990) 
 
Risa, Alf Erling, The Welfare State as provider of accident insurance in the workplace: 
efficiency and distribution in equilibrium, The Economic Journal, Vol. 105, num. 458, 
129-144 (1995) 
 
Robertson, David W., William Powers, Jr., David A. Anderson, and Olin Guy Wellborn, 
III, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, West, 3d ed. (2004)  
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Regulation and the law of torts, The American Economic 
Review, vol. 81, no 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Hundred and Third Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association, 54-58 (1991)  
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, Effluent Charges: A Critique, Canadian Journal of Economics, 6, 
512-28 (1973) 
 
Rosenberg, David, Deregulating insurance subrogation: towards an ex ante market in tort 
claims, Harvard Working Paper no. 395, 12/2002 (2002) 
 
Ross, Kenneth and Gregory G. Scott, Europe 1992: Warning and Instructions under the 
Strict liability, Machinery, and proposed Product Safety Directives, 388 PLI/Lit 49 (PLI) 
(1990) 
 
Rotchild, Michael and Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an 
essay on the economics of imperfect information, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90: 
629-649 (1976) 
 
Rubí, Antoni and José Piñeiro, Muerte de un niño asfixiado con un caramelo, comentario 
a la STS, 1ª, 10.6.2002, indret working paper 123 (2003). Available at 
http://www.indret.com/pdf/123_es.pdf.  
 
Rubin, Paul H. and J.M. Shepherd, Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths, Journal of Law 
& Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50, 221-238 (2007)  
 
  461 
Rubin, Paul H., Courts and the tort-contract boundary in product liability, in Frank 
Buckley, ed., THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, Duke University Press 
(1999) 
 
Rubin, Paul H., TORT REFORM BY CONTRACT, American Enterprise Institute Press (1993) 
 
Rutgers, Jacobien W., The Rule of Reason and Private Law or the Limits to 
Harmonization, Rule of Reason; Rethinking Another Classic of EC Legal Doctrine, 
Annette Schrauwen, ed. The Hogendorp Papers (4), Groningen: Europa Law Publishers 
(2005) 
 
Salvador Coderch, Pablo, and Fernando Gómez (eds.), TRATADO DE RESPONSABILIDAD 
CIVIL DEL FABRICANTE, Civitas (2008) 
 
Salvador Coderch, Pablo and Solé Feliu, Josep, BRUJOS Y APRENDICES: LOS RIESGOS DE 
DESARROLLO EN LA RESPONSABILIDAD DE PRODUCTO, Marcial Pons, Madrid/Barcelona 
(1999) 
 
Sanchirico, Chris, Detection Avoidance, 81 New York University Law Review 1331 
(2006) 
 
Scascia, Anthony, Safe or sorry: how the precautionary principle is changing Europe’s 
consumer safety regulation regime and how the United States’ Consumer Product Safety 
Commission must take notice, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 706 (2006) 
 
Sharkey, Catherine M., Products liability preemption: an institutional approach, 76 The 
George Washington Law Review 101 (2008) 
 
Schauer, Frederick, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE, Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press 
(1991)   
 
Schauer, Frederick, Neutrality and Judicial Review, Law and Philosophy, 23, 217-40 
(2003) 
 
Schmit, Joan T., Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union, The 
Geneva Papers 31, 304-313 (2006) 
 
Schmitz, Patrick W., On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, International 
Review of Law and Economics, 20:3, 371-382 (2000)  
 
Schwarcz, Daniel, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance 
Policies, 48 William and Mary Law Review 1389 (2007). This article is available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=923423 
 
  462 
Schwartz, Alan, Statutory Interpretation, Capture and Tort Law: The Regulatory 
Compliance Defense, American Law and Economics Review, vol. 2 num.1 (2000) 
 
Schwartz, Alan, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 819 (1992) 
 
Schwartz, Gary T., Mixed Theories of tort law: affirming both deterrence and corrective 
justice, 75 Texas Law Review 1801 (1997) 
 
Schwartz, Gary T., Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 377 (1994)  
 
Schwartz, Gary T., The Beginning and Possible End of the Rise of Modern American 
Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601 (1992) 
 
Schwartz, Gary T., The Ethics and the Economics of Tort Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell 
L. Rev. 313 (1990)  
 
Schwartz, Ivo E.and Will, Michael R., Wie geht es weiter mit der produkthaftung?, 
ZEUS 5 (Zeitschrigt fur Europearechtliche studien), 14 (2002) 
 
Schwartz, Victor E., Tort law reform: strict liability and the collateral source rule do not 
mix, 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 569 (1986) 
 
Schwartz, Victor E., and Thomas C. Means, The Need for Federal Product Liability- and 
Toxic Tort Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 Vill. L. Rev. 1088 (1982-83)  
 
Schmitz, Patrick W., On the joint use of liability and safety regulation, International 
Review of Law and Economics 20, 371-382 (2000) 
 
Scott, Gregory G. Product Liability Laws In The European Community In 1992, 18 Wm. 
Mitchell L. Rev. 357 (1992) 
 
Seuba Torreblanca, Joan Carles, Las Sentencias del Tribunal de Justicia de las 
comunidades de 25 de abril de 2002 sobre la Directiva 85/374, de productos defectuosos: 
una directiva imperativa, no de mínimos, Indret 3/2002 (2002) available at 
www.indret.com 
 
Shapiro, Barbara J., "Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical 
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, Berkeley: University of 
California Press (1991) 
 
Shapo, Marshal S., In Search Of The Law Of Products Liability: The ALI Restatement 
Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631 (1995) 
 
Shapo, Marshall S., Comparing Products Liability: Concepts in European and American 
Law, 26 Cornell Int'l L.J. 279 (1993) 
  463 
Shapo, Marshall S., A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, 
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974) 
 
Shavell, Steven, Minimum Asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as 
solutions to the judgment-proof problem, Rand journal of economics, 36(1), 63-77 (2005)  
 
Shavell, Steven, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press (2004) 
 
Shavell, Steven, On the Social Function and the Regulation of Liability Insurance, 
Geneva papers on Risk and Insurance, 25(2), 166-179 (2000)  
 
Shavell, Steven, The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive 
to use the legal system, 26 J. Legal Stud. 2, 575-612 (1997) 
 
Shavell, Steven, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, (1987) 
 
Shavell, Steven, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 International Review of Law and 
Economics, 45-58 (1986)  
 
Shavell, Steven, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 Journal of Legal 
Studies 2, 357-374 (1984) 
 
Shavell, Steven, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, Rand J. 
Econ., 15(2), 271-280 (1984) 
 
Shavell, Steven, Suit and settlement v. trial: a theoretical analysis under alternative 
methods for the allocation of legal costs, 11 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 55-81 (1982) 
 
Shavell, Steven, On Liability and Insurance, The Bell Journal of Economics 13(1), 120-
132 (1982) 
 
Shavell, Steven, Strict liability versus negligence, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 1-25 
(1980) 
 
Shavell, Steven, On moral hazard and insurance, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
93(4), 541-562 (1979) 
 
Sherman, Paul, PRODUCTS LIABILITY FOR THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER, Colorado Springs, 
Colo.: Shepard's/McGraw-Hill (1981)  
 
Shoben, Elaine W., William Murray Tabb and Rachel M. Janutis, REMEDIES, CASES AND 
PROBLEMS, Foundation Press, 3rd ed. (2002) 
 
  464 
Silva, Franceso, and Alberto Cavaliere, The Economic Impact of Product Liability: 
lessons from the US and the EU Experience, in: Giampaolo Galli and Jacques Pelkmans 
(eds.), REGULATORY REFORM AND COMPETITIVENESS IN EUROPE, I, Horizontal Issues. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar: 292–323 (2000) 
 
Skogh, Göran, Mandatory insurance: Transaction Cost Analysis of Insurance, 
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 521-527 (2000)  
 
Skogh, Göran, The combination of private and public regulation of safety, in ESSAYS IN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS. CORPORATIONS, ACCIDENT PREVENTION AND COMPENSATION FOR 
LOSSES, 87-101 Michael Faure and Roger van den Bergh (eds.) (1987) 
 
Skogh, Göran, Public insurance and accident prevention, The international review of law 
and economics, vol 2, 67-80 (1982)  
 
Slovic, Paul, Smoking: risk, perception & policy, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage 
Publications, (2001); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Cass R. Sunstein ed. (2000) 
 
Smits, Jan M., The Harmonisation of Private law in Europe: some insights from 
evolutionary theory, special volume in Honor of Alan Watson, Georgia Journal of 
international and Comparative Law 31, 79-99 (2002) 
 
Solé Feliu, Josep, EL CONCEPTO DE DEFECTO DEL PRODUCTO EN LA RESPONSABILIDAD 
CIVIL DEL FABRICANTE, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch (1997)  
 
Spacone,  Andrew C., Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United States 
Analog, 5 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 341 (2000)  
 
Spacone, Andrew C., The Emergence of Strict Liability: A Historical Perspective and 
Other Considerations, Including Senate 100. J. Products Liability 8: 1-40 (1985) 
 
Spence, Michael, Consumer misperceptions, product failure, and producer liability, 
Review of Economic Studies, 44(3): 561-72 (1977) 
 
Spier, Kathryn E., Product Safety, Buybacks and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn (2009). 
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 597 (2009). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023125  
 
Spühler, Jürg, Swiss Re Liability and liability insurance: yesterday - today - tomorrow 
Swiss Reinsurance Company, Zurich (2001) 
 
Spühler, Jürg, Swiss Re Product recall and product tampering insurance, Swiss 
Reinsurance Company, Zurich (1998) 
 
Stapleton, Jane, Bugs in Anglo-American Products Liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, edited by Duncan Fairgrieve, Cambridge (2005) 
  465 
Stapleton, Jane, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, 53 S. C. L. Rev. 1225 (2002)  
 
Stapleton, Jane, Products Liability in the United Kingdom: The Myths Of Reform, 34 
Tex. Int’l L. J. 45 (1999) 
 
Stapleton, Jane, PRODUCT LIABILITY, London; Boston: Butterworths (1994) 
 
Stempel, Jeffrey, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations 
Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judicial Role, 5 Conn. Ins. L. J. 181 (1998-
99) 
 
Stenberg, Erik, Swiss Reinsurance, PL for US exports, 01/99 (1999), available at 
www.swissre.com 
 
Stewart, Richard B., Liability for Natural Resource Injury: Beyond Tort, in ANALYZING 
SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW, Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart 
(editors), RFF Press, 219-241 (1995)  
 
Stuyck, Jules, European Consumer Law After The Treaty Of Amsterdam: Consumer 
Policy In Or Beyond The Internal Market?, Common Market Law Review 37: 367-400 
(2000) 
 
Sugarman, Stephen D., Personal Injury and Social Policy - Institutional and Ideological 
Alternatives, in Nicholas Mullany and Allen Linden, ed., TORTS TOMORROW, Australia: 
LBC Information Services (1998) 
 
Sugarman, Stephen D., The New Zeland Experience and Alternative Compensation 
Schemes, 15 U. Haw. L. Rev. 659 (1993)  
 
Sugarman, Stephen D., Doing away with personal injury law, Westport, Connecticut: 
Quorum Books (1989)  
 
Sugarman, Stephen D., Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 555 (1985) 
 
Sunstein, Cass R. (Ed.), BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge (2001) 
 
Sunstein, Cass R., Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997) 
 
Sykes, Alan O., Subrogation and Insolvency, 30 Journal of Legal Studies 2 (2001)  
 
Taschner, Hans Claudius, Harmonization of product liability in the European 
Community, 34 Tex. Int’l L. J. 21 (1999)  
 
  466 
Taschner, Hans Claudius, Product Liability in Europe: Future Prospects, in EEC STRICT 
LIABILITY IN 1992: THE NEW PRODUCT LIABILITY RULES (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice 
Course Handbook Series No. 371 (1989) 
 
Thieffry, Patrick, Philip Van Doorn and Simon Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: 
Implementation, Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 Tort 
& Insurance Law Journal 65 (1989-1990) 
 
Thomas, Jim, Justice as Interaction: Louse Coupling and Mediations in the Adversary 
Process. Symbolic Interaction 6 (2): 243-277 (1983) 
 
Thomas, R. Patrick, Risk Management in the New Europe: Insurance and Financial 
Management Issues, in THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: PRODUCTS LIABILITY 
RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, Patrick Thieffry & G. Marc Whitehead eds. (1990) 
 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, U.S. Tort Costs: 2003 Update: Trends and Findings on The 
Costs Of The U.S. Tort System 17 (2003) 
 
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2008 Update on U.S. Tort Cost Trends (2008)  
 
Todd, Stephen, THE LAW OF TORTS IN NEW ZELAND, Brookers, 3rd ed. (2001) 
 
Trebilcock, Michael and Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Nuclear Accident Law, 
International Review of Law and Economics, 17:2, 215-243 (1997) 
 
Twerski, Aaron D. and James A. Henderson, Jr, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective 
Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk-Utility, 74 Brook. L. Rev. 1061 (2008-2009) 
 
Urban, David A., Custom's Proper Role in Strict Product Liability Actions Based on 
Design Defect, 38 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 439 (1990)  
 
van Boom, Willem H. and Michael G. Faure, Concluding Remarks to the book Shifts in 
Compensation between Private and Public Systems, TORT AND INSURANCE LAW IN 
SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS, Willem H. van 
Boom/ Michael G. Faure (eds.), Tort and Insurance Law, vol. 22 (2007) 
 
van Dam, Cees, EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006) 
 
van Ginneken W., Finding the balance: Financing and coverage of social protection in 
Europe, in OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON SOCIAL SECURITY, ed. van Ginneken W, International 
Social Security Association, Geneva (1996) 
 
van der Zeijden, Paul and Rob van der Horst, Self-Regulation Practices in SANCO 
Policy Areas (2008) available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/self_regulation/docs/self-reg-SANCO-final.pdf  
 
  467 
Varian, Hal R., INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH, W. W. Norton 
& Co Inc (Np); 6th ed. (2002) 
 
Vargo, John F., The Emperor's New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns a 
“New Cloth” for Section 402A Products Liability Design Defects - A Survey of the 
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 493 (1996)  
 
Vela Sanchez, Antonio J., Products liability in Spain, 32 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 979 (2001) 
 
Verheugen, Günter, Closing Speech at the European Conference on the 20th Anniversary 
of the New Approach 6 (Nov. 30, 2005). Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/pdf/verheugen_%20speech_%20anniv
ersary_%20naga.pdf 
 
Verheugen, Günter, Exchange of views of Vice-President Verheugen with the Internal 
Market and Consumer protection Committee (IMCO) European Parliament Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection Committee European Parliament, Brussels, 14 
September 2006. Available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/500&format=HT
ML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Tort Reform and insurance markets, John M. Olin Center for Law, 
Economics and Business, Harvard Law School, Discussion Paper No. 440. 10/2003 
(2003) 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Regulation through Litigation, AEI Brookings Joint Centre for 
Regulatory Studies, AEI Press (2002)  
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, The Regulation-Litigation Interaction, AEI Brookings Joint Center for 
Regulatory Studies Working Paper 01-13 (2001). Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=292645. 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip,  Steven R. Rowland, Howard L. Dorfman and Charles J. Walsh, The 
Effect of Products Liability Litigation on Innovation: Deterring Inefficient 
Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance 
Defense, 24 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1437 (1994) 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Reforming Products Liability (1991) 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Toward a diminished role of tort liability: social insurance, government 
regulation, and contemporary risks to health and safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989)  
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate 
Institutional Division of Labor, The American Economic Review, 78(2), 300-304 (1988) 
 
  468 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 (1988) 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, The Determinants of the Disposition of Product Liability Claims and 
Compensation for Bodily Injury, Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 15, No. 2, 321- 346 
(1986)  
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Structuring an Effective Occupational Disease Policy: Victim 
Compensation and Risk Regulation, Yale Journal on Regulation, 2, 53-81 (1984) 
 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Regulating Consumer Product Safety, Washington, DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Research (1984) 
 
Wade, John W., Symposium: The Passage of Time: The Implications for Product 
Liability: On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to 
Marketing, 58 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 734 (1993) 
 
Wade, John W., On the Nature of Strict tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825 
(1973) 
 
Wade, John W., Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965) 
 
Wagner, Gerhard, Tort liability and insurance: Comparative report and final conclusions, 
in Gerhard Wagner (ed), TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE, Wien: Springer (2005) 
 
Walker, Gary T., The Expanding Applicability of Strict Liability Principles: How Is a 
"Product" Defined?, 22 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1 (1986) 
 
Wandt, Manfred, German Approaches to Product Liability, 34 Tex. Int'l L.J. 71 (1999) 
 
Warin, Thierry, and Peter Hannessy, One welfare state for Europe: a Costly utopia?, 
Middlebury college economics discussion paper no. 03-25 (2003)  
 
Warleigh, Alex, ed., UNDERSTANDING EUROPEAN UNION INSTITUTIONS, Routledge (2002) 
 
Warren, Ashley W., Compliance with governmental regulatory standards: is it enough to 
immunize a defendant from liability?, 49 Baylor Law Review 763 (1997)  
 
Weatherill, Stephen, EU Consumer Law and Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham-
Northampton (2005) 
 
Weber, Robert C., E.C. Directive Follows U.S. No-Fault Approach, But Litigation Is 
Rare, Nat’l L.J., 30 (1991) 
 
Weiler, Joseph, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L. J. 2403 (1991) 
 
  469 
Weinstein, Alvin S., Aaron D. Twerski, Henry R. Piehler and William A. Donaher, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT A GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT, 
DESIGN, AND MARKETING, New York: Wiley-Interscience Publication (1978) 
 
Weitzman, Martin L., Prices versus Quantities, Review of Economic Studies vol. 41, 
num. 4, 447-491 (1974)  
 
Welling, Linda, A Theory of Voluntary Recalls and Product Liability, Southern 
Economic Journal, 57: 1092-1111 (1991) 
 
Werro, Franz and Vernon Valentine Palmer (eds.), THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT 
LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW, Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press (2004) 
 
Werro, Franz, Tort Law at the Beginning of the New Millennium. A Tribute to John G. 
Fleming's Legacy, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 147 (2001) 
 
Westerbeke, William E., Reasonable Alternative Design: A. Design-Based Liability in 
American Products Liability Law: The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 8 
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y  66 (1998) 
 
Whittaker, Simon, LIABILITY FOR PRODUCTS: ENGLISH LAW, FRENCH LAW AND 
EUROPEAN HARMONIZATION, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005)  
 
Wickelgren, Abraham L., The inefficiency of contractually-based liability with rational 
consumers, 22 J.L. Econ & Org. 168 (2006) 
 
Widiss, Alan I., Liability Insurance Coverage for Punitive Damages?  Discerning 
Answers to the Conundrum Created By Disputes Involving Conflicting Public Policies, 
Pragmatic Considerations And Political Actions, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 455, 503 (1994) 
 
White, Michelle J. and Donald Wittman, A Comparison of Taxes, Regulation, and 
Liability Rules under Imperfect Information, Journal of Legal Studies, 12:2, 413-425 
(1983) 
 
Wilhelmsson, Thomas and Samuli Hurri, FROM DISSONANCE TO SENSE: WELFARE STATE 
EXPECTATIONS, PRIVATISATION AND PRIVATE LAW, Ashgate Publishing (1999) 
 
Wilhemlsson, Thomas, SOCIAL CONTRACT LAW AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, Darmouth 
Pub. Co. (1995) 
 
Wilkinson, Kathleen D., Admissibility of State of the Art Defense - Manufacturer's 
Expertise May No Longer Be Allowed in the Courtroom, Pennsylvania Bar Association 
Quarterly (1988) 
 
Will, Michael R., Liability for failure to warn in the European Community, 6 B.U. Int’l 
L. J. 125 (1988) 
  470 
Winter, Ralph A., The Liability Insurance Market, The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 5, no 3, 115-136 (1991) 
 
Wittman, Donald, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and 
Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 1, 193-211 (1977) 
 
Wright, Richard W., The principles of product liability, 26 Rev. Litig. 1067 (2007) 
 
Wright, Christopher J., PRODUCT LIABILITY: THE LAW AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR RISK 
MANAGEMENT, Blackstone Press. Ltd. (1989) 
 
Xu, Chenggang & Katherina Pistor, Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law: Theory 
and Evidence from Financial Market Regulation, Columbia Law School Working Paper 
No. 222 (2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=396141 
 
Yin, Tung, and Nailing Jello to a Wall: A Uniform Approach for Adjudicating Insurance 
Coverage Disputes in Products Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and 
Damages, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 1243 (1995)  
 
Zekoll, Joachim, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. National 
Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section II Liability for 
Defective Products and Services, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 121 (2002) 
 
Zekoll, Joachim, The German Products Liability Act, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 809 (1989) 
 
Zollers, Frances E., and Sandra N. Hurd, Peter Shears, Product Safety in the United 
States and the European Community: a comparative approach, 17 Md. J. Int’l L. & Trade 
177 (1993) 
  471 
REGULATION   
 
EUROPE  
 
 
European Treaties   
 
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, signed at Lisbon, C 306/01, 13 December 2007. The text of the 
Treaty is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML 
 
Accession Treaties for Bulgaria and Romania were signed on 2005 to take place in 2007. 
See http://europa.eu/abc/index_en.htm 
 
Consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome, C 325, O.J., 24 December 2002. The 
consolidated version can be found at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/htm/C_2002325EN.003301.html 
 
Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties Establishing The 
European Communities And Certain Related Acts, O.J. C 80 of 10 March 2001. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/nice_treaty/index_en.htm .  
 
Treaty of Amsterdam was signed on October 2, 1997 and entered into force on May 1st, 
1999. It amended and renumbered the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, October 2 1997, O.J. C 
340. This Treaty can be found at 
http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre546.html 
 
The Maastricht Treaty is often called as the Treaty on European Union O. J. C 191 
(1992). The EEC Treaty was officially renamed the European Community Treaty. For the 
full text of the treaty see http://europa.eu/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/EU_treaty.html. For 
information regarding the European internal market see 
http://europa.eu/pol/singl/index_en.htm.  
 
Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, September 27 1968 (Official Journal C 189 of 28.07.1990). 
 
Treaty Instituting a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European 
Community, Apr. 8, 1965, art. 9, 10 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 152) 2 (1967). 
 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome), Mar. 25, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm .  
 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 
4 November 1950. 
  472 
European Council Directives  
 
Directive 2009/142/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 
2009 relating to appliances burning gaseous fuels, OJ L 330 of 16.12.2009, overruling 
Council Directive 90/396/EEC of 29 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to appliances burning gaseous fuels (OJ L 196/15 of 1990-07-26) 
 
Directive 2009/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 relating to simple pressure vessels (codified version), OJ L 264 of 2009-10-08 
overruling Council Directive 87/404/EEC of 25 June 1987 on the harmonization of the 
laws of the Member States relating to simple pressure vessels, OJ No L 220/48 of 1987-
08-08) 
 
Directive 2006/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 on the harmonisation of the laws of Member States relating to Electrical Equipment 
designed for use within certain voltage limits, OJ L 374 of 2006-12-27, p. 10-19 
amending Council Directive 73/23/EEC of 19 February 1973 on the harmonization of the 
laws of Member States relating to electrical equipment designed for use within certain 
voltage limits, OJ L 77, 26.3.1973, p. 29–33 
 
Council Directive 76/769/EEC on Restrictions on marketing and use of certain dangerous 
substances and preparations and the Council Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste electrical 
and electronic equipment (WEEE) amended by the Council Directive 2003/108/EC. 
 
Council Directive 2001/95/EC of December 3, 2001 on General Product Safety O.J. (L 
11) (January 15, 2002). 
 
Technical Standard Directive, Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 June 1998. Official Journal L 204, 21/07/1998 P. 0037-0048. See 
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/s06011.htm for technical harmonization. 
 
Directive 98/8/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 1998 
concerning the placing of biocidal products on the market, OJ L 123, 24.4.1998, p. 1–63 
 
Council Directive 98/37/EC of June 22 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the 
member states relating to machinery 
 
Council Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
December 1997 on common rules for the development of the internal market of 
Community postal services and the improvement of quality of service, OJ L 15, 
21.1.1998, p. 14–25  
 
Council Directive 94/62/EC of 20 December 1994 on packaging and packaging waste, OJ 
L 365, 31.12.1994, p. 10), amended by Directive 2004/12/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 February 2004, OJ L 47, 18.2.2004 
 
  473 
Council Directive 93/42/EEC of 14 June 1993 concerning medical devices, OJ No L 
169/1 of 1993-07-12 
 
Council Directive 93/68/EEC of 22 July 1993 amending Directives 87/404/EEC (simple 
pressure vessels), 88/378/EEC (safety of toys), 89/106/EEC (construction products), 
89/336/EEC (electromagnetic compatibility), 89/392/EEC (machinery), 89/686/EEC 
(personal protective equipment), 90/384/EEC (non-automatic weighing instruments), 
90/385/EEC (active implantable medicinal devices), 90/396/EEC (appliances burning 
gaseous fuels), 91/263/EEC (telecommunications terminal equipment), 92/42/EEC (new 
hot-water boilers fired with liquid or gaseous fuels) and 73/23/EEC (electrical equipment 
designed for use within certain voltage limits), Official Journal L 220 , 30/08/1993 P. 
0001 - 0022 
 
Council Directive 92/59/EEC of June 29, 1992 on General Product Safety, O.J. L228 24 
(Aug. 11, 1992). 
 
Council Directive 90/385/EEC of 20 June 1990 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to active implantable medical devices, OJ No L 189/17 of 1990-
07-20 
 
Council Directive 89/686/EEC of 21 December 1989 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to personal protective equipment OJ No L 399, 30.12.1989, p. 
18–38 modified by Directive 93/68/EEC(CE Marking); Directive 93/95/EEC(OJ of 1993-
11-09 No L 276/11) and Directive 96/58/EC (OJ of 1996-09-18 No L 236/44 
 
Council Directive 89/392/EEC of 14 June 1989 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to machinery/, OJ L 183, 29.6.1989, p. 9–32  
 
Council Directive 89/106/EEC of 21 December 1988 on the approximation of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating to construction 
products, OJ No L 40/12 of 1989-02-11 
 
Council Directive 88/378/EECof 3 May 1988 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States concerning the safety of toys, OJ No L 187/1 of 1988-07-06  
 
Council Directive 87/358/EEC of 25 June 1987 amending Directive 70/156/EEC on the 
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the type-approval of motor 
vehicles and their trailers, OJ L 192, 11.7.1987, p. 51–54  
 
Council Directive 86/594/EEC of 1 December 1986 on airborne noise emitted by 
household appliances, O.J. L 344 , 06/12/1986 P. 0024 - 0027 
 
Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 On The Approximation of The Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Of The Member States Concerning Liability 
for Defective Products O. J. L 210, 07/08/1985 P. 0029 – 0033.  
 
  474 
Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 September 1984; Relating to the approximation of 
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning 
misleading advertising (Official Journal 1984, L 250, p 17).  
 
Council Directive 76/768/EEC of 27 July 1976 on the approximation of the laws of the 
Member States relating to cosmetic products, OJ L 262 of 27.9.1976 (Cosmetics 
Directive) 
 
Council Directives 75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of provisions laid 
down by law, regulation or administrative action relating to medicinal products O.J. (L 
147), 9.6.1975, p. 13; amended by Council Directives 83/570/CEE (OJ No L 332 of 28. 
11. 1983, p. 1), 89/341/CEE (OJ No L 142 of 25. 5. 1989, p. 11), 89/342/CEE (OJ No L 
142 of 25. 5. 1989, p. 14), 89/343/CEE (OJ No L 142 of 25. 5. 1989, p. 16), 89/381/CEE 
(OJ No L 181 of 28. 6. 1989, p. 44), 92/027/CEE (OJ No L 113 of 30. 4. 1992, p. 8) and 
93/39/CEE (OJ No L 214 of 24. 8. 1993, p. 22), Council Directive 2000/38/EC (OJ L 
139, 10.6.2000, p. 28) and 81/851/EEC OJ L 317, 6.11.1981, p. 1. Directive as last 
amended by Council Directive 2000/37/EC (OJ L 139, 10.6.2000, p. 25). 
 
 
European Council Decisions 
 
Council Decision 768/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 
2008 on a common framework for the marketing of products, OJ L 218, 13.8.2008, p. 
82–128, repealing Council Decision 93/465/EEC. This Council Decision is available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008D0768:EN:NOT 
 
Council Decision 3052/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 1995 establishing a procedure for the exchange of information on national 
measures derogating from the principle of the free movement of goods within the 
Community, OJ L 321 (1995).  
 
Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993 concerning the modules for the various 
phases of the conformity assessment procedures and the rules for the affixing and use of 
the CE conformity marking, which are intended to be used in the technical harmonization 
directives, Official Journal L 220 , 30/08/1993 P. 0023 - 0039 
 
Council Decision 93/580/EEC of 25 October 1993, O.J. L 278, 11.11.1993, p. 64–69. 
This Council Decision is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_
doc=Decision&an_doc=1993&nu_doc=580 
 
Council Decision on a Global Approach to Conformity Assessment 90/683/EEC, 1990 
O.J. (C 10), amended by the Council Decision 93/465/EEC of 22 July 1993  
 
  475 
Council Decision 84/133/EEC of 2 March 1984 introducing a Community system for the 
rapid exchange of information on dangers arising from the use of consumer products, OJ 
L 70, 13.3.1984, p. 16–17 subsequently replaced by the Decision 89/45/EEC: OJ L 17/51 
as amended by the Decision 90/352/EE, OJ L 173/49. 
 
 
European Council Regulations 
 
Council Regulation (EC) 765/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 
July 2008 setting out the requirements for accreditation and market surveillance relating 
to the marketing of products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 339/93, OJ L 218, 
13.8.2008, p. 30   
 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 834/2007 of 28 June 2007 on organic production and 
labeling of organic products, that repealed the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91. 
OJ L189, p1, 20.07.2007, The Regulation is available at http://eur 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:189:0001:0023:EN:PDF 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 510/2006 of 20 March 2006 on the protection of 
geographical indications and designations of origin for agricultural products and 
foodstuff. OJ L93 p. 12, 31.3.2006. The regulation is available at 
http://www.tpe.gov.tr/dosyalar/ABcografi/510_2006_Sayili_AB_Tuzugu.pdf 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and requirements of food law, 
establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures in matters 
of food safety, O.J. L 031 (2002).  
 
Council Regulation 2866/98/CEE of December 31, 1998 on the conversion rates between 
the euro and the currencies of the Member states adopting the euro, OJ L 359, 
31.12.1998, p.1 
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1103/97 of 17 June 1997 on certain provisions relating to 
the introduction of the euro, Official Journal L 162, 19/06/1997 P. 0001 – 0003  
 
 
SPAIN  
 
Royal Decree 1/2007 of November 16, approving the merged text of the General Law for 
the Defense of Consumers and users and other complementary laws (BOE num. 287, de 
30-11-2007, pp. 49181-49215).  
 
Real Decreto Legislativo 8/2004, de 29 de octubre, por el que se aprueba el texto 
refundido de la Ley sobre responsabilidad civil y seguro en la circulación de vehículos a 
  476 
motor (BOE núm. 267, de 5.11.2004) available at 
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2004/11/05/pdfs/A36662-36695.pdf  
 
Ley 23/2003, de 10 de Julio, de Garantías en la Venta de Bienes de Consumo (BOE  
núm. 165, de 11-07-2003, pp. 27160-27164). 
 
Ley 39/2002, de 28 de octubre, de transposición al ordenamiento jurídico español de 
diversas directivas comunitarias en materia de protección de los intereses de los 
consumidores y usuarios,  BOE núm. 259, de 28-10-2002, pp. 37922-37933 
(http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2002/10/29/pdfs/A37922-37933.pdf).  
 
Law 1/2000 of January 7 of Civil Procedure (BOE 7, of January 8, 2000 pp. 575-728. 
amendment of errors BOE num. 90, de 14-04-2000, p. 15278 and BOE num. 180 of July 
28, 2001, p. 27746) (http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2000/01/08/pdfs/A00575-00728.pdf). 
 
Law 46/1998 of December 17 of 1998 regarding the introduction of the Euro.  
 
Organic Law 10/1995, of November 23rd, approving the Spanish Penal Code, BOE num. 
281 of 24/11/1995, pages 33987-34058, BOE-A-1995-25444, available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-25444 
 
Organic Law 5/1995, of May 22 regulating juries in criminal cases, BOE num. 122 of 
23/5/1995, pages 15001- 15021, BOE-A-1995-12095, available at  
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1995-12095 
 
Law 22/1994 of July, 6 1994 de Responsabilidad Civil por los Daños Causados por 
Productos Defectuosos (BOE núm. 161, of 07-07-1994) 
(http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1994/07/07/pdfs/A21737-21739.pdf). 
 
Royal Law Decree RDL 1/1994 of June 20, approving the General Law on Social 
insurance (BOE 154, p. 20658 of June 29, 1994). The text of the Royal Decree is 
available at http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1994-
14960 
 
Law 26/1984, of July 19, of the General Defense of Consumers and Users (LGDCU) 
(BOE nums. 175 and 176, of July 24, 1984). 
 
Law 50/1980, of October 8, of Insurance Contracts (BOE-A-1980-22501, available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1980-22501) 
Law 48/1960 of July 21th of aerial navigation, BOE num. 176 of 23/7/1960, pages 
10291-10299, BOE-A-1960-10905, available at 
http://www.boe.es/aeboe/consultas/bases_datos/doc.php?id=BOE-A-1960-10905 
 
Spanish Civil Code of 1889, Royal Decree of July 24 of 1889, published in the Gaceta of 
Madrid the reformed edition of the Civil Code.  
 
  477 
Spanish commercial code of 1885.  
 
 
UNITED STATES 
 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998).   
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).  
 
 
REGULATION OF OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Law 698 of 17-8-1990 (Tuotevastuulaki) amended by the Law 8.1.1993/99; 
22.10.1993/879 and 27.11.1998/880. 
 
Loi du 21 Avril 1989 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux of April 
21, 1989 amended by the law 6.12.1989. 
 
Lov om Produktansvar, Act No. 104 of 23 December 1988 (Norsk Lovtidend 1988, Avd. 
I, p. 1025), as amended by Act No. 40 of 24 June 1994. 
 
German Pharmaceutical law, Arzneimittelgesetz, adopted on August 24, 1976. 
 
BGH Urt. V. 9, 5, 1995-V12R 158/94 Hamm.  
 
Lov om Produktansvar No. 371 of June 7, 1989. 
 
Wet Productktenaansprakelijkeid 1990 (Netherlands Product Liability Act), contained in 
Book 6, Title 3, Chapter 3 §§ 185-193 of the Netherlands Civil Code of 1991 of 
September 13, 1990 
 
Decreto-Lei No. 383/89 of November 6, 1989. 
 
Greek Law 2251/1994. 
 
Loi du 21 Avril 1989 relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits défectueux of April 
21, 1989.  
 
Decreto del Presidente della Republica No.244 of May 24, 1988.  
 
Italy, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica no. 244 of 24 May 1988, section 7   
 
Norvegian Lov om Produktansvar (Product Liability Act) no. 104, of 23 December 1988, 
sections 1, 2(2). Amended in November 1991 effective January 1 1993.  
  478 
United Kingdon, Consumer Protection Act 1987, in force on March 1 1988.  
 
Belgium, Loi relative à la responsabilé du fair des produits defectueuxm of 25 February 
1991, Section 6 
 
Austrian Product Liability Act (Produkthaftungsgesetz, ProdHG) 1988, Federal Act of 21 
January 1988. Section 6. Amended 11 February 1993. 
 
Lov om produktansvar of December 23, 1988 and Produkansvarlag (1992:18) of January 
23, 1992. 
 
Loi relative à la responsabilité du fait des produits defectueux, of February 25, 1991. 
 
 
 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION DOCUMENTS  
 
 
European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2004-2009 Reports.  
RAPEX reports are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/stats_reports_en.htm 
 
European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2009 Annual report on the 
operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/2009_rapex_report_en.pdf  
 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the 
implementation of the Directive 2001/95/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 3 December 2001 on general product safety, 12, COM (2008) 905 final.  
Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/prod_legis/docs/report_impl_gpsd_en.pdf 
 
European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2008 Annual report on the 
operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2009_en.pdf 
 
Memo/08/252 issued by the Directorate General on health and consumers on April 17, 
2008. Available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/252&format=HTM
L&aged=0&language=EN 
 
European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2007 Annual report on the 
operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/docs/rapex_annualreport2008_en.pdf  
 
  479 
The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Product Liability 2007, Chapter 3. 
Product Safety: The New EU Regime. This document is available at 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publications/pdf/1486.pdf 
 
European Commission (SANCO) report Establishing a Comparative Inventory of 
Approaches and Methods Used by Enforcement Authorities for the Assessment of the 
Safety of Consumer Products Covered by Directive 2001/95/EC on General Product 
Safety and Identification of Best Practices, Final Report (2006), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/serv_safe/reports/risk_assessement_methods_en
.pdf 
 
Report on the application of Council Directive on the approximation of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products (85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985, amended by Directive 1999/34/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 1999), COM(2006) 496 final, 
Brussels, 14.9.2006. This document can be found in  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0496:FIN:EN:PDF 
 
European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2006, Annual report on the 
operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/stats_reports_en.htm 
 
European Commission, Consumer protection in the Internal Market, Special 
Eurobarometer (2006). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/topics/eurobarometer_09-2006sum_en.pdf 
 
European Commission, Keeping European Consumers Safe, 2005 Annual report on the 
operation of the Rapid Alert System for non-food consumer products, RAPEX, available 
at  http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/reports/report_rapex_05_en.pdf 
 
European Commission, Guide to the implementation of Directives Based on the New 
Approach and the Global Approach (2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/files/blue-
guide/guidepublic_en.pdf 
 
European consumer Law Group, Legal bases for EC consumer policy ECLG/036/05 
(2005). This document can be found at 
http://212.3.246.142/Common/GetFile.asp?ID=16576&mfd=off&LogonName=GuestEN 
 
The Current State of Co-Regulation and Self-Regulation in the Single Market, EESC 
pamphlet series (2005). Available at 
www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/2018_cahier_en_smo_def.pdf 
 
European Commission Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on services in the internal market, COM(2004) 2 final/3, 2004/0001 (COD), 
5.3.2004 (SEC(2004) 21) 
  480 
Directorate for the Internal Market of the European Commission (Contract No. 
ETD/2002/85) (2004). Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/regulation/goods/docs/liability/2004-06-dev-risk-clause-
study_en.pdf 
 
Study on the economic impact of the development risk clause as in the Directive 
85/374/EEC on the liability for defective products, (Contract No. ETD/2002/85) (2004).  
 
Directorate General Health and Consumer Protection (DG SANCO), Guidance Document 
on the Relationship Between the General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) and Certain 
Sector Directives with Provisions on Product Safety (2003). Available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/guidance_gpsd_en.pdf 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 
Enhancing the Implementation of the New Approach Directives, 7.5.2003, COM(2003) 
240 final. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!DocNumber&lg=en&type_
doc=COMfinal&an_doc=2003&nu_doc=240 
 
Council Recommendation 2003/54/EC of 2 December 2002 on the prevention of 
smoking and on initiatives to improve tobacco control (O.J. L 22 of 25.01.2003). The 
Council Recommendation can be found at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2003:022:0031:0034:EN:PDF 
 
Commission’s Consumer Policy Programme for 2002-2006, COM 2002, 208. This 
document can be found at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/c_137/c_13720020608en00020023.pdf 
 
The Social Protection Committee Coreper/Council (Employment, Social Policy, Health 
and Consumer Affairs), Fight against poverty and social exclusion: common objectives 
for the second round of National Action Plans (2002). Available at 
ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/docs/counciltext_en.pdf.  
 
European Commission Guidelines for the management of the Community Rapid 
Information System (RAPEX) and for notifications presented in accordance with Article 
11 of Directive 2001/95/EC. This document is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_safe/prod_safe/gpsd/rapex_guid_en.pdf 
 
European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428, 
25.7.2001. 
 
Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for 
Defective Products, COM(2000) 893 final, Brussels, 31.1.2001, available at   
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0893:FIN:EN:PDF 
 
  481 
Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the Experience 
Acquired in the Application of the Directive 92/59/EEC on General Product Safety, 
COM (2000) 140 final. 
 
Report on the first years of application of the Decision was published by the Commission 
on 7 April 2000 - COM(2000) 194 final. Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995D3052:EN:NOT 
 
European Council, Fight against poverty and social exclusion - Definition of appropriate 
objectives (2000). The report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm.  
 
Commission Guide to the Implementation of Directives Based on the New Approach and 
the Global Approach (2000). Available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/legislation/guide/document/1999_128
2_ en.pdf 
 
Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle COM (2000) 1 
final, 1-2 (2000).  
 
Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on the role of standardisation in Europe, O. J., C 
141 of 19.05.2000. 
 
Commission of the European Communities, Green paper Liability for defective products 
presented by the Commission on July 28, 1999 COM (1999)396 final. Available at  
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com1999-396_en.pdf 
 
Council Resolution of 17 December 1998 on Operating Instructions for Technical 
Consumer Goods, 98C/411/01, OJ C411/1, 31.12.98.  
 
Council Resolution of 19 February 1997 on the results of the Temporary Committee of 
inquiry into BSE, O.J. C 85, (17.3.97). 
 
Communication from the Commission, Action plan on consumer access to justice and the 
settlement of consumer disputes in the internal market, COM (96) 13 final (1996). 
Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF  
 
Report on the application of council directive on the approximation of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the member states concerning liability for defective 
products, COM (95) 617 final, 13.12.1995 
 
European Commission, Employment in Europe, Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities and Webb, S. Social Security Policy in a 
changing Labor market, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 11, num. 3, 11-24 
(1995). 
 
  482 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
Development of Administrative Co-operation in the implementation and Enforcement of 
Community Legislation in the Internal Market, COM (94) 29 final, 16.2.1994; adopted by 
the Council Resolution of 16 of June 1994 on the Development of Administrative Co-
operation in the Implementation and Enforcement of Community Legislation in the 
Internal Market, OJ C179/1,1.7.1994 
 
Commission of the European Communities,  Green Paper on Access of Consumers to 
Justice and the Settlement of Consumer Disputes in the Single Market COM(93) 576, 
November 16, 1993, available at 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/l32023_en.htm 
 
Commission, Ninth Annual Report to the European Parliament on Commission 
Monitoring of the Application of Community Law - 1991, (1992) O.J. (C 250) 17. 
 
Commission Communication on the Development of European Standardization, 1991 
O.J. C20/1  
 
European Commission Explanatory Memorandum, (1991) E.C. Bull. Supp. L11 para.21. 
 
Commission Green Paper on the Development of European Standardization: Action for 
Faster Technological Integration in Europe, COM (90) 456 final, 8 October 1990. 
Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1996:0013:FIN:EN:PDF  
 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the liability of suppliers of services, COM (90) 482 
final, 20 December 1990. .  
 
Council Resolution on a Global Approach to Conformity Assessment 90/683/EEC, 1990 
O.J. C 10, Available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?val=163035:cs&lang=en&list=163035:cs,&pos=1&page=1&nbl
=1&pgs=10&hwords=&checktexte=checkbox&visu=#texte 
 
Proposal for a Council Decision regarding the modules for the various phases of the 
conformity assessment procedures which are intended to be used in the technical 
harmonization directives, O.J. C231/3, COM (89) 209 (1989) 
 
Council Resolution of November 9th 1989 on future priorities for relaunching consumer 
protection policy, 1989 OJ (C 294) 1  
 
European Commission: A Global Approach to Certification and Testing (OJ 1989 C 
267/3)  
 
Council of Europe, Social Affairs, Rationalization and simplification of social security 
systems, Strasbourg, (1987). 
 
  483 
Council Resolution on a New Approach to technical harmonization and standardization, 
of 7 May 1985 OJ C 136, 4.06.1985.  
 
Memorandum from the Commission: Consumer Redress COM(84) 692, 12.12.1984  
 
Communication from the Commission Concerning the Consequences of the Judgment 
Given by the Court of Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (Cassis de Dijon), 
Official Journal of the European Communities C 256/2 (March 10, 1980). 
 
Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Liability for Defective Products, 1979, O.J. (C 114) 15 (1979).  
 
Report on the proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the 
Council for a directive relating to the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective 
products, 1979-1980, EUR PARL. Doc. (DOC 71/79) 4 (1979)  
 
Amendment of the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the member States Concerning 
Liability for Defective Products, O.J. Eur. Comm. C 271, 3 (1979). 
 
Opinion of the European Parliament (COM 71) 1979. 
 
Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) Report on Proposal for a Council Directive 
on Liability for Defective Products, COM(76)372 final.  
 
Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Approximation of the Laws 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability 
for Defective Products, COM (76) 372 final, 23 July 1976, 19 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No C 
241) 9 (1976)  
 
Vademecum on European standardization 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standards_policy/vademecum/ 
 
 
OTHER SPANISH DOCUMENTS  
 
National Consumer institute is an authority created by the Spanish Government, in 
development of article 51 of the Constitution and consumer protection regulation. See 
http://www.consumo-inc.es/ 
 
Red de Alerta, Notificaciones de productos de consumo no alimenticios que pueden 
suponer un riesgo para la seguridad de los consumidores. Available at  
http://www.consumo-inc.es/Seguridad/informacion/pdf/resumen2007.pdf 
  484 
JURISPRUDENCE 
 
EUROPE  
 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 14 March 2006. 
Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, C-177/04, 2006 ECR I-
02461. 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 9 February 2006. 
Declan O'Byrne v Sanofi Pasteur MSD Ltd andSanofi Pasteur SA., C-127/04, 2006 ECR  
I-01313 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 10 January 2006, 
Skov Æg v. Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S and Bilka Lavprisvarehus A/S v Jette Mikkelsen 
and Michael Due Nielsen on a Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Vestre 
Landsret, C-402/03, 2003 ECR I-199  
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 5 July 2007. 
Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, C-327/05, 2005, 
ECR I-93, p. 007. 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 25 April 2002. 
Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic, C-154/00, 2002 ECJ 
CELEX LEXIS 2955; 2002 ECR I-3879.  
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 25 April 2002. 
Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, C-52/00, 2002 ECR I – 
03827 
 
Opinion that Mr. Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 18 September 2001; 
Commission of the European Communities v French Republic. Case C-52/00. 2001 ECJ 
CELEX LEXIS 6747; 2002 ECR I-3827 
 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 20 September 2001, Simone 
Leitner v TUI Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG. Case C-168/00. 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 
6656; 2002 ECR I-2631. 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 25 April 2002. 
María Victoria González Sánchez v Medicina Asturiana SA, C-183/00, 2002 ECR I – 
03901 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 10 May 2001; 
Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Hojesteret - Denmark. Case C-203/99. 2001 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 6690; 2001 ECR I-
3569.  
  485 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 14 December 2000 
in the case Henning Veedfald v Arhus Amtskommune. Reference for a preliminary 
ruling: Hojesteret - Denmark. Case C-203/99. 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7596; 2001 ECR 
I-3569.  
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 3 June 1999.  
Colim NV v Bigg's Continent Noord NV, Reference for a preliminary ruling: Rechtbank 
van koophandel Hasselt – Belgium, Case C-33/97, 1999 ECR I-3175 
 
Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cosmas on 19 February 1998 in the case Colim NV v 
Bigg's Continent Noord NV. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Rechtbank van 
Koophandel Hasselt - Belgium. Case C-33/97. 1998 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13375; 1999 
ECR I-3175.  
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 29 May 1997. 
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland; Case C-300/95, 1997 ECR I-02649 
 
Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 23 January 1997 in the case of 
the Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland; Case C-300/95; 1997 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 13458. 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 13 January 1993; Commission of the 
European Communities v French Republic, Case C-293/91, 1993 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 
7268 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 19 November 1991. Andrea 
Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, Joined cases C-6/90 and 
C-9/90, 1991 ECR I-05357 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 12 July 1990; Commission of the 
European Communities v French Republic, C-236/88, 1988 ECR I-03163 
 
Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 May 1990, Kongress Agentur Hagen GmbH 
v Zeehaghe BV, Case C-365/88, 1990 ECR I-01845 
 
Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 15 December 1988. Criminal 
proceedings against Esther Renee Bouchara, nee Wurmser, and Norlaine SA., Case 
25/88.  Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de grande instance de Bobigny - 
France, 1988 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 7211 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 10 April 1984; Sabine von Colson 
and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-14/83, 1984 ECR I-01891 
 
Opinion of Mr. Advocate General VerLoren van Themaaat delivered on 7 December 
1982 in Case European Commission v United Kingdom, C 124/81, 1983 ECR 203-253. 
  486 
Judgment of the Court of 17 December 1981, Criminal proceedings against Frans-
Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten BV, C-272/80, 1981 ECR I-
03277 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979. Rewe-Zentral 
AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein. - Reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Hessisches Finanzgericht - Germany. - Measures heaving an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions, C-120/78 (known as Cassis de Dijon), 1979 ECR 649 
 
European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court of 5 February 1963. NV Algemene 
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration, C 26/62, 1970 ECR 1 
 
 
 
SPAIN  
 
Supreme Court  
 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Law Section), num 556/2002, of June 10, 
2002, (Hon. Román García Varela)(RJ 2002\6198) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Law Section), num. 770/1999, of 
September 30, 1999, (Hon. Antonio Gullón Ballesteros) (RJ 1999\7848) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Law Section), num. 409/1999, of May 18, 
1999 (Hon. Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta) (RJ 1999\4112) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Law Section), num. 1081/1997, of 
December 3, 1997, (Hon. Ignacio Sierra Gil de la Cuesta) (RJ 1997\8722) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Law Section), num. 540/1996, of June 25, 
1996 (Hon. Alfonso Barcalá y Trillo-Figueroa) (RJ 1996\4853) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Civil Law Section), Auto of April 15, 1997 (RJ 
1997\5280) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Labor Law section), num. 1663/2002, of 
February 7th, 2003 (Hon. José María Botana López)(RJ 2004\1828). 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Labor Law Section), num. 124/1997, of 
February 2nd, 1998 (Hon. Pablo Manuel Cachón Villar) (RJ 1998/3250) 
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative law section), num 2694/1995, 
of April 17, 1998 (Hon. José Manuel Sieira Míguez) (RJ 1998\3832). 
  487 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Administrative law section), num. 1770/1994, 
of March 27, 1998 (Hon. Francisco José Hernando Santiago) (RJ 1998/2942)  
 
Judgment of the Spanish Supreme Court (Criminal Law Section), of April 23, 1992, 
(Decision by Hon. Enrique Bacigalupo Zapater) (RJ 1992/6783) 
 
 
Court of Appeals 
 
Court of Appeals of Alicante: Tomás v. Pirofantasía Multimedia S.L. (producer), Centro 
Asegurador Baeza (the manufacturer’s insurer), Casimiro, owner of Comercial Alegre 
Carnaval (retailer), 10.1.03 (JUR 2003\114114; MP: José María Rives Seva).  
 
Court of Appeals of Asturias: Jesús v. Garlovi S.A. and Citroën Hispania S.A., 23.2.00 
(JUR 2000\124793; Hon: José Manual Barral Díaz)  
 
Court of Appeals of Badajoz: Transportes Miguel Aranda, S.L. v. Automoción Ramos, 
S.A. and Firestone, 13.7.2002 (AC 2003\303; MP: Francisco Rubio Sánchez)  
 
Court of appeals of the Balearic Islands: Winterthur Seguros, S.A. v. Gesa Endesa 
(electricity supplier), 17.7.07 (JUR 2007\317144; Hon: María Rosa Rigo Rosselló)  
 
Court of Appeals of the Balearic Islands: Ocaso S.A. de Seguros and Reaseguros v. 
Endesa Distribución Eléctrica, S.L. (supplier), 20.4.07 (JUR 2007\281413; Hon: 
Covadonga Sola Ruiz).  
 
Court of Appeals of the Balearic Islands: Mercedes v. Instaladores C.C.C., S.L. 
(supplier), 28.12.04 (JUR 2005\38399; Hon: Santiago Oliver Barceló)  
 
Court of Appeals of the Balearic Islands: Antonio and Antonia v. Manufacturas A., S.A. 
(manufacturer) and Seguros M., SA. (manufacturer’s insurer), 28.3.00 (EDJ 2000/18237, 
Hon. Miguel Ángel Aguiló Monjo)  
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Semilleros Monteplant S.L. c. Futureco S.L. 
(manufacturer and supplier), Court of Appeals of Barcelona 13.6.05 (JUR 2005\181270; 
MP: Marta Font Marquina)  
 
Court of appeals of Barcelona: Espasir Viaje, S.L. v Endesa Distribución Eléctrica 
(supplier), 25.1.2005 (JUR 2005\146169; Hon: Mª Jesús Jurado Cabrera). 
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Blanca v. Collagen Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. 
(importer), 4.3.05 (JUR 2005\116914; Hon: Joaquín de Oro-Pulido López). 
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Jesús Carlos y Andrés v. Citroën Hispania, S.A, 21.4.05 
(JUR 2005\122401; Hon: Josep Llobet Aguado).  
 
  488 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Segurcaixa, S.A. de Seguros y Reaseguros v. SMEG 
España, S.A. (supplier), 29.11.04 (AC 2004\2017; Hon: Laura Pérez de Lazarraga 
Villanueva).   
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: María Virtudes c. Rhone Poulenc Rorer, S.A., Court of 
Appeals of Barcelona 17.11.03 (JUR 2004\5123; Hon: Laura Pérez de Lazarraga 
Villanueva)  
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Francisco V.H. v. Suarep and Lladó, S.A. (retailer) and 
Chemvic, S.L. (supplier), 30.5.02 (AC 2002\1211; Hon: Inmaculada Zapata Camacho) 
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Rosa S.M. v. Distribuidora Internacional de 
Alimentación, S.A. (DIA), 17.12.01 (JUR 2002\84388; MP: Amelia Mateo Marco)  
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Francisco Javier F.S. v. Dokasde, S.A., Compañía 
Vinícola del Norte de España, S.A., N.D de Comunicaciones, S.L. y Orbis Fabri, S.A.), 
30.6.00 (JUR 2000\305476; MP: Pablo Díez Noval)  
 
Court of Appeals of Barcelona: Ramón and Seguros A, S.A. v. C (supplier), 10.5.00 (EDJ 
2000\48626; MP: Dolors Montolió Serra). 
 
Court of Appeals of Burgos: Jesús María M. C. v. Conal Hispania, S.A. and Celaya 
Parreño, S.L., 16.12.03 (JUR 2003\43604; Hon: Ildefonso Barcalá Fernández de 
Palencia)  
 
Court of Appeals of Burgos: Maxi and Isabel, S.L. and Mutua General de Seguros v. 
EDESA, Sociedad Cooperativa (manufacturer), 13.2.03 (JUR 2003\122404; Hon: 
Ildefonso Barcalá Fernández de Palencia),  
 
Court of Appeals of Cáceres: José Ángel T.R. c. José Marcos M.C. (retailer), Almacenes 
Sarti, S.L. (supplier) y Alicantina de Juguetes, S.L. (manufacturer), 18.4.02 (AC 
2002\1330; Hon Juan Francisco Bote Saavedra). 
 
Court of Appeals of Castellón: Daniel c. Dual Gres, S.A. (manufacturer), 28.2.06 (JUR 
2006\185376; Hon Esteban Solaz Solaz).  
 
Court of Appeals of Granada: Pescados Montabán, S.L. c. Autodistribución Iliberis, S.A., 
SAFE de Neumáticos Michelín e Iveco-Pegaso, S.A., 2.11.2000 (AC 2000\266; MP: 
Antonio Gallo Erena)  
 
Court of Appeals of Jaen: Gabino and Marcelina v. Cerámica Malpesa, S.A. 
(manufacturer), 5.11.03 (JUR 2003\71326; Hon: Jesús María Passolas Morales)  
 
Court of Appeals of La Coruña: Amanda v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen 
Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), 31.3.04 (JUR 2006\93996; Hon: Mª del 
Carmen Vilariño López)  
  489 
Court of Appeals of La Coruña: Jesús Manuel v. Autos Lobelle, S.L. and Nissan Motor 
España, S.A., 25.4.06 (JUR 2006\152372; Hon.: José Ramón Sánchez Herrero).  
 
Court of Appeals of La Coruña: María Luisa L.V. v. Repostería Martínez, SA y Allianz 
Compañía de Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A., 21.6.02 (AC 2002\1348; MP: Rafael Jesús 
Porto García) 
 
Court of Appeals of Las Palmas: Hércules Hispano, S.A. v. Comercial Naranjo (seller), 
22.3.01 (JUR 2001\170616; Hon: Juan José Cobo Palma).  
 
Court of Appeals of Madrid: Iñigo v. BMW Ibérica, S.A., 23.1.06 (JUR 2006\120705; 
MP: Ana María Olalla Camarero)  
 
Court of Appeals of Madrid: Juan Ramón c. Goodyear Dunlop Tires España, S.A., 
20.6.05 (JUR 2005\173118; MP: Juan Luis Gordillo Álvarez Valdés).  
 
Court of Appeals of Madrid: Jesús Luis v. Peugeot España, S.A., 21.3.05 (JUR 
2005\107495; Hon: Ramón Ruiz Jiménez) 
 
Court of Appeals of Málaga: Javier c. Gregorio y Flamagas, S.A. Lesiones, 7.10.03 (JUR 
2004\12120; MP: Inmaculada Suárez Bárcena Florencio);  
 
Court of Appeals of Murcia: Nicasio Celdrán Atienza, S.A. v. Iberdrola Distribución 
Eléctrica, S.A. (supplier), 1.2.06 (JUR 2006\68585; Hon: Fernando López del Amo 
González)  
 
Court of Appeals of Pontevedra: Marta v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen 
Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), 14.10.05 (JUR 2006\101870; Hon: Jaime 
Carrera Ibarzábal)  
 
Court of Appeals of Pontevedra: Soledad v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) and Collagen 
Biomedical Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), 26.1.04 (JUR 2006\18374; Hon: Margarita 
Fuenteseca Degenefee)  
 
Court of Appeals of Salamanca: Comunidad de Propietarios v. Tecal Miguel Prieto, S.L. 
y Cahispa, S.A. de Seguros Generales, 12.2.2004 (AC 2004\426; MP: Ildefonso García 
del Pozo)  
 
Court of Appeals of Sevilla: Isabel v. Lidl Supermercados, S.A., 13.11.06 (AC 2007\978; 
MP: Conrado Gallardo Correa)  
 
Court of Appeals of Sevilla: Paula v. Europ S.L. (seller) and Compañía de Seguros 
MAPFRE, 25.2.05 (AC 2005\943; Hon: Rafael Márquez Romero).  
 
  490 
Court of Appeals of Tenerife: Paulino c. Sika, S.A. (manufacturer) and Adicons Canarias, 
S.L.U (supplier), 19.1.07 (JUR 2007\158172; MP: Concepción Macarena González 
Delgado)  
 
Court of Appeals of Tenerife: Julián v. Autoservicios Miguel, 9.12.05 (JUR 2006\69428; 
Hon: Modesto Blanco Fernández del Viso)  
 
Court of Appeals of Tenerife: Jean L.B. v. Goyo e Hijos C.B. (retailer), 23.9.01 (JUR 
2001\18469; Hon: Pilar Aragón Ramírez).  
 
Court of Appeals of Valencia: Luis Alberto v. Construcciones Arssis, S.L. (supplier), 
Simex (manufacturer), 20.7.06 (JUR 2007\5615; Hon: Manuel José López Orellana),  
 
Court of Appeals of Valencia: Reamar, S.L. vc. Suministros de Pintura Juan Carlos 
Jiménez, S.L. (supplier) and Alp Reveton, S.L., 25.4.06 (JUR 2006\207061; Hon: 
Enrique Emilio Vives Reus)  
 
Court of Appeals of Valencia: Luis A. B. v. Centro Asegurador, Cía. Seguros and 
Reaseguros S.A., Pirofantasia and Multimedia, S.L., Ms. Mª José H. M. and Ms. 
Inmaculada R. S; 12.7.2001 (JUR 2001\279709; MP: Enrique Emilio Vives Reus) 
 
Court of Appeals of Valencia: Rafael v. Comisión Fallera San Vicente-Marvá, Centro 
Asegurador, Cía. de Seguros and Reaseguros, S.A. and Pirotecnia Zaragozana, S.A, 
13.4.00 (AC 2000\3794; MP: Vicente Ortega Llorca) 
 
Court of Appeals of Vizcaya; Esther v. AEI Inc. (manufacturer) y Collagen Biomedical 
Aesthetic Iberica, S.A. (importer), 20.4.05 (JUR 2005\200889; Hon: María Carmen 
Keller Echevarría) 
 
Court of Appeals of Zaragoza: Lockatrucs v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires, S.A. 
(manufacturer), Nirvauto, S.A. and Direcauto, S.L, (importer). 10.2.04 (JUR 2004\92259; 
Hon: Antonio Luis Pastor Oliver)  
 
 
 
 
Trial Courts 
 
Agreal v. Sanofi Aventis, S.A., Trial Court number 12 of Barcelona 7.9.06 (EDJ 
2006\283594; Hon: Marta del Valle García). 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES  
 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)  
  491 
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986)  
 
William Bell et al. v. Industrial Vangas, Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266 (1981)  
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 90 S.t. 1893 (1970)  
 
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  
 
 
 
OTHER SOURCES 
 
 
Collateral Source Rule Reform, American Tort Reform Association, available at 
http://www.atra.org/show/7344 (last visited April, 10 2011)  
 
El País 01/05/2008, Arcadio Silvosa, Sanidade paraliza 3.000 kilos de aceite de Ucrania, 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/Galicia/Sanidade/paraliza/3000/kilos/aceite/Ucrania/elpep
iautgal/20080501elpgal_6/Tes 
 
El Pais 22/05/2008, Ricardo M de Rituerto, Bruselas prohíbe las importaciones de aceite 
de girasol de Ucrania. Kiev es incapaz de garantizar una exportación libre de 
contaminantes, Brussels 
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/sociedad/Bruselas/prohibe/importaciones/aceite/girasol/U
crania/elpepisoc/20080522elpepisoc_6/Tes.  
 
International Herald Tribune, April 26, 2008, Spain issues health warning about tainted 
sunflower oil, The Associated Press, 
http://iht.nytimes.com/articles/ap/2008/04/26/europe/EU-GEN-Spain-Tainted-Sunflower-
Oil.php?scp=1&sq=sunflower%20oil%20spain&st=cse  
 
Background Report: OECD Workshop on Consumer Dispute Resolution and Redress in 
the Global Marketplace, 31 Washington, DC (2005). 
 
2000 Current Award Trends in Personal Injury, LRP Publications, Jury Verdict 
Research(R) Series 52 (2000).  
 
Lessons from USA, Australia and the UK, (European Justice Forum, 2006). Conclusions 
may be found in www.europeanjusticeforum.org 
 
Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) on 
the Potential health risks of exposure to noise from personal music players and mobile 
phones including a music playing function. This 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_risk/committees/04_scenihr/docs/scenihr_o_018.pdf 
 
“Social Security in Europe: the impact of an aging population: and information paper 
prepared for use by the Special Committee on aging, United States Senate.” (1981) 
